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Dedicated to the eternal memory of Thomas Aikenhead, Divinity Student at the University of 
Edinburgh who, for blasphemy and the denial and impugnation of the existence and power of God, was 




“Nevertheless it is of verity, that you Thomas Aikenhead, shakeing off all fear of God and regaird to 
his majesties lawes, have now for more than a twelvemoneth by past, and upon severall of the dayes 
within the said space, and ane or other of the same, made it as it were your endeavour and work in 
severall compainies to vent your wicked blasphemies against God and our Saviour Jesus Christ, and 
against the holy Scriptures, and all revealled religione, in soe far as upon ane or other of the dayes 
forsaid, you said and affirmed, that divinity or the doctrine of theologie was a rapsidie of faigned and 
ill-invented nonsense, patched up partly of the morall doctrine of philosophers, and pairtly of poeticall 
fictions and extravagant chimeras, or words to this effect or purpose, with severall other such 
reproachfull expressions.” 
 
Excerpt from the Transcript Condemning Aikenhead to Death,  






This Thesis is an experiment.  Within its pages a number of stories will be told, the foci of which will 
apply a particular methodology—what I call ‘Ethnographic Criticism’—to the examination of a 
specific concept: modern Atheist identity.  First, it will introduce Ethnographic Criticism as a new and 
significant style of literary analysis aimed at reading fictional texts in order to generate anthropological 
insights about how particular identities are formed.  Second, it will use this new means of criticism to 
discuss and evaluate how Atheist identity might be perceived as being constructed within a dialectic 
between seemingly exclusive forms of Theism and Atheism.  
 
Ethnographic Criticism exists at the nexus between fiction and ethnography, and its genesis derives 
from three foundational pillars: ethnographic construction, Ethical Criticism, and discourse analysis.  
In the three Chapters of Part One, each of these pillars will be established, both exegetically and 
critically.  This examination will play a key role in explicating how the ‘made-up’ qualities of fiction 
might be converted into the ‘made-from’ qualities of ethnography.  Additionally, these Chapters will 
reveal the roots of Ethnographic Criticism through an analysis of discourses dealing with the ‘literary 
turn’ in the theory of anthropology, how Ethical Criticism associates fictional character development 
with identity construction, and the anthropological benefits of discourse analysis.         
 
As a case study, I will apply Ethnographic Criticism to an analysis of Atheist identity construction.  
Due to the combination of a relative absence of existing ethnographic sources on the subject, an 
ambiguous academic discourse on the definition of the term, and a paucity of cultural units or ‘tribes’ 
of Atheists in which to observe, my use of Ethnographic Criticism will attempt to fill a methodological 
lacuna concerning the study of Atheist identity.  Thus, in Part Two, I will focus on two fictional texts 
by the contemporary English novelist Ian McEwan: Black Dogs (1992) and Enduring Love (1997).  In 
this analysis, not only will McEwan’s fictional characters be treated as if they are ‘real,’ historical 
individuals, they will be evaluated through an anthropological lens in order to isolate within their 
interactional validations a means to understand how Atheists define themselves via dialectical 
communication.  In this way, and in both explicating and reflecting upon this approach, my 
experimental analysis will identify a number of dynamic, yet no less precarious, outcomes that might 
surface from reading fictional texts as if they were authoritatively equal to ethnographic ones.   
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   1 
INTRODUCTION—ETHNOGRAPHIC CRITICISM 
 
“A model of the phenomenologist’s work is, perhaps, reading and 
assimilating a novel.  Within the pages of the novel and in their 
own way, the brothers Karamazov exist, though in another way it 
does not matter whether they did or did not exist; typically it is not 
a question which needs asking.  Prescinding, however, from the 
‘real’ world, in a novel one is immersed in a particular ambience, 
and moves with the characters, play-acting their feelings, 
understanding their beliefs, beginning to live in their social world.  
It is not necessary to agree with Ivan Karamazov in ‘real life’: one 
still can see the world from his point-of-view, and likewise with 
Alyosha.  They are two brothers with very different outlooks.  One 
may not in real life actually sympathize with a given character, but 
within the world of the novel one can have a vivid empathy.”  
 
—Ninian Smart, The Phenomenon of Religion, 19731 
 
 
1. Hypothesis  
This Thesis will address the question: what is Ethnographic Criticism?  Moreover, this Thesis is an 
experiment, so that in answering this question, and by plotting out the method, theory, and data 
necessary to introduce—as well as use—Ethnographic Criticism, it will equally become a critical 
analysis of the elements that make up its description.  For this reason, and though it represents a unique 
approach to the subject of observing, classifying, testing, and defining certain conceptual terms, it does 
not originate ex nihilo.  In fact, and for clarity’s sake, we might concede that this approach stems from 
a specific hypothesis: 
In consideration of more experimental conceptions about the ‘literary aspects’ of 
ethnography, and in light of a lack of traditional sources pertaining to a particular subject (in 
this case, Atheist identity), can we read fictional accounts for insight into cultural identity 
constructions; and if so, what does that say about how texts—cultural representations in 
textual form—might be considered ‘authentic’ or ‘authoritative?’   
 
Put differently, in outlining the methodological and theoretical process one might adopt in using an 
‘invented’ or ‘fictional’ account in order to establish an ‘ethnographic understanding’ about how a 
particular cultural identity is formed, this thesis will present a two part discussion: a critical 
examination about how doing that might benefit the larger study of religious identity construction, as 
well as a critical consideration about how this might precariously blur the line between that which is 
‘fictional’ or ‘non-fictional.’  Additionally, because Ethnographic Criticism is dependent upon three 
subject-specific foundations (ethnography, literary criticism, discourse analysis), the introduction of it 
herein will act as both a contribution to those fields, as well as offer unique perspectives on each.  In 
this way, this Thesis will collectively present an experimental and inter-disciplinary examination of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Ninian Smart, The Phenomenon of Religion (London: Macmillan, 1973), 72. 
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limits and complications pertaining to the ways in which we approach—as well as alter—data, identity, 
and definitions in the process of stipulating what might be deemed textually authentic, authoritative, 
and true.  Lastly, as an introduction to Ethnographic Criticism, it is also an invitation, an appeal to 
others in the hope that they might adopt and test it in reference to their own conceptual interests.       
 
2. Self-Reflective Inspiration  
The locus of inspiration for writing this thesis can be divided into two parts.  On one end, I have found 
myself a member of a small group of individuals attempting to inaugurate—or perhaps better stated, 
control—the ever-broadening field of ‘Atheist studies.’  Given the newness of this field of analysis, the 
implicit controversial tone of its subject material, and the way ‘Atheism’2 has been defined by 
individuals hoping to produce ‘the’ definition, our group seems to be more adrift than anchored.  Like a 
Flying Dutchman of academic scholars, we seem cast about in a sea of differing opinions and 
approaches, drifting haphazardly without a specific disciplinary port-of-call.  We have neither a 
prevailing base, nor an orthodox or standardized method of approach; which makes our discourse one 
of a multi-disciplinary polyvocality.  Granted, while there do exist a few ‘research organizations’ 
within which we might find an academic group identity, such as the Nonreligion and Secularity 
Research Network,3 I have found myself generally dissatisfied with their approaches, particularly with 
their apprehension in focusing solely on ‘Atheism,’ and by their use and promotion of relatable, yet 
likewise general, terminology, such as ‘ir-religion,’ ‘un-belief,’ or ‘non-religion.’  To me, the latter is 
like drinking salt water: while it might briefly abate the thirst, it will merely cause worse issues later.  
For these reasons, my choice for focusing on ‘Atheism’ is two-fold: my interests in understanding how 
Atheists define themselves beyond these kinds of external distinctions, and an attempt at moving away 
from this stipulative—and thus terminologically imprecise—style of approach.  However, in my initial 
research, these interests revealed their own issues.   
 
When I first began exploring this subject, I undertook the sort of initial inquiry likely familiar with 
anyone interested in a particular concept: I looked up the definition.  This, of course, involved more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The capitalization of the ‘A’ here, as well as throughout the Thesis as a whole, is a choice 
made by the author to denote ‘Atheism’ as an identity, in the same way we might capitalize the ‘C’ in 
‘Christian,’ or ‘B’ in ‘British.’ 
3 The NSRN, founded in 2011 as a research organization focused on establishing this exact 
sort of group identity, is perhaps the most ideal example.  See their ‘about page’ here: 
http://nsrn.net/about/ (accessed 3 January 2015). 
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than a mere rudimentary study of the ‘dictionary’ definitions of the term.  Rather, I began with some of 
the more known publications, isolated the definition in each, and sourced from where the authors might 
have developed their stipulations.  I continued this process for some time, recording notable influences 
and references, until after amassing roughly seventy or so definitions, I started to notice a unique 
progression.  To make sense of this, I categorized this discourse according to theoretical similarity, and 
the result is the discursive field that I will discuss in detail in the third Chapter.   
 
Beyond realizing that these definitions revealed a term ‘less simple to understand’ or ‘easy to define,’ 
as many of these publications seemed to argue, I also came to realize that this ambiguous discourse 
made my ability to theoretically stipulate a definition of my own overtly problematic.  To remedy this, 
I turned my attention toward a more material approach.  That is, because I wanted to consider how an 
individual might go about defining him or herself as an Atheist, within a specific context, rather than 
simply describe what I thought Atheism might mean in a general sense, a material approach seemed 
more accessible than a theoretical one.  However, this raised a number of its own issues.  In order to try 
and make sense of how I might create an ‘anthropology of Atheism,’ I first needed to determine how 
that might be accomplished.  Out of this investigation I came to two very important conclusions.  First, 
because the field of ‘Atheist studies’ is somewhat new, and because the concept itself is still fairly 
contentious—even in ‘secular’ Britain—the ‘organizations’ or ‘cultural units’ we might substitute as 
‘tribes’ are equally difficult to define.  That is, while the majority of the ‘in-process’ sources we might 
look at as examples—which all seem to have begun their research at the same time that I started 
working on this Thesis—focus their attention on ‘Humanist Societies’ or ‘Secular Groups,’ I found 
myself again dissatisfied with their approaches.  While the data they have provided is extremely useful 
and important, I felt it to be a bit too equivocal.  This is due, in large part, to my second conclusion: it 
occurred to me that the dubious nature of their results was inextricably linked to the issues I discovered 
in my research on the definition of the term.  In each of the anthropological examples that I found, their 
results seemed quite heavily impeded by an indecisive collectivity of terms.  While ‘Atheists’ and 
‘Atheism’ pop up from time to time, they are intermixed with broader notions of ‘humanist,’ 
‘agnostic,’ ‘secular,’ ‘non-religious,’ ir-religious,’ ‘non-believer,’ ‘indifferent,’ ‘apatheist,’ and so on.  
While I will discuss these issues in more detail at the start of the second Chapter, I will conclude here 
with the admission that my disappointment with both the theoretical and anthropological approaches to 
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the study of Atheist identity construction led me down a more creative or experimental path toward 
using fiction ‘as ethnography.’  Which, in all honesty, is perhaps the direction I wanted to take all 
along, and which likewise brings me to my second inspiration.  I have always been fascinated with the 
novel, especially with how the novelist creates a reflective world, as if allegorically holding a mirror up 
to his or her own surroundings.  Additionally, I have always enjoyed the way reading a novel is like 
playing a detective, seeking out how the novelist is secretly telling a story within the story itself.  I can 
link this back to my earliest textual analyses in High School, and how we were required to translate the 
sub-textual meaning of narrative images like Fitzgerald’s use of the ‘green light,’ what Orwell meant 
by calling his conniving pig ‘Napoleon,’ or why Hemingway had the ‘Old Man’ lose the fish to the 
sharks.   
 
Through this style of sub-textual translation, the novel seems written in a language that offers more 
than just an opportunity to empathetically see or feel as if we exist in another’s world.  I believe it also 
speaks to a particular culture, time, and place.  Just as much as The Great Gatsby is about vengeance 
and greed and the debaucheries of the American 1920s, it is also about the people, their identities, in 
what ways they construct those identities, and the identities of others, through their specially crafted 
interactions.  They are like well-formed and organized representations, so that novels like this might 
also be seen as telling two stories: a plot and sub-plot.  With the former, these are texts that entertain 
us.  They provide aesthetic amusement, and an escape into another world.  These are stories embedded 
with characters and dialogue, and because they are designed and dictated by plot, they also lead us 
toward a particular conclusion.  With the latter, the sub-plot hidden beneath the aesthetic fiction tells an 
altogether different kind of story.  Here is where we find layers of cultural insight, where the ‘made-up’ 
aspect of the fiction reveals the culturally inspired ‘made-from’ quality of the character-dialogue-plot 
description above.  It is through analyzing the sub-plot where we learn about the influences that shaped 
the story, about the author’s intentions, about how the plot itself might tell us something about the 
culture it presents, and about the context within which it was constructed.  Moreover, perhaps this two-
level understanding explains why we so often find ourselves using fictions to teach about historical 
concepts, or to elucidate academic discussions about religious and/or ethical debates.  
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Yet, even with these romantic notions about the ‘scope’ of the novel, or about how fiction ‘works,’ I 
have often found myself cautiously considering a number of critical questions, the theme of which is 
always directed at the differentiation between the ‘fictional’ and the ‘non-fictional.’  For example:  
Given that fiction is a particular type of writing, and that ‘writing-in-general’ is defined by a 
process of constructing or manufacturing something either ‘real’ or ‘fake’ from an author’s 
perspective, what might limit a fiction from being read as a non-fiction, aside from the 
distinction on the cover?  As well, what happens when we begin to believe that a novel might 
be able to speak on behalf of some cultural snapshot in time, such as my example of The 
Great Gatsby above?  Does this initiate a sense of confusion about the writing process 
between fiction and non-fiction, and thus blur these into some strange form of both?  What 
about the textual importance of theme, like when a ‘fictional’ text takes up a thematic style 
that ‘mimics’ the non-fictional, such as the genre of ‘historical fiction’ wherein the characters, 
settings, and plots are based on real people, in a real place and time?  How might these 
questions collectively alter how we consciously acknowledge the ‘made-up’ quality from the 
‘made-from’ method of scientific textual construction?   
 
As an exemplary source with which to contextualize these questions, what immediately comes to mind 
are the award-wining first two parts of Hilary Mantel’s trilogy about the rise and fall of Thomas 
Cromwell: Wolf Hall (2009) and Bring up the Bodies (2012).4  These are fictions.  The people in them 
are not real.  They are fictional characters placed into a world created by the author for a pragmatic 
purpose.  They speak what the author wants them to say, and they act according to a chronology that is 
‘plotted’ by the author’s intentions.  They exist within a fictional milieu, so that when we read their 
dialogues and conflicts we begin to vividly empathize with them.  We move along with their stories, 
we embody and embrace their feelings and emotions, and we begin to imaginatively live in their social 
world because we consciously accept that it is ‘made-up.’  It is a fantasy, and thus a product of a shared 
imagination between author and reader.  Yet, with Mantel’s texts these characters are both real and 
fake.  They existed once as historical fact, just as much as they exist now as fictionalized creations.  
More importantly, they are historical figures who played an integral political role in shaping the Britain 
we know today.  Their ‘realness’ can be measured by the actions they took when alive, by the decisions 
they made, and how the repercussions of those decisions live on in British History.  Yet, we still might 
ask: are these novels ‘real?’  Or rather: are they fiction, fact, or something else?  Do they somehow 
stand with a foot on each shore, a bridge of sorts between what is factual and what is fabricated?     
 
Reading these sorts of fictions requires a different type of detective work than that used while reading a 
novel like Animal Farm.  We know that farm animals do not hold meetings, form governments, 
supplant humans, and then descend into destructive political systems evocative of Communism and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Both won the Man Booker Prize for their respected years of publication. 
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Fascism.  These are metaphors, and this is fantasy.  Yet, so are the stories told about Henry VIII, and 
Anne Boleyn, and Thomas Cromwell.  Their ‘truths’ are just as metaphorical as the fantasy in Orwell’s 
fairytale because as fictionalized versions of themselves they become representatives, in many ways 
indicative of how utterly invented individuals like Nick Carroway, Daisy Buchanan, or Jay Gatsby 
might become representations of the Jazz Age.  In the same way that a novel tells two stories, they take 
on a double-life: on one end they are evocative of their actual lives, and on the other they embody a 
metaphorical meaning based upon the author’s intentions in creating them.  Whether or not they really 
existed at some point in time, when novelized, they become something made-up, regardless of whether 
or not their traits and customs and habits are made from actual history.   
 
So where do we draw the line?  Where do we acknowledge a ‘novelization’ from an historical text, 
such as those by Alison Weir, whose histories of Henry VIII have made her the ‘highest-selling’ 
female historian in Britain?5  Between Mantel and Weir, whose texts do we declare as more 
‘authoritative’ or ‘authentic?’  Answering from within the Academy, we might immediately declare on 
the side of Weir’s non-fiction, such as The Six Wives of Henry VIII (1991).  After all, and by its very 
dialectical distinction as a ‘non-fiction,’ it denotes a sense of truth.  A non-fiction is neither made-up 
nor imagined.  It is writing that conveys fact.  Of course, this becomes all the more difficult when we 
learn that Weir has no formal training in writing history,6 and has equally produced a number of 
historical fictions to coincide with her historical texts.  Does this knowledge diminish her authority?  
Has she somehow herself crossed a line into the realm of ‘partial truths’ or ‘true fictions?’   
 
It seems that with the more we examine these sorts of texts, which in turn causes us to question the 
lines we have drawn in order to distinguish between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction,’ the more these sorts of 
signifiers begin to blur.  As we move along the axis of what constitutes the ‘real’ from the ‘fake,’ and 
the ‘true’ from the ‘false,’ we begin to veer precariously toward a sort of consensus, a middle ground 
where these distinctions no longer appear stable, and accuracy begins to transmute into a concept that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Emma Buckley, “The 14/4 Interview with Alison Weir,” Glow Magazine, 2012, accessed 
via: http://www.glowmagazine.me/the-144-interview-with-alison-weir/ (28 August 2014). 
6 She cites a feeling of disillusionment with ‘trendy teaching methods’ as the reason for her 
not pursuing a career in academia.  See her ‘biography’ at: http://alisonweir.org.uk/biography/ 
(accessed 29 August 2014). 
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no longer means what it used to.  In other words, we begin to believe that everything is fiction.  This is, 
perhaps, the quintessential impetus of my choosing to discuss these issues herein.     
 
This Thesis, then, is my attempt at combining the two inspirations described above into a useful, as 
well as contributive, approach to studying cultural identity construction via an experimental 
interpretation of fiction as fact.  However, before moving forward, and because I will be focusing this 
first example on ‘Atheism,’ I feel it is important to briefly describe one further inspiration, from my 




When I was compiling my list of definitions I came across a short text that seemed to rest perfectly at 
the nexus between my two inspirations.  As part of a series on ‘new directions in religion and 
literature,’ Bradley and Tate’s (2010) The New Atheist Novel seemed an intriguingly apt assessment of 
a new approach to ‘religion’ and fiction.  After all, New Atheism was only a few years old at the time 
of their publication,7 and their correlations between the four New Atheists—Harris, Dawkins, Dennett, 
and Hitchens—and four well-known and commercially successful novelists—McEwan, Amis, 
Rushdie, and Pullman—looked, on the surface at least, to address some of the points concerning 
‘representation’ and the merits of fiction that I spoke about above.   
 
However, upon reading their text I again found myself dissatisfied, specifically by their approach and 
interpretations.  Notably, I thought their thesis was highly contestable: that their notion of the thematic 
similarities between the New Atheist novels and the New Atheist texts revealed an effort on the part of 
the latter to create a ‘mythopoeia’ via what they called an ‘aestheticization,’ was nothing more than 
finding larger correlations between things that happened to look alike.  Moreover, I felt that their 
analysis was merely skimming the surface of an idea that, only when filtered through a more precise 
and organized theoretical and methodological lens, might be of significant value.  For instance, when 
they introduce their theory about the growing popularity of New Atheism they quite innocuously touch 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 If we are to state that New Atheism was ‘born’ with the publication of Harris’ first text, The 
End of Faith, in 2004. 
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on something that would prove otherwise intriguing if it were not for their somewhat misguided 
discussion after it:  
To our eyes, though, it is possible to detect an obscure but even more compelling reason for 
the massive popular appeal of the New Atheism: it constitutes a new and powerful creation 
mythology that—like all mythologies—performs an implicit anthropological service.8      
 
As we later learn, what they mean by this is that the ‘New Atheist novel’—including those fictions 
written years, even decades, before the first New Atheist texts—conveys a “secular object of 
devotion,” and thus becomes a ‘sacralized’ text that additionally offers a “this-worldly experience of 
grandeur, consolation, freedom and even redemption.”9  They declare this as based on a correlative 
‘literary reception,’ wherein the novelists under question appear to be receptive of, even supportive of, 
the polemics of New Atheism, transmuting their fictions into Atheist-based narrative myths.  Again, 
this is not an utterly useless assessment, and their cursory nod here to the interchangeable influence 
that media such as these have on discourse is interesting, but it barely touches on the more central 
importance of how that discourse is shaped, by whom, and in what ways it is both reflective of a 
particular environment, as well as how it is utilized by individuals within that context.  In other words, 
though it appears that they consider this aspect, particularly in their notion of the novel performing an 
implicit ‘anthropological service,’ they do not offer an explanation as to what that might mean.  I’ll 
return to this discussion a bit more in the second and third Chapters. 
 
For me, reading this text was catalytic, the ‘killing of Ruwahiwa’ that would ‘set the whole thing 
going.’10  That is, their oversight would be my motivation, their omission the basis of my research 
questions.  Thus, I set out to examine the cultural significance that might come from a detailed 
examination of particular fictional texts, aimed explicitly at how fictional accounts, such as those 
surveyed by Bradley and Tate, and read as products of, as well as contributing voices to, specific 
discourses, might offer narrative ‘representations’ of concepts formed by the written word.  
Accompanied with the combined interests disclosed above, this cursory gathering of ideas began to 
shape more specific—rather than general—questions, out of which I formed the hypothesis stated 
above:   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate, The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic 
After 9/11 (London: Continuum, 2010), 7. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Napoleon Chagnon, Yanamamo: The Fierce People, Fifth Edition (New York: Wadsworth, 
1997), 1. 
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When acknowledged as ‘fiction,’ how might these texts be read as offering the cultural insight 
we might gain from reading non-fictional texts?  That is, how might they be seen as providing 
an ‘anthropological service,’ and what might that entail?  If they were simply the product of a 
writer’s imagination, would reading these texts ‘as if’ they were somehow equal to, or 
mimetic of, non-fiction, transform them in some way?  By being treated as culturally 
insightful sources, would they suddenly become something more than ‘fiction?’  As well, in 
that they were the products of a particular action, written by a person driven by intention, what 
role would the author play in this process?  Would the author equally become something 
more, and if so, what would that say about the process of writing culturally insightful non-
fiction, and about the author’s position of authority when a novel might be seen as equally 
authoritative?  Lastly, in consideration of this seemingly ‘more experimental’ sort of 
interpretation, could a fictional account ‘stand-in’ for a non-fictional, ethnographic one, if that 
latter type of text did not presently exist, or proved difficult to compile?   
 
As well, and for methodological purposes, I reduced the theoretical content of these questions—the 
‘research design’—into three categories: method, theory, and data.  By doing this, I began to establish 
the approach that would come to embody and shape my concept of Ethnographic Criticism.  Therefore, 
and in accordance with these foundational requirements, I produced three direct questions that I 
thought necessary for a proper description.   
1. How would I go about reading fictional accounts as if they were something more akin to non-
fictional texts on a similar subject?   
2. Given the association this sort of reading might have with existing literary criticism, how 
might that criticism play a part in directing the texts chosen, as well as influence the way I 
read them?   
3. In reading these texts for an insight on a particular concept—Atheism—how might I stipulate 
this concept for this particular approach in a relatable manner?   
Dividing these inquiries like this took the shape of a formula, a three part foundational template by 
which I might proceed.  The first would be inherently focused on how cultural representations in 
written form become standardized and critiqued: ethnography.  The second would need to introduce the 
data—fictions—that I would be using, as well as how the predominant criticism focused on these 
fictions might be thematically mimetic of ethnographic construction: literary analysis.  The third would 
need to address the theoretical means by which the concept within these texts was expressed, and thus 
defined: discourse.  From this spawned the foundational pillars of Ethnographic Criticism.  The first—
and major—part of this thesis is devoted to these pillars, on one end offering critical examinations of 
the ‘traditional’ means of conducting research according to the subject areas under discussion, while on 
the other presenting the method, means, and existing discourse on how to perform an Ethnographic 
Criticism through critical analysis.  Said otherwise, in my attempts to cultivate the cultural insight we 
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might gain from reading fiction as ethnography, these three Chapters will describe the process with 
which that might be possible.     
 
3. Outline of the Text/Literature Review 
The first Chapter of Part One will present the first methodological foundation of Ethnographic 
Criticism.  Built upon a critical analysis of the theoretical discourse on defining ethnography as the 
‘doing of anthropology,’ this Chapter will follow a progressive thread.  Beginning with the concept of 
the ‘Literary Turn,’11 this thread will present the traditional requirements of writing ethnography, and 
how two specific issues pertaining to the style and form of ethnography—‘discourse’ and ‘signature’—
were effectively amended by the Literary Turn’s influence on textual style and authorial presence.12  
Then, this Chapter will present two means by which the construction of ethnography came to blur the 
distinction between the ‘science’ of anthropology and the ‘art’ of textual construction: in one way, 
altered by the process of writing ethnography so that it looked like a fictional text—the ‘ethnographic 
novel’13 and ‘auto-ethnography’14—and on the other, with the proposal of reading fictional texts as 
either ethnographic sources or descriptions.15  This latter discussion will account for a large part of this 
first pillar, as it will establish the experimental and familial base upon which I will shape the 
methodology of Ethnographic Criticism.          
 
The second Chapter will act as a continuation of the first, both as an introduction to the data examined 
in Part Two, as well as by drawing a correlative line between the process of ethnographic construction 
and a particular type of literary criticism.  Beginning with a three-part justification for using fiction to 
examine the construction of an Atheist identity—a lack of existing ethnographic sources (aside from a 
number of ‘in process’ examples), the ambiguity of defining ‘Atheism,’ and a lack of an ‘Atheist 
community’ with which to observe—this Chapter will equally contextualize my experimental use of 
Ethnographic Criticism to a specific time and place.  In addressing how my experimental use of chosen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Geertz (1973 and 1988), Markus (1980), Markus & Cushman (1982), Clifford and Markus 
(1986), Clifford (1988). 
12 Spradley (1980), Sperber (1982), Marcus and Cushman (1982), Clifford (1983 and 1986), 
Van Maanen (1988), Geertz (1988), Bruner (1993), Firth (1999). 
13 Langness and Frank (1978), Crapanzano (1980), Dwyer (1982 and 2008), Tyler (1986), 
Stewart (1989), Fernea (1989), Wolf (1992), Narayan (1999), Cesareo (2002), Tallman (2002). 
14 Heider (1975), Hayano (1979), Jackson (1986), Strathern (1987), Denzin (1989), Knab 
(1995), Richard and Sally Price (1995), Reed-Danahay (1997), Ashforth (2000), Ellis (2004), 
Anderson (2006). 
15 Fernea (1989), Stewart (1989), Banks (1990), Handler and Segal (1990), Eriksen (1994). 
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fiction—data—is representative of a marriage between the experimental ethnographic approaches after 
the Literary Turn and the specific Literary Theory used to analyze the author and fictions I have 
chosen, this Chapter will additionally establish my experimentation within an existing method and 
discourse pertaining to the notion of religion and literature.  More specifically, this Chapter will align 
my Ethnographic Criticism within the context of ‘Theism and Literature,’16 ‘Atheism and Literature,’17 
and the ‘Ethical Criticism’ that predominates the discourse on the work of my chosen author: Ian 
McEwan.18  In reflection of this critical assessment, I will utilize Krupat’s (1992) notion of 
‘Ethnocriticism’ to draw a line between the means with which Ethical Criticism associates character 
development with the ethnographic perception of identity construction made internally, externally, and 
between dialectical notions of similarity and difference.19  With this final theoretical concept 
established, I will introduce the two texts chosen—Black Dogs (1992) and Enduring Love (1997)—
briefly describe the characters and plot, and introduce how the Atheism represented within will be 
discussed in my later examination.   
 
The third Chapter will isolate and clarify the concept at central focus in this Thesis by addressing the 
process of term stipulation that I believe fits best with the theoretical aspect of Ethnographic Criticism.  
Taking Atheism as the concept at center in this analysis will serve three interests: first, given the issues 
of ambiguity within the discourse on defining the term itself, this approach will act to remove my 
discussion from that discourse, in order to align it with a more anthropological focus on identity 
construction; second, as this represents a shift from one approach to another, it will also present the 
theoretical methodology that I believe best characterizes the way concepts are to be addressed when 
conducting an Ethnographic Criticism; third, because this new style of textual analysis requires an 
external comprehension about the concept internalized within the texts being analyzed, this approach 
will not only provide such an understanding, it will equally offer a means to do that without a 
predetermined bias.  For these reasons, I will be borrowing—rather than explicitly using—the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Detweiler (1989), Detweiler and Jasper (2000), Jasper (2004), Wright (2007), Hass (2007), 
Hass, Jasper, and Jay (2007); Tate (2008), Knight (2009). 
17 Sutherland (1977), Smith (1991), Priestman (1999), Gordon (2002), Arbeit (2006), 
Bullivant (2008), Holderness (2010), Kane (2011), Bradley and Tate (2010), Schweizer (2011). 
18 Malcolm (2002), Schemberg (2004), Childs (2005, 2006, 2007, 2009), Head (2007) Muller-
Wood (2009) Wells (2010), Moller’s (2011). 
19 Berger and Luckmann (1966), Goffman (1959), Jenkins (2004). 
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theoretical language of Discourse Analysis.20  That is, rather than focusing merely on first-level 
discursive examples, wherein concepts are defined by actual individuals in actual places and at actual 
times, I will instead be adopting the theoretical language of Discourse Analysis to make sense of the 
ways in which Atheism has been defined, shifting the second-level discourse—definitions theorized by 
secondary interpreters—into a particular discursive field.  Not only will this provide a solid foundation 
upon which to address my three interests described above, it will likewise attempt to make sense of the 
discordancy about how the term is currently ‘defined.’  To do this, I will be splitting this discourse 
between two types of terminological representation: historical and theoretical.  While the first will 
present an analysis of a discourse that has defined the term via historical examples, delineated between 
‘ancient’—referred herein as ‘ἄθεος’21—and ‘modern’—referred herein with the capitalized ‘A’22—the 
second will reveal the ways in which the definition of the term has been built from a theoretical intent 
on producing a ‘general’ stipulation.  For reasons that will become clear, the latter will receive much of 
my attention in this Chapter, as it is this discourse that I argue is the source of much of the ambiguity 
about what the term ‘means,’ stemming directly from its differentiation between an Atheism that is 
‘positive’ (explicit) and ‘negative’ (implicit),23 as well as the general stipulations that result from this, 
such as ‘un-belief,’24 ‘ir-religion,’25 or ‘non-religion.’26  Lastly, this Chapter will conclude with a final 
statement concerning the necessity of comprehending the ‘meaning’ of a particular concept in order to 
study it, as well as why I will be choosing not to offer my own stipulation of the Atheism I expect to 
find in McEwan’s novels.      
 
With this foundation established, Part Two will present my analytic use of Ethnographic Criticism.  It 
will begin with a short introductory Chapter that will, on one end, act as a useful summation of the 
three pillars from Part One, while on the other, critically address the precarious dangers of too 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 van Dijk (1997), Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton (2001), Fairclough (2003) Von Stuckrad 
(2003, 2010, 2013), Gee (2005), Paltridge (2006), Jaworski and Coupland (2006), Taira (2013). 
21 Muller (1888), Aveling [1907 (1913)], Drachmann (1922), Buckley [1987 (1990)], Robb 
(1993), Kahn (1997), Reid and Mondin (2003), Hartley (2006), Bremmer (2009), Fergusson (2009), 
Palmer (2010). 
22 Masterson (1965), Fabro (1968), Herrick (1985), Buckley (1990), Smith (1991), Pasquini 
(2000), Gordon (2002), Baggini (2003), Converse (2003), McGrath (2005), Fergusson (2009), Hyman 
(2007 and 2010), Ledrew (2012). 
23 Robertson (1970), Flew (1976), Stein (1980), Smith (1989 and 1991), Martin (1990, 2007a, 
2007b), Hiorth (2003), Baggini (2003), Cliteur (2009), Eller (2010), Hyman (2010), Palmer (2010), 
Walters (2010), Bullivant (2013).   
24 Marty (1966), Budd (1977). 
25 Campbell (1971). 
26 Lee (2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
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distinctly blurring the lines between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ within my experimental analysis.  In this same 
way, it will additionally provide a short description of the style and structure of that analysis.  In my 
Ethnographic Criticism itself, the predominant focus will be directed at how Atheism is constructed as 
an identity, and what McEwan’s texts themselves say about this process.  Concentrating on the 
‘Atheists’ of his creation, I will adopt a specific formula that will track the development of their 
identities, beginning with their internal constructions based on ‘interests,’ that is then externally 
validated through interaction: first through the process of identifying others, then in identifying 
themselves in reflection of those others, and finally in how those others identify them in the same way.  
The goal of this analysis will be to provide a more nuanced and specific case-based interpretation of 
the process in which the Atheists within these texts construct their identities, so as to offer a 
perspective on the ‘meaning’ of ‘Atheism-in-specific’ that speaks to a larger ethnographic—and 
historical—understanding beyond mere theoretical stipulation.  Likewise, as I will be using two texts, 
this analysis will also take the shape of a cross-comparative examination wherein the Atheism from the 
second will appear like a developed form of the Atheism in the first.  In this way, not only will I 
present an anthropological interpretation of fiction, I will also draw out a number of critical questions 
about the authoritativeness we implicitly afford ‘ethnographic writing.’   
 
Following this experimental examination, Part Three will be comprised of a short Fifth Chapter and the 
Conclusion.  With the former, I will reiterate, as well as further clarify, some of the more theoretical 
and experimental aspects of my examination of McEwan’s two novels.  With the latter, I will provide a 
brief examination of this Thesis’ plot and sub-plot, my stipulation of the concept ‘fiction’ as based on a 
number of pre-existing examples,27 and one final statement about the artifice of textual construction 
alongside the experimental notion that this Thesis, in a number of ways, is nothing more than a 
‘fiction.’  
 
4. Conclusion: Revealing the ‘Magic’ in the Magic Trick 
In his discussion about the ‘being there’ and ‘being here’ process of ‘doing anthropology,’ Geertz 
(1988) refers to the literary artifice that goes into constructing an ethnography as a sort of literary 
‘magic trick:’ “Ethnography becomes, it is said, a mere game of words, as poems and novels are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Vaihinger (1935), Kliever (1979 and 1981), Said (1975), Anderson (1983), Fine (1993), 
Miller (1997), Cusack (2010). 
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supposed to be […] exposing how the thing is done is to suggest that, like the lady sawed in half, it 
isn’t done at all.”28  As he further contends, revealing the magic of ethnographic construction by 
focusing on the literary efforts that go into ‘writing culture,’ becomes an issue of authority when we 
begin to scrutinize how this trick works.  As he also suggests, this turn toward the ‘literary’ roots of 
writing ethnography causes us to reconsider what was once thought to be objective and scientific about 
the process: “concentrating our gaze on the ways in which knowledge claims are advanced undermines 
our capacity to take any of those claims seriously.”29  As I will discuss in more detail shortly, this 
equally begins to re-conceptualize our collective notions about what might determine ‘proper 
ethnography.’  In this way, revealing the magic of the magic trick, or in other words, revealing the 
‘literary,’ and thus ‘artistic’ process underscoring the construction of ethnography, moves the entire 
conversation into a discursive debate about what might differentiate fact from fiction.  While I will 
address this more thoroughly in the pages to follow, I will conclude this Introduction—and thus 
effectively begin the Thesis—with my own sort of ‘reveal.’    
 
This thesis, as the subtitle suggests, is an experimental study.  As I stated above, it is the result of my 
disappointment with a number of ‘established ways of doing things,’ both theoretically and 
anthropologically, and thus my choice for using fiction stems from an equally experimental attempt at 
studying Atheism in a manner not previously considered.  This will, at times, require a bit of cross-
disciplinary blurring.  What this also means, is that while in its own way this Thesis will attempt to 
both reveal the magic Geertz refers to, as well as perform a few tricks of its own, it will be telling two 
distinct stories: a plot and sub-plot.  For the sake of introductive clarity, I will here define the former as 
my introduction, description, and use of Ethnographic Criticism, and the latter as an essential 
acknowledgement of the precarious defects that might arise out of that.  While I would prefer to allow 
the narrative to simply unfold from this point on, and thus let the Thesis present itself like a novel, I 
feel that, for pragmatic reasons, revealing a little of the sub-plot here will assist the reader along the 
way, as well as pre-emptively alleviate any confusion that might occur.   
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Perhaps the most essential ‘reveal’ that I might place here concerns the structure and linguistic style of 
the Thesis as a whole.  As it was designed in order to be mimetic of the theoretical issues discussed 
throughout, and by its very nature as an ‘artifice,’ it is a fiction both ‘made-from’ and ‘made-up.’  This 
is exemplified throughout by certain shifts in narrative style.  In Part One, the narrative will adopt an 
objective third-person voice, a choice that I have made because I believe this manner of speaking best 
reflects the type of language appropriate for an objective account.  For this same reason, because they 
represent the three-point foundation of Ethnographic Criticism, and will thus need to cover a great deal 
of pre-existing or established information, these three Chapters will be theoretically detailed and 
heavily annotated.  In this same way, because Ethnographic Criticism is a new style of textual analysis, 
my introduction of it is equally dependent upon a requisite need to foundationally establish the 
correlated roots of those things that influenced its method.  Thus, each of these Chapters should be read 
as telling a necessary story—plot-building—that will lead to the style adopted in Part Two.  That is, as 
they have been designed to not only set up the structure, style, and content of Part Two, they also exist 
to equip the reader—who might not have such preceding knowledge—with the necessary terminology, 
language, and intricate details that have led to the creation of this experimental analysis.  
 
In comparison, and as the analytical center of my Thesis—both as an examination of the data used, as 
well as an illustration of my experimental approach at analyzing that data—the ‘text’ in Part Two will 
adopt a very unique narrative style.  Without revealing the totality of the magic in my magic trick, this 
text can be described as a ‘fictionalized’ adaptation of the ethnographic experimentation discussed in 
the latter half of the first Chapter, as well as the Ethical Criticism described within the second.  Like an 
‘ethnographic novel,’ which the first Chapter will describe as a ‘fictionalized interpretation of culture 
told through a literary lens,’ this text will be a modified version of this genre: a fictionalized 
examination of McEwan’s two novels in order to depict them as texts representing the type of data we 
might find within an ethnography.  Why I have chosen to design my analysis in such a ‘fictional’ 
manner, as well as a more comprehensive description of what I mean here, will be made in the fourth 
Chapter.    
   
Lastly, as I have repeated throughout this Introduction, this Thesis is an experiment, and should be read 
as such.  While this forewarning might seem excessive, I believe it to be essential in establishing how I 
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would like it appraised.  Which inspires a second repetition: what follows are two stories.  Much like 
the double-sense meaning of ‘criticism’ in Ethnographic Criticism—‘critical’ as meaning both 
analytically evaluative, as well as condemnatory of an established position—these two stories will 
reveal a ‘plot’—the method-data-theory that defines how we might read fiction as ethnography—as 
well as a ‘sub-plot’—the experimental outcome that develops from our doing this, that we can use as 
an example of the consequences that might arise in the process.  That being said, I will conclude here 
by stating that while an analysis of ‘Atheism’ in fiction might seem as simple as isolating when and 
where a character might refer to him or herself as such, interpreting how that might be of value to that 
analysis, let alone be useful in a wider ‘anthropological’ interpretation, is an entirely different thing.  








Part One: Foundational Pillars 
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CHAPTER ONE—METHODOLOGY: WRITING 
 
“If, then, we admit that ethnographies tend to look at least as much 
like romances as they do like lab reports (though, as with our mule, 
not really like either), two questions, or perhaps the same one 
doubly asked, immediately pose themselves: (I) How is the ‘author-
function’ (or shall we, so long as we are going to be literary about 
the matter, just say ‘the author’?) made manifest in the text?  (2) 
Just what is it—beyond the obvious tautology, ‘a work’—that the 
author authors?” 
 
—Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives, 19881 
 
 
1.1—Introduction: The ‘Four Archetypes’ of ‘Doing’ Anthropology 
 
At the start of the Introduction we posed a hypothetical question pertaining to the possibility of reading 
invented fictions—texts manufactured solely for pleasure or entertainment—as having the same sort of 
ethnographic authenticity as ‘true’ ethnographic texts.  Arising out of this question is a critical 
interpretation of the process itself, particularly focused on how any sort of written text might be able to 
offer a cultural insight on a social or political concept, especially when that text is constructed by an 
individual outside the context within which that concept exists.  This is what the core of this Chapter 
shall be in response to.   
 
Like the two others in this First Part, this Chapter will be foundational: its sole purpose will be to 
provide a base upon which to build, as well as justify, the methodological root of our Ethnographic 
Criticism in Part Two, as well as better explicate how we might read a novel ‘anthropologically.’  
While focused on the concept of ‘ethnography,’ this Chapter will introduce the discourse pertaining to 
the meaning of that term, in particular reflection of the Literary Turn’s focus on the artistic aspects of 
reading and writing ethnographic texts.  This will take the shape of a number of specific parts.  First, in 
order to conceptualize our later discussion within the context of an explicit theoretical framework, we 
will begin with an introduction to the Literary Turn itself.  Second, we will address two distinct 
challenges fostered by this ‘focus on the literary,’ aimed exclusively at the meaning and process of 
ethnographic construction.  Third, our discussion will progress toward the larger issue of how the line 
between ‘science’ and ‘art’ in the process of ‘doing’ anthropology came to be challenged by two points 
of composition: the writing of ethnography like fictional texts, and the reading of fictional texts like 
ethnography.  In total, this foundational discussion will follow along a progressive track, at the center 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Geertz, Works and Lives, 8-9. 
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of which will be the driving narrative about how we write, read, and define the scientific art of 
ethnographic construction.   
 
While the goal of this Chapter is to methodologically set up the Ethnographic Criticism of Part Two, it 
should not be designated to this one specific task.  Rather, it should likewise be seen as a direct 
discussion of a particular progression, contextualized by a critical analysis pertaining to textual 
authority.  This path, like most theoretical discussions, has been properly mapped out, not just by the 
voices of those we shall hear in the pages to follow, but also by the larger discourse concerning the 
process of ‘doing’ anthropology.  As Tedlock (1991) quite poignantly notes: “The mythic history of 
anthropology is populated by four archetypes: the amateur observer, the armchair anthropologist, the 
professional ethnographer, and the ‘gone native’ fieldworker.”2  After our brief description of the 
Literary Turn, our own discussion will borrow from this erudite calibration, following certain examples 
along this ‘theory of anthropology,’ that will demonstrate the manner with which the Literary Turn 
begat a new genre of ethnographic bipolarity between fictions made-up and fictions made-from.  This 
will, as the conclusion will discuss, not only more concisely support the how of our using fiction in Part 
Two, it will also lead us toward the next Chapter’s discussion of why that might be possible.        
  
1.2—The Literary Turn and its Influences 
 
Perhaps more than anything, the Literary Turn3 signifies a transition: a shift of attention from the 
essentialist notion about what anthropology is, toward making sense of, acknowledging, and 
interpreting the elements that define what anthropologists do.  As such, and as Geertz (1973) warns us, 
if we are to understand what—as a science—anthropology is, we should look at neither the ‘theories or 
findings,’ nor at what ‘apologists say’ about the subject, but instead at what the ‘practitioners do.’4  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Barbara Tedlock, “From Participant Observation to the Observation of Participation: The 
Emergence of Narrative Ethnography” (Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1991), 
69. 
3 The term ‘Literary Turn’ here has a number of origins, most predominately linked to the 
publication of Writing Culture in 1986.  However, and like many of the terms used throughout this 
Thesis, it does not come from any singular source.  Thus, the use of it herein is meant to broadly denote 
the results of the literary focus that derives from the discourse inspired by the individuals discussed 
throughout this Chapter.     
4 Clifford Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic books, 1973), 
5. 
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As ‘doing anthropology’ after the Literary Turn is re-conceived as ‘writing ethnography,’ it is this 
focus on the text that marks its unique character.  In this way, the process turns from a focus on the 
‘thick description’5 that differentiates involuntary action from meaningful action and parodied action—
“a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures in terms of which twitches, winks, fake-winks, 
parodies, rehearsals of parodies are produced, perceived, and interpreted”6—toward a contentiously 
hybridized textual translation via an explicitly formed genre.  That is, according to the leading scholars 
who define the Literary Turn—notably Geertz (1973, 1988) Markus (1980), Markus & Cushman 
(1982), Clifford & Markus (1986), and Clifford (1988)—‘writing ethnography’ comes to be defined by 
the literary qualities and methods involved in the writing itself: an analysis of the ‘established codes,’ 
of “winks upon winks upon winks,” that is not unlike the enterprise undertaken by the literary critic.7        
 
Geertz first initiates this discourse with a conception that finds ‘ethnography-as-literature’ as 
something based on discursive constructions, so that, as ethnographies become literary types, they also 
become “constructions of other people’s constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to.”8  
Then, as these constructions become ‘interpretations,’ the products of finding cohesion in the 
“multiplicity of complex conceptual structures”9—the scientific endeavor of rendering a culture from 
the thick description of anthropological research—they become, by their inherent synthetic nature, 
what he refers to as ‘fictions.’  However, while it will become a defining characteristic of the post-
Literary Turn discourse that comes to argue the mere act of ‘setting pen to paper’ as equivalent to 
“perpetuating a literary act,”10 Geertz’s use of ‘fiction’ here is not the same as that which is 
dichotomously impregnated with the concept of ‘false’ or ‘made-up.’  Rather, it demonstrates an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Borrowing from Ryle’s ‘multi-layered sandwich,’ Geertz’s conception of ‘thick description,’ 
is compared to ‘thin description,’ the mere action of something, rather than the purposeful meaning 
behind that action.  Both encompass a deeper understanding of what the utterer of an utterance meant 
in that vocalization.  Geertz defines the difference between ‘mere action’ and ‘purposeful action’ as 
like the difference between a ‘twitch’ and a ‘wink.’  The twitch is an involuntary action, while the wink 
has a purpose-driven action underscoring the motion.  See Gilbert Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: 
What is ‘Le Penseur’ Doing?” (University Lectures, The University of Saskatchewan, 1968), accessed 
online via: http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/CSACSIA/Vol14/Papers/ryle_1.html (accessed 21 June 2013); and 
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 3-33. 
6 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 6. 
7 Ibid., 9. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 David Hackett Fischer, “The Braided Narrative: Substance and Form in Social History” in 
Angus Fletcher, ed., The Literature of Fact: Selected Papers from the English Institute (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1976), 114. 
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etymological re-interpretation of ‘fictio,’ meaning something ‘made’ or ‘fashioned.’11  For Geertz, this 
early perception of ‘ethnography-as-fiction’ is nothing more than an awareness of the writing process: 
an acknowledgment of ethnography as ‘artifice,’ an appreciation of the translation of another’s culture 
into words on the page, and the recognition of the process involved in converting social discourse into 
inscription.12  This re-focused attention on the ‘fictionality’ of ethnographic construction indicates the 
introduction of a new and unorthodox means of analysis, a discursive shift—“the enterprise may be 
seen as turning”13—that becomes the basis of an innovative and controversial type of genre with its 
own “kinds of constraints and rules of construction.”14  
 
While this genre is distinct for giving precise attention to the writing process, as well as to textual 
interpretation, it is also reinforced by an explicit ‘epistemological concern’ for how this type of writing 
‘textualizes’ the objective discourse on the research being conducted.15  This again appears 
counterintuitive to the established conception of ethnography as “an activity that occurs in the field,” 
and thus treated chiefly as “a method, rather than a product, of research.”16  What develops from this is 
a ‘fusion’ of sorts, a coalescence of ‘cultural analysis’ with ‘ethnographic description,’ that Marcus and 
Cushman (1982) translate through the synthesis of the classic debate on hermeneutics, “between 
philosophical reflection about the nature of interpretation,” and the “methodological attempt to create a 
science of interpretation.”17      
 
Yet, the Literary Turn is not merely defined by the sudden acceptance that doing anthropology is 
‘enmeshed in writing.’  As the genre develops, so too do the elements that define it.  More specifically, 
as the anthropologist’s critical eye turns from interpreting culture to interpreting texts, the role of 
literary analysis becomes the discourse of choice.  This is perhaps most evident in Clifford’s (1983, 
1986, 1988) distinct theoretical discussions, what might be argued as the quintessential sources on the 
development of the genre as a whole.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 15. 
12 Ibid., 19. 
13 Geertz, Works and Lives, 142. 
14 George E. Marcus, “Rhetoric and the Ethnographic Genre in Anthropological Research” 
(Current Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1980), 507. 
15 George E. Marcus and Dick Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts” (Annual Review of 
Anthropology, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1982), 25. 
16 Ibid., 25-26. 
17 Ibid., 26. 
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For Clifford, ethnography is a product of hybridity, a polyvocal textual activity that is both science and 
art.  Bridging this once great void are the literary themes at the locus of the Literary Turn—metaphor, 
figuration, and narrative—that when adapted to the construction of ethnography, “affect the ways 
cultural phenomena are registered, from the first jotted ‘observations,’ to the completed book, to the 
ways these configurations ‘make sense’ in determined acts of reading.”18  As Clifford further 
determines, the adoption of these literary qualities mirror, or even echo, the once conflicting processes 
of semiotics, post-structuralism, hermeneutics, and deconstruction.  However, he also makes the 
distinction that while incorporating these approaches might blur the border between ‘science’ and 
‘literature,’ their use does not necessitate one give up facts and accurate accounting for the supposed 
“free play of poetry.”19  Instead, in reading these texts as cultural concepts in written form filtered 
through the theoretical lenses of literary theorists such as Marx, Foucault, Dilthey, Ricoeur, de 
Saussure, and Derrida,20 the genre of the Literary Turn develops a sense of reflexivity, a 
‘grammatological’ acknowledgment that all texts are, in essence, a chorus of both writer and 
informant.21  This nod to the influence of allegory and polyvocality, the former drawing “special 
attention to the narrative character of cultural representations [emphasis in original],”22 and the latter 
developing a sense of the ethnographer as a ‘co-writer’ alongside his or her informants, grants the 
anthropologist an insight into his or her own voice as he or she records the voice of the Other. 
 
What all of this eventually contributes to is the notion of transition mentioned above, what von 
Stuckrad (2003) later refers to as a sense of shaken self-confidence: “the writing culture debate 
demolished academic confidence in the scientists’ neutral role as an objective observer and placed their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 James Clifford, “Introduction: Partial Truths” in James E. Clifford and George E. Marcus, 
eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1986), 4. 
19 Ibid., 25-26. 
20 Ibid., 10-11.    
21 Clifford distinctly employs the term ‘grammatology’ in reference to Derrida’s contention 
that there is no differentiation between the ‘written’ and the ‘spoken:’ “there is no need here to pursue 
in detail a disorienting project that is by now well known. What matters for ethnography is the claim 
that all human groups write—if they articulate, classify, possess an ‘oral-literature,’ or inscribe their 
world in ritual acts. They repeatedly ‘textualize’ meanings. Thus, in Derrida's epistemology, the 
writing of ethnography cannot be seen as a drastically new form of cultural inscription, as an exterior 
imposition on a ‘pure,’ unwritten oral/aural universe [emphasis in original].”  James Clifford, “On 
Ethnographic Allegory,” in James E. Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The 
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 117-118.  
22 Ibid., 100. 
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work in a cultural process of constructing meaning or just producing narratives [emphasis in 
original].”23  By referring to the ethnographer as a ‘novelist manqué,’24 Clifford acknowledges this as a 
shift from cultural construction to narrative production, what Geertz allegorically describes as the 
identity crisis affecting the North African Mule who “talks always of his mother’s brother, the horse, 
but never of his father, the donkey.”25  As a literary ‘bastard type’ caught somewhere between 
“wanting to create a bewitching verbal structure,”26 and the responsibility of communicating basic facts 
and ideas, the post-Literary Turn ethnographer is shifted into a hybridized place of anxiety, reduced 
thematically by Geertz into two issues pertaining to ‘signature’ and ‘discourse.’27  Referring to the way 
the text is written, as well as the place of the author in writing it, these two aspects become symbols, 
abstractions with which we might begin to address the consequences of turning the focus of ‘doing’ 
anthropology toward the literary act in ‘writing’ ethnography.  By adopting these two points we begin 
to more clearly see the ways in which the Literary Turn opened the possibility of reading fiction as if it 
were ethnography, guided by theoretical perceptions such as those made by Rapport (1994)—
“Anthropological writings are works of the imagination, whose responsibility and credit must be tied to 
the romancer who dreamed them”28—or even Geertz himself, whose notion that what anthropology 
does post Literary Turn is ‘faction:’ “imaginative writing about real people in real places at real 
times.”29   
 
This sense of theoretical transition plays a major methodological role in shaping our model of 
Ethnographic Criticism, especially in the way it opens the possibility of an homogenization between 
ethnography and fiction via their shared focus on performing a literary act.  Therefore, our analysis 
here will turn toward Geertz’s two challenges, beginning with ‘discourse,’ so as to develop an 
understanding about the ways in which a focus on the text came to contest the standard method of 
ethnographic construction, as well as shed some light on how the acceptance of these texts as ‘written’ 
came to engender a reflexive and pragmatic acknowledgment—‘signature’—of the author’s existence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Kocku von Stuckrad, “Discursive Study of Religion: From states of the Mind to 
Communication and Action” (Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 15, 2003), 255. 
24 Clifford, “Introduction”, 4. 
25 Geertz, Works and Lives, 8. 
26 Ibid., 20. 
27 Ibid., 9-10. 
28 Nigel Rapport, The Prose and the Passion: Anthropology, Literature, and the Writing of E. 
M. Forster (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 7. 
29 Geertz, Works and Lives, 141. 
	  
	   23 
and role in the process itself.  An awareness of these two challenges, and how they shape the discourse 
underscoring the meaning of doing anthropology, will likewise properly lead us toward the essential 
discussion below on how ethnographic fiction, and reading fiction ethnographically, became possible.  
Understanding the route that led to these experimental amalgamations will equally assist us in 
foundationally composing our own in Part Two.        
	   
1.3—Challenge One: The Formation, and Move Away From, Functionalist Ethnography 
Prior to the Literary Turn, ‘proper ethnography’ is defined by a detailed practical process made up of 
both ‘being there’ and ‘being here.’  As Geertz rhetorically states: “What a proper ethnographer ought 
properly to be doing is going out to places, coming back with information about how people live there, 
and making that information available to the professional community in practical form.”30  It does not, 
as he further describes, involve an overt focus on theory, wherein one might simply ‘lounge about’ a 
library, “reflecting on literary questions.”31  Focusing his own discussion on the changing perspectives 
of this ‘proper ethnography,’ it is here where Geertz pinpoints the locus of our first challenge.  As he 
contends, because the proper means of doing ethnography was once cemented by the early twentieth-
century process of functionalism, showing an excessive concern with “how ethnographic texts are 
constructed” would seem an “unhealthy self-absorption.”32  That is, by defining ethnography with the 
literary process involved in writing and forming a text, rather than with the process of participant-
observation, the ‘doing’ begins to veer precariously toward reflexively exposing “how the thing is 
done.”33  As he remarks, and to repeat ourselves from the Introduction, this sort of argument is like 
saying the focus on the literary, rather than the research process, is like exposing the method of any 
good magic trick: “Ethnography becomes, it is said, a mere game of words, as poems and novels are 
supposed to be […] exposing how the thing is done is to suggest that, like the lady sawed in half, it 
isn’t done at all.”34  
 
The incorporation of the literary in the Literary Turn brings forth a number of questions, specifically 
aimed at how this re-focused combination of both participant-observation and the translation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid., 1. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 




fieldnotes into a literary form, might balance the objectively scientific with the subjectively literary.  
This is especially pertinent concerning the advancement of textual authority.  That is, if the former has 
been designed in order to confer a sense of authority onto the endeavor, does the inclusion of the latter, 
and thus the creation of a genre that makes ethnography look as much like a ‘romance’ as it does a ‘lab 
report,’ generate a contention between the two?  Moreover, considering the traditional ascription of 
strict functionality to ethnography as an activity that occurred as a part of the research process ‘within 
the field,’ can a text written using literary techniques, such as metaphor, dialogue, differentiated 
perspective, and narration be as objective as it once was?  Together, these questions seem to be 
addressing a larger issue about how the Literary Turn converted ethnography from being a part of the 
research process as a whole, into a product in, and of, itself.  However, and in order to address this in 
relation to how reading fiction ethnographically might challenge the ‘proper’ mode of ‘doing 
anthropology,’ we need to first understand how that pre-Literary Turn process came to be 
conventionalized.  It is here where our discussion turns toward Tedlock’s ethnographic archetypes that 




Before there arose the professional figure of the ‘ethnographer,’ early scholars intent on sourcing 
material on “contemporaneous ‘savage,’ or ‘primitive’ peoples,” whom they regarded as “living 
cultural analogies with the past,” rarely traveled, but instead practiced the refined art of “armchair 
ethnology.”35  That is, these scholars’ texts were dependent upon written accounts from travellers, 
missionaries, government officials, and other ‘amateurs’ not trained in what would become the 
dispassionate art of a “prescribed attitude of cultural relativism.”36  As substantiating evidence, these 
early amateur accounts formed a particular type of genre, an ethnographic antecedent similar to 
‘traveler’ and ‘explorer’ accounts, by means of a shared narrative motif: the “romantic discovery by the 
writer of people and places unknown to the reader.”37  However, this sort of process breeds 
complication when the objective of one’s text is meant to be a holistic representation.  How, one might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer, “Ethnography and Interpretive Anthropology” 
in George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental 
Moment in the Human Sciences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 17. 
36 Clifford, “On Ethnographic Authority,” 124. 
37 Ibid., 24. 
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ask, does an armchair ethnologist such as Tylor or Frazer create a universal textual representation when 
the source material could be derived from biased or inaccurate notations?  Or rather, how might these 
armchair ethnologists construct any sort of accurate representation without the slightest regard for first-
hand knowledge and experience of the culture being represented?  In answer to these questions there 
appears an ethnological shift, a move from ethnography solely written ‘here,’ to ethnography being 
conducted ‘out there:’ in the field and ‘off the veranda.’        
 
Removed from the parochial confines of ‘being here,’ the goal of the ‘anthropologist in the field’ was 
not altogether different from the holistic intent of his armchair predecessor: the focus was still directed 
at creating a written representation of a whole culture.  However, now that the research conducted was 
without an intermediary between author and subject, and based solely on the work of the researcher in 
the field, there arose the need for a system of organizing principles, the first of which dealt with the 
way in which this culture-as-a-whole might best be textualized.  Thus, in fusing the “establishment of 
anthropology as an academic discipline” with the “elaboration of professional fieldwork,”38 a style of 
realism became the definitive genre convention.  Borrowed from the nineteenth-century literary 
conception, ethnographic realism sought to “represent the whole world or form of life,”39 a system of 
writing meant to “allude to a whole by means of parts or foci.”40  In essence, this writing offered a 
more detailed interpretation of the ‘otherworld,’ a textual representation of the cultural totality in its 
entirety.  As a secondary organizing principal there then also arose the need for specific research 
techniques, with the reality of the text, alongside the author’s authority in writing it, organized into an 
“intimate link between ethnographic writing and fieldwork.”41          
 
What this accumulation soon becomes is an amended type of theory and practice that would, roughly 
two decades into the twentieth-century, come to be established as a “powerful new scientific and 
literary genre.”42  As can be expected, though, with a new approach come new challenges, the remedy 
of which appear in a number of innovative tactics and procedures.  For summary purposes, Clifford 
(1983), Firth (1999), and Marcus & Cushman (1982) abridge these solutions into six preliminary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Marcus and Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts,” 29. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Marcus and Fischer, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, 23. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Clifford, “On Ethnographic Authority,” 124. 
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distinctions.  First (1), there is the practical matter of separating the professional from the amateur, the 
anthropologist from the missionary.  In that the latter might be otherwise distracted by the act of 
conversion, in order to get to the “heart of the culture,”43 the former would need to apply a series of 
‘analytic techniques,’ modes of ‘scientific explanation’ aimed at reaping a truly objective analysis.  In 
further separating the professional from the amateur, this requires a more personal experience.  It 
necessitates the act of (2) living amongst the people, physically witnessing culture, taking note of 
‘characteristic behaviors,’ and becoming a ‘trained onlooker.’44  In this process a methodology is 
formed, the actual, physical ‘doing’ of observation.  No longer fettered by the university or library, the 
fieldwork-theorist is now out and amongst his or her subjects, learning their customs (3), speaking their 
‘vernacular tongue,’ participating in their “initiation rites and funerals,” and attending “their marriage 
ceremonies.”45  The process, then, of participant-observation is distinguished by the “directness and 
intensity of the relationship of its fieldworkers to the people among whom they work.”46  However, 
even with this methodology ascribed, and even though the professional, with his “powerful theoretical 
abstractions,” might be better equipped at ‘getting to the heart’ of a particular culture, there still 
remains the issue of (4) constructing, from the parts gathered, a “central armature of structure of the 
cultural whole.”47  That is, given the limited ability of a short research span, it would prove quite 
difficult to observe and record the ‘complex whole’ of an entire culture.  Thus, the focus turns toward a 
thematic concentration on particular institutions, the holistic approach replaced with a method of 
getting at the ‘whole’ through “one or more of its parts.”48  This new stance (5) offers a sort of genre 
identity, a re-focused ‘synecdochic’ or ‘rhetorical’ position, the individual informant suppressed by the 
‘composite creation’ of a “normative role model or national character.”49  Parts become assumptive 
microcosms or analogies of wholes, and by setting the “institutional foregrounds against cultural 
backgrounds in the portrayal of a coherent world,” the ethnographer’s product, his or her writing, in 
turn lends itself to the aforementioned “realist literary conventions.”50  Lastly, this new ethnographic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 125. 
45 Raymond Firth, “An Anthropological Approach to the Study of Religion” in Russell T. 
McCutcheon, ed., The Insider/Outside Problem in the Study of Religion: A Reader (London: Cassell, 
1999), 116-117. 
46 Ibid., 116 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Marcus and Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts,” 32. 
50 Ibid. 
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structure renders the culture-as-a-whole as (6) ‘synchronic,’ the ethnography itself standing as a 
‘sketch’ of an “ethnographic present.”51     
 
The participant-observation made by the fieldwork-theorist thus functions as a ‘shorthand’ for the 
‘continuous tacking’ between inside and outside.52  On one end, there is the acquisitive aspect of 
accumulating the Other’s “specific occurrences and gestures empathetically,” while on the other there 
is the return from the field and the process of situating “these meanings in wider contexts.”53  From out 
of this going-out and coming-back a narrative of ‘question-discovery’54 appears: the outsider enters a 
foreign culture, undergoes a ‘kind of initiation,’ which leads to a sense of ‘rapport,’ from which then 
emerges a representational text that is manufactured by the participant-observer.55  Yet, even with this 
establishment of method and practice, there still persists the mystery of what, exactly, is meant by 
‘text.’  
 
Beyond even the ‘simple’ definition of ethnography as “an account resulting from having done 
fieldwork,” or the written form of that fieldwork out of which is shaped the identity of a whole 
“academic discipline,”56 the meaning of ethnography has a much higher level of complexity.  
According to Marcus (1980), whatever the particular arguments or topic might be, as a practical text to 
be read by a newly formed professional community, ethnography fails if it does not realize the 
“traditional genre characteristics” of everyday life, translated “across cultural and linguistic 
boundaries.”57  In other words, it is a synthetic narrative, a written product with a degree of 
independence—“how culture is portrayed”—from that of the fieldwork on which it is based—“how 
culture is known.”58  Yet, as a ‘representation’ of culture it performs a double act, that of decoding one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid. 
52 Clifford, “On Ethnographic Authority,” 127. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See James P. Spradley, “Chapter Three: The Ethnographic Research Cycle” in James P. 
Spradley, Participant Observer (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980), 33-34. 
55 Clifford, “On Ethnographic Authority,” 128. 
56 Marcus and Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts,” 27. 
57 George E. Marcus, “Rhetoric and the Ethnographic Genre in Anthropological Research” 
(Current Anthropology, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1980), 509. 
58 James P. Spradley, “Chapter One: Ethnography and Culture” in James P. Spradley, 
Participant Observer (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1980), 33. 
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culture, “while recording it for another;”59 the initial goal of which, perhaps more than anything else, 
becomes the ability to “grasp the native’s point of view,” so as to realize “his vision of his world.”60    
 
Likely the most ideal representation of this discourse crystalizing into a distinct genre style can be 
found in Malinowski’s (1922) Argonauts of the Western Pacific.  Based upon his economic study of 
the Kula ring, Malinowski’s methodology presents a microcosmic depiction of a whole culture by 
means of a particular institution.  In this same way, it becomes an exemplary form of functionalism, a 
manner with which we might distinguish the difference between the ethnographer’s report and the 
amateur’s account.  Embodying the six distinctions listed above, Argonauts depicts the ethnographer as 
incorporating a certain type of ‘objective magic’ in formulating “the true picture of tribal life;”61 so that 
by eschewing the “biassed [sic] and pre-judged opinions”62 once made by amateur, ‘white informants,’ 
the culture observed is more clearly translated via a “patient and systematic application” of certain 
codes, common sense, and “well known scientific principles.”63  Only by achieving these goals, 
Malinowski argues, is the anthropologist capable of attaining the ‘imponderabilia’ of his or her 
subjects, their day-to-day processes only viewed through an internalized lens.  What this does, 
stylistically, is shift the narrative language of ethnographic construction toward the scientific, the 
systematic, and the technical, further differentiating the variance between objective and subjective 
representation.  That is, in reifying particular cultural institutions into “typological pigeonholes for 
cross-cultural comparison,”64 this functionalism removes any sense of doubt that the ethnographic text 
is to be deemed more authoritative when compared to the untrained reflections of the amateur 
missionary or travel account.   
 
 
It is here where we find perhaps the leading characteristic of the functionalist definition of 
ethnography: the necessity of objectivity in order to establish an authoritative voice.65  However, the 
task of doing so is not without a few concessions.  ‘Ethnographic realism,’ ‘participant-observation,’ 
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‘functionalism,’ these elements act to shift the writing aspect of ‘doing anthropology’ into the context 
of a particular, interpretive science; and the goal of ‘ethnography-as-science,’ as Sperber (1982) 
defends it, is aimed at “an objective and general knowledge.”66  However, given the interpretative 
process of ‘writing culture,’ ethnography-as-science is also situated at the crossroads between ‘science’ 
and ‘art,’ the artful fusion of the objective and subjective striking an awkward balance within the 
process of representation.    
 
In order to remedy this issue, functionalist approaches, bolstered by a foundation that viewed the 
product of ethnographic research as the “outcome of a method or of an epistemological attitude 
essential to [the] social sciences,”67 ensured a separation between the subjective and the objective, 
translated by Clifford as differentiating between the ‘poetical’ and the ‘political,’ or the literary from 
the scientific.68  As such, with the rise of ethnography-as-science there begins the systematic 
‘elimination’ of qualities unfitting the objective goal of the anthropologist-as-interpreter:          
The qualities eliminated from science were localized in the category of ‘literature.’  Literary 
texts were deemed to be metaphoric and allegorical, composed of inventions rather than 
observed facts; they allowed a wide latitude to the emotions, speculations, and subjective 
‘genius’ of their authors.69 
 
That literature is here circumscribed as being ‘non-utilitarian,’ the domain rather for the “playing out of 
experimental, avant-garde transgressions,”70 in a converse distinction, ethnography-as-science reflects 
the opposite.  
 
It is here where we come to the issue of the ethnographer’s voice, and how the concern of objectivity 
works to mute the author’s opinions, emotions, and personal reflections so as to prevent these sorts of 
‘subjective views’ from “coloring objective facts.”71  Thus, the ethnographic text, with its dull, yet 
dependable style, assures a social scientific encounter with “reliable fact[s], precise thought, and well-
funded conclusions based on carefully reasoned analysis.”72  However, this is still not without 
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provocation, in that as this differentiation might eliminate the falsity of aesthetic intent on one end, it 
stimulates the ‘question of signature’ on the other.  That is, as an objective scientist undertaking a 
writing project, dictated by its own genre, and underscored with a particular style, how does one define 
the writer’s identity, if at all?  It is here, with this question of authorial signature within the text, where 
this discourse begins to shift away from the structure of functionalism, back toward a sense of the 
subjectively aesthetic.    
 
This, we might say, is the direct catalyst that leads to the literary qualities of the Literary Turn: with the 
return of the author’s voice, the ethnographic focus shifts from the culture toward the fieldwork, 
experience, and process, transmuting ‘ethnography’ into an insider’s account of an outsider within an 
unfamiliar context.  Then, as more texts become more literarily experimental, the limitations and 
restrictions drop away, revealing new styles; the aesthetic intent of the Literary Turn taking the form of 
textual creativity, with ‘ethnographic truth’ giving way to a particular construction made possible by 
“powerful ‘lies’ of exclusions and rhetoric.”73  Soon, the concept of ‘fiction’ itself is redefined—or, 
perhaps more appropriately, etymologically revisited—leading to another re-conceptualization of 
ethnography as embodying “serious true fictions,” the truth-claims within now “inherently partial.”74  
These things equally considered, the rise in value of the author’s signature leads as well toward a 
contested interpretation, and thus analytical challenge, directed at the means of achieving ethnographic 
authority.  It is to this second challenge in which we now turn.          
 
1.4—Challenge Two: The Author’s Signature and Function, and the Crisis of Authority  
The construction of a ‘writerly identity’ and the establishment of an ‘authorial presence’ within the text 
is something—as Geertz further claims—that has haunted the process of doing anthropology from the 
very beginning, albeit in a specifically ‘disguised’ way:       
Disguised, because it has been generally cast not as a narratological issue, a matter of how 
best to get an honest story honestly told, but as an epistemological one, a matter of how to 
prevent subjective views from coloring objective facts.  The clash between the expository 
conventions of author-saturated texts and those of author-evacuated ones that grows out of the 
particular nature of the ethnographic enterprise is imagined to be a clash between seeing 
things as one would have them and seeing them as they really are.75  
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The presence of the author within the text conjures a sense of ownership, whereby the author’s 
fingerprints are found in the way the text has come into existence.  This gives it an identity.  Whether 
the text itself falls on either side of the clash between things seen through a perspective, or just as they 
supposedly ‘are,’ it still originates as a product of an individual’s actions.  This, Geertz states, is the 
‘author-function,’ and this issue of both separating and identifying the author from/with the text, will 
become a major contributing factor to how we perform the Ethnographic Criticism to follow.  For now, 
however, we must turn our attention toward a brief discussion of the origins of the ‘author-function,’ 
how that in turn depicts the ethnographic text as a form of artifice, as well as how it exposes a larger 




Even where functionalist approaches ensure there does not occur “too close a connection between 
authorial style and the reality presented,”76 we still might discern a particular accent, either through the 
style of representation, or the way in which the research is formulated.  These accents become attached 
to individuals, especially by means of interests, so that by recognizing the name attached to the text—
such as Mead or Firth—we might know what to expect from the text itself.  However, what a 
functionalist methodology is meant to do is separate the name from the individual, so that when 
reading these texts we do not see them as encompassing a ‘Meadian’ or ‘Firthian’ inflection.  
 
With the Literary Turn this clear distinction becomes muddled.  Where it was once wholly absent or, if 
nothing else, marginally relegated to footnotes or appendices, the presence of the author ceases being 
epistemologically disguised.  In acknowledging the author’s ‘textual strategies,’ that is, the literary 
qualities used to recreate culture within a written account, we also come to acknowledge that not only 
do these accounts have a genesis, they have a creator as well.  How we then come to define the role of 
this creator plays a major part in the way ethnography is later conceptualized, based largely in part on 
Geertz’s concept of the ‘author-function,’ which poses the significant question as to what, in 
anthropological terms, “an author is?”77       
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In order to answer this, Geertz borrows—albeit critically—from Foucault’s ‘hyphenation,’ a 
determination the latter makes in his “What is an Author”78 (1977), that locates the ‘author-function’ 
between two particular discourses:  
Foucault distinguishes there, perhaps a bit too sharply, between two realms of discourse: 
those, most especially fiction (though history, biography, philosophy, and poetry as well), in 
which what he calls the ‘author-function’ remains, for the moment anyway, reasonably strong; 
and those, especially science (but also private letters, legal contracts, political broadsides), in 
which, for the most part, it does not.79  
 
From these two distinctions, we might conclude that because the identity of the ethnographer comes 
attached to discursive ‘systems of thought,’ such as what we see with Malinowski or, as Geertz offers, 
such as we might see with ‘Radcliffe-Brownian Functionalism’ or ‘Levi-Straussian Structuralism,’80 
anthropological writings fall under the distinction of the more literary type: “it is clear that, in these 
terms, anthropology is pretty much entirely on the side of ‘literary’ discourses rather than ‘scientific’ 
ones.”81  However, we might also argue, both against Geertz’s use of Foucault’s hyphenation, as well 
as equally against Foucault’s ‘sharp’ distinction, that any text is inherently dependent upon an author 
and, as such, cannot be separated from that creator in even the most objective terms.  Even prior to the 
Literary Turn authors are still fieldworkers, so that even when the research is conducted in the utmost 
functionalist and objective manner, the individual doing that anthropology is still an ‘individual,’ prone 
to a distinct style and accent.82  Likewise, we might also conclude that, with the rise of literary value, 
the author-function of post-Literary Turn ethnographic construction becomes something akin to a 
bipolarity, retaining the ‘factual’ objectivity of strict functionalism, while also appearing subjectively 
“evocative or artfully composed.”83  If nothing else, then, the ‘author-function’ acts as a practical 
means of disassociation, guiding us in determining the relative subjectivity or objectivity of a text by 
looking at the amount of ‘authorial presence’ we might find within.  What we mean by ‘presence,’ and 
how that is shaped ‘literarily,’ will come to determine a major shift in the adoption of reflexivity within 
anthropological writings, a reflexivity that challenges the notion that an author-absent text is more 
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authoritative—because of its objectivity—than an author-saturated one—because, as a subjective text, 
the author’s presence serves as substantiating evidence to support the author’s own work.  This is made 
all the more apparent when we consider the text itself as a result of calculated choices, and thus as an 
artifice.     
 
If we take into consideration that a text, regardless of the author’s level of presence within it, is still a 
product of that individual’s creating something, we must also come to recognize that what we are 
reading has been inspired by choice.  That is, the author does not merely allow facts and information to 
form ex nihilo on the page, but rather chooses certain data in order to shape the narrative into a 
formulation, a ‘story,’ developed from, and arising out of, the chaos of in-the-field perceptions.  This is 
a conscious act, and as such it is representative of the literary styles and processes inherent in any sort 
of writing, what Van Maanen (1988) translates as involving certain “narrative and rhetorical 
conventions,” such as personal expression, choice of metaphor, and textual organization.84   Moreover, 
these conscious choices additionally highlight the ‘presentational’ or, more properly, ‘representational’ 
qualities of fieldwork writing, drawing further attention to their “inherent story-like character.”85  For 
these reasons he refers to them as ‘tales,’ not entirely fictional in the sense that the facts within need to 
be placed between ‘quotation marks,’ but ‘fictional’ in that they are the byproduct of an interpretive 
act, constrained and limited by the author’s duty in decoding an observed narrative through “self-
consciously selected words.”86     
 
Related to our discussion above on the literary influences that might define ethnography, recognizing 
the text as carefully constructed by choice draws out a number of questions that seem to challenge the 
authoritative reliability of objective functionalism, particularly in how it differs from those amateur 
accounts against which its methods seem more authentic.  For instance, does merely recognizing the 
choices made by the ethnographer not diminish the text’s objective authority?  That is, does 
recognizing that the ethnographer has self-consciously arranged the text in a certain way not allude to 
the fact that the culture, as it is, has now become culture, as an individual perceives it?  In this way, 
like how learning the way the trick is performed diminishes the magic of the performance, does even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 John Van Maanen, Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988), 5. 
85 Ibid., 8. 
86 Ibid., 4. 
	  
	  34 
the most objective text not rely upon a subjective foundation, in that the author has chosen how it takes 
shape?  After all, it might be argued that even when authority is granted by means of the artful 
narration of one’s apparently strict objectivity, that same authority is diminished by the knowledge that 
the culture portrayed is the result of the conscious choices made by an intermediary between subject 
and reader.  Consequently, we might equally see even the most author-absent text as still being 
‘authored,’ and thus, just by means of the text’s existence, as less authoritative.  Given these 
revelations, then, we might ask, as Clifford (1988) does, how does someone attain the authority to 
“speak for a group’s identity or authenticity” when they merely function as a mediator involved in a 
literary act? 87  
    
These questions directly address the issue of authority after the Literary Turn; that is, after the 
acknowledgement of the author’s existence, and thus of the ethnography as artifice, wherein the rules, 
restrictions, and limitations of objective functionalism seem to collapse under the application of literary 
analysis.  They also speak to a rationalization in the shape of a balance—much like that seen in the 
discourse above—struck somewhere between an allegiance toward ethnographic functionalism and the 
creative act of writing.  This is perhaps best demonstrated by a stylistic demarcation made between the 
ethnographer’s omniscient and dispassionate voice—“the X do this”—and the more reflexive first-
person account—“I saw the X do this.”88 
 
In acknowledging and accepting the author’s role in writing the text, there also arises a focus on the 
“substantive theoretical role” of self-reflection.89  Gained through the “influence of perspectives on 
meaning and interpretation,” but most notably through ‘marks of enunciation,’ self-reflexivity becomes 
a paradoxical device for proving and re-interpreting the ethnographer/fieldworker’s “basic rhetoric of 
authority.”90  On one end, when the ethnographer becomes a character within the ethnographic 
narrative, the ethnography itself becomes both autobiographical—a description of the author’s 
involvement in forming the work, not just the finished product—and dialogical—what Clifford calls 
the narration of “interpersonal confrontations.”91  In this way, not only does the once dull and objective 
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narrative become relatable to the reader by means of empathy and sympathy, it also provides a 
viewpoint that speaks toward an evidential experience.  The text becomes a ‘speaking subject,’ 
something not just seen, but that “evades, argues, [and] probes back.”92  It gives a firsthand insight into 
the ‘complex interactions’ between researcher and subject, and provides the reader a look at the 
“emotions and personal beliefs” of the author without drastically hindering the ‘ethnographic 
intention.’93  So as not to mask these ideologies in objective silence, this is what Laterza (2007) marks 
as an opportunity to “discern the personal bias of the ethnographer.”94  
 
On the other end, though, reflexivity also further blurs the line between science and art, wherein a 
character’s ‘descriptions and dialogues’ equally become literary portrayals of events in which those 
very characters are involved, alongside the author, as “part of the narration.”95  This produces a sense 
of self-absorption, pointing the attention toward the author, not the subject, as if to acknowledge the 
former—and the former’s experience amid the latter—as the intended research target.  In this way, 
ethnography is further re-conceptualized as an insightful report of the ethnographer’s feelings and 
emotions, rather than a snapshot or recreation of an unfamiliar culture for academic purposes.   
 
Through acknowledging these elements—author function, the text as artifice, and self-reflexivity—the 
voice of the author defines a type of signature: a means with which ‘authority’ is achieved within the 
text, as well as another sense of ‘hybridization,’ a re-conceptualized process of consonance that 
translates the “intrusion of personal testimony”96 into a statement that imparts value.  In this way, 
textual authority becomes a negotiated principle, the center-point of debate between the foundations of 
functionalism and the heterodoxy of anthropological literary criticism.  
 
This brings us to a conclusive point.  From here, and after a brief interlude concerning the way the 
discussion above has inspired an ethnographic interplay between fact/fiction, our discussion below will 
turn from this sort of theoretical discourse, to an analysis of select data.  In this way, not only will this 
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Chapter assist in theoretically justifying our conception and use of Ethnographic Criticism in Part Two, 
it will equally provide solid examples to both support the theoretical analysis just provided, as well as 
substantiate the notion that our experimentation herein is not without a base upon which to grow.      
 
 
1.5—Ethnography between Fact/Fiction 
The re-interpretation of ‘ethnography’ after the Literary Turn tells a progressive story that speaks to a 
weakening barrier between fact/fiction by means of depicting the text as something artistically 
rendered.  At this stage it will further assist our discussion to review a few specifics.  First, and as a 
part of doing anthropology, ethnography was something intrinsic to functionalist research, equal in 
objective meaning to participant-observation, note taking, and learning another’s language.  It was, 
solely, a science.  Then, as we begin to view ethnography as a ‘product,’ the result of those other 
actions, it likewise begins to take on a particular meaning.  It becomes action, the process of writing, of 
compiling ideas and crafting characters out of perceived individuals.  As such, this writing depicts a 
style that seems to mimic certain literary qualities such as dialogue, plot, metaphor, and so on.  Then, 
this perception of ethnography-as-literature comes to challenge the traditional idea of ethnography-as-
science, the two forming a binary across two issues dealing with discourse—the way ethnography 
shifts from ‘part of the process’ to ‘product’—and signature—the means by which the author’s 
subjective presence in the text alters its scientific objectivity.   
 
From out of this arises a consolidation, the idea that the concept of ‘fiction’ represents something both 
‘made-from’ and ‘made-up.’  For example, Leach (1982), who perceives ‘insight’ as a type of ‘deep 
understanding’ only accessible via personal, emotional, and reflexive styles of writing, states that 
“social anthropology is not, and should not aim to be, a ‘science.’”97  He concludes, rather, that 
ethnography is, if anything, “a form of art.”98  Likewise, Marcus and Cushman, as well as Geertz, 
contend that the ‘fiction’ of ethnography is emulative of the ‘made-up’ qualities associated with 
“classic pattern[s] of development in literary genres,”99 such as “telling stories, making pictures, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Edmund Leach, “The Diversity of Anthropology” in Edmund Leach, Social Anthropology 
(Glasgow: Fontana Paperbacks, 1982), 52. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Marcus and Cushman, “Ethnographies as Texts,” 26-27. 
	  
	   37 
concocting symbolisms, and deploying tropes.”100  In this way, ethnography begins to appear more like 
Rapport’s citation above, something derived from one’s imagination: “for these writings are fictions, in 
which one form of life is represented in the categories of another.”101  As far as genre distinction is 
concerned, this consolidation appears like an inter-textual absorption, such as Van Maanen suggests by 
associating the holistic intent of ethnographic writing with “a novelist’s sense of narration.”102    
 
While this inter-textuality between ethnography and fiction, rendered here as the adoption of fictional 
style to objective translation—“social anthropologists are bad novelists rather than bad scientists”103—
appears as a progressive challenge to the functionalist style standardized prior to the Literary Turn, it is 
in fact more indicative of a ‘retreat.’  As Langness and Frank (1978) point out, a number of pre-
functionalist accounts marked ‘unscientific’ by objective realism are, in fact, defined by this same sort 
of textual interrelatedness.  Traced back to Bandelier’s 1890 story of the Keresan Pueblos, The Delight 
Makers, this early ethnographic genre depicts a hybridized style of factual/fictional, the representation 
of ‘sober facts’ as more “accessible to the general public.”104  Likewise to Bandelier, we might find an 
equal hybridization with Rasmussen’s (1908) The People of the Polar North and Parson’s (1922) 
American Indian Life.  Not unlike the roman à clef—a novel that fictionalizes real life—these early 
ethnographic fictions, as Langness and Frank concede, reveal a “legitimate if not perfectly ordinary 
means of description.”105  
 
Our data analysis below will address this consolidation by focusing on two literary outcomes: 
ethnography written like fiction, and fiction read like ethnography.  By concentrating our discussion on 
these two literary consequences, this analysis will assist the intentions of this Thesis in two ways: first, 
by furthering the foundational importance theoretically mapped out in the discussion above with usable 
and tangible examples; and second, by thematically priming the experimental style of our own analysis 
in Part Two.  That is, by rendering the means with which the Literary Turn inspired anthropologists to 
‘fictionalize’ their ethnographies—which will equally affect the style of our Ethnographic Criticism—
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as well as how this then encouraged a critical assessment of fictional texts for their anthropological 
insight—the intent of that Ethnographic Criticism—the following will provide an almost point-by-
point structure with which to bolster, as well as frame, our intentions in Part Two. 
 
1.6—Fact/Fiction: The Ethnographic Novel  
The genre of ‘ethnographic fiction’ is described as a ‘hybrid’ that bridges the “distance between 
literature and anthropology;”106 blurs the “relationship between the ethnographer and the novelist;”107 
and advances a perspective on the “plots and counterplots of life”108 not available to the objective and 
standard ethnographic text.  Considered a type of, and even written like, a novel, this genre seeks to 
incorporate the art of writing into the scientific process of doing anthropology, retaining the focus on 
the “accurate description of another way of life,” but with the “addition of character and plot.”109  
Langness and Frank further describe this incorporation by means of a nominal appropriation:       
If interpretation and explication of others’ lives is the goal, the novel may prove a better 
medium than the standard or topical ethnography.  If we acknowledge our creative abilities 
rather than pretend they do not exist, if we allow ourselves to read perceptively, and if we are 
honest about our intent and limitations in presenting ethnographic materials, there would seem 
to be no compelling reason that an ethnographic novel would not be as useful or as legitimate 
as the standard monographs.110 
 
Likewise, Fernea (1989) defines the ethnographic novel as a text dictated by the style used, applying 
the broad conception of ‘fiction’ to the adoption of literary form: “It is a text, like other literary texts, 
that in the course of presenting a fictional story creates a setting (or physical and social context), 
characters (or people), plot and action.”111  This process, she contends, affords a number of advantages 
over the traditional ethnography: “The novelist need not shun conflict, anger, hatred, or passion, and 
may often become a participant in the drama of the novel in a way denied the ethnographer, who has in 
the past been at pains to observe carefully and not to become too involved.”112 
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Somewhat related, but more cautiously reasoned, Tallman (2002) makes the argument that the use of 
the ‘novel’ as a comparable medium acts as an ‘entry point’ to the cultural insight found within, 
serving the ethnographer as an “imaginative field of study itself.”113  Moreover, in comparing the 
ethnographer with the novelist she asserts that the once perceived separation—put in place by 
functionalism—appears, after the Literary Turn, as “somewhat artificial.”114  That is, as she asserts that 
both tend to consciously ‘stand apart,’ marginalized by the cultures they intend to describe, and bound 
by albeit differing disciplinary processes concerning the act of making the “familiar strange and the 
strange familiar,”115 the ethnographer and the novelist share more than just the construction of texts: 
both are observers, individuals separate from the group, whose attempts at putting ‘into words’ the 
“results of their observations and their ruminations on what they have observed,” equally draw on the 
“conventions and traditions of writers before them.”116  Though these similarities paint a picture of a 
correlation without complications, Tallman does not discount the differences either.  Notably, where 
ethnographers give themselves the task of describing a culture, “in such a way that observers might 
come to similar conclusions were they to explore the same culture,” the novelist, unbound by such 
methodological restrictions, strives for a “fresh, unique, [and] original description of life.”117   
 
These sorts of complications, given the experimentation of the genre in general, raise a number of 
questions as to what, exactly, is meant by the concept of an ‘ethnographic novel.’  For the sake of 
clarity we might state that what Langness and Frank, Fernea, and Tallman are discussing is a style of 
writing: developed within the intellectual climate wherein not only are ethnographies being treated like 
‘literary texts,’ but novels are also being treated as ‘cultural’ ones, ethnographic fiction, or rather, 
ethnography written like fiction, depicts an amalgamated and unique textual format.  Emerging out of 
this, we see a new vision of culture, re-structured “through imagination and art,”118 by ‘ethnographers-
as-novelists’ who now use a “rich and flexible prose style quite beyond what anthropologists have 
employed to date.”119  Turning here from description to example, our discussion will begin with two 
Moroccan examples: Crapanzano’s (1980) Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan and Dwyer’s (1982) 
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Moroccan Dialogues.120  While not in any measure the sort of ethnographic fictions we will discuss 
shortly, these two texts are ideal for easing us out of the strict functionalism described above, and into 
the experimental literary texts below.  In fact, with the former’s use of a single-character narrative, and 
the latter’s conversational use of dialogue, their ability to slide precariously along the slippery axis 
between the ethnographic novel and the ‘standard monograph’ ideally places them right at the nexus 




Considering the slow progression toward accepting the novel as a useful medium for ethnographic 
writing, our first example is initially “designed to shock.”121  That is, given the anthropologist’s wholly 
neutral position traditionalized by functionalism, Crapanzano’s Tuhami is designed to offer the reader 
an opportunity to realize the ethical and political relationship cultivated between individuals within the 
ethnographic encounter.  Focusing on the face-to-face confrontation, the point-of-contact between 
subject and anthropologist, Crapanzano’s text means to ‘shock’ by jarring both the reader and writer 
out of the “complacency with which they have succumbed to the determinants of their respective 
endeavors.”122  The experimentation in Tuhami is predominately found within its intention to turn the 
reader’s eye toward the process of ethnographic construction, particularly in regard to the ethical and 
political ramifications inherent in the ethnographer’s use of choice:       
As anthropologists, we have a responsibility to the people we study, if not our readers, to 
recognize the ethical and political implications of our discipline.  Every interpretive strategy, 
including those implicit within description itself, involves choice and falls, thereby, into the 
domain of ethics and politics.123 
 
However, Crapanzano’s method of doing this is not without the use of unconventional—fictional—
style.  Tuhami utilizes a combination of certain genres, an integration of the ‘case history’—similar to 
biography wherein the goal is to present a “view of the subject from the perspective of an outsider”—
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with the ‘life-history’—a style like the autobiography wherein the subject is presented from within “his 
own perspective.”124  Stylistically, the text is both like, and unlike, both of these genres.  It differs from 
the biography in that a great deal of the text is embodied by Tuhami’s direct ‘recitations,’ and it differs 
from the autobiography due to these recitations originating as responses to Crapanzano’s questions.125  
Moreover, because Crapanzano plays a significant role in the formation of Tuhami’s story—“as 
Tuhami’s interlocutor, I became an active participant in his life-history, even though I rarely appear 
directly in his recitations”126—the text is a co-written, polyvocal encounter.   
 
This is not, however, the only way in which Tuhami is a literary experiment.  In that the text is meant 
to shock by providing both the ‘frozen picture’ of the subject and the subject’s culture, as well as offer 
a glimpse of the encounter between subject and author, the interrelated style drifts carefully along the 
border of our two conceptions of fiction.  In one respect, Crapanzano’s formation of the text so as to 
locate within Tuhami’s story an allusion toward the “traditional Moroccan social hierarchy, patterns of 
authority, and attitudes toward paternal and maternal figures,”127 is representational of the holistic 
conception of fiction as ‘made-from.’  In another, guided by the “permitted ‘blend’ of the imaginary 
and the real,”128 the use of Tuhami as a character, brought to life by means of dialogue and narrative 
storytelling, reflect the idioms of fiction as ‘made-up.’  This latter category is further reflected not only 
in the shared style of the text and Crapanzano’s voice throughout—“Tuhami was, as I have said, an 
illiterate Moroccan Arab”129—but is also found in his own reflection of the text as relational to the 
‘modern novel.’  For these reasons, then, Tuhami demonstrates an inaugural emersion, a poly-thematic 
treatment of literary style incorporated into an objective construction.   
 
Equally driven by a shared concern with providing the reader a text that properly reflects “the nature of 
the fieldwork experience,”130 Dwyer’s Moroccan Dialogues follows from Tuhami with a focus on 
‘transcription;’ and it is designed around what Dwyer perceives as the need for a form of writing that 
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moves beyond the “depersonalized, decontextualized, and non-reflexive perspectives”131 of traditional 
objectivity.  However, this is not meant as a call for a text that is entirely subjective or absolutely 
author-saturated:  
I did not want to overemphasize the subjectivity and/or interiority of Self (that is, of the 
anthropologist and his/her own society), nor did I want to foster the illusion that there could 
be an ‘objective’ transcription of lived experience into a text supposedly faithful to it—on the 
contrary, I believed it to be quite obvious that the very idea of a text ‘faithful’ to lived 
experience was oxymoronic.132 
 
As he further argues, because ‘traditional’ anthropological genres are dependent upon a “contemplative 
epistemology that effectively divorces Self from Other and places the Self beyond criticism,”133 this 
has the inevitable tendency to lead toward a ‘systematic neglect,’ on the part of the anthropologist, of 
three fundamental ‘dialogical’ features of the experience itself: its ‘temporal dimension,’ ‘contingent 
nature,’ and nature of ‘embarkation.’134  With these in mind, and in answer to the quintessential 
question, “what is the larger purpose of the text,”135 Dwyer’s focus on ‘transcriptions,’ defined as 
“transformations of oral communication into written form,”136 and seen as distorted by the ‘clear 
research project’s’ suppression of the “spontaneity and normal behavior” between subject and 
observer, acts as a thematic challenge.137  Thus, and so he concludes, a concentration on the dialogical 
encounter between subject—Other—and object—Self—permits an exposure of these deficiencies in 
such a way as to convey the experience itself, without repeating these oversights to the detriment of the 
anthropologist’s work. 
 
By allowing his subject—the ‘Faqir’—to tell his own story, in his own words, Dwyer is attempting to 
further allow the spontaneity of the encounter to be his text’s stylistic guide.  As such, the Faqir’s story 
is dialogical, the encounter and relationship between Dwyer—object—and the Faqir—subject—
appearing on the page much like a scripted conversation.  In further establishing his reasoning, he 
defines this dialogical structure as a rejection of what he deems the two customary, and thus 
traditionalized, styles of textual presentation in the anthropological encounter:  
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One is to interpret the experience according to the norms of ‘science’ and to create an object 
for study (or, as the anthropologist might say, an ‘Other’) that is strictly distinct from the 
subject who studies it (the ‘Self’).  […]  Or, the anthropologist may reject science and insist 
on the unique and personal aspects of the experience, trying to recount that experience 
subjectively, in a manner somewhat akin to a novel.”138 
 
This latter rejection is equally two sided: first, because he sees the scientific approach as radically 
distorting the interactional experience by overlooking the “role played by the anthropologist in 
constructing the situation,” and second, because in the subjective description this experience is 
presented ‘naively,’ so that the text appears without consulting the “implications of the anthropologist’s 
presence and comportment.”139  In this way, he equates the textual process of ‘filling in the spaces’ 
within the dialogical encounter as conducting an act of ‘made-from’ fictionalization: “the 
anthropologist may take substantial liberties in remodeling the object, organizing it into selected 
themes, neglecting ‘irrelevant’ details, combining separate events and ignoring chronology—all in 
accord with the canons of science.”140   
 
Overall, his eleven dialogues141 take up the notion of fictional style in a rather similar manner to 
Crapanzano’s.  By focusing solely on the dialogue and allowing his subject to speak for himself, his 
text marks a progressive move toward a particular literary genre.  This is by all means due in part to his 
challenge toward the customary manner of textualizing culture, each of which reveal a facet of his 
text’s novelization: the dialogical process, the saturation of Dwyer within the text, and the means by 
which the ‘magic’ of the process is revealed.  Moreover, his use of dialogue speaks to a methodology 
that, not unlike the ‘oral history,’ casts each participant into roles like characters, as suggested by his 
description of each under the banner ‘Cast of Characters’ at the start of the text.142              
 
The literary experimentation of Moroccan Dialogues, aimed at presenting culture without the deficient 
involvement of textual translation is, like Tuhami, symbolic of the ironic transmutation of 
‘ethnography’ alongside criticisms of the restrictions posed by objective functionalism.  This is 
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somewhat suggested in Tedlock’s (1987) own experimental defense of the former text’s apparent lack 
of ethnography, where in his own constructed dialogue with himself—monologue?—he both defends 
and critiques Dwyer’s own constructivism: “those interviews are ethnographically formed and shaped 
at every step, and they would be even if we stripped away Dwyer’s commentaries.”143  As he further 
argues, the ethnography is in fact still present, only now, and in order to permit the anthropological 
encounter the freedom of action, it has been marginally relegated to footnotes and personal 
commentary, accounting for “45 percent of the book.”144  When compared to Marcus and Fischer’s 
(1986) initial description of the author’s voice in traditional ethnography, we find an ironic example of 
the way in which these texts have advanced the notion of ethnographic discourse and signature:   
Unlike the functionalist ethnography in which the writer was absent or had only a marginal 
voice in footnotes and prefaces, the presence in the text of the writer and the exposure of 
reflections concerning both his fieldwork and the textual strategy of the resulting account have 
become, for very important theoretical reasons, pervasive marks of current experiments.145  
 
Perhaps more ‘bridge’ than blending, these Moroccan examples exhibit the early adoption of the 
“inherent story-like character”146 of fieldwork accounts: while at the same time both ‘sophisticated and 
naïve’ and ‘confessional and analytic,’ the rhetorical style of these accounts yields to that of the 
autobiography or “ironic self-portrait,”147 at the center of which stands the ethnographer, now both a 
writer of the story, as well as a character within it.  Moreover, in their precarious use of fictional style, 
there appears as well an attempt here at reviving an essence lost to the more structured and objective 
text, a sense of ‘evocation’ found in the course of the researcher becoming one with his or her subject.  
In this process the ethnographer undergoes a sort of transformation, not just in literary style, but also of 
his or her place within the larger development of research and writing.       
 
This ‘sense of evocation,’ what Stewart (1989) associates with a vivid literary implementation,148 and 
what Tyler (1986) extols over mere ‘representation,’149 speaks to an insertion of the ethnographer into 
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his or her field of inquiry.  Like Dwyer’s renewed marriage of the once divorced Self and Other, this 
likewise depicts an outsider who is speaking to us from inside the culture he or she means to recreate.  
This becomes one of the defining characteristics of ethnographic fiction, the ethnographer’s text itself 
shaped in such a way as to depict a quasi-autobiographical insider’s account, an evocative description 
that is defined as either being “written from within the culture” by a professional insider or outsider,150 
or as a representation of the ethnographic experience itself.  This latter description comes from Marcus 
and Fischer, whose definition of the ‘ethnographic novel’ is that of a product of dissatisfaction that 
takes the duplicitous form of a particular methodological type:  
Such literatures offer not only expressions of indigenous experience, unavailable in any other 
form, but also constitute, as similar literatures do in our own society, indigenous 
commentaries as a form of autoethnography that in particular concerns itself with the 
representation of experience.151   
 
This newly established and multi-meaning style of writing, the ‘auto-ethnography’ is a summation of 
the ‘going native’ immersion of the ethnographer in his or her own text through the process of self-
reflexivity and fictional incorporation, what Fernea—echoing Marcus and Fischer—defines as “written 
by an artist within the culture.”152  Admittedly, the term has a much wider genealogy,153 so that before 
examining the examples below, a brief explication is necessary in order to clarify our own 




The initial use of the term can be traced to Heider’s (1975) study of the Dani in West New Guinea, and 
his inquisitive approach to ‘what people do—“akhuni nena hakakhatek [emphasis in original].”154  
Experimental in its own way, Heider’s conception of ‘auto-ethnography’ stems from asking the 
‘absurdly simple’ question, ‘what do people do,’ to sixty Grand Valley Dani children, the result of 
which provided a definition of the lived experience of the Dani in terms of the “routine activities of 
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gardening and cooking,” rather than “in terms of war and ritual.”155  He refers to this definition as a 
Dani auto-ethnography: “‘auto’ for autochthonous, since it is the Dani's own account of ‘what people 
do;’ and ‘auto’ for automatic, since it is the simplest routine-eliciting technique imaginable.”156   
 
Beyond this genesis, it is perhaps with Reed-Danahay’s (1997) conception where we receive the most 
balanced interpretation of the term.  Built from Hayano’s (1979) notion as a position focused on the 
‘insider’ status of the ethnographer,157 differentiating between auto-ethnography as a written text from 
a distinctly ‘insider’s’ perspective—either by a member of a culture, or by someone adopted into it—
and ‘autobiographical writing,’ Reed-Danahay uncovers a double-sense typology.158  On one end there 
is the ‘nativisation’ of ethnography, the process by which the text becomes a “form of writing wherein 
the ethnographer is the native.”159  This type is affected by the author’s position in the text itself, such 
as suggested by Van Maanen (1995), who defines it as the process in which the “culture of the writer’s 
own group is textualized,”160 or as Strathern (1987) conceives it, as the idea of anthropology “carried 
out in the social context which produced it.”161  On the other, there is what she classifies as the 
‘biographical type,’ that defined by Brandes (1982), Denzin (1989),162 and Wolcott (1995)163 as writing 
that mimics the biographical ‘case-history’ and autobiographical ‘life-history’ previously discussed 
herein, the text composed as either a “strictly first-person narrative told by ‘a commoner, an ordinary 
member of his or her society,’”164 or in which the “anthropologist himself or herself is the 
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autobiographical subject.”165  As a fusion of ethnographic and autobiographical style, this conception 
rejects the perception of the ethnographer as an ‘objective outsider,’ while at the same time 
incorporates certain “elements of one’s own life experience when writing about others.”166  For our 
interests herein, her double-sense definition works as a stipulation that, as we shall see, not only assists 
in elucidating how ethnography is constructed literarily,167 but also directs our reading of it toward an 
experimental appreciation of how the shifting identity of the ethnographer helps transcend the wall of 




Where Reed-Danahay’s theoretical analysis gives us an insight into how the concept comes of shape, it 
is Ellis’ (2004) practical usage, in the process of defining it, that perhaps works best as a transitional 
example with which to introduce the ethnographic novels below.  Experimental to the point of meta-
narration, Ellis’ The Ethnographic I presents the fictional style of auto-ethnography by means of a 
fictionalized academic course, taught by the author, and told through plot, dialogue, and narration.  
Working with a definition put forth in a previous text with Bochner (2000), Ellis depicts auto-
ethnography as an “autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of 
consciousness, connecting the personal to the cultural.”168  Her definition here is anchored solidly on 
the latter end of our spectrum between fact and fiction, particularly in how it adopts thematic elements 
related to “poetry, fiction, novels, photographic essays, personal essays, journals, fragments, and 
layered writing,” in which the action and dialogue within the text are “dialectically revealed through 
action, feeling, thought, and language [emphasis in original].”169  Indeed conceived as a shift in the 
ethnographer’s position from outsider to insider, Ellis’ equation of auto-ethnography with fictional 
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forms—“thus, autoethnography claims the conventions of literary writing”170—marks a point along our 
progression wherein the style of writing has become dependent upon a theoretical approach, the 
methodological concerns of which focus on the same conditions pertinent to the way a novel “engages 
readers in its plot.”171 
 
We might state, then, that the novels presented below—Jackson (1986), Knab (1995), and Richard and 
Sally Price (1995)—are ‘true ethnographic fictions’ in that they represent the theoretical methodologies 
of literary auto-ethnography in practical form.172  That is, where Ellis’ text above, and Wolf’s (1992) 
text below, stand with a foot each on the shores of theory and practice, these three examples display 
ethnographic fiction and auto-ethnography as it functions and appears in words on the page.  It should 
as well be noted that signifying these as ‘true’ does not denote a sense of ‘truthfulness’ or ‘factuality,’ 
but rather indicates a representational ‘purity.’  As such, while literary in that they each employ the 
tropes of plot, dialogue, and characterization, they are not auto-ethnographically equal, so that while 
we may be able to further state that they are collectively auto-ethnographic in their inclusion and use of 
reflexivity and literary narration, they do not uniformly share the same perceptions of that term. 
 
Divided into three parts—the political and historical contextualization of Sierra Leone, followed by 
two unique ethnographic examinations—Jackson’s Barawa and the Ways the Birds Fly in the Sky is 
told via a fictionalized third-person narration, with Jackson himself appearing within his text as if 
existent upon two planes of consciousness between memory and narrative invention.  He describes 
himself as ‘The Anthropologist,’ Michael, a ‘Kuranko Bard’ cast as narrator, who seizes upon the 
stories told to him by others so as to shape the text into an “allegory of cultures in contact.”173  It is in 
this way that his own story becomes ‘analogous to others,’ the story of the Barawa functioning as much 
like a fictional narrative as his own.  Stylistically, Jackson’s novel presents an auto-ethnographic 
immersion, the author/ethnographer faced with the challenge of presenting a first-hand experiential 
interpretation of the Other written from “within their consciousness of history,” and in order to bridge 
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the gap “between aspects of his own experience and theirs.”174  Once characterized, then, Jackson’s 
narrated Self becomes synchronous with the Barawa Other, a genealogical intermarriage based on 
commonality between subject and object:     
For it was his hope that anthropology might move away from a yearning for essences, causes, 
and determinate meanings to an open-ended quest for connections and juxtapositions—
striking common chords, finding common ground, disclosing common historical horizons 
without the pretense of arriving at any necessary truth.175 
 
Thematically similar, though told from a first-person perspective, Knab’s A War of Witches begins with 
an allegorical introduction that sets up the plot, conflicts, and leading characters of the text.  Excusing 
himself from a recording session with an informant—‘Don Inocente,’ whom he describes as a “master 
narrator, an accomplished teller of tales”176—Knab, the narrator/protagonist places himself into a 
metaphorical tableau, wherein he becomes an eavesdropping outsider listening to his subjects converse 
in a dialect—Nahuat—they believe he is unable to translate.  This unexpected observation reveals to 
Knab—and us—that not only is Don Inocente a witch doctor, but that the interaction between him and 
his ‘client’ involves a contractual agreement of murder.  While literarily depicted as a ‘happy accident,’ 
this chance encounter serves a unique narrative purpose.  It sets both Knab and his text on a specific 
trajectory, and draws him—as well as us, empathetically—into an unexpected and unknown culture.  In 
this way, his narrative is shaped around the thematic elements of mystery and intrigue, the telling of a 
story within a story, with Don Inocente as his guide and informant.  Though classified in the same 
category as Barawa, A War of Witches is a comparatively different ethnographic novel.  First, the 
differentiation between third- and first-person narration places Knab in an altered state of 
characterization, generating a sense of autobiographical transference wherein the action, conflicts, and 
dialogues are not just happening to Knab the author/ethnographer, but to the reader as well.  
Additionally, where Jackson’s Part One alludes to the ‘factuality’ of his text, Knab includes two 
substantiating and wholly objective venues: an historical Afterword that offers the reader a glimpse of 
the facts within the fiction; and a glossary of terms, so as to remind the reader that though it looks 
fictional, the story within the text is actually based in fact.  Lastly, with his focus on mystery, an 
allegorical nod to the process of detection in researching and writing ethnography, Knab’s text 
develops what Pierson (1989) refers to as the comparative literary style between ethnography and 
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mystery fiction: by means of the mystery novelist’s “extensive use of a variety of geographic and 
cultural settings,” as well as the “considerable cultural information” they adopt in their attempts at 
presenting finite details as ‘evidence,’ detective literature looks in many ways quite ethnographic.177  
   
In much the same way that the mystery element plays a role in shaping the content and plot of Knab’s 
text, we see this repeated in Richard and Sally Prices’ Enigma Variations.  Perhaps the most distinctive 
of our examples here, their novel presents an equally symbolic narrative, the story on the surface—two 
anthropologists tasked with proving the authenticity of certain artifacts—providing an outlet for the 
story hidden beneath—a metaphorical correlation with the difficulty in determining something as 
authentic, such as an ethnographic text.  That is, in their fixation on differentiating the genuine from the 
fabricated, and battered by the ‘mental Ping-Pong’ of these sorts of binary oppositions,178 their 
investigations of the physical artifacts in the story become stand-ins for the verbal artifacts an 
anthropologist collects in the field.  While the uniqueness of their text is distinctively found in this 
metaphorical symbolism, it is also located in the plot as well.  Where our previous examples stick 
seemingly close to an ethnographic format, Enigma Variations never quite separates itself from the 
mystery narrative.  Because of this, and because the artifacts in the text might also be seen as symbols 
of the culture in which they exist, the process of their authentication equally becomes a symbol of the 
translation of that culture into a written text.  In this way, when we eventually discover that the artifacts 
they are investigating for the fictionalized Musee d’Equatoria—perhaps based on the Musée Des 
Cultures Guyanaises that opened in 1995—are indeed forgeries, this becomes a caveat for the 
perceptions we might have about what might look real or fake, a difficult and obsessive—even life-
threatening in their telling—task that leaves a blemished mark on the implicit foundation of 
ethnographic authenticity.  This final statement is perhaps best embodied by the conclusive description 
of their fictionalized selves chasing the ghost of an eccentric art dealer—who played a major role in 
their narrative—and their final description of him as a theoretical ‘third man.’179           
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Running through each of these examples is a shift into the unknown or the taboo, both in writing style, 
as well as in subject matter.  This positions each of them in such a way as to mark a significance in 
their experimental content, the subject matter only accessible via this sort of non-traditional 
experimentation.  These novels are heavily metaphorical, filled with characters, conflicts, and 
emotional reflections, which draw the reader into fictional worlds that are no less real.  Perhaps this is 
the most poignant aspect of the ethnographic novel, of ethnographies written like fiction: a style that 
not only presents a re-created culture in a new and engaging way, but that brings the reader, either 
professional or not, into the world itself.  Alongside the facts and details, then, is an emotional 
connection with the author and the author’s subject, a metaphorical self-reflection on the process of 
constructing ethnography in general, and an imposture of the way in which ethnographers attempt to 
enter the minds of their subjects in order to see their world through their eyes.  This method is indeed a 
seminal part of conducting life histories, of writing an informant’s autobiography, and allowing them to 
speak for the culture itself.  In an exchange of perspective and literary embodiment, this has the equal 
power to make any individual who reads such a text an anthropologist in their own way: the reader 
embodies the ethnographer, who has embodied the informant, so that their culture becomes that much 




To conclude our progressive discussion here on the literary influences that have affected writing 
ethnography, we turn to a final example that, in contrast to Ellis’ application of the theoretical in 
practical form, should act as a decent mode of transition.  In critical response to issues of ‘colonialism’ 
in ethnography, Wolf focuses her Thrice-Told Tale on the experimental remedies of post-modernism, 
presenting three different types of writing—invented fiction, ‘unanalyzed’ fieldnotes, and objective 
ethnographic text—as testable data that each reflect, in different ways, the influence of textual 
translation on in-the-field research.180  While admittedly accepting that each of these three stylistically 
differentiated texts “involve the same set of events,”181 she does not accept that they stand as equal 
accounts.  Moreover, she uses this differentiation to argue that while her invented fiction might “evoke 
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a setting, a social context, an involvement of all the senses in ways that enhance understanding,”182 it 
does not equal its matching ethnographic account in “conveying information, analysis, and 
understanding about gender, shamanism, and power relations in a Chinese community.”183  While this 
criticism is indeed indicative of the issues addressed by post-modernist and literary interpretations of 
ethnographic construction, rather than focus on the borrowing of fictional style in order to add an 
artistic nuance to a scientific text, it is mostly concentrated on the possibility of fiction standing in as 
ethnographic writing.  As such, while her overall criticism acts as a decent bookend to Ellis’ The 
Ethnographic I, her critical refusal to acknowledge an invented fiction—such as her Hot Spell—as 
being equally authentic as a ‘proper’ ethnography, conveniently leads us to the “blurry rather than 
sharp”184 aspect of reading fiction as a source of cultural insight.	  
 
1.7—Fact/Fiction: The Novel as Ethnography 
With the analysis above, our notion about the influences and outcomes of the Literary Turn revealed 
the consequences a literary effect might have on the style and process of writing an anthropological 
text like a novel.  With the short analysis below, our attention will turn toward the secondary outcome: 
these same influences turned toward the utility, or even ability, of reading a novel like an ethnography.  
While this might seem like a somewhat disjointed progression, it actually shares many of the same 
roots as our first outcome.  One in specific reaches all the way back to Malinowski himself who, 
though critical of the novel as a ‘trashy’ substitute to non-fiction, spoke highly of Conrad’s writing as a 
“window open on life.”185  In fact, in Sam’s (1974) study of Malinowski’s ‘addiction’ to fiction during 
his time in New Guinea, he cites the anthropologist as considering Conrad’s writing as “a surrogate 
reality,”186 a textual representation that, though seemingly beneficial to our attempts at capturing the 
ways of life of a different culture, is still divorced from the authentic nature of an ethnographic non-
fiction.  This quite poignantly sums up the discussion below.      
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In the following review we will look at certain theoretical and practical examples of scholars who have 
attempted to answer the question: if ethnographic texts are read critically for their literary merits, which 
then demands a more literary and reflective means of writing that makes ethnography look like realist 
fiction, would the next logical step not be to consider those same fictions as offering cultural insight in 
an auto-ethnographic sense?  The answer, as we shall see, will not only provide another facet to this 
Chapter’s progressive consideration of the ways in which we might blur the line between fact and 
fiction in the pursuit of cultural insight, it will also ultimately influence the methodological style with 




To begin, Fernea (1989) traces within this further blurring of fact/fiction what she refers to as an 
underlining ‘strangeness,’ an odd and blatant disregard for “written works of the imagination,” given 
the anthropologist’s and the ethnographer’s shared “interest in myth, legend, and proverb.”187  As such, 
she argues that if the novel—in her case Anan’s Sitt Marie-Rose (1982)—were to be analyzed as an 
experimental ethnography, not too unlike the ethnographic novel, then the invented ‘short pieces’ and 
‘voices’ of the characters could easily be interpreted as equal to “quotations from interviews and 
fieldnotes.”188  Therefore, because the novel’s intent is focused on providing the reader with the 
“sequences of events in the society” portrayed within, as well as the “reactions of individual informants 
to those events,”189 its ethnographic nature is validated.  However, though this experimental analysis 
offers another analytical interpretation of the blurred relationship between objective and subjective 
texts, and while Fernea’s argument supports the ‘logical next step’ from writing ethnography like 
fiction to reading fiction as ethnography, it leaves out the essential discussion of exactly how that 
might be done.   
 
With Banks (1990), this issue begins to get resolved, as for him the novel becomes a useful tool for 
deciphering how cultural concepts are imagined, presented, acknowledged, and then used.  Reflective 
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of Anderson’s (1983) notion of ‘imagined communities,’190 Banks’ inspiration for examining fictional 
texts stems from his attempt at understanding a Malaysian Islamic resurgence as seen through the 
works of novelists writing from within that resurgence itself.  Using four novels as examples, and in 
analyzing the plots and characters in regard to the factors affecting social solidarity found within, 
Banks is enabled to “abstract reasonably coherent conceptions of Malay society.”191  As such, he is 
likewise able to reveal how these authors ‘gain their audience’ by “encapsulating, crystalizing, and 
articulating shared social ideas and sentiments,” so that their culturally related readers might “build on 
positive images and reject negative ones.”192  Thus, less fiction-as-ethnography and more fiction-as-
discursively-fashioned, these novels become sources for understanding how novels themselves—
“symbolic constructs that draw upon their author’s perceptions of the real world”193—might shape, and 
be shaped by, a ‘perceived reality.’194  While this method reveals more of an insight into how cultural 
transitions alter fictional accounts within that transition, and how, in reverse, those fictional accounts 
might then shape the results of that cultural transition, the novel-as-ethnographic here is indeed a 
plastic distinction.  As a conclusion, Banks attempts to solidify this through Anderson’s conception that 
national communities selectively draw upon their own history in order to “foster social solidarity,” in 
much the same way a “novelist may construct a plot and create characters to suit didactic purposes.”195 
 
This conception of the novel as an ethnographic ‘source’ is equally found in Stewart (1989), and then 
picked up by Handler and Segal (1990), and Eriksen (1994).  In each, the novel becomes a secondary 
source for the ethnography, a ‘case study’ that is beneficial, yet still unequal, much like Malinowski’s 
notion of ‘surrogate reality.’  With Stewart this is embodied by Turner’s (1975) concept of ‘social 
drama,’196 wherein the “relationships between a selected number of individuals” within a novel are 
interpreted against the “social environment to which, and for which, they are responsible.”197  In this 
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way, as a case study, the novel becomes useful by revealing culture as a ‘subject of discourse’ for the 
ethnographic text.  In a similar manner, Handler and Segal’s treatment of select novels by Jane Austen 
as though they contain “the record of a social world amenable to cultural analysis of the kind typically 
practiced by symbolic anthropologists,”198 determines the novel-as-source as an exemplar of both 
‘intercultural translation’ and ‘intracultural defamiliarization.199  Using these novels as sources for 
which they might interpret both the cultural construction within the writing of ethnography, as well as 
in the anthropological process itself, they equally rely on the ‘organizing principles’ of the novel-as-
medium in order to comprehend a “social world that is partially foreign and partially familiar.”200   
 
While these two examples provide an introductory insight into the utility of the novel as an 
ethnographic source, Eriksen’s distinction between the scientific and the artistic—“fictional accounts 
[…] present persons and events which have been invented by the writer […] anthropological texts try 
to present a few aspects of social reality as accurately as possible”201—provides for an equally dualistic 
relationship between the notion of the novel-as-source and the novel-as-description.  His intention with 
these two forms is further delineated between two points, on one end set on exploring both the 
“possible practical uses of fiction in ethnographic research,”202 while on the other making sure to 
maintain the oppositional relationship between ‘fictitious’ and ‘anthropological’ modes of writing.  By 
means of the former, he recognizes the fiction as something that is evidentially expedient to the 
understanding of social constructs, but that needs to be cautiously approached: “novels, which are 
simultaneously the production of a society and contributions to the self-definition and reification of that 
society, have the additional virtue of presenting some kind of ethnographic evidence—although the 
status of such ethnographic material can be uncertain.”203  That is, though he acknowledges the 
“qualities of a sociological analysis”204 found in certain fictions, he affirms not to make use of these 
novels as ethnographic surrogates: “they cannot be used as plain ethnography since they do not profess 
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to represent the truth.”205  For this reason, he stipulates the importance of clarifying the novel-as-
source—“the reader must be familiar with the society at the outset of the reading”—from the novel-as-
description—the reader of which need not have “such prior knowledge.”206  As examples, he defines 
Mittelholzer’s (1979) A Morning at the Office as a source, and Naipaul’s (1961) A House for Mr. 
Biswas, as a description.   
 
While he maintains that A Morning at the Office is “an important piece of Trinidadian ethnography,”207 
he also adds that where the novel might be read as a “micro-sociobiological analysis of social 
relations,”208 its insights and virtues can only be fleshed out properly when compared with “research 
carried out in Trinidad during the same period,”209 such as Braithwaite’s (1953) Social Stratification in 
Trinidad.  In this way, and even though he lauds the narrative’s “fine nuances of inter-ethnic micro-
relations,” he is unwilling to acknowledge it as “hard ethnographic evidence,”210 due in most part to 
what he refers to as Mittelholzer’s ‘exaggerated and biased’ depictions.  Thus, A Morning at the Office 
becomes complementary to the ethnography, offering insight into the culture itself, but necessitating a 
pre-existing knowledge about that culture to support its validity.   
 
In comparison, where he equally uses Naipaul’s A House for Mr. Biswas as a discursive source with 
which to examine similar ethnographic monographs—such as Niehoff and Niehoff (1960) and Klass 
(1961)—he concedes that this novel is perhaps more accessible: “Naipaul is able to describe urban-
rural relationships in a way unavailable to the Niehoffs and Klass, since their studies were classical 
anthropological community studies.”211  For this reason, he further concedes that because the novel 
“assumes some of the same ambitions as the anthropological analysis,”212 and because of Naipaul’s 
position within the cultural milieu depicted in his text, it becomes difficult to determine “where the 
storytelling stops and the analysis begins.”213  This does not, however, and for reasons of style and 
format, distinguish it as something ‘more’ than fiction: “Unlike Klass’s and Niehoff’s monographs, it is 
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unsystematic and contains no testable or tested hypotheses; it does not attempt to assess the 
representativity of the sample and does not purport to account for mechanisms of integration in the 
community.”214  In this way, Eriksen’s dual conception of source vs. description becomes somewhat 
more discursive-based, his description of Naipaul’s novel as representing an “ethnographic description 
of the East Indian community in the first half of this century,” discursively substantiated by his 
simultaneous depiction of it as a “description of Trinidadian society which has reflexively fed back into 
the society with which it deals.”215 
 
Alongside these distinctions, Eriksen’s contribution here offers our interests a formulaic guideline with 
which to structure the methodology of our Ethnographic Criticism, demarcating the discursive 
influences that label the differences between the novel-as-source and the novel-as-description.  For the 
former, the novel functions alongside statements from informants like raw cultural insight in need of 
representation, while the author represents an aspect of that culture, akin to a self-reflective auto-
ethnographer.  With the latter, it serves as a ‘face value’ description, a kind of ‘ethnographic 
documentation’ that, unlike the novel-as-source, can stand alone, as well as alongside, more 
‘ethnographic’ monographs.  As based on his samples, Eriksen defines these as such: “A Morning at 
the Office is mainly an ethnographic statement and A House for Mr. Biswas is part ethnography and 
part an aspect of Trinidadian society.”216  However, and though his examinations seem to bend a bit 
toward the experimental, he concludes with a thematic disclaimer, ensuring the novel and ethnography 
maintain their separateness: “what fiction gains from its vividness, freedom to experiment and 
evocative techniques, it loses in its lack of accuracy, empirical comprehensiveness and attempt to 
establish interesting comparative dimensions.”217  
 
Eriksen’s caveat here brings us to a conclusion, specifically for its differentiation between those things 
gained and lost through reading fictions out of the context of its made-up quality.  This is, in fact, 
somewhat reminiscent of Narayan’s (1999) own warning about the dangers of slipping too close to the 
fictional side of our spectrum between the made-from and the made-up: “if one is free to invent other 
people and their lives, why even bother with the inconvenient dislocations and anguished ethical 
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ambiguities of fieldwork?”218  As we transition here toward the conclusion of this Chapter, these 
admonitions will take center focus, both in a summary fashion, as well as in order to describe the way 
the discourse discussed herein will influence our textual analysis to come.     
 
1.8—Conclusion: The ‘How’ of Using Fiction 
Through the discourse and data analyzed within this Chapter we have, in short, reduced a much larger 
discussion to specific points.  While this is a regrettable characteristic of the reductive process in 
designing a methodological foundation, it is likewise essential to its purpose.  As one of the three 
‘pillars’ that we intend to erect beneath the Ethnographic Criticism in Part Two, this Chapter’s focus on 
ethnography, by means of Tedlock’s archetypical ‘mythic history of anthropology’—amateur observer, 
armchair ethnologist, professional ethnographer, and gone native fieldworker—provided a foundation 
upon which to test our hypothesis concerning the ‘how’ of using fiction for cultural insight. 
 
First, in our discussion of the manner with which the Literary Turn shifted the focus of ‘doing 
anthropology’ from fieldwork and trained observations, to the literary act of weaving the data collected 
in that process into a narrative, we established a theoretical route that might notionally support our use 
of fiction in Part Two.  Secondly, our turn toward practical examples provided further justification via 
two outcomes: ethnography written like fiction and fiction read like ethnography.  While the theoretical 
discussion in that first part is essential to our understanding of the practical examples in the second, it 
is from the latter where we might more directly locate this Chapter’s role as a pillar of Ethnographic 
Criticism.   
 
The two novels that will be examined in that analysis—Black Dogs and Enduring Love—will be 
treated in a somewhat peculiar fashion.  That is, while our interpretation will define them as 
‘descriptions,’ rather than ‘sources,’ they will also be viewed as creative examples of auto-
ethnography, particularly because of the role their narrators play in their formation.  In this way, our 
analysis will be thoroughly influenced by the discourse reviewed herein.  However, while our 
discussion about the way McEwan’s fiction has been examined in Chapter Two—and thus the manner 
with which our discussion will build on this—will deal with this a bit more specifically, our conclusion 
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here will return once more to the precarious nature of ethnography’s place at the nexus between fact 
and fiction.   
 
Our hypothesis at the start of the introduction considered the possibility that we might find the same 
sort of cultural insight in an invented fiction as we would an objective ethnography, which in its own 
way poses a secondary criticism about the way ethnography, in a textual manner, is just as equally 
designed as a novel.  This, of course, is not a completely original notion.  For example, we might 
consider Geertz’s comparison of ethnography as fiction, “in the sense that they are ‘something made,’ 
‘something fashioned;’”219 Laterza’s perception that “any written representation of reality will involve 
some degree of fictionalization;”220 or Ortner’s (2006) more direct statement: “ethnographies are false, 
made up, and more generally are products of a literary imagination that has no obligation to engage 
with reality.”221  These appraisals seem to quite casually blur the line between fiction and non-fiction, 
to the point that we might merely continue their contentions by stating here that the novels we intend to 
examine are authoritatively equal to an ethnography on the same subject, an argument we could easily 
balance atop the reasoning that justifies writing ethnography like fiction, or reading fictions like 
ethnography.  However, before we turn our attention to that particular discussion, it would prove 
beneficial for our larger introduction of Ethnographic Criticism to first introduce those novels.  In the 
following Chapter, this introduction will be made via a continuation of the discussion started here.  We 
refer to this as a ‘continuation,’ because the structure of this examination will mimic the ‘writing-to-
reading’ paradigm drawn out above.  That is, where this Chapter’s focus was predominately aimed at 
the way in which the Literary Turn inspired a more literary style of ethnographic writing, and thus 
warranted an experimental approach to reading novels ethnographically, the following Chapter will 
continue that latter discussion by linking the anthropological means of doing this with an existing style 
of literary criticism.  From out of this discussion, our conception herein of Ethnographic Criticism will 
gain another layer of nuance, both in how it might be applied, as well as in how we might apply it in 
regard to our hypothesis concerning the analogous relationship between ethnography and fiction.   
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CHAPTER TWO—DATA: READING 
 
“The novelist’s privilege, according to Ian McEwan, is to step 
inside the consciousness of others, and to lead the reader there like 
a psychological Virgil.  Again and again in McEwan’s books, it is 
the interior monologue of the characters, and that monologue’s 
encounter with the ‘truth’ in the outside world, that grips us.  
Whether paralyzed, obsessed, filled with guilt, or operated on, the 
brains of McEwan’s protagonists construct their mental world as 
we, the readers, watch and empathize.”  
 
—Matt Ridley, Ian McEwan and the Rational Mind, 20091 
 
 
2.1—Introduction: The ‘Why’ of Using Fiction 
 
In the previous Chapter, our focus was directed at a methodological discussion concerning 
‘ethnography,’ and the means by which that form of writing might be constructed like, and sourced or 
described within, certain types of fiction.  As a foundational discussion, it helped clarify how our 
Ethnographic Criticism might consider reading a fictional text for cultural insights about a particular 
identity.  In that same way, it also presented the first of our three foundational pillars that make up the 
description of Ethnographic Criticism.  Where it spoke directly to the ‘ethnographic insight’ of our 
hypothetical intent in creating and conducting that Ethnographic Criticism, this second Chapter will 
introduce the ‘fictional texts’ we have chosen to do that.  Before delving into that discussion, however, 
we must first turn to a rationalization of sorts, a three-part justification for reading fiction—rather than 




If we were intent on discovering the process with which an individual within a particular context might 
construct his or her religious identity, one traditional means of doing so would be to turn to 
ethnographic data or case studies.  This would demand an examination of certain pertinent details: an 
understanding of the discursive qualities underlining that individual’s own personal conception based 
on a larger, yet explicit discursive field; how this conception, when adopted by that individual, might 
transform according to their interests; and a larger holistic understanding of the context within which 
these two things took place.  These details would usually ‘come together’ through ethnographic sources 
that might also provide us with a diverse and multi-layered snapshot of individual, as well as group, 
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identity formation.  However, if in our initial research we discovered a paucity of ethnographic data 
concerning our chosen concept, then our best option would be to conduct our own observations ‘in the 
field.’  It is in regard to these methods concerning Atheism, particularly in a British context, that we 
have created, and will conduct, our Ethnographic Criticism.            
 
At present, there are three reasons why an examination of Atheist identity construction might benefit 
from such an experimental analysis.  First, and as we will demonstrate further in the third Chapter, 
there currently exists a scholastic disagreement in how we define the term itself, the product, as we will 
conclude, of a predominant theoretical generalization.  What this means for conducting a more 
traditional type of ethnographic examination is an issue of clarity: we might find one ethnography 
focused on the ignorant lack of belief in a particular ‘God,’ while another might focus on the specific 
rejection of that—or any other—God.  Moreover, these two sources might even be of the same 
subjects, giving us two dialectically opposed notions about how that Atheism is utilized in the process 
of identification, let alone who might be identified as ‘Atheist.’            
 
Second, rather than a complete lack of ethnographic data on Atheist identity, there seems a more 
focused interest in quantitative analysis, such as we see with Zuckerman’s (2007) “Contemporary 
Numbers and Patterns,” or Hout and Fischer’s (2014) discussion of the role played by political 
backlash and generational change in stimulating ‘non-religiosity’ in the United states.  Again, while 
this does not indicate a complete absence of identifying data, it equally does not offer us a more 
specific ‘ethnography of Atheism.’  Rather, the ethnographic data we do find for our context is either 
ulterior within studies about broader concepts that ‘look like’ Atheism—such as Day’s (2009 and 
2011) sociological analyses of how ‘articulations of beliefs’ reflect where individuals might “define 
and locate legitimate sites of power, meaning, and authority”2—or within ‘in-process’ analyses that 
have yet to be published.  Worth citing here, these are best exemplified by Engelke’s participant 
observation of the British Humanist Association;3 Mumford’s emphasis on political and marginalized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Abby Day, “Believing in Belonging: An Ethnography of Young People’s Constructions of 
Belief” (Culture and Religion, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2009), 263. 
3 Matthew Engelke, “In spite of Christianity: Humanism and its Others in Contemporary 
Britain” (Non-Religion and Secularity Research Network Annual Lecture: London School of 
Economics, 28 November 2012), 12; accessible via the Economic and Social Research Council website 
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‘emotional responses’ as the motivation for asserting an actively nonreligious identity;4 the results of 
Catto and Eccles’ Young Atheists Project at the University of Lancaster5 and how it reveals a nuanced 
look at the way young Atheists become ‘engaged with atheism’ as a reaction to particular “religious 
attitudes within their immediate social environs;”6 and Aston’s focus on how ‘heritage’ dictates 
particular traits concerning her informant’s “ritual symbolism” and “textual and visual language” 
within the confines of the “contemporary landscape of organized and everyday non-religious action.”7  
While the former type of data demonstrates an example of our first justification, providing case-by-
case dialogical interpretations of seemingly contradictory ‘beliefs,’8 these latter examples—at this point 
in time—can only offer us introductory snapshots of how certain individuals are attempting to do an 
‘anthropology of Atheism.’9   
 
This brings us to our third reason for turning to experimentation, dictated by two specific issues.  First, 
given the precariousness of Atheists ‘in the field’ who do not wish to assign themselves to a ‘negative 
connotation,’ we are forced to adopt differing types of ‘definitions,’ even re-conceptualizations of the 
term ‘Atheism.’  When accompanied with the theoretical generalizations from our analysis in Chapter 
three, we begin to lose more and more clarity about what it is we are actually examining.  Secondly, 
Atheists are not currently what we might refer to as ‘culturally organized,’ in that they do not belong to 
a particular cultural system.  Nor are they ‘tribal’ in the sense of an organization based on kinship and 
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6 Titled, “A Sociological Investigation of Young People in Britain’s Active Non-Religious 
Identities,” see Mumford, “Atheism and Anthropology,” 3. 
7 See Katie Aston, “Report: NSRN annual Lecture 2011: Atheism Explained by Jonathan 
Lanman.”  Accessed via http://nonreligionandsecularity.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/nsrn-annual-
lecture-2011-events-report-katie-aston.pdf. (Accessed 14 December 2012); as well as her research 
profile at the Goldsmith’s webpage via: http://www.gold.ac.uk/anthropology/current-
students/katieaston/ (accessed 15 February 2014). 
8 See her discussion of the ‘non-religious’ beliefs of ‘Chris,’ ‘Hannah,’ ‘Patrick,’ ‘Becca,’ 
‘Andrew,’ and ‘Robert’ in Abby Day, Believing in Belonging: Belief and Social Identity in the Modern 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 99-103; or ‘Jordan’s’ precarious statement: “I’m 
Christian but I don’t believe in owt,” in Day, “Believing in Belonging,” 265-266.  
9 Much of this information derives from Mumford’s (2011) NSRN Events Report on the 
‘Atheism and Anthropology’ workshop conducted at the University of London, and sponsored by the 
European Association of Social Anthropologists: Lorna Mumford, “Atheism and Anthropology: 
Researching Atheism and Self-Searching Belief and Experience Workshop” (NSRN Events Report of 
the Atheism and Anthropology Workshop: 21 September 2011, accessible via: 
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heritage, making it that much more difficult to enter their world in order to conduct fieldwork.10  While 
the ethnographic examples above have found certain success in engaging with and entering into the 
‘community’ of humanist organizations, this is by no means the same as conducting a ‘traditional’ type 




For our own experimental approach, we have chosen to direct our focus toward a particular case-study 
analysis, using fictional depictions of Atheism as representations of Atheist identity constructions.  
While this is not an entirely unfamiliar approach, as we saw at the end of our discussion in the previous 
Chapter, in order to substantiate that ‘anthropological’ language with a more direct literary analysis, we 
need to first acquaint ourselves with the discourse inherent in the methodological and theoretical 
process which that entails.  While this will definitely assist our efforts by introducing the fictions we 
have chosen as our ‘data,’ it will equally act as a link between the anthropological and literary 
foundations underscoring both this and the first Chapter.  This will take the shape of a number of 
examinations, so that the structure of this Chapter will both build upon, and differ from, the previous 
one.  We will begin with an examination of the existent scholarship on ‘religion and literature,’ which 
will then lead us to a more specific discussion of ‘Atheism and literature,’ a new and emerging style of 
literary study.  By presenting this first, we will equally be ensuring that our analysis in Part Two is 
built upon two specific foundations: the discourse on reading fictions ethnographically—as described 
by Fernea, Banks, and Eriksen in the previous Chapter—and the larger category of using fiction to 
study religion.  Next, our attention will turn to Ian McEwan, in order to both contextualize our chosen 
texts within the context in which they were created, as well as link the anthropological notions of using 
fiction as a source for cultural insight with the Ethical Criticism predominately used to critique his 
writing.  This process will reveal a marriage of sorts, a correlation between the methodology adopted 
through our analysis of the Literary Turn, and Ethical Criticism’s focus on character self-construction.  
This will in turn lead us to our next discussion, the ‘ethnocriticism’ we will be using to build this 
connection, which will likewise direct us toward the theoretical discourse that we will take up in our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is becoming less of an issue with the ascent of organizations such as the Sunday 
Assembly.  Of course, we are still faced with the issue of re-conceptualization as not all members of 
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http://sundayassembly.com/about/ (accessed 4 August 2014).  
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analysis concerning the process of identity construction.  With this established, we will conclude the 
Chapter with a detailed introduction of our chosen texts, focusing on the characters that will be central 
to our examination, as well as on how these texts themselves will function within our critical 
assessment of the Atheism revealed within them.   
 
2.2—A/Theism and Literature 
There is a distinct sense of interdisciplinarity within the overlap between literary-styled ethnographic 
construction—the writing of ethnographic fiction, and reading fiction ethnographically—and the 
method and process of conducting literary analysis.  Hass (2007)—citing Said (1978)11—alludes to this 
as a type of ‘textuality,’ a term that speaks to a combination of analyses, such as we might find in 
discussions about the interdisciplinarity between studying religion and interpreting literature: “[the] 
expanded grammar of cultural production and interpretation that carries one back into the material 
world through the critical parsing and syntactical analysis of its structures.”12  Likewise, this 
interdisciplinarity speaks to two particular viewpoints: the study of religion as literature, and the study 
of literature as having something to say about, or to, religion.  Within these perspectives we find the 
discourse shifting away from a less distinct notion of ‘religion and literature,’ toward a more habituated 
‘theology and literature.’   
 
While this shift appears in somewhat vague interpretations, such as with Ratti’s (2013) theological-
based notion of ‘post-secularism,’13 it can also be found in more specific analyses, such as Detweiler’s 
(1989) ‘pragmatic use’ in an attempt at deciphering the production and consumption of fiction within 
the context of social and cultural—religious-based—desire fulfillment.14  With the latter we find a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Edward W. Said, “The Problem of Textuality: Two Exemplary Positions” (Critical Inquiry, 
Vol. 4, No. 4, 1978), 673-714.    
12 Andrew Hass, “The Future of Literature and Theology” in Andrew Hass, David Jasper, and 
Elisabeth Jay, eds., The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 852. 
13 He defines this as a ‘negotiated term’ that conveys less a return of religion after the secular 
age, and more an amalgamated continuation of both the secular and the religious.  See Manay Ratti, 
The Postsecular Imagination: Postcolonialism, Religion, and Literature (New York: Routledge, 2013), 
21-23.      
14 Robert Detweiler, Breaking the Fall: Religious Readings of Contemporary Fiction 
(London: MacMillan, 1989) 37, and 54-59.  See also Detweiler’s “Art/Literature/Religion: Life on the 
Borders” in Robert Detweiler, ed., Art/Literature/Religion: Life on the Borders (Journal of the 
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foundation both journalistic15 and monographic, embedded with theoretical perspectives that range 
from addressing the ‘obsession with theory’ within post-modern evaluations of fictional—mythical—
narratives (Detweiler and Jasper 2000,16 Knight 200917), to more explicit literary analyses of Biblical 
accounts.  This more Biblical-focused type is represented by examples such as Jasper’s (2004) 
postmodernist focus on the desert as an inter- and extra-Biblical sacred space;’18 Wright’s (2007) focus 
on the ‘midrash’ as an inter-textual literary metaphor that, under his scrutiny, becomes a larger symbol 
of the innate need to repeat sacred stories within secular fiction;19 or Tate’s (2008) post-secularist 
conclusion that even cynical fictionalizations of Biblical narratives—such as Crace’s Quarantine—
provide evidence of a wider ‘return’ to religion.20  This discourse is perhaps crystalized most clearly in 
Hass, Jasper, and Jay’s (2007) Oxford Handbook on Literature and Theology, which delineates 
between three theoretical conduits: reading the Bible literarily, reading literature Theologically, and 
Theology presented as literature.     
        
Where this discourse removes much of the ambiguity in determining what is more precisely meant by 
‘religion’ in the interdisciplinarity between ‘religion and literature,’ it also presents a thematic bias, 
shifting the notion of religion into a normative category that depicts it as ‘Theology.’  For our own 
intentions this is less problematic than it is fortuitous, for it is from out of this bias that the sub-field of 




Because it represents a somewhat new perspective in the study of religion and/in literature, the 
examples we might use to define ‘Atheism and literature’ appear quite varied.  More than anything, this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 For example: Christianity and Literature 
(http://www.pepperdine.edu/sponsored/ccl/journal/); Religion and Literature 
(http://religionandlit.nd.edu); and Literature and Theology (http://litthe.oxfordjournals.org).   
16 Robert Detweiler and David Jasper, eds., Religion and Literature: A Reader (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), xi. 
17 Mark Knight, An Introduction to Religion and Literature (London: Continuum, 2009), 
especially 24-40, and 105-111. 
18 David Jasper, The Sacred Desert: Religion, Literature, Art, and Culture (Malden: 
Blackwell, 2004), 1-14, and 70-109.     
19 Terry R. Wright, The Genesis of Fiction: Modern Novelists as Biblical Interpreters 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 1-10, and 169-173; see as well his chapter on Biblically reading Bakhtin 
and Tolstoy in Mark Knight and Thomas Woodman, eds. Biblical Religion and the Novel, 1700-2000 
(Hampshire: Ashgate, 2006), 25-39.   
20 See Andrew Tate, Contemporary Fiction and Christianity (London: Continuum, 2008).    
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variance is a product of differing thematic foci, the majority of which seem to be dedicated to 
representation: examinations that interpret how Atheism is presented within particular fictions through 
the creation and development of Atheist characters.  For example, Sutherland (1977) and Bullivant 
(2008b) both offer interpretations of characters within Dostoevsky’s fiction, the former on the Atheism 
of ‘Ivan’ in The Brother’s Karamzaov, and the latter on Dostoevsky’s creation of what he calls 
‘pseudo-Atheist’ characters, such as Raskolnikov, Kirillov, and Ivan Karamazov, in Crime and 
Punishment, Demons, and The Brothers Karamazov.  Likewise, we see similar discussions with 
Smith’s (1991) investigation of ‘objectivism’ and its notions of individualism and Atheism in post-
industrial fictions like Rand’s The Fountainhead or Atlas Shrugged, Lackey’s (1998) more gender-
specific focus on ‘sympathetic description’ in Woolf’s “A Simple Melody,” and Arbeit’s (2006) 
exploration of what he refers to as a ‘dictionary definition’ of Atheism in O’Connor’s “A Good Man is 
Hard to Find,” Wright’s Black Boy, and Chappell’s Brighten the Corner Where You Are.  In more 
contemporary contexts, we have examples such as Holderness’ (2010) examination of the ‘post-
Dawkins’ style science-based Atheism within Crace’s Quarantine, as well as Kane’s (2011) analysis of 
the dystopian style of Atheism found within the search for ‘self’ in McCarthy’s post-apocalyptic The 
Road.  While these interpretations might themselves be interpreted as unique discursive examinations, 
explanations of Atheism as it is presented—or rather, represented—within an aesthetic media, they 
likewise offer a brief introduction to the early establishment of this particular subfield.  In comparison, 
then, the four texts toward which we now turn might best be defined as this sub-field’s theoretical 
foundation.   
 
As part of the Cambridge Studies in Romanticism, Priestman’s (1999) Romantic Atheism explores the 
links between poetry and the earliest public displays of ‘explicit Atheism’ during the Romantic period 
in Britain.  Placed within what he perceives to be an absence of scholarship in both the ‘history of 
ideas’ and ‘literary studies,’ Priestman notes the unfortunate absence of literary examinations of 
Atheism as being based upon either the belief that doing so would be “barely conceivable” or somehow 
“crudely beside the point.”21  To remedy this, he offers that the medium of poetry is a “special kind of 
discourse”22 for this endeavor, due in part to its ability to present Atheism in a less imaginative form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Martin Preistman, Romantic Atheism: Poetry and Freethought, 1780-1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1.  
22 Ibid., 1. 
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because it is “affirmative from a single subjective position.”23  As for Atheism itself, rather than 
defining it outright, he applies the term topically, characterizing it as an issue or ‘concern’ within the 
“period called Romantic [emphasis in original],”24 which he localizes contextually via Berman’s (1988) 
citation of 1781 as the “birth of avowed atheism” in Britain.25  He adopts this topical designation 
because, as he himself acknowledges, it is too difficult, if not impossible, to know for certain if the 
authors within his discussion—Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley, Byron, and Keats—were, in 
fact, ‘Atheistic,’ especially in consideration of what he terms the ‘simplistic description’ given to the 
belief that there is no God.26  For his intentions, then, this affords him the ability to decipher the term’s 
literary, even lyrical, usage as something akin to an ‘Atheist discourse,’ the concept itself manifested as 
a challenge toward the orthodox religious and social pre-eminence of the time.  His choice of poetry, 
he further asserts, thusly provides a means by which to synthesize these two discourses into a 
contextual harmony, focused upon the former’s use of Romantic themes such as ‘nature’ and 
‘imagination,’ in relation to the latter’s conceptual foundations.27  By tracing these authors’ nominal 
use—as well as virtual representation—of an historically contextualized “positive, unapologetic 
atheism as a phenomenon,” 28 he is able to link the literary with the philosophical, while at the same 
time propose a theoretical means to do so.    
 
In a somewhat conflicting investigation, particularly in his re-conceptualization and thus re-definition 
of  ‘modern Atheism,’ Gordon’s (2002) Literary Atheism offers two types: naïve and sophisticated.  
While he labels the former as shaped by the conviction that the Theist’s belief in the existence of God 
can be proven or disproven objectively and with empirical evidence, he classifies the latter as an 
Atheism that is able to acknowledge the Theist’s God as something to be subjectively “understood 
intellectually as myth or metaphor.”29  By adopting literary language, and in shifting his re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 7   
24 Ibid. 
25 Berman cites this moment as inaugurated by the pseudonymously named William Hammon 
who, in 1781, declared: “Be it therefore for the future remembered, that in London in the Kingdom of 
England, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-one, a man has publickly 
declared himself an atheist.”  Priestman, Romantic Atheism, 12-13; as well, see David Berman, A 
History of Atheism in Britain from Hobbes to Russell (London: Routledge, 1988), 113.      
26 While this brief definition is unpacked in some detail in the first chapter of his text, it still 
appears to be infected with notions of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ differentiation.  See Priestman, 
Romantic Atheism, 14-15, 18-20, 31-45. 
27 Ibid., 7. 
28 Ibid. 
29 David J. Gordon, Literary Atheism (New York: Peter Lang, 2002), 5. 
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conceptualization into the discourse on perceiving ‘belief’ and ‘myth’ within the borders of literary 
texts, Gordon differentiates his ‘two types’ by means of a marriage between ‘positive/negative’ and a 
pragmatic acceptance of one’s own particular context.  As such, he states that while the naïve Atheist is 
more dogmatic in his or her ability to enter into, as well as retreat from, the spirit of texts that represent 
supernatural intervention in human affairs,” the sophisticated Atheist knows outwardly that the ‘God 
idea’ that he or she is challenging is “always mediated by social and psychological circumstances, 
whatever its strength.”30  Gordon gives this sophisticated Atheist the title, ‘literary,’ because it marks 
this individual as a person who can be described as “not believing in the ghosts of religion” but who, 
due to cultural context, is continuously “haunted by them.”31  
 
To exemplify this idea of ‘haunting,’ he cites a statement made by the character Hamm in Beckett’s 
(1957) Endgame: “The bastard!! He doesn’t exist.”32  Because this statement appears as a reaction to a 
failed prayer, and is thus ‘ironic’ in character, Gordon uses it to define an ‘unbeliever’ as someone 
“who must acknowledge some sort of residual presence”33 of that which they are denying.  In this way, 
and in adopting a subjective viewpoint, the ‘literary’ aspect of Gordon’s sophisticated Atheism rests 
solely in the imagination, placing the ‘Literary Atheist’ in a quasi-dualistic relationship with the ‘naïve’ 
Atheist’s empirical-based argument.  As the Literary Atheist must, by Gordon’s type, contend with an 
idea “inside oneself,” he relates this process to the “characteristic activity of the literary imagination,” 
which he then compares to the “emergence of conceptual atheism in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.”34  Linking this to the works of literary scholars he deems ‘Atheistic,’ and whose writings he 
argues demonstrate a literary style that served to ‘weaken’ traditional theology,35 his conception here 
marries literary language with certain Enlightenment discourses.  In this way, and if we perceive his 
text as foundationally built upon Priestman’s use of poetry as a discourse infected by religious 
protestations, Gordon’s definition of Literary Atheism as a discursive type of “severe poetry” offers a 
unique theoretical marriage between making sense of Atheism, and developing an analysis of literary 
things.36   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Samuel Beckett, Endgame: A Play in One Act (London: Faber and Faber, 2009). 
33 Gordon, Literary Atheism, 5. 
34 Ibid., 6. 
35 Such as Descartes, Diderot, Locke, Voltaire, and Hume; Ibid., 12. 




Along similar lines, particularly in regard to Priestman and Gordon’s discursive interpretations, 
Bradley and Tate’s (2010) The New Atheist Novel is directly inspired by the ‘New Atheist’ discourse 
established by Harris’ The End of Faith (2004), and substantiated by Dawkins (2006), Dennett (2006), 
and Hitchens (2007).  Drawing a connection between the discourse of New Atheism and the Atheism 
they source within the fictional narratives of four English novelists—McEwan, Amis, Rushdie, and 
Pullman—Bradley and Tate hypothesize the latter as constituting a “new and powerful creation 
mythology” for the former.  Moreover, they contend that these novels, through the process of 
‘mythopoeia’ or ‘aestheticization,’ perform an “implicit anthropological service.”37  In this way, the 
connection they make between what they call the ‘New Atheist cult’ and the Atheism within these 
particular fictions, represents a practical mythologization: the fictionalization of the polemical and 
reactive Atheism promoted by the ‘New Atheists’ in response to September 11, 2001, aesthetically 
made available to a large reading audience.    
 
Additionally, this mythologization generates an associative link between sacred/secular and 
fiction/non-fiction.  As they argue, the New Atheist novel exists as a culmination of the New Atheist 
philosophy, a “literary reception of the New Atheism” that incorporates a new type of literary genre, a 
“secular object of devotion” that offers a ‘sacred,’ yet no less secular, text with which to present a 
“this-worldly experience of grandeur, consolation, freedom and even redemption.”38  By placing these 
two textual entities side-by-side, their conception of the New Atheist novel shifts this type of fiction 
into something more than mere aesthetic text, so that through the ‘anthropological service’ mentioned 
here, it is transmuted into something like a sacred text, serving the mythological need of a new, more 
vitriolic, definition of Atheism.39  
 
Nevertheless, it should also be critically noted that despite the cleverness of their hypothesis, their 
analysis ultimately suffers from a problematic misguidance.  This is partly an issue of chronology.  
Because New Atheism, according to their own definition, is dependent on the rise of fundamentalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate, The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic 
After 9/11 (London: Continuum, 2010), 7. 
38 Ibid., 11. 
39 See also Grayling’s attempt to create a secular sacred text that might ‘replace the Bible’ for 
an Atheism void of such objects: A.C. Grayling, The Good Book: A Humanist Bible (New York: 
Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2011), especially the “Epistle to the Reader.”         
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theism after September 11th, then their conception of the New Atheist novel as a mythologized form of 
this discourse falls into discordancy on a number of occasions.  For example, when they discuss 
McEwan’s Atonement (2001), Amis’ Yellow Dog (2003), Pullman’s His Dark Materials trilogy (1995, 
1997, 2000), and Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1981) and Satanic Verses (1988) they are putting the 
proverbial cart before the horse, as each of these fictions were published prior to their New Atheist 
counterparts.  However, where we might concede that these analyses may theoretically work, Bradley 
and Tate fail to make this connection.  In all likelihood, this is due to their examination being 
somewhat belied by their own concept, so that their interpretations of McEwan, Amis, Pullman, and 
Rushdie as ‘mythopoetically’ embodying a New Atheist discourse fails to acknowledge that both the 
New Atheist texts and the New Atheist novels are discursively influenced by, as well as representative 
of, a similar sort of developing discourse about how Atheism is being both defended, as well as 
fictionally constructed.  By trying to prove their hypothesis, or perhaps simply in trying to argue that 
Atheists require sacred texts, they fail to see both as discursive sources that, as we shall argue herein, 
are more easily accessible when we cease trying to ‘define’ Atheism itself.            
 
As a last ‘foundational’ text, we turn to Schweizer’s somewhat precarious notion about expressions of 
literary Atheism.  Though in an earlier publication (2011) his addressing the lack of analysis on the 
idea of ‘hating God,’ which he titled ‘misotheism,’40 is slightly relatable to our discussion here, his 
later (2013) addition to the Oxford Handbook of Atheism is more specifically directed at interpreting 
‘literature and Atheism,’ an interrelated literary phenomenon that he contends is somewhat new.  In 
fact, he goes so far as to state that no form of thematized Atheism existed in any ‘major’ work of 
fiction prior to the mid nineteenth century.41  He further argues that this is in large part the result of a 
definitional discrepancy, an inconsistency that he attempts to remedy with his own two-part 
description: ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit.’  This dichotomy, however, is not without precarious issues, 
especially in his borrowing the overly ambiguous conventional definition of Atheism as something 
either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’—and thus ‘explicit’ or ‘implicit.’ 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Bernard Schweizer, Hating God: The Untold Story of Misotheism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 8. 
41 Bernard Schweizer, “Literature and Atheism” in Stephen Bullivant and Michael Ruse, eds., 
The Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 683.  
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For example, his conception of a text that is implicitly Atheist as consisting of “works that are wholly 
and entirely secular, i.e. works without any religious content whatsoever,”42 is inherently troublesome.  
Defining a fiction as implicitly Atheist by the mere fact that the narrative does not, in any way, discuss 
some religious theme—applying, we can only assume, an extremely broad definition of ‘religion’—
seems normatively ‘Theistic,’ as a ‘lack’ of a thematic discussion of ‘religion’—Theism—within a 
fiction predisposes that fiction as being inherently—implicitly—Theist.  He attempts to mitigate this 
issue by stating that “since religious thinking, imagery, and rhetoric are so ubiquitous in human 
discourse,” seemingly associating all forms of discourse with fiction, then it is “almost impossible to 
produce a work that fits the criterion of this type of implicit atheist literature exactly.”43  He concludes 
thus that a ‘pure’ form of implicit literary Atheism is “hard to come by.”44   
 
It is for this reason that his analytical focus aims at ‘explicit’ manifestations of Atheism, in two forms: 
‘approving,’ or pro-Atheist, and ‘disapproving,’ or anti-Atheist.  By distinguishing this type of 
explicitness by means of the author’s use of Atheism as a “prominent story element,” central to the 
characters’ “thoughts and dialogues,”45 and thus as a product of authorial intention, he is able to cite a 
number of authors—as well as their texts—that explicitly reflect this sort of intention.  Beginning with 
Dostoevsky’s The Brother’s Karamazov, he compares the explicit Atheism of Dostoevsky’s Ivan 
Karamazov to that of Dr. Rieux in Camus’ The Plague, and Cass Seltzer in Goldstein’s 36 Arguments 
for the Existence of God.  By paralleling the ‘Atheists’ from within these texts, Schweizer is equally 
able to decode a thematic progression in the way these author’s literary Atheism is manifested within 
the world of their own fictional creations.  In this way, this progression provides a differentiation of 
sorts, the expressed Atheism of Dostoevsky—“accompanied by tortuous self-doubts, by fears of 
recriminations, and by copious self-exculpation”—is comparably distinctive to that of contemporary, 
even ‘casual,’ expressions: “what is happening more frequently is that atheist perspectives are 
unspectacularly, almost casually, woven into the fabric of twenty-first century fiction.”46  Thus, like 
Atheism culturally expressed, the discernible transition detailed in Schweizer’s literary treatment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Ibid., 686. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 687. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 710. 
	  
	   73 
shows an intriguing progression from one generation to the next, wherein these literary expressions 




While these four texts succeed in constructing the early phase of the subfield on Atheism and/in 
literature, they have equally established an underlying thematic essence: Atheism as a discursive 
concept, a representation—as well as representative—of Atheism in literary form.  That is, though they 
do not—at least equally—declare this their theoretical intention, the manner with which they address, 
approach, and examine the ‘Atheism’ in their chosen fictions is heavily discursive-based.  This is, we 
might contend, an inevitable, even unavoidable, method.  After all, within their collective literary 
analyses—and despite their faults—we can distinguish a certain type of discursive analysis: Priestman 
with ‘romantic Atheism;’ Gordon with ‘Literary Atheism;’ Bradley and Tate with ‘New Atheism;’ and 
Schweizer with ‘progressive Atheism.’  It is to this interpretation that our own investigation intends to 
contribute.  However, though it will express a contribution in regard to the conception of Atheism as a 
discursive signifier, it will also offer a unique perspective in its focus on the ‘ethnographic’ aspect of 
this perception.  That is, where these four texts might hint at the discursive meaning of Atheism 
discovered by reading fictional constructions of it, our intention is to do this same sort of analysis with 
a more direct focus on Atheism as an identity, particularly in how that identity is textually expressed, 
such as we saw in our discussion of ethnography in the previous Chapter.  This process is not, 
admittedly, without a foundation of its own, which brings us to the aforementioned marriage between 
ethnographic construction and Ethical Criticism.  From here our discussion turns to our chosen author, 
as well as to a description of the Ethical Criticism predominately used to interpret his fiction, which we 
will adopt, and amend, in order to both isolate the notion of identity construction in Ethnographic 
Criticism, as well as align the latter with the former.      	   
 
2.3—Ian McEwan and Ethical Criticism  
The four novelists chosen by Bradley and Tate construct their fictions from very different genre and 
stylistic points of reference.  For pragmatic reasons, we might divide them into two broad categories: 
Rushdie and Pullman representing fantasy, and McEwan and Amis representing realism.  While these 
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are not perfect categorizations, given the plasticity with which their fictions symbolize either genre, for 
our own intentions this is an important differentiation.  That is, while we might be able to decipher a 
unique type of Atheist identity from within the more fantastical fictions of Rushdie and Pullman—
especially the latter’s His Dark Materials trilogy—in order to read these fictions with an ethnographic 
intent it is important that they more closely mimic the realism adopted in ethnographic construction.  
What this means is that Ethnographic Criticism is reliant upon a particular genre style, an exclusivity of 
necessity.  In other words, the fictions examined by this method need to look ‘as if’ they are 
stylistically real, what Seaboyer (2005) links to a particular literary convention: “a literary historical 
tradition that goes back to an eighteenth- and nineteenth-century focus on plot- and character-driven 
narratives, in which psychologically believable individuals function in familiar, everyday worlds rather 
than in fantastic or allegorical ones.”47            
 
Of the two novelists in Bradley and Tate’s ‘realism’ category, we have chosen McEwan, for three 
specific reasons.  First, his career has been predominately focused on realist fiction.  Developed out of 
productive ‘turns,’ his novels have repeatedly addressed political and social issues pertinent to his 
surroundings and context, so that the narratives themselves represent interactions with actual historical 
events and often ‘real-world’ individuals.  Second, within this realism, his novels are also very 
character-driven, so that these interactions appear often in the form of character—identity—
development.  In the case of Atheism, this development offers a unique description and representation 
of how Atheism-as-identity has taken shape via more specific dialogical interactions between 
individuals.  Third, his novels have become popular both commercially and critically.  While this might 
seem to merely depict his work as ‘successful,’ it also shows his ability to transcribe the worlds of his 
creation in a way that is accepted, even sought after, by the reading public.  For our intentions, this 
‘success’ translates into accessibility, further translating his fiction into ideal data.  From here we turn 
to a more in-depth discussion of his work, as well as to how it has been critically perceived with a 
focus on the ‘ethics’ of self-orientation.   
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Judith Seaboyer, “Ian McEwan: Contemporary Realism and the Novel of Ideas” in James 
Acheson and Sarah E. Ross, eds., The Contemporary British Novel (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2005), 23. 
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Emerging within a new generation of English literature, McEwan’s success as a novelist is easily 
determined.  His novel Amsterdam was awarded the Man Booker Prize in 1998, and two of his 
previous works, The Comfort of Strangers and Black Dogs were shortlisted for the prize in 1981 and 
1992.  His novel Saturday was awarded the University of Edinburgh’s James Tait Black Memorial 
Prize in 2005, and in 2000 he was bestowed the title of Commander of the British Empire.  He also 
accepted—amid some controversy—the Jerusalem Prize for the Freedom of the Individual in Society 
in 2011.  Commercially, his fictions have progressively gained ‘bestseller’ status, more so after his 
2001 novel Atonement was adapted into an Academy Award winning film in 2007.48   
 
Since his first publication of two short story collections, First Love, Last Rights (1975) and In Between 
the Sheets (1978), McEwan has published—at the time of this writing—thirteen novels: The Cement 
Garden (1978), The Comfort of Strangers (1981), The Child in Time (1987), The Innocent (1990), 
Black Dogs (1992), Enduring Love (1997), Amsterdam (1998), Atonement (2001), Saturday (2005), On 
Chesil Beach (2008), Solar (2010), Sweet Tooth (2012), and The Children Act (2014); as well as two 
forms of children’s literature: Rose Blanch (1985) and The Daydreamer (1994).   He has also published 
six screenplays—Jack Flea’s Birthday Celebration (1976), Solid Geometry, The Imitation Game (both 
based on previously printed short stories and published in 1982), The Ploughman’s Lunch (1985), Sour 
Sweet (based on the novel of the same name by Timothy Mo, 1989), The Good Son (1993), an oratorio, 
or Shall we Die? (1983), and a libretto, For You (2008), both of which were set to music by Michael 
Berkeley.  
 
From a critical perspective, and it order to structure their examinations, the critics discussed below 
have delineated his narratives by certain points of departure, thematic shifts in focus where differing 
subjects have defined the dominant theme, the first occurring with The Child in Time.  Prior to this 
somewhat fantastical and dystopian novel, his previous publications were seen as indicative of a 
popular genre of ‘shock’ literature, so that his two short story collections and first two novels were 
equally categorized by their ‘grotesque fantasies’ about death, incest, rape, murder, sexual mutilation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The film adaptation was Directed by Joe Wright.  It was nominated for six Academy 
Awards, including Best Picture and Best Adapted Screenplay, and won for Best Original Score.   
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brutal violence, and general anti-social behavior, usually, but not always, involving children or 
adolescents.  These same examinations likewise placed McEwan himself within the brotherhood of the 
‘enfants terribles,’ a title given to the generation of ‘angry young men,’ English authors first published 
in the late 1970s, and whose literary focus on neo-realism was built upon, but highly different from, 
that of their predecessor’s.49   
 
Perhaps his greatest point of departure came after the publication and critical acclaim of The Comfort 
of Strangers in 1981.  Labeled his ‘move abroad,’ this shift is marked by his brief withdrawal from 
writing novels and his turn to writing screenplays, a shift that equally marks his movement away from 
the genre of ‘shock’ literature, and his entrance into the category of historical and political fiction.  
Possibly the clearest example of this is his screenplay, The Ploughman’s Lunch.  Set against the 
backdrop of the Falklands War and the Conservative Party Conference in 1982, one underlying theme 
we might consider is the subtlety with which McEwan depicts how an individual may intentionally 
construct history in order to frame it as something entirely authentic.  This notion of fictional 
historicity, of the inauthentic being marketed and sold as truly authentic, is metaphorically revealed in 
the title itself, the ‘ploughman’s lunch,’ which is exposed as a marketing campaign to convince 
Briton’s that eating it somehow links them to their agrarian roots.  For McEwan, this becomes a larger 
statement about how easy it might be to alter one’s perception of what is historically ‘true,’ stating that 
his inspiration for writing the screenplay itself was based on the issue of not knowing where it is that 
history comes from: "I thought our subject might encompass the uses we make of the past, and the 
dangers, to an individual as well as to a nation of living without a sense of history."50 
 
It is this focus on the historical, or rather, on his fictional interpretations of history, as well as his ability 
to blur the line between the real and the invented, between what we might call the ethnographic and the 
fictional, which distinguishes McEwan’s narratives from that of his contemporaries.  However, this 
interpretation has been somewhat overlooked by the critical examinations of his work, relegated to 
brief references and contextualizations in order to delineate the aforementioned ‘shifts’ and 
‘transitions’ that mark his career.  These range from analyses of his move toward the political and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Jack Slay, Jr., Ian McEwan (New York” Twayne Publishers, 1996), 3. 
50 Ian McEwan, “Introduction” in Ian McEwan, A Move Abroad: Or Shall We Die?: An 
Oratorio and The Ploughman's Lunch (London: Picador, 1989). 
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historical after The Comfort of Strangers, an interpretation of the superficially psychoanalytic 
correlations between himself and his characters, and the search for post-modern reflections of ethics 
and morality within unorthodox settings.  While these interpretations have provided a varied 
perspective on his fiction, lifting a veil of sorts to reveal a number of different thematic interpretations, 




Ryan (1994) and Slay (1996) present the first critical examinations of McEwan’s fiction up to the 
publication of Black Dogs in 1992.  Both are short analyses, the former focused on what Ryan calls 
McEwan’s ‘art of unease,’51 and the transformation of his fiction from shock and awe toward the 
thematically re-aligned “apprehension of the power of love and the possibility of redemption.”52  
Though limited to the point of introduction, Ryan’s diminutive discussion of Black Dogs provides for 
our own interests a valuable connection between the text’s narrator Jeremy and McEwan himself as 
representing a relationship of self-reflection: “McEwan is writing a family history of his own adopted 
ideas, turning the searchlight on himself to find out what he has come to think and what kind of author 
his writing has made him.”53  Slay’s examination is broken into three overlapping thematic categories: 
neo-realism, politics, and feminism.  Placing McEwan into a realist milieu built upon the traditions of 
authors such as Dickens, Eliot, and Carlyle, Slay sees him and his contemporaries as ‘continuing the 
tradition,’ their fictionalizations acting to ‘transmogrify’ the “horrors of slums and labor conditions” 
with more contemporary issues, such as the “terrors of nuclear armaments and unconscionable 
patriarchies.”54  Then, built from this sense of neo-realism, he distinguishes McEwan’s fiction as 
progressively portraying the “duplicitous nature of British politics” in which the Body Politic is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Kiernan Ryan, Ian McEwan: Writers and Their Work (Plymouth: Northcote House 
Publishers, Ltd., 1994), 3.  Ryan also contributed a chapter to Peter Child’s Ian McEwan’s Enduring 
Love in which he discusses the religious undertones of that text alongside the metaphor of the “falling 
man” in a literary and religious sense.  See also his “Sex, Violence, and Complicity: Martin Amis and 
Ian McEwan,” in Rod Mengham, ed. An Introduction to Contemporary Fiction (Cambridge: Polity, 
1999), 203-218. 
52 Ryan, Ian McEwan, 3. 
53 Ibid., 64. 
54 Slay, Ian McEwan, 4.  Slay’s two other publications on McEwan appear in 1994 in the 
journal Critique under the title “Vandalizing Time: Ian McEwan’s ‘The Child in Time,” and in 1995 in 
the journal Notes on Contemporary Literature under the title “The Absurdity of Love: Parodic 
Relationships in Ian McEwan’s Reflections of a Kept Ape and Dead as they Come.”  See also Malcolm 
Bradbury, The Modern British Novel, 1878-2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), 416-543.  
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only distorting, but also reinventing, “past histories in order to better serve their present needs.”55  
Lastly, he notes the effect this political focus has on McEwan’s view of the “brutalization and 
mistreatment of women,” observing a thematic shift between The Comfort of Strangers and The Child 
in Time that is ‘increasingly more feminist’ in its depiction of gender equality and the importance now 
placed on female characters.56  In both critical accounts Ryan and Slay acknowledge a sort of ‘principle 
concern’ in McEwan’s early fictions, perceiving them as narratives shaped by inter-relational and 
dialogical reflections of the social worlds in which they are incorporated, so that they become, in a 
general sense, comparable ‘microcosms.’57 
 
Byrne’s (2004) analysis presents a wholly unique—and truly unorthodox—perspective on McEwan’s 
fiction, focusing as much on the author himself as on his writing.  Her ‘psychodynamic approach’ is in 
part a critical response to certain structuralist forms of Literary Criticism in which any links between 
the author and text are ‘bracketed off,’ and where the concentration focuses “entirely on the form,” 
rather than the “actual content of the story [emphasis in original].”58  By means of interpreting the 
“connections between his work and his life,” she challenges the notion that the critic must first remove 
the author’s intentions, reasoning that any attempt at interpreting the ‘unconscious motives’ of the 
characters in a text must, of necessity, “start in the unconscious mind of the author.”59  As a 
methodological framework for this unconventional interpretation she prescribes the analytical 
perceptions of Freud’s ‘components of personality,’ alongside Jung’s sociological archetypes.  Then, 
and by using this framework as a formula, she articulates an overall dichotomous yen within 
McEwan’s texts, a ‘sandwiched’ interplay between the “search for spiritual abnormal values,” and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Slay, Ian McEwan, 8. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., 6. 
58 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 83; 82-85, 
and 87; see also, Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, Wade Baskin, trans. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 15-17, and 71-109; Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics 
(London: Routledge, 1975); and Peter Barry’s chapter on “Structuralism” in Peter Barry, Beginning 
Theory: An Introduction on Literary and Cultural Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2002), 38-59.       
59 Bernie C. Byrnes (originally as Christina Byrnes), The Work of Ian McEwan: A 
Psychodynamic Approach (Nottingham: Pauper’s Press, 2004), 15; see also her supplementary 
publications via the same publisher: Sex and Sexuality in Ian McEwan’s Work (2004); Ian McEwan’s 
Atonement and Saturday (2006); McEwan’s Only Childhood: Development of Ian McEwan’s Metaplot 
(2008); and Ian McEwan’s On Chesil Beach: The Transmutation of a Secret (2009).  As well, see 
Bernie C. Byrnes, “Ian McEwan—Pornographer or Prophet?” (Contemporary Review, Vol. 266, Iss. 
1553, 1995), 320-323. 
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overbearing control of “dark elements from the personal and collective unconscious.”60  Within this 
confliction, she isolates the superego, ego, and id within what she deems a mythopoetic ‘polarity of 
opposites,’61 manifestations in the unconsciousness of select characters that present as difficulties with 
‘masculine self-identification’ and the ‘problems of sexual functioning’ that coincide with certain 
power issues.62  For our own interests, Byrne’s use of these Jungian oppositions, these ‘universal 
symbols’ that depict a disputatious relationship between good and evil63—or male and female—is 
suggestive of the dialectical means by which these same characters shape their respective identities.  
Additionally, her somewhat playful interpretation of McEwan’s characters as embodying 
characteristics shared by their real-world counterparts will play an integral role within our own 
experimental reading.              	   
 
Malcolm’s (2002) Understanding Ian McEwan—as part of a series on contemporary British authors—
compliments the biographical and contextually historical analysis of McEwan’s work up to the 
publication of Amsterdam with an introduction to the interpretation that will become the predominant 
focus of the six book-length texts to follow: Ethical Criticism.  Building his ethical interpretation upon 
the hypothesis that McEwan’s social and political disaffections have assisted in shaping his 
narratives—“the 1970s and early 1980s mark an important point of departure in contemporary British 
fiction, the clear emergence of a new generation or grouping of writers and of new concerns in 
fiction”64—Malcolm contends that McEwan’s ‘points of departure’ are best defined by his balancing 
the historical/political representations discussed above within the context of an ethical construction 
based on empathy.  Citing four distinct features found in the fictions emerging from this new 
generation—(1) a fascination with political and social history, (2) a cosmopolitan curiosity, (3) a 
“considerable prominence of genre mixing,” and (4) a meta-fictional reflexivity “that constantly 
reminds the reader it is fiction”65—Malcolm traces the ethical means by which McEwan responds in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Byrnes, The Work of Ian McEwan, 17. 
61 Ibid., 35. 
62 Ibid., 18. 
63 Ibid. 
64 David Malcolm, Understanding Ian McEwan (Columbia: University of South Carolina 
Press, 2002), 6.  See also his “The Media-Genic and Victorian Mr. McEwan?” in Rudiger Ahrens and 
Heinz Antor, eds. Anglistik, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2010).  
65 Malcolm, Understanding Ian McEwan, 6. 
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four equal ways: (1) his presentation of women, (2) his interests in rationalism and science,66 (3) the 
moral perspectives of his narratives, and (4) the fragmentariness of his novels.67  In classifying 
McEwan’s responses to these four features via a functional itemization based upon certain thematic 
elements in reference to the empathetic thread running through each text, Malcolm forms his 
discussion around a basic, transcendent hypothesis: the reader “gains access to reality through texts that 
are not transparent windows, but particular shapings of events through language, narrative, and 
genre.”68   
 
The first wholly direct approach to McEwan’s fiction considering the Ethical Turn, which Muller-
Wood (2009) later defines as located in content, in “what is being said rather than how it is being 
formulated [emphasis in original],”69 is Schemberg’s (2004) Achieving ‘At-one-ment.’  Originally 
published as volume 26 of the journal series Anglo-Amerikanische Studien, Schemberg centers her 
interpretation upon the late twentieth century dissatisfaction in an utter lack of questions pointing 
toward ‘moral philosophy,’70 with an added focus on certain theoretical formations of the ‘self’ in The 
Child in Time, Black Dogs, Enduring Love, and Atonement.  These formations are based upon a 
particular perception of ‘self’ as the product of a type of ‘pattern building,’ a linguistic response to an 
epistemic crisis characterized by the post-modernist “absence of ultimate truth.”71  As Schemberg 
concludes, in our post-modern attempts at resolving epistemological and ontological questions 
pertaining to ‘who we are’ and ‘where we are going,’ we find ourselves “guided by a difficult to define 
and mostly tacit ideal of ‘at-one-ment.”72  This introspective reconstruction of ‘self,’ of re-aligning 
oneself to an ethos in the process of ‘narratively’ constructing “coherent stories about who, where, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See also Jane F. Thrailkill, “Ian McEwan’s Neurological Novel” (Poetics Today, Vol. 32, 
No. 1, 2011); and Jonathan Greenberg, “Why Can’t Biologists Read Poetry?: Ian McEwan’s Enduring 
Love” (Twentieth Century Literature , Vol. 53, No. 2, 2007).  
67 Malcolm, Understanding Ian McEwan, 13-18. 
68 Ibid., 11. 
69 Muller-Wood continues: “Ethical criticism of this kind typically takes it for granted that 
texts transmit a particular, usually transformative (and therefore didactic) message.”  See Anja Muller-
Wood, “The Murderer as Moralist or, The Ethical Early McEwan” in Pascal Nicklaus, ed., Ian 
McEwan: Art and Politics (Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag Weiner, 2009), 41; see also Booth (2001), 
16-29; Phelan (2005), 222-236. 
70 For example, see Booth (1988), Miller (1989), Nussbaum (1989), Taylor (1989), and 
Benhabib (1992). 
71 Claudia Schemberg, Achieving ‘At-one-ment:’ Storytelling and the Concept of the Self in 
Ian McEwan’s The Child in Time, Black Dogs, and Atonement (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004), 7-8. 
72 Ibid., 8. 
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what we are” in reflection of the “accounts of others,”73 exposes a literary correlation between 
character development and epistemological ‘self-making.’  This process is attached to fictional 
storytelling—notably that of McEwan—by following the ethical process by which the characters and 
narrators within these texts “structure their world, endow it with meaning, and strive for ‘at-one-ment’ 
in their lives.”74  In summation, and as we shall see in the next four main texts, ethical critics claim that 
in order to gain orientation in a ‘world of uncharted diversity,’ human beings become dependent upon 
certain structures of meaning, which, when perceived through literature, mimic an acquaintance 
between humanity and the “structuring and meaning-giving task that narrative in general, and fictional 
storytelling in particular, perform in our lives.”75  
 
The second of these ethical criticisms appears in a number of publications by Childs, which include an 
edited collection of criticism (2006), a chapter in his collection of twelve contemporary British 
novelists (2005), an essay within a section of ‘critical readings’ in his own book-length analysis of 
Enduring Love (2007), and a chapter in a volume on McEwan’s interests in morality and politics edited 
by Nicklas (2009).  Running through each of these publications is the common thread of Ethical 
Criticism, against which he traces McEwan’s varying thematic interests.  For instance, in his 
introduction to The Fiction of Ian McEwan he makes the case for an integral progression in the 
author’s fiction, not unlike the ‘points of departure’ in Malcolm’s account, but isolated now in 
reference to the re-orientation essential to an ethical interpretation.  This, he claims, is seen through a 
‘three-phase’ evolution, beginning with the short story collections and their focus on challenging the 
normative societal claims of masculinity/femininity, which then continues through the ‘transformative’ 
“rites of passage of great intensity” in the novels between The Child in Time and Enduring Love.  It 
then culminates in the “self-reflexive historical” fictions of Amsterdam and Atonement.76  Arguing 
against the presupposition that the dominant thread connecting McEwan’s work is a sense of the 
‘macabre,’77 Childs concludes that there is, running throughout these texts, a process of “delineating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., 10. 
75 Ibid., 9. 
76 Peter Childs, “Introduction” in Peter Childs ed. The Fiction of Ian McEwan: A Reader’s 
Guide to Essential Criticism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 6. 
77 See also Jergen Shlaeger, “Whose Afraid of Ian McEwan?” in Ramon Plo-Alastrue and 
Maria Jesus Martinez-Aflaro, eds. Beyond Borders: Re-Defining Generic and Ontological Boundaries 
(Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag Winter, 2001), 185-197. 
	  
	  82 
individual reactions to crisis” by means of empathetic self-analysis.78  Perhaps Child’s most lasting 
contribution to this ethical discourse is his alignment of the notion of empathy to the ethics of self-
construction, an imaginative process by which individuals ‘modify,’ or at least ‘better comprehend,’ 
their own actions through the eyes of an other.79  As Childs argues, this process, described by McEwan 
himself as the “core of our humanity,” “the essence of compassion,” and the “beginning of morality,”80 
demands an “impulse towards storytelling,”81 a nod in the direction of the ethical response to the post-
modern sense of disorientation.   
 
This equally represents what Head (2007) calls a “persistent human hunger for narrative,”82 a hunger 
not unaffected by “a variety of key social and political changes,”83 and caught somewhere between the 
loss of a universal British identity in the twentieth-century, and the ideology of the novel as a formal 
sense of ethic-building.  It is then driven on by what he refers to as an equally persistent “quest for an 
ethical world-view.”84  While linking the former to a number of chaotic transitions—“fading 
colonialism; the dissolution of the British class structure; educational reform; the transformation of 
family life; and the second wave of feminism”85—and the latter with the ‘resuscitation’ of associating 
‘morality’ with the novel, he isolates the ‘ethical foundation’ of these things to a “significant 
consonance,” an investigation of both the self and morality via comparative readings of certain literary 
texts alongside “critical work[s] in narrative ethics.”86  While his Ian McEwan: Contemporary British 
Novelists appears to merely repeat the ethical criticisms described above, there is one specific way in 
which Head’s analysis stands out.  This concerns his argument that in addressing the “central issues of 
our time,”87 by linking morality and the novel through reclaiming it as a “key site for the exploration of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Childs, The Fiction of Ian McEwan, 6. 
79 Ibid., 5. 
80 Ian McEwan, “Only Love and then Oblivion” (The Guardian, 15 September 2001), 
accessed via: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/15/september11.politicsphilosophyandsociety2 (15 
February 2014).   
81 Peter Childs, “Critical History,” in Peter Childs, ed. Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 36. 
82 Dominic Head, Ian McEwan: Contemporary British Novelists (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2007), 1; see also Dominic Head, “On Chesil Beach: Another ‘Overrated’ Novella?” 
in Sebastian Groes, ed. Ian McEwan: Contemporary Critical Perspectives (New York: Continuum, 
2006), 115-123.  
83 Head, Ian McEwan, 5. 
84 Ibid., 2. 
85 Ibid., 1 
86 Ibid., 13 
87 Ibid., 2.  
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the human domain and moral being,”88 fictions like McEwan’s become something more than mere 
aesthetic: “the novel is a significant form of cultural expression.”89  
 
According to Wells (2010), these ‘cultural expressions’ are themselves shaped by the lens through 
which we view them.  Arguing that McEwan explicitly focuses the reader’s attention on certain 
elements, shaping perceptions of history in order to affect a literary outcome, and using characters as 
representative vessels for particular social perspectives—such as the growing social dichotomy 
between men and women between the 1960s and 1980s90—Wells isolates the ‘face-to-face’ interaction 
that takes place between these characters, and within their contexts, as the locus of his ethical analysis.  
Reflective of the empathy cited by Malcolm and Childs, Wells’ interpretation is anchored to the 
philosophical ideology of alterity,91 of identity defined by ‘literary moments’ when individual 
characters are pitted against one another “at crucial points of decision,” during which they must choose 
“between self-gratification, or even self-preservation and general benevolent action.”92  These 
moments, which he sees as concentrated acts of ‘ethical decision making,’ create clear points of 
‘identification’ for McEwan’s readers who, according to Wells, “must bring their own sense of 
judgment to the situations.”93  This promotes the text to a realm of meta-fiction whereby “the self 
consciousness of these key encounters thus extends beyond the texts themselves, as readers are induced 
to reflect upon the values underlying their own dealings with others.”94  Wells sees this sense of self-
forming at the foundation of an individual’s identity, as well as a condition that can be found in each of 
McEwan’s novels, from June’s encounter with evil in Black Dogs, between Briony Tallis and Private 
Latimer in Atonement, and between Henry Perowne and Baxter in Saturday.  Each of these interactions 
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89 Ibid., 1. 
90 See also Angela Roger, “Ian McEwan’s Portrayal of Women” (Forum for Modern 
Language Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1996). 
91 See Levinas (1999, 2003), Peperzak, Critchley, and Bernasconi (1996), Critchley and 
Bernasconi (2002), and Davis (2004). 
92 Lynn Wells, Ian McEwan: New British Fiction (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 15; 
see also Lynn Wells, “The Ethical Otherworld: Ian McEwan’s Fiction” in Philip Tew and Rod 
Mengham, eds. British Fiction Today (New York: Continuum, 2006), 117-128.  See also Tammy 
Amiel-Houser, “The Ethics of Otherness in Ian McEwan's Saturday,” (Connotations, Vol. 21, No. 1, 
2011/12).  




is built upon McEwan’s own conception of morality through empathy wherein the “sense that other 
people exist”95 presents the reader with a guide for their own self-construction.    
 
At the apex of these Ethical Criticisms is Moller’s (2011) Coming to Terms with Crisis.  Her published 
Doctorial Thesis,96 Moller’s text builds upon Wells’ emphasis on alterity and ethic-building by 
focusing on the ‘moments’ in McEwan’s novels when his characters are “faced with a sudden, 
unforeseeable crisis in their lives,” that challenges their sense of stability, and thus demands an 
individualized ‘re-orientation.’97  It is, then, within this re-orientation where she locates a sense of 
‘ethic-building,’ particularly through the lens of alterity, which she defines in “terms of the interactive 
encounters between individuals.”98  Though mimetic of the texts referenced above, Moller’s 
interpretation offers a new perspective by drawing out the confrontations between McEwan’s 
characters through three thematic clusters: contingency and crisis, the dichotomy between innocence 
and experience, and the personal orientation between autonomy of the self and one’s commitment to 
society.99  By breaking from the linear format taken up by the six previous critics, this deviated 
concentration grants her perspective a more thematic-based analysis, where “attention to the 
continuities” between these confrontations, allows her focus to be on the “ethical implications inherent 
in the novels,” rather than on each story’s historical relevance in chronological context.100  As she 
concludes, because McEwan’s novels “address central problems of contemporary life dominated by 
experiences of ontological and epistemological uncertainties,” they can equally be considered as 
“fictional realizations of the search for a coherent identity under the conditions imposed by a 
postmodern, heterogeneous society,”101 bridging a gap of sorts between the thematic elements in the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Ian McEwan quoted in Ramona Koval, “Interview with Ian McEwan,” Erudition (4 April 
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96 For other Theses/Dissertations, see also Gauthier (2009), 83-133; O’Hara (2009); and Smith 
(2010), 78-90. 
97 Swantje Moller, Coming to Terms with Crisis: Disorientation and Reorientation in the 
Novels of Ian McEwan (Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag Winter, 2011), 12. 
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99 Ibid. 
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This scholarship’s focus on Ethical Criticism appraises McEwan’s fiction in order to make sense of 
both his, and his context’s, shaping of ethical and moral belief structures beyond conventional notions 
about epistemology and ontology.  While based in Literary Theory, this process also hints heavily at a 
quasi-anthropological approach, within which we might slide the conversation away from the 
structuralized interpretation of McEwan’s formation of a certain type of ethic-building, toward a 
consideration of his narrative’s wider cultural implications, and thus how it might serve a particular 
‘anthropological service.’  Likewise, this focus on the ethical equally links the perception of these texts 
as representations of self-constructions with the ways anthropological ones document, compile, and 
present cultural epistemologies about particular ‘others.’  Within this relationship, and secured under 
the canopy of the interplay between literary theory and ethnographic construction, McEwan’s fiction—
or rather, specific fictions—might take on a more nuanced and anthropological significance.  As such, 
we might consider how these fictions, now seen as supplying a sense of ethical identity construction, 
might equally be seen as providing a sense of evidential authority as it pertains to a particular type of 
cultural or religious identity.  That is, in borrowing from the methodologies of the scholarship cited 
above, wherein McEwan’s novels become inter-relational and dialogical microcosmic reflections of 
real-world identity construction, we might take a step further with a critical reading that appraises his 
fiction as an ethnographic source.  This is not, unfortunately, something we might simply mimic from 
the examples discussed in our analysis of the Literary Turn.  Rather, this sort of inter-disciplinary 
interlinking requires a bit more nuance, and the discussion to which we now turn should offer us a 
stronger template by which we might develop a pragmatic correlation between the ‘ethics’ of Ethical 
Criticism and the identity construction at focus in our Ethnographic Criticism.    
 
2.4—‘Ethnocriticism’ and Identity Construction   
Underlying the inter-disciplinarity of Ethnographic Criticism is an approach that seems to equally blur 
the line between anthropological writings, and the narratives revealed, observed, and recorded in the 
process of observation: Ethnocriticism.  First developed by Krupat (1992), Ethnocriticism denotes a 
sense of inter-mingling, of combining the discourse and narratives of sources that would, traditionally, 
be delineated by the differentiation of Self and Other.  Krupat compares this to the notion of ‘frontier,’ 
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that “shifting space in which two cultures encounter one another [emphasis in original],” wherein 
notions of ‘liminality’ or ‘betweenness’ take the shape of dialogues.102  As he states, the subsequent 
crossing one does to record such dialogical data carries with it a sense of ‘cosmopolitanism:’    
The ethnocritical perspective manifests itself in the form of multiculturalism, a term I take to 
refer to that particular organization of cultural studies which engages otherness and difference 
in such a way as to provoke an interrogation of and a challenge to what we ordinarily take as 
familiar and our own [emphasis in original].103 
 
This likewise speaks to what he calls a ‘polyvocal polity,’ an organization made up of two separate 
voices, speaking different languages, but that become, in the process of cultural translation, a singular 
discourse.104  Similarly, and in noting a correlation with Clifford’s reference to Bakhtin’s 
conceptualization of ‘polyvocality,’ Wong (1995) substantiates Krupat’s idea here of the liminality and 
multi-voiced position of the translator—anthropologist—as standing upon a middle ground, a position 
“between and of two cultures.”105     
 
As a literary critique, Krupat’s creation of Ethnocriticism has roots that are linked exclusively to issues 
we have seen thus far discussed, such as the dialogical representation of the encounter between subject 
and object.  Thus, in that it regards “border and boundary crossing,”106 his Ethnocriticism is 
specifically ‘oxymoronic,’ making use of “apparently oppositional, paradoxical, or incompatible 
terms” that, in acknowledging the ‘imperialism’ of speaking for an other, or in telling our own story as 
theirs, creates an approach that allows for a ‘decidable,’ if not “polysemous and complex meaning.”107  
 
While Ethnocriticism is not without its faults,108 we shall make use of its notion of polyvocality to 
bolster the inter-subjectivity of our own approach.  As such, we might state that where it was missing 
in the discourse on reading fictions ethnographically, the notion of Ethical Criticism adds an important 
methodological perspective with its overview on the post-modern traits of character development as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Arnold Krupat, Ethnocriticism: Ethnography, History, Literature (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1992), 5. 
103 Ibid., 3. 
104 Ibid., 4-5. 
105 Hertha D. Wong, “In Search of a Dialogic Criticism: Ethnocriticism and Native American 
Literatures (American Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1995), 160. 
106 Krupat, Ethnocriticism, 26. 
107 Ibid., 28. 
108 See Scheiber, “Mirrors and Menageries,” 374; Wong, “In Search of a Dialogic Criticism,” 
159; Dennis Dutton’s review, “Arnold Krupat’s Ethnocriticism,” in Philosophy and Literature, Vol. 
17, 1991, 188-192; and Hartwig Isernhargen, “Culture, Fiction, Literature: Between the New 
Historicism and Ethnocriticism” (Zeitschfrit fur Anglistik und Amerikanistik, Vol. 41, No. 2, 1993).   
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identity construction.  However, both discourses are flawed by their own subjective limitations.  The 
process of reading fiction as ethnography is limited by its necessity in distinguishing fiction from 
ethnography, while Ethical Criticism is limited by its focus on orientation and re-orientation as isolated 
to fictions not considered ethnographically authoritative.  Our approach, then, will ethnocritically 
combine these discourses into a polyvocal unit, the defining characteristic of which will be our focus 
on Atheism-as-identity, and the means by which ‘real-world’ identities are shaped within realistic, 
though no less ‘fictitious,’ contexts.  While we will later return to this ‘marriage,’ and its 
methodological importance for our intentions below, it is to the notion of ‘identity construction,’ both 
individual and group, and in the manner with which we will direct our analysis of McEwan’s novels, in 




Painted with a broad stroke, ‘identity’ is a “multi-dimensional classification.”109  According to Jenkins 
(2004), it consists of ‘map-making,’ of charting the ‘human world’ and discovering our place in it, both 
as individuals, as well as “members of collectivities.”110  He further declares it as the discursive human 
capacity, through language, of knowing “who we are, knowing who others are, them knowing who we 
are, us knowing who they think we are,” and so on.111  As well, and perhaps most important, he marks 
identity as a process, rather than a thing itself, the means of identification being “something that one 
does,” rather than “something that one can have [emphases in original].”112  However, he also 
emphasizes that this differs from the process of mere categorization or ‘hierarchical organization,’ in 
that it is not a process of simply shifting objects into relatable groups, such as ‘A,’ ‘B,’ and ‘C.’  
Because identity construction is so multi-dimensional and interactional, it is likewise a social endeavor, 
so that while what we classify as an ‘A’ might fit well with another ‘A,’ aspects of that secondary ‘A’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Richard Jenkins, Social Identity, Third Edition (London: Routledge, 2008), 5; see also 
Richard D. Ashmore, Kay Deaux, and Tracy McLaughlin-Volpe, “An Organizing Framework for 
Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionality” (Psychological Bulletin, Vol 
130, No. 1, 2004).  





might also fit well with aspects of a ‘B,’ and so on.113  This leaves us, then, with the question of how 
this process leads toward a notion of identity construction.     
 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) contend that identity is formed by ‘social processes,’ much like that 
mapped out above.114  It is then “maintained, modified, or even reshaped by social relations,” which are 
themselves “determined by the social structure” within which they exist.115  As well, these social 
structures engender ‘identity types,’ which then become recognizable by a progressive reduction of 
one’s understanding of where they stand in the world.  As an example, they offer a hypothetical 
American who, in acknowledging his difference from a Frenchman, then also acknowledges how he 
differs by measures of municipality from his fellow American.  Then, within even that level, this same 
individual might discover how he differs socially with an individual of different social or economic 
position, such as between an ‘executive’ and a ‘hobo.’116  While seemingly opposed to Jenkins’ 
processual structure concerning the categorization of identities ‘A,’ ‘B,’ and ‘C’ above, Berger and 
Luckmann’s ‘types’ here are not meant as such.  Rather, these are verifiable examples of identity 
“observed in everyday life,” and are assertions that might be confirmed or refuted by means of ‘pre-
theoretical,’ and thus, ‘pre-scientific’ experience.  This condition is a nod to Weber’s (1949) notion of 
the ‘ideal type,’ the categorical process of identifying relatable characteristics within particular 
phenomena, and their citation here is meant to signify what they deem the ‘pre-scientific’ organization 
of identity that has yet to be applied to that sort of empirical categorization.  Additionally, though they 
seemingly disagree on the means by which an individual defines him or herself in reference to 
another—difference—they and Jenkins are saying similar things about the difficulties of so strictly 
categorizing individual identities.117           
 
Furthermore, for Berger and Luckmann identity construction stems from a progression beginning with 
a particular type of relationship, what they call the “phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic 
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114 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the 
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117 Ibid., 194-196; and Max Weber The Methodology of the Social Sciences, E. Shills, & H. 
Finch, Trans (New York: Free Press, 1949), 90-114.  
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between individual and society.”118  Formed by an habitualization, or, rather, by a routinization 
wherein the meanings behind actions become ‘embedded’ within a “general stock of knowledge,” these 
dialectical actions signify a narrowing of ‘choices.’119  These choices then become institutionalized, 
and are enacted as a ‘pattern of activity’ when individuals acknowledge their doing them through 
communication with other individuals who are themselves doing them as well.  This process thus 
alleviates the need to perpetually define each and every situation, and further develops a sense of ‘the 
way things are’ within a now “substantial, and secure, environment” that becomes something more 
than, or, at least, something more akin to, an organized entity or collectivity that begins to take the 
shape of a ‘group dynamic.’120     
 
This collective environment of identities forming together involves both ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion:’ 
“our similarity is their difference and vice versa [emphasis in original].”121  According to Jenkins, a 
group or ‘human collectivity’ comes to exist when members of that group both recognize the existence 
of the group itself, as well as their membership within it.122  In this way, a group cannot exist without 
the formation of human identities, nor can they behave or act independently, or have a “definite, 
bounded material existence in time and space.”123  The most substantial kind of group, Jenkins states, is 
the “somewhat fuzzy and unclear” formal organizations.124  Defined functionally, this type of 
organization is a particular kind of ‘institution,’ embodying a number of traits: 
there are always members; members combine in the pursuit of explicit objectives, which serve 
to identify the organization; there are criteria for identifying, and processes for recruiting, 
members; there is a division of labour in the specification of the specialized tasks and 
functions performed by individual members; and there is a recognized pattern of decision-
making and task allocation.125 
 
Of course, given the functionalist mentality of these traits, an ‘organization’ might just as much consist 
of a myriad different types of organized identities, ranging from a ‘New Guinean men’s house,’ to a 
‘bowling club,’ or even the ‘United Nations.’126   
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119 Ibid., 71. 
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In order to narrow these down, Jenkins distinguishes two more concise types: small informal groups 
and small-scale formal organizations.  The small informal group consists of the “local reality for each 
of us,” which is composed of “families, peer groups, or friendship circles.”127  The small-scale formal 
organization is, like the small informal group, deeply “implicated in the everyday construction”128 of 
collectivity.  This latter group is composed of “sports clubs, religious congregations, schools, voluntary 
organizations, business and political party branches,” as well as similar entities.129  While seemingly 
just as varied, this differentiation between group-types provides a framework by which we might deem 
an organization ‘informal,’ as something organized in close proximity to one’s ‘inner circle,’ and 
‘formal,’ as something as personal as the informal group, but more publically delineated.  As well, this 
differentiation between formal and informal also provides further insight into the differentiation made 
by those within a group, about those without.  In both accounts, routinizing oneself as a member of 
either group requires a categorization of the Other: “defining ‘us’ involves defining a range of ‘thems’ 
also.”130  It is here, within this notion of similarity and difference, as well as within the inclusivity of 
excluding others, where we discover “what we are in what we are not.”131  This last distinction can be 
more efficiently delineated via three orders: the ‘individual’ order—“the human world as made up of 
embodied individuals and what-goes-on-in-their-heads”—the ‘interaction’ order—“the human world as 
constituted in relationships between individuals, in what-goes-on-between-people”—and the 
‘institutional’ order—“the human world of pattern and organizations, of established-ways-of-doing-
things.”132   
 
The communicational quality of this sort of inclusivity derives from an “internal-external dialectic of 
identification [emphasis in original].”133  By this is equally meant the “simultaneous synthesis of 
(internal) self-definition and the (external) definitions of oneself offered by others,” what might better 
be defined as a concept of ‘selfhood.’134  With an emphasis on the equality between ‘similarity’ and 
‘difference’ in the inherent dialectic within the collective differentiation seen above, selfhood is 
defined by Jenkins as “a way of talking about the similarity or consistency over time of particular 
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embodied humans.”135  This ‘embodiment,’ though an essential aspect of the differentiation made 
between the self and others—“individuals identify themselves and are identified by others, in terms 
that distinguish them from other individuals”136—is also dependent on similarity.  This is perhaps the 
overall crux of Jenkins argument, that dialectic, as he sees it, is not merely about the difference 
between two opposing ideas, but is also about the internalized similarities as well.  When applied to the 
process of identification, this paradoxical notion of ‘attachment with’ and ‘differentiation from,’ 
signifies a “game of playing the vis-à-vis” between seeing oneself as similar to those who see 
themselves as different from others.137  This is itself signified by an amendment from ‘similarity or 
difference,’ to ‘similarity and difference.’    
 
As such, a committed and sole emphasis on the ‘difference paradigm,’ defined by a heterogeneous 
scholarship of notable theorists such as Derrida (1963), Butler (1990), Irigaray (1993), Taylor (1994), 
Benhabib (1996), Hall (1996), Seidman (1997), and Gilroy (2006),138 seems to mistakenly 
misunderstand the relationship between similarity and difference, in that “neither makes sense without 
the other.”139  That is, neither should be placed above the other, so that both contribute to the process of 
identification: “to identify something as an A is to assert that it has certain properties in common with 
all other As, and that it differs from Bs, Cs and so on.”140  Said differently, to say ‘who I am,’ is also to 
say ‘who or what I am not,’ as well as ‘with whom I have things in common.’141  Both similarity—
internal—as well as difference—both internal and external—are matters of ‘meaning,’ and as such 
further involve the process of interaction: “agreement and disagreement, convention and innovation, 
communication and negotiation.”142   
 
Lastly, as a social construction, the process of identity formation requires ‘validation.’  That is, it 
requires an acknowledgement by others in order to exist, a process described by Goffman (1959) as the 
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‘presentation of the self.’143  Applying a ‘dramaturgical analysis’ to the study of interaction, and citing 
within the face-to-face—vis-à-vis—confrontation between individuals a sense of choice not unlike the 
way in which an actor might ‘switch’ or ‘change’ their persona in order to become someone wholly 
different from themselves, Goffman’s conception offers a ‘presentational’ aspect to an individual’s 
process of meaning-making that equally avoids any notion of anxiety or embarrassment felt in how 
they are perceived.  As it necessitates not just a choice on the part of the individual in how he or she 
wishes to be seen through the eyes of another, but also requires the interaction with an individual 
against whom he or she defines him or herself as different, this ‘presentation’ both entails and 
dramatizes the “interface between self-image and public image [emphases in original].”144  This 
additional paradigm of insider/outsider distinguishes one final layer in defining the process of identity 
construction: “not only do we identify ourselves in the internal-external dialectic between self-image 
and public image, but we identify others and are identified by them in turn.”145       
 
The overall emphasis of this survey leads us to the notion that it is through acknowledging the merits of 
both ‘similarity’ and ‘difference,’ in the dialectical process of identification, where we create a much 
clearer understanding as to what we mean when we define ourselves, others, and the way others define 
themselves and us in return.  By distinguishing these processual parts—the dialectics of similarity and 
difference within the paradigms of self/self, self/group, and group/group—we equally find a sense of 
‘collective mobilization,’ a pursuit of shared objectives that also speaks to a “characteristic theme of 
history and social change.”146  For our intentions with Ethnographic Criticism herein, this process of 
‘identity construction’ will help shape our style of literary analysis, particularly concerning the way in 
which McEwan’s characters shape their own identities within the boundaries of similarity/difference 
and interactional validation.  However, just as much as their dialectical—and dialogical—exchanges 
are essential to their identity construction, so too is the environment in which this takes place.  
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As such, part of Berger and Luckmann’s argument is that “identity remains unintelligible unless it is 
located in a world.”147  What they mean by this is that any sort of interpretation or analysis of any sort 
of social construction—identity formation—must “occur within the framework of the theoretical 
interpretations within which it and they are located.”148  In essence, what they mean is that identity is 
not constructed in a void.  Thus, accompanying any type of interpretation or analysis would, for the 
sake of clarity, need a functional or working description of what that social environment looks like.  
For example, if our intent was to distinguish how and against whom a particular type of ‘identity’ was 
formed within a particular time and place, we would, at the start, need to have at least a minimal or 
functional appreciation of what that time and place looked like, as well as against whom that identity 
was constructed.  This necessity acts as an ideal transition here, as it requires us to turn from this more 
theoretical discussion to an introduction of the two novels on which our analysis in Part Two will be 
focused.  Therefore, it is to a description of that context, and the individuals who populate it, in which 
we now turn. 
 
2.5—Texts: Black Dogs and Enduring Love 
 
McEwan’s ‘Atheist trilogy’149—Black Dogs (1992), Enduring Love (1997), and Saturday (2005)—
appear roughly at the midpoint in his career.  While each demonstrates an accessible resource for 
particular examples of Atheism, we have chosen two: Black Dogs and Enduring Love.  While the 
rationale for choosing to exclude Saturday will be justified within the discussion below, this decision is 
mostly due to the contextual alignment between the others.  These two novels offer us an insightful 
look at Atheist identity construction from two positions: historical and philosophical.  That is, where in 
the first we are introduced to a specific historic type of Atheist identity, in the second that same 
Atheism is seen as progressively philosophized, so that in reading these texts chronologically not only 
will we see how these ‘Atheisms’ are defined in context, but also how they are relatable to the 
discourse used to define Atheism-in-general.  This is not to say, however, that this does not carry 
through into Saturday, which it does.  Rather, even though that text’s exceptional representation 
provides an important insight into an Atheism that is, as Bradley and Tate argue, a discursive 
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illustration of New Atheism, using it herein would hinder our hypothetical experimentation for reasons 




Black Dogs was published in 1992 and is McEwan’s fifth novel and seventh publication of fiction.  It is 
bookended by The Innocent (1990), a novel about Cold War espionage that follows a young English 
postal engineer to Berlin shortly after the Second World War, and Enduring Love (1997).  As much as 
The Child in Time (1987) marked a shift in thematic focus, moving McEwan’s fiction from the 
demographic of ‘shock literature’ into the category of ‘serious’ fiction, The Innocent marks a shift 
toward historic realism.  Guyver (2009), citing Head, remarks that this shift consists of a ‘stylistic 
departure’ toward a “significant phase of political writing.”150  As well, he characterizes it as a distinct 
‘venture’ beyond McEwan’s earlier focus on the ‘private sphere,’ which then leans toward a wider 
historical perspective encompassing the “legacy of major twentieth-century social and political 
upheavals.”151  While the ‘shock’ is not entirely vacant from The Innocent, and no less metaphorical in 
its placement—such as the dismemberment of the character ‘Otto’ as a symbol for the joint American, 
British, and German re-building of Berlin—the narrative focus is less directed at depraved acts aimed 
at challenging the reader’s perception of certain social mores.  Instead, The Innocent defines a point in 
McEwan’s career where his narratives begin to orbit around actual historical events.  Plot-points are 
suddenly located in real-world chronology,152 and real-life individuals become characters153 whose 
interactions with their invented counterparts help shape both the flow of the story, as well as the way 
the characters define themselves.  Like snapshots of actual people in actual places at actual times, after 
The Innocent, McEwan’s fiction becomes something more akin to the holistic representation of a whole 
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by means of select foci that we saw predominating the description of ‘ethnography’ in the previous 
Chapter.   
 
Black Dogs is a first-person narrative written some time between November 1989 and 1992, based on 
notes taken during interviews starting in 1985.  Its focus orbits around a family myth derived from an 
event that occurred during the honeymoon of June and Bernard Tremaine in 1946.  This focus might be 
deemed ‘historic’ because the dialogues that discuss how this myth took shape are told against the 
backdrop of the early deconstruction of the Berlin Wall, thus bookending it between World War II and 
the Cold War.  The narrator of the story is June and Bernard’s son-in-law, Jeremy, whose interest in 
their four-decade estrangement is built upon his curiosity as to how religious ideologies could so alter 
the outcome of a seemingly content marriage.  Though a character with his own unique voice who 
equally signifies a microcosmic representation, Jeremy also symbolizes the role of the author as he 
guides us through the process by which a writer translates his research and subjects into a literary 
creation.  As Childs (2005) notes: “Jeremy increasingly becomes an image of the novelist, of the 
observing outsider trying to make sense of the lives and opinions of others.”154   
 
Like The Innocent, the story continues McEwan’s use of realism, building itself atop historical reality 
by placing characters within real-world contexts for narrative effect.  As well, the narrative itself is 
dialogically-driven, a step away from the plot-focused style in The Innocent, which provides a more 
nuanced depiction of identity construction within the process of similarity and difference.  Considered 
both ‘episodic’ and ‘fragmented,’155 Black Dogs is organized into functional vignettes, each providing 
more substance to the story as a whole as it leads toward a conclusive summation.  Structured almost 
like a biographical memoir, the first Three of the novel’s Four Parts focus on a specific character, 
including Jeremy.  The first is devoted to June’s perspective concerning the text’s ‘myth,’ while the 
second provides Bernard’s.  The Third is more solipsistic and self-reflective, almost to the point of 
being a diary, riddled with Jeremy’s anxieties about properly re-creating June and Bernard’s case-
history.  The Fourth is a mostly dispassionate factual re-telling of the event that shaped the myth.  This 
Fourth Part is the summation of the text as a whole, a conclusive dénouement where the subjectively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Peter Childs, “Ian McEwan: The Child in Us All” in Peter Childs, Contemporary 
Novelists: British Fiction Since 1970 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 165. 
155 Tim S. Gauthier, Narrative Desire and Historical Reparations: A. S. Byatt, Ian McEwan, 
Salman Rushdie (New York: Routledge, 2009), 119. 
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ambiguous nature of the first Three Parts seems to be resolved by the ‘unproblematic’ and objectively 
‘factual’ nature of its style.156  In reading these Four Parts as divided into two distinct voices, we begin 
to see a chronologically reversed progression of our earlier discussion on ethnographic construction: 
the subjective, self-reflective fieldwork account leading to a more objective representation. 
 
Read critically as an attempt to engage the reader in notions of historical authenticity, McEwan’s 
switch in narrative style between the first Three Parts and the Fourth has inspired a number of 
discussions concerning both accuracy and reliability.  For example, and as Childs (2006) notes, if we 
are to interpret Jeremy as a “faithful and reliable conduit” through which we can view the relationship 
between June and Bernard, then this shift from subjective to objective style should cause us to question 
both his ‘reliability,’ as well as our reliance upon his ‘ability,’ to properly create a consistent 
document.157  Likewise, as Gauthier (2009) argues, this is more so the case when the prior Three Parts 
additionally act to remind us of the difficulty in unifying and contextualizing “distinct voices into a 
coherent narrative.”158  Because Bernard’s and June’s stories seldom agree, and because they each tell a 
different perspective of similar events, then Jeremy’s job of compiling their viewpoints into a singular 
narrative appears all that more difficult.  What’s more, when framed as an investigation in which the 
reader embodies Jeremy’s investigative position in an attempt to “uncover the true significance of an 
event that occurred in the past,”159 then McEwan’s narrative differentiation between Parts One through 
Three and Part Four creates both the “illusion that things can be put in perspective,” as well as 
highlights the intrinsic fact that in compiling narratives there will “always be more than one version of 
the events.”160  Lastly, as Wood and Wood (2007) contend, this employment of two narrative types 
drives the more acute reader toward a “more critical understanding of history,” wherein the 
problematic and ambiguous nature of the dual perspectives in Parts One through Three further illustrate 
the “impossibility for the historian to ever occupy the position of a fully neutral observer.”161  This is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Anja Müller-Wood and J. Carter Wood, “Bringing the Past to Heel: History, Identity and 
Violence in Ian McEwan’s Black Dogs” (Literature and History, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2007), 53. 
157 Childs, The Fiction of Ian McEwan, 109. 
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159 Ibid., 21. 
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especially the case, so they conclude, when one considers Jeremy’s involvement in ‘writing’ the text as 
a whole alongside the “unproblematic, factual account” of Part Four.162   
 
The way that McEwan has designed Black Dogs provides for us a theoretical means by which to relate 
this invented fiction to texts that are deemed ‘true’ or ‘formed,’ particularly in light of that latter type 
of writing’s ability to both decode and record culture simultaneously.  Because of his use of realism, 
and because the dialogical processes applied by his characters to define themselves appear within a 
narrative that is itself a critical examination—and re-creation—of the process in which this same thing 
occurs in ethnographic construction, this novel becomes a thematic source that is uniquely accessible.  
In reading Black Dogs against the backdrop of writing culture, that is, as a bridge between the two 
definitions of ‘fiction’ discussed in the previous Chapter, we begin to see in the structure of the text 
itself echoes of the formatting challenges initiated by the Literary Turn.  Because McEwan’s formation 
of the novel appears as a reflection of the process of both participant-observation and the functionalism 
inherent in textually re-creating an observed culture, it equally becomes a representation of the literary 
transition from absolute objectivity toward more creative and reflective subjectivity.    
 
In fact, were we to comparatively align the Four Parts of Black Dogs with examples, such as 
Malinowski’s Argonauts—as objective ethnography—and A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term 
(1967)—as subjective fieldwork account—the fragmented or disorganized quality of the novel 
becomes less about questions of authority or contingency in different narrative perspectives, and more 
about the process of formulating an objective text, wherein the author gingerly balances between being 
present or absent within the narrative itself.  In the first Three Parts, ‘Wiltshire,’ ‘Berlin,’ and 
‘Majdanek, Les Salces and St. Maurice de Navacelles 1989,’ our narrative guide, Jeremy, an outsider 
drawn to his mother and father-in-law for reasons of religious curiosity, describes the difficulty 
inherent in representing his subjects accurately and, in the process, in guarding his empathy from too 
biased a position on either side of their opposing claims.  In recreating the dialogues with his subjects, 
those times when he is present in the discussion, taking part in, directing, and even responding to 
certain aspects of the process, Jeremy’s Four Parts demonstrate the process by which an ethnographer, 
such as Malinowski, performs the act—even art—of crafting a distinct cultural representation.  As 




well, it equally demonstrates the intricate balancing act integral—or, perhaps even inevitable—in 
shaping an Other’s culture alongside paradoxical notions about ‘creativity’ and ‘fact.’  This is perhaps 
most succinctly demonstrated by Jeremy’s depiction of the ‘myth’ that guides his focus: “It was a story 
whose historical accuracy was of less significance than the function it served […] it was a myth, all the 
more powerful for being upheld as documentary.”163     
 
Lastly, though this introduction has declared Black Dogs an ideal textual bridge between fictional 
representation and ethnographic construction, in this same process it equally provides us an excellent 
source through which we might decipher the Atheist identity construction within.  Through the 
dialogical means in which Jeremy records and re-creates the opposing positions of June and Bernard, 
we gain access to how they themselves, as representatives of the process by which this type of Atheism 
is defined as an identity, become equally demonstrative of a particular type of processed Atheism.  
Without delving too deep into this discussion just yet—and in order not to expose the magic before the 
illusion—this type reveals a process of transition, a passage from one distinction to the next, a 
concentrated depiction of the larger shift in twentieth-century Atheism from an established political 
ideal to a philosophical conclusion that appears caught within a void awaiting a re-association.  We 
might relate this to what Van Gennep (1960) and Turner (1966, 1967) refer to as a transitional or 
marginalized stage that represents something that is “neither this nor that, and yet is both.”164  This 
‘Atheism-in-progress,’ appears, as we shall see in our analysis in Part Two, as both historically and 




Enduring Love was published in 1997 and marks both a philosophical turn in McEwan’s use of 
realism, as well as a point of commercial popularity and scholarly attention.  It is bookended by a short 
piece of children’s fiction, The Daydreamer (1994), and the novel Amsterdam (1998).  While The 
Innocent marked a turn in his fiction toward the realism we find in Black Dogs, his focus on 
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philosophical perceptions in The Daydreamer represents a thematic shift not fully addressed in the 
realism of The Innocent and Black Dogs.  Offering as well a somewhat nostalgic step back toward the 
fantasy found in his early short story collections, the seven Chapters in The Daydreamer give brief 
accounts of a young boy, Peter Fortune, as he daydreams his way through his early youth.  These 
vignettes are shaped around philosophical depictions of metamorphic fantasies where, in the course of 
his coming-of-age, Peter learns to develop his sense of self through a series of empathetic 
transformations, both physical and metaphorical.  Across these short Chapters, written with a ‘simple 
prose’—“[a] book for adults about a child in a language that children could understand”165—we find 
the locus of the philosophical turn that marks the differentiation between the representations of 
Atheism in Black Dogs and Enduring Love.   
 
Thus, the realism in Enduring Love moves away from the distinctly historical, such as that in Black 
Dogs, and becomes, as Schemberg notes, more philosophical: “in Enduring Love, the conflict between 
mysticism and rationalism is removed from the domain of politics and history which shaped much of 
the characters’ lives in Black Dogs.”166  In that the interactions between the characters are less 
historically anchored, they appear more as ‘analogies,’ what Seaboyer refers to as representations of 
the “urgent dilemmas surrounding rapid change,” in an ever evolving ‘post-industrial’ Britain.167  This 
does not, however, mean that the text is entirely disassociated from the familiar functionality and 
realism of the ‘everyday world.’  In fact, though the characters within might stand for rhetorical 
ideologies, the wider philosophical discussion plays out across a distinct setting.  The novel’s twenty-
four chapters are interspersed with references to a “known (or knowable) public world,”168 
demonstrating a ‘verisimilitude’ of dates and locations that can be “pointed out on a good map of the 
respective area.”169  Across the text these pin-points remind us that the story itself is playing out upon a 
stage that exists within a represented world, further raising the narrative from the level of the invented 
and the made-up, toward the level of the ethnographically formed and made-from.  However, this does 
not mean that the narrator’s narration goes wholly unchallenged.  Like we saw in our introduction to 
Black Dogs, Enduring Love is interspersed with a number of instances where the authenticity of his 
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account is questioned by alternative points of view, as well as opposing voices that contest his 
perception of things.  This provides for us a further outlet in connecting the narrative itself with the 
issue of authority discussed in the previous Chapter.  These appear in the form of letters that are 
chronologically inserted into the narrative, as well as an Appendix that, like Part Four in Black Dogs, 
serves to objectively substantiate the text by offering an evidential source to the narrator’s 
representation.  This is also, we might note, similar to the substantiating additions made by Jackson and 
Knab in Barawa and A War of Witches.      
 
As well like Black Dogs, this first-person narrative is almost formulaic in its use of a trio of differing 
perspectives, wherein the individual characters are shaped as representatives of particular points of 
view.  Throughout the scholarship on the text, as well as through evidence from within the novel, this 
trio comes to represent three specific perceptions.  The narrator is Joe Rose, a forty-eight170 year old 
“well-known science writer,”171 whose devotion to “the power of reason,”172 presents itself as an 
almost “snobbish belief in the epistemological superiority”173 of objectivism and rationalism.  As such, 
his character represents a “rational, scientific mind-set,”174 that is built upon certain scientific theories 
such as evolutionary psychology and genetics.175  Joe’s ‘common-law wife,’176 Clarissa, is an English 
Professor who specializes in Romantic literature.  Her perspective, as befitting her occupation and 
interests, is filtered through the “lens of canonical high art and literature.”177  Hers is a “more synthetic 
vision,” a reliance upon both feeling and thought, that reaches “beyond reason.”178  The third 
perspective is represented by the psychologically deranged Jed Parry, a young man whose obsession 
with Joe manifests itself into a benign religiosity, his psychosis—‘de Clerembault’s syndrome, or 
‘erotomania’—taking the shape of a “highly individualistic Christianity.”179  While each of these three 
characters represent distinct ideologies which, as we shall see, develop into points of identity, it is 
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within the dialectical relationship between Joe and Jed where we shall find the core of this text’s 
representation of Atheism.  Again, and as Schemberg further notes: “both Joe and Parry are defenders 
of master narratives which give their believers a considerable confidence in the truthfulness of their 
judgments […] Joe’s language is shot through with the authority of science and Jed’s with the authority 
of religious faith.”180   
 
The backdrop against which the novel is set can be established as “just before 1995.”181  While this 
broad placement might appear innocuous, particularly in reference to the distinct placement of the 
dialogues in Black Dogs, we can also connect a discursive thread here between Joe’s represented 
Atheism and the identification of this time-period as the ‘Decade of the Brain,’ a context within which 
“the study of consciousness became all the rage.”182  This is further defined by Green (2011) via a ‘host 
of new developments,’ such as neuroimaging, molecular biology, genetics, psychopharmocology, and 
cognitive science, that Richardson (2001) and Bryce, Adams, and Coyle (2000) link to certain 
‘hybridized disciplines,’ such as cognitive neuroscience, psychobiology, behavioral neurology, and 
neuropsychology.  This in turn clarifies this discourse as an inter-disciplinary correlation with the 
‘study of the mind’ and the ‘study of the brain,’ the result of which sees a fundamentally altered 
‘science’ of the brain.183  This is then manifested in Enduring Love via the way McEwan shapes Joe’s 
interest-based Atheism, particularly prior to his interactions with Clarissa and Jed, that equally 
demarcates his worldview as a uniquely lexical distinction.  How this might be emulative of similar 
discourses on the meaning of ‘Atheism’ outside the context of McEwan’s usage, will become more 
apparent through our discussion in the next Chapter.       
 
In that it might be read as a representative discussion of these interests, Enduring Love is perhaps best 
summarized as a microcosmic philosophical discussion about a singular event, the accident at the start 
of the novel that brings our characters/informants together, and against which their interactions find 
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reference.  This incident and its aftermath formulates the philosophical perspectives throughout the text 
and acts as a catalyst for the dialectic interactions between Joe and the others, particularly shaped 
around his coming-to-terms with how his own philosophical understanding of the actions that transpire, 
differ according to perspective.  These perspectives are clearly laid out in the opening chapters as the 
event is told and re-told from different points of view and with different voices: “Joe’s de-divinisation 
and de-mystification of the self and the world contrasts with both Clarissa’s and Jed’s teleological 
interpretations of the world.”184  Of course, while this apparent classification of each individual into a 
particular identity—“Joe, Clarissa, and Jed represent the three conflicting worldviews”185—might 
simplify the overall theme of the text into a mere representation of the “conflict between religion and 
science,”186 for our intentions a more focused analysis of Joe’s philosophical construction of self in 
opposition to Clarissa and Jed—but especially the latter—will reveal within the novel’s conflicts and 
insight into the way the liminal Atheism in Black Dogs comes to be established into a defensible 
position above its mere ‘parasitic,’ or ‘negative,’ dependency.      
 
Again, not to reveal too much of the method in the magic, we can briefly here locate the Atheism in 
Enduring Love as developed from that in Black Dogs along a philosophical axis.  That is, where in 
Black Dogs, the represented Atheism is seen as founded upon a condition of political opposition toward 
the ‘spiritual,’ with Enduring Love that opposition takes up the narrative of ‘science,’ making itself less 
negative by promoting a positive position.  In this way, the Atheism we shall examine in this fiction 
develops in two ways: first, as a continuation of the practical Atheism in Black Dogs, and second, as an 
Atheism-as-promotion, attached to, and in support of, certain ideals and doctrine.  In order to more 
succinctly examine the differentiation between these two ‘types,’ we will utilize Jenkins’ distinction of 
‘nominal’ and ‘virtual’ identification, the former representing the name or label given to a particular 
identity, of which the latter, the experience, is privy to change depending upon context: “the name can 
stay the same—X—while what it means in everyday life to be an X can change dramatically.”187    
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∇  
 
One final disclaimer is necessary here before concluding this Chapter.  While a keen-eyed reader might 
notice that the in-process ethnographic studies cited above—Engelke, Mumford, and Aston—are not 
focused on the same time-period as the fictions just discussed—given that there is, in fact, a two-
decade differentiation between them and Black Dogs—this is more beneficial than detrimental to our 
choice in using them.  That is, while we might reason that there is a limited amount of ethnographic 
data to source from in our present context, the time in which McEwan’s texts are set might be 
justifiably void of that sort of ethnographic data.  This is partly true and false.  Atheism had been 
examined to a point by this stage, as we shall see in our discussion of the term in the next Chapter.  
However, there still appears a complete lack of what we might call ‘proper ethnography,’ either in the 
shape of traditional participant observation, or of the more experimental type.  For this reason, and 
because we will be filtering these texts through our lens of Ethnographic Criticism, our analysis will be 
on the Atheism specific to the context of these texts.  Again, this is more of a blessing than a limitation.  
As we will see in our discussion of the discourse built around the definition of the term, one of the 
underlying themes is a consistent sense of progression.  From its historical interpretations, to 
contemporary theoretical stipulations, and further along to the New Atheism discussed by Bradley and 
Tate, ‘Atheism’ is a product of progression, and the Atheism we shall find in McEwan’s two texts will 
demonstrate this ideally.  From the positive promotion of Communism and the dialectical negation of 
religious ideology in Black Dogs, to the re-conceptualization of that Atheism as attributed through the 
promotion of scientific thinking in Enduring Love, this chosen stage offers us a fine example with 
which to not only interpret how Atheism is ‘identified,’ but how it might represent an internalized 
representation of that Atheism externally defined.   
 
2.6—Conclusion: A Marriage of Convenience 
As we pointed out in the introduction of this Chapter, the discussion above is in many ways a 
continuation of that made in the previous one.  That is, where we located a methodological foundation 
of our Ethnographic Criticism in that Chapter’s discussion of the means by which a more literary 
focused style of writing ethnography led to a few examples where fiction was read ethnographically, 
this Chapter substantiated that methodology with a literary analysis focused on character development 
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and ‘self construction.’  In this same way, our discussion herein on how we might further support our 
turn toward fiction presented a number of correlations between the manner with which the writing of 
our chosen author has been criticized, and the style with which we will shape our own criticism.           
 
Because of this, this Chapter did more than just introduce those fictions as our ‘data.’  Rather, it acted 
as a larger introduction to the ways in which our Ethnographic Criticism has developed out of 
established foundations in the fields of ‘Atheism and Literature’ and ‘Ethical Criticism.’  Likewise, our 
marrying the methodology spanning these two Chapters has equally led us to an important clarification 
about our own concentration on fictional representations of identity construction within Ethnographic 
Criticism.  Thus, we can conclude here with the more nuanced notion that the methodological intent of 
Ethnographic Criticism is the result of an associative link between reading fiction ethnographically, 
and the evaluation of it as a representation of character self-making in Ethical Criticism.  We might 
also resolve that as it is built upon these two discourses, it might be equally defined as a particular type 
of textual analysis, substantiated and contextualized by these two discussions, that additionally 
transforms the fictions we intend to analyze from constructions fictionally ‘made-up’ into constructions 
that might also be considered as ethnographically ‘made-from.’  For the sake of clarity, this 
transformation will be more fully explained in Chapter Four.                   
 
Lastly, this conclusion brings us back to our three-point justification for turning to fiction.  As we 
specified earlier, the current discourse about the study of Atheism, particularly in regard to conducting 
an ‘anthropology of Atheism,’ is plagued with ambiguities about the definition of the term.  With our 
methodology now established, we can turn to that subject itself.  In the following Chapter, our 
discussion concerning the concept of Atheism will supply a theoretical means through which an 
individual conducting an Ethnographic Criticism might do that with the sort of objectivity required of 
an anthropological approach.         
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CHAPTER THREE—THEORY: DEFINING 
 
“It is a bit of a problem, the title ‘Atheist’—no one really wants to 
be defined by what they do not believe in. We haven't yet settled on 
a name, but you wouldn't expect a Baptist minister to go around 
calling himself an ‘aDarwinist.’  
 
—Ian McEwan, The New Republic, 11 January 20081 
 
 
3.1—Introduction: Discourse Analysis and the Definition of Atheism 
 
The previous two Chapters were predominately focused on the notion of ‘text,’ and how we might 
locate that term somewhere within the opposition between ‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction.’  As well, they 
provided for us an insight into how we might read such texts in regard to a ‘particular concept.’  This 
Chapter will focus on that concept, adding a third pillar to our introduction of Ethnographic Criticism, 
and aimed once more at addressing our hypothetical intention of reading fictional texts for 
ethnographic insight.  However, this Chapter will function in an entirely different manner than the 
previous two.  That is, where those Chapters helped establish the how and why of our Ethnographic 
Criticism, essentially justifying our conception and use of it, as well as contextualizing it within the 
fields of anthropology and literary analysis, this Chapter will focus on the what of our analysis.  In this 
way, while it will be about the modern Atheism upon which our Ethnographic Criticism will be 
focused, and thus specifically clarify what we mean when we use the term itself, this will not be its 
only function.  In fact, its intended objective has two goals: on one end it will introduce our theoretical, 
rather than methodological, use of Discourse Analysis in an attempt at addressing the current 
ambiguity about what Atheism ‘means,’ while on the other, it will use this issue to provide for us an 
external comprehension about the Atheism internalized within McEwan’s two texts.  In other words, it 
will present a style of conceptual analysis designed to remove us from the equivocality presently 
afflicting the study of Atheism, while at the same time introduce the concept itself so as to reinforce 
our examination in Part Two.           
 
In order to accomplish this, our use here of what we refer to as ‘Discourse-as-theory,’ will be an 
adoption of the process involved in conducting a discursive analysis: a notional perception of that 
methodology that will theoretically assist us in explicating a useful perception about Atheism out of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Isaac Chotiner, “The TNR Q&A, Interview with Ian McEwan on Saul Bellow, the Internet, 
and Atheism” (The New Republic, 11 January 2008), accessed 15 August 2013 via Richard Dawkins 
Foundation website: http://old.richarddawkins.net/articles/2159.  
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complex discourses focused on defining it.  That is, because these discourses have contributed to a 
myriad of definitions of Atheism, and because these definitions are built upon theoretical stipulations 
stemming from a rather expansive foundation, this has made our ability to merely stipulate what we 
might be looking for in the texts we intend to examine a rather dubious enterprise.  This is, in fact, 
quite similar to the same issues we might face were we to replace our chosen concept with the term 
‘religion.’  Because there exist different types of definitions of this term, and thus different routes to 
defining it, any attempt at signifying a distinct, yet equally expansive, meaning of ‘religion’ would be 
arduous, if not impossible.  Thus, our adoption of Discourse-as-theory is an attempt at moving away 
from this sort of approach, replacing here where we might stipulate the sort of Atheism we intend to 
find in our chosen data, with a more comprehensive discursive perception of those things that 
contribute to an individual’s use of ‘Atheism’ as an identifying term.  This will equally affect the type 
of discourses that we will be examining.  That is, where ‘Discourse-as-method’ might be determined as 
an examination of ‘first-order’ discourses—individuals defining themselves using particular 
language—our Discourse-as-theory will instead examine how conceptions like Atheism are shaped by 
what we might call ‘second-order discourse:’ a discourse shaped by both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders,’ 
wherein that first-order discourse is used to create a broad or useful ‘definition.’  Therefore, in order to 
remove ourselves from the standard approach where we would stipulate our own definition of Atheism, 
while at the same time present that concept so as to conceptually benefit our analysis in Part Two, our 
use of Discourse-as-theory will focus on how select individuals have defined the term, what influenced 
those definitions, and how they in turn have influenced the definitions made by others.    
 
Additionally, using a theoretical adaptation of Discourse Analysis equally benefits our description—
and use—of Ethnographic Criticism in two ways.  First, in its capacity to eliminate the need of a 
standard definition, this type of discursive approach also eliminates the inherent bias that we ourselves 
might not be aware of in the formulation of even the most abstract ‘working definition.’  In fact, we 
might see this occurring in descriptions that seem entirely objective—as we shall see below—where a 
standardized and utilitarian definition might be built upon, and infected by, a foundation constructed on 
partiality and preconception.  Because of this, we might even concede that the trouble with offering any 
sort of definition is that even when one is put forth with the most objective of intentions, in its acting as 
both a summation and contribution, it is still built upon a discourse that might not be derived from the 
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most impartial of origins.  In this way, we might further argue that it would likewise foundationally 
negate those objective intentions.  
 
Second, this sort of approach also mimics the anthropological process typically adopted while 
researching the ways individuals develop their cultural identities.  That is, because our intention with 
Ethnographic Criticism is to read fictional accounts as if they are as equally useful in deciphering 
cultural identity construction as ethnographic ones, the inherently objective style of Discourse Analysis 
presents a method as equally ‘methodologically agnostic’2 as the participant observation discussed in 
the first Chapter.  That is, because this style of analysis ensures that we ‘bracket out’ any sort of pre-
determined notions about Atheism, and thus further safeguards our efforts from ‘inserting’ individuals 
into boxes designed to categorize their identities, it also assists us in avoiding the all-too-simple 
procrustean method of assuming that the way ‘X’ uses a particular term is identical to the way that ‘Y’ 
uses it.  Respectively, because this alleviates the requirement of formulating a general term or 
‘umbrella’ category, what we are left with is an anthropological style that allows the subject to speak 
for him or herself, such as we saw with Crapanzano’s Tuhami.  This, perhaps more than anything, 
seems to be the leading issue in the growing study of Atheism and ‘non-religion,’ the evidence of 
which is found in the existence, and use, of generalizations such as the latter term.  Thus, by focusing 
less on defining the term, and more on the process involved in constructing its definition, we also 
remove ourselves from the necessity of determining the ‘right’ definitions from the ‘wrong’ ones, 
while at the same time alleviate the need to summarize the ‘frustrating morass of contradictions’ across 
the definitions examined below into a stipulation that is both generalized and essentialized.  
 
Therefore, and because it will be presenting as equally a foundational aspect to our description of 
Ethnographic Criticism, the structure of this Chapter will slightly mimic the first one: a theoretical 
discussion followed by an analysis of specific data.  To begin, we will provide a survey description of 
Discourse Analysis, followed by a specific example of how it has been used to deal with the myriad 
and convoluted definitions of ‘religion.’  Next, we will compare this example to the same issues 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 First coined by Berger as ‘methodological atheism’ in 1967, this was later amended to 
‘agnosticism’ by Smart in 1973.  See Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological 
Theory of Religion (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 100 and 108; and Ninian Smart, The Science of 
Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge: Some Methodological Questions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1973), 160. 
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underscoring the definitions of ‘Atheism,’ and thus establish what we mean by Discourse-as-theory.  
With this theoretical description then determined, we will proceed with our analysis of those 
definitions across two discursive categories: the historical—or what we call ‘lexical’—and the 
theoretical—or what we call ‘real’ or ‘essential.’  Arranging our analysis in this way will not only 
assist us in better understanding how the latter category emerged as a result of an attempt at combining 
the different historical definitions found in the former—and thus isolate an origin for the ambiguity 
found within that discourse—it will also provide a detailed external understanding against which to 
relate our examination of McEwan’s texts in Part Two.  
 
 
3.2—Discourse Analysis and the Definition of Religion 
 
In order to locate the meaning of Discourse Analysis as a method, we might initially agree with Gee 
(2005) that it is an “analysis of language in use.”3  Of course, this is admittedly neither a fair nor 
complete definition.  For it also entails an analysis of the way language use impacts the communication 
of beliefs within interactions between individuals (van Dijk 1997), as well as demonstrates a particular 
type of approach (Paltridge 2006) aimed at specific patterns of language use across differing textual 
media: from language use in relation to social, political, and cultural formations—“[discourse] is 
language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order”4—to more ‘textual’ based 
analyses—“[discourse analysis]’ primary purpose […] is to provide a deeper understanding and 
appreciation of texts and how they become meaningful to their users.”5    
 
Because of this methodological polyfocality, the notion of ‘discourse’ itself, as van Dijk further 
suggests, is somewhat ‘fuzzy.’6  Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton (2001) refer to this as the ‘curse of 
discourse,’ alluding to the fact that because discourse-as-language-use might represent a myriad of 
multi-disciplinary approaches, then “the directions in which its meanings may fan out are limitless.”7  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 James Paul Gee, An Introduction To Discourse Analysis: Theory And Method, 2nd edition 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 5.  
4 Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland, “ Introduction: Perspectives on Discourse Analysis” 
in Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland, eds., The Discourse Reader, Second Edition (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 3.  
5 Brian Paltridge, Discourse Analysis: An Introduction (London: Continuum, 2006), 3. 
6 Teun A. van Dijk, “The Study of Discourse” in Teun A. van Dijk, ed. Discourse Studies: A 
Multidisciplinary Introduction, Volume One (London: Sage, 1997), 1. 
7 Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, “Introduction” in Deborah 
Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton, eds. The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2001), 1. 
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In its own way, this makes the description herein of Discourse-as-method a bit tricky, particularly for 
issues of limited space.  For our intentions then, and because our use of Discourse-as-theory will be 
dependent on a more specific discussion of Discourse Analysis in the study of religion, the following 




For his intentions, van Dijk demarcates three main dimensions—“(a) language use, (b) the 
communication of beliefs (cognition), and (c) interaction in social situations [emphases in original]”8—
which then give way to three disciplinary approaches—linguistic, psychological, and social 
scientific—with which to differentiate an ‘order of discourse’ between ‘abstract’—language and 
communication—and ‘concrete’—singular or particular conversations.  This formula performs a 
clarification of sorts, cataloguing disciplinary notions about how discourse is examined in the process 
of perceiving how language use influences the beliefs and interactions of those speaking.9  Relatedly, 
in their compilation of Jaworski and Coupland’s (1999) ‘ten definitions,’ and in order to address the 
‘broad conglomeration’ of their ‘curse of discourse,’ Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton stipulate their 
own three-part interpretation: “(1) anything beyond the sentence, (2) language use, and (3) a broader 
range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic and nonspecific instances of language.”10  Similarly, 
and by combining elements of comparable analysis, Fairclough (2003) clarifies the integral presence of 
dialecticism in the social study of language, particularly through a correlative meaning of ‘language’ 
that broadly encompasses a wide range of textual and dialogical elements: “written and printed texts 
such as shopping lists and newspaper articles are ‘texts’, but so also are transcripts of (spoken) 
conversations and interviews, as well as television programmes and web-pages.”11  This broadening the 
concept ‘text’ to incorporate any ‘actual instance of language in use,’ re-conceptualizes the notion of 
discourse by incorporating a sense of authorial intention—integral to the concept of identity 
construction—into his own definition.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 van Dijk, “The Study of Discourse,” 2. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton, “Introduction, ” 1. 
11 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 4.   
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Building on Farclough’s three-level method of discursive interpretation—“the production of the text, 
the text itself, and the reception of the text”12—Gee’s (2005) conception takes up the emphasis of 
balance: “discourse analysis […] seeks to balance talk about the mind, talk about social interaction and 
activities, and talk about society and institutions.”13  Somewhat mimetic of the typeface change we 
shall see in von Stuckrad’s (2003, 2010, 2013) discussion below, Gee differentiates between 
‘Discourse,’ and ‘discourse,’ the latter designating how language is used ‘on site’ to “enact activities 
and identities,” and the former to denote when this sort of discursive ‘language-in-use’ is “melded 
integrally with non-language ‘stuff’ to enact specific identities and activities.”14  Thus, at least for Gee, 
the focus of Discourse Analysis is a two-pointed affair:  
(a) illuminating and gaining evidence for our theory of the domain, a theory that helps to 
explain how and why language works the way it does when it is put into action; and (b) 
contributing, in terms of understanding and intervention, to important issues and problems in 
some ‘applied’ area (e.g. education) that interests and motivates the researcher.”15 
 
With a more direct focus on identity construction, Paltridge (2006) takes up this identifying notion of 
‘language-in-use’ in order to decipher the relationship between language and identity, both in an 
individual ‘display’ of one’s identity, as well as in how that identity is intended to be seen.  In this way, 
his emphasis is on the particular ways in which, through the use of both ‘written’ and ‘spoken’ 
discourse, language plays a part in ‘performing’ and ‘creating’ certain social identities.16  Anchored to 
the concepts of communication and interaction, Paltridge’s more social-oriented use of discourse is 
attached to the development of patterns across ‘texts,’ denoting a process by which we might decipher 
influential aspects of identity construction within relational interactions between participants.  As he 
himself states: “discourse analysis considers the relationship between language and the contexts in 
which it is used and is concerned with the description and analysis of both spoken and written 
interactions.”17         
 
Lastly, Jaworski and Coupland (2006) seem to develop their notion of discourse on top on Paltridge’s 
more social-centered conception, their perception of language-use as “relative to social, political, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid., 10. 
13 Gee, An Introduction To Discourse Analysis, 6. 
14 Ibid., 7. 
15 Ibid., 8. 
16 Paltridge, Discourse Analysis, 1. 
17 Ibid., 3. 
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cultural formations,”18 as thematically correlative to Paltridge’s argument that Discourse Analysis 
considers, “how people manage interactions with each other, how people communicate within 
particular groups and societies, as well as how they communicate with other groups, and with other 
cultures.”19  Dependent upon actions of communication, Jaworski and Coupland see discourse not just 
as ‘language-in-use,’ but as language that is reflecting and shaping social order.  In this way, language 
becomes something that influences, and is influenced by, how individuals interact with that social 
order.  This sense of social interaction, they argue, is why there appears such a multi-disciplinary 
interest in studying ‘discourse,’ not just linguistically, but also textually, historically, politically, 
philosophically, and social-scientifically: “despite important differences of emphasis, discourse is an 
inescapably important concept for understanding society and human responses to it, as well as for 
understanding language itself.”20 
 
Throughout this survey, ‘discourse’ becomes somewhat fluid and plastic, a signifier bound to 
‘language’ and ‘language use,’ that is also privy to stimulations pertaining to particular disciplinary 
ends.  For this reason Discourse-as-method is equally bound to a number of cross-disciplinary 
concepts: textual and conversational interactions, identity construction, social construction, and the 
creation, presentation, and translation of ‘texts.’  In essence then, and according to this survey, we 
might stipulate Discourse-as-method as the analysis of the way in which discourse—language in use 
that is represented via either spoken or written ‘texts’—shapes, and is shaped by, the way in which the 
individuals whom we are studying pragmatically use this discourse in order to construct meaning in 
their lives.  Discourse-as-method is thus the borrowing, and practical use of, different methodological 
practices regulated by a focus on how individuals discursively shape the ‘selves’ they wish to be read 
by others.  Through this stipulation, we may further concede here that our Ethnographic Criticism is a 
type of Discourse Analysis, an examination of a particular textual entity that is embedded with a 
discursively constructed concept.  While this is true in consideration of the survey above, given the 
experimental and non-traditional method of the former, our use of the latter is a bit more specialized.  
For our interests, then, Discourse Analysis offers a means with which to interpret the concept at focus 
within the process of conducting an Ethnographic Criticism.  That is, in our attempt at reading a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Jaworski and Coupland, “ Introduction,” 3 
19 Paltridge, Discourse Analysis, 1. 
20 Jaworski and Coupland, “ Introduction,” 3 
	  
	  112 
fictional text for a cultural insight concerning a particular concept, we need to stipulate both the 
context, and cursory meaning, of that concept.  It is here, with a focus on ‘definitions,’ where we 
translate Discourse-as-method into our Discourse-as-theory.  For further clarification, we turn now to a 




In his approach to the discursive study of religion, von Stuckrad (2003) cites three ‘turns’ that he 
argues have ‘profoundly transformed’ the process with which we study religion: the ‘linguistic turn,’ 
wherein the issue of religion moved from “its place in the transcendent and numinous into the realm of 
language and text;”21 the ‘pragmatic turn,’ whereby through semantic analyses of ‘written sources’ the 
scholar of religion focused an emphasis on the “contexts and pragmatic options that are necessary to 
really understand what a text is all about;”22 and the ‘writing culture debate,’ which we discussed in 
detail in the first Chapter.  Acknowledging these turns as enacting a theoretical polyvocality in the way 
the term ‘religion’ has come to be defined, the result appears as a sort of nonconsensual ambiguity in 
what is meant by ‘religion’ in the ‘study of religion.’  A discourse in itself, this begins with a 
theological-based ‘sui generis’ and ‘essentialist’ approach—‘substantive’—out of which later develop 
a number of ‘functionalist’ methodologies.  From within the latter, with its focus on ‘actions’ rather 
than ‘beliefs,’ there arise a myriad of perspective-based interpretations about how we might construct a 
definition of religion: polythetic/monothetic (Bailey 1973; Saler 1987 and 2000); dimensional (Smart 
1996); phenomenological (Cox 2010); taxonomic (Smith 1978, 1988, 1996, and 2004); cognitive 
(Boyer 2001), and critical (Fitzgerald 2000; McCutcheon 2001).  While this brief list in no way 
represents a concise compendium of each and every methodological approach, it does offer us a simple 
snapshot with which to perceive the wider implications of approaching a singular concept through 
disparate venues.   
 
Von Stuckrad refers to this disparity as a double-edged issue, on one end offering a particular 
disciplinary horizon to one’s individualized study, while on the other creating what he refers to as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kocku von Stuckrad, “Discursive Study of Religion: From states of the Mind to 
Communication and Action” (Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2003), 255.   
22 Ibid. 
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“cornucopia of methodological approaches,” a nod to Smith’s (1998) argument that where once we 
might have struggled to define the term itself, we are now faced with a larger issue, as predicted by 
Leuba (1912), in doing so “more than fifty ways.”23  What this ‘multi-definability’ equally generates is 
a contentious discourse not unlike the issues we will address in our discussion of Atheism, a 
discordancy von Stuckrad resolves by supplanting the formulation of a ‘generic definition of religion’ 
with a ‘theory of discourse:’ 
Our object of study is the way religion is organized, discussed, and discursively materialized 
in cultural and social contexts. ‘Religion,’ in this approach, is an empty signifier that can be 
filled with many different meanings, depending on the use of the word in a given society and 
context. It is this use of ‘religion’—including the generic definitions of academics—that is the 
responsibility of scholars to explain.”24 
 
Emulative of Gee’s differentiation between ‘Discourse’ and ‘discourse,’ von Stuckrad marks this 
grammatical shift with a change of typeface, ‘religion’ referring to “contributions to a discourse on 
religion,” and ‘RELIGION’ referring to the discourse itself, the “societal organization of knowledge 
about religion.”25  Indicative of the substantive/functionalist split referenced above, this grammatical 
alteration shifts our attention from perceiving ‘religion’ as revealing some sort of transcendent truth, to 
‘religion’ as serving a practical purpose to those who use it: “Religions are powerful […] because they 
serve as instruments in the communicative formation of identity and provide people with a concrete 
script of action.”26  Thus, by regarding religion as a system of ‘communication and shared action,’ we 
can turn to an analysis of how those who identify as ‘religious’ go about doing that, our focus now on 
the “public appearance of religious propositions [emphasis in original].”27  It is from out of this process 
where we will build our own theory of discourse.   
 
As an introductory and exemplary example, let us here pretend that the concept with which we were 
focusing our Ethnographic Criticism was ‘Catholicism,’ and the fiction with which we were critiquing 
was Greene’s (1940) The Power and the Glory.  Rather than begin with a general definition that we 
might then attempt to relate to the Catholicism represented in Greene’s text, a more theoretically 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious” in Mark C. Taylor, ed., Critical Terms 
for Religious Studies (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 281-282; see also James H. 
Leuba, “Appendix: Definitions of Religion” in James H. Leuba, A Psychological Study of Religion: Its 
Origin, Function, and Future (New York: Macmillan, 1912). 
24 Kocku von Stuckrad, “Reflection on the Limits of Reflection: An Invitation to the 
Discursive Study of Religion” (Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, Vol. 22, 2010), 166. 
25 von Stuckrad, “Discursive Study of Religion,” 12. 
26 von Stuckrad, “Discursive Study of Religion: From states of the Mind to Communication 
and Action,” 269. 
27 Ibid., 268. 
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discursive approach would be to interpret the elements that contribute to the societal organization of 
knowledge about ‘Catholicism’ in the contextualized structure of that text.  This is both an external and 
internal process, meaning that our discursive knowledge about the empty signifier ‘Catholicism’ is 
influenced by different discursive fields pertaining to this particular ‘type.’  This is also an ‘in-process’ 
sort of discursive analysis, meaning that though we might enter into our criticism with an 
understanding based on external research, our conclusive stipulation of what Catholicism means in 
Greene’s text is equally influenced by that text’s internalized interpretation—such as we see with 
ethnography.  In this way, ‘Catholicism’ becomes less a signifier defined across a millennial 
spectrum—a ‘defined thing’—and more a term discursively embodied by individuals within a 
particular time and place—an ‘identity.’  This provides us a more nuanced cultural understanding about 
how the concept-as-identity takes shape within the context of the text under examination, while at the 
same time removes any sort of essentialized notion that the ‘Catholicism’ within this text speaks for a 
universal Catholicism outside of it.  In ethnographic terms, this is characteristically similar to the 
holistic goal of re-creating culture in words on the page: while the identities revealed to us within the 
text are examples of a wider type of identity, they do not comprehensively define that wider identity.          
 
It is within this difference between definition and identity where our approach shifts from method to 
theory.  Somewhat relatable to the notion that the use of specific discourses within specific sets of data 
are reflective of the ways in which those discourses demonstrate a practical usage, this process assists 
us by moving the examination away from macro-level discussions about what terms mean ‘in general,’ 
toward more germane and practical assessments about how individuals within measured contexts go 
about constructing these sorts of identities.  Of course, we also need to accept that this must first begin 
with a conceptual understanding, an accumulation of knowledge about the concept we are examining.  
Like needing to understand where ‘Catholicism’ lies on the spectrum between ‘religion’ and 
‘Christianity,’ it would be disadvantageous to approach the identities within a text without a working 
knowledge about where they come from.  This is perhaps the locus of our Discourse-as-theory: the 
adoption of certain analytical language in order to provide a means by which we might more narrowly 
assess our chosen concept.  This, then, will assist us in generating a particular ‘comprehension’ about 
how that concept has been shaped beyond the simplistic manner of just ‘defining’ it, a pragmatic 
process less concerned with the interests of Discourse Analysis as a distinct methodology in the study 
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of religion—the clarification and differentiation between definitions of religion that are deemed ‘real’ 
or ‘incorrect’—designed to cautiously alleviate the a priori manner of term stipulation alongside the 
necessity of having a finite knowledge about the concept which that stipulation might define.  From 
here, we turn then to an introduction of our chosen concept, differentiated by the above mentioned 
Discourse-as-method between the discourse we shall be analyzing below—ATHEISM—and the 
manner with which the term has been defined—Atheism.  
 
3.3—A Tale of Two Discourses 
 
Because Discourse Analysis frees the analyst from more ‘traditional’ means of conceptualization, and 
thus warrants a sense of ‘agnostic’ freedom in sourcing the significance of certain concepts most 
pertinent to the examination taking place, it also affords us the opportunity to be a bit more creative in 
our approach.  Therefore, because our chosen concept is not as directly referenced as our example of 
Catholicism above, and because it stems from an increasingly vague discourse, the field from within 
which we might initiate our wider ‘understanding’ about the concept itself is not as readily accessible.  
That is, because ‘Atheism’ is such an ambiguous term, and because the study of Atheism is somewhat 
new to the discourse on studying religion, our chosen field represents a ‘reflective’ assessment, looking 
inward rather than outward—second-order, rather than first-order.  This choice is determined by three 
issues: the broadness of this discourse, the essential nature of the definitions that come out of it, and the 
division of these definitions between two categorical types.  Before turning to an analysis of that 




To begin, and to borrow once more from Leuba’s assessment about ‘religion,’ definitions of Atheism 
appear in just as many iterations.  Much like the four cited below, these fall across a spectrum of often 
overlapping and relatable themes.  As we shall see, these themes develop into particular categories, so 
that we might even inequitably conclude that the discourse on defining ‘Atheism’ is actually a 
discourse on defining ‘Atheisms.’  In fact, it is because of this polyvocality where we will find a direct 
correlation with the overall generalization found in many of the definitions discussed.  It is also within 
this generalization where the term becomes ‘stretched’ beyond what might be considered its 
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etymological or historical boundaries.  Here is where we find precarious terms like ‘ir-religion’ or 
‘non-religion,’ concepts or identities generated by social scientists attempting to define anything that 
‘looks like’ Atheism in order to address the myriad ways the term is defined in and out of their 
research.28  This has additionally developed into a ‘hodge-podge’ of conceptualizations, a discursive 
field with players running in different directions, with no clear notion as to what might be the intended 
goal.         
 
In adopting this as our chosen discourse, we are likewise attempting to resolve two problems here: first, 
an analysis of this discourse will hopefully resolve the general ambiguity that appears prevalent in the 
study of Atheism; and second, because Atheism is such a new topic of study, this discursive analysis 
will assist in our own interpretations in Part Two.  That is, because Atheism is a new topic of interest, 
and because the discourse on defining it is heavily burdened with theoretical stipulations, focusing on 
how scholars have defined it will act to alleviate much of the confusion about what Atheism means 
when it shifts from a ‘defined thing’ into a contextualized identity.  
 
Furthermore, uncovering this polyvocality raises a second issue, which is found in the inherent 
essentialism underscoring generalized terms.  As is often the case with ‘religion,’ the meaning of 
Atheism is commonly considered ‘essential knowledge,’ an interpretation that is usually built upon 
‘real’ definitions.  Consider, for example, these four samples: “the belief that there is no God or 
gods;”29 “a conscious or unconscious lack of commitment to God(s);”30 “a negative view, characterized 
by the absence of belief in God;”31 or, simply, “the absence of theistic belief.”32  These sorts of 
definitions depend on generalizations, what Baird (1971) refers to as the ‘res’ or ‘essence’ of the term, 
which in turn is “frequently an attempt at finding an identity in the numerous applications of an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See especially Colin Campbell, Toward a Sociology of Irreligion (London: Macmillan, 
1971.); and Lois Lee, “Being Secular: Towards Separate Sociologies of Secularity, Nonreligion and 
Epistemological Culture” (PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University, 2012). 
29 Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction, 3. 
30 This definition is provided by the Nonreligion and Secularity Research Network’s Glossary 
of terms, accessible via their website at: 
http://nonreligionandsecularity.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/nsrn-glossary-28-aprl-2011-lois-lee1.pdf 
(accessed 7 July 2014). 
31 Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1990), 463. 
32 George H. Smith, Atheism: The Case Against God (New York: Prometheus 1989), 7. 
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ambiguous word.”33  Unlike lexical definitions, which Baird labels as ‘true’ in that they assert a 
“certain meaning to someone sometime,”34 and are thus historically demarcated by context, real 
definitions are further ambiguous in their reliance upon certain ‘functional’ definitions to support their 
truth assertions.  Said otherwise, while the definitions above might be deemed ‘lexical’ in that they fit 
within a particular context, not knowing that context prior to reading them renders them untethered.  
Thus, their ambiguity can only be judged unambiguous by first applying functional definitions to their 
real assertions.  More often than not, this appears alongside pre-determined notions about the 
‘simplistic’ process of defining Atheism.  
 
For this reason, choosing to look at the way the term has been defined further represents our attempt at 
moving beyond these sorts of categorizations so as to formulate a more concise understanding about 
how an Atheist within our context might go about defining him or herself.  Thus, when we interpret the 
‘type’ of Atheism being demonstrated in our Ethnographic Criticism, rather than looking for ways to 
anchor that Atheism to a pre-determined, functional, or real definition, we can instead assess the 
manner in which the individual who we are examining has defined him or herself in relation to the 
discursive qualities found in how the term has come to be defined.  Likewise, because an analysis of 
second-order discourses also incorporates the analyses of the first-order discourse used to design it, by 
moving our focus from the context of ‘out there’ to ‘in here’ we will additionally clarify the 
differentiation between a definition of the word—‘in here’—and the use of the word in the construction 
of an individual’s identity—‘out there.’ 
 
Lastly, an analysis of this ‘in here’ discourse provides an interesting chronological assessment: a 
‘wider-scale’ perspective that reveals certain patterns along the chronology in which the definitions are 
shaped by means of thematic focus.  What this also means is that we are able, through an analysis of 
the ways the term has been defined, to trace how the term itself has contextually developed within both 
‘in here’ and ‘out there.’  This benefits our interests here by providing for us a more comprehensive 
assessment about how the term might be used, as well as gives us a useful paradigm with which to 
proceed with our analysis.  As such, the thematic elements that stand out in this discourse can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Robert D. Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions (Paris: Mouton & Co., 
1971), 11. 
34 Ibid., 10. 
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divided between three points: two historic and one theoretic.  In fact, we might better describe these 
patterns as designating two types of discourse: the definitions of one having been built on historical and 
lexical first-order discourses, and the definitions of the other having been built on essentialist and more 
theoretical interpretations in an attempt at manufacturing a more ‘generalized’ type of Atheism.  The 
latter category is where we predominately find definitions that attempt to combine the two historic-
based categories into a term that encompasses the essence of each.  In fact, this template is perhaps best 
represented by one of the definitions cited above, the Nonreligion and Secularity Research Network’s 
conception: “a conscious or unconscious lack of commitment to God(s).”   
 
Within the structure of this definition we find signifiers representative of each category: ‘lack’ is 
indicative of the etymological origins of the term—ἄθεος—where the alpha privative ‘A’ signals a type 
of absence, or ‘without-ness’ associated with the earliest pragmatic and political uses of the term; 
‘God(s)’ is indicative of the concept’s ‘re-emergence’ as a parasitic conclusion via theological debates 
concerning God’s hypothetical existence; and ‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious,’ much like the pluralized 
‘God(s),’ speak directly to the generalization of the term, denoting a type of Atheism that is either 
explicit or implicit—positive or negative—and thus removed from its modern position as dependent 
upon a particular type of Theism.  
 
Because the structure of this definition so aptly represents an essentialist attempt at summarizing the 
history of the definition of the term, for our analysis herein we will be adopting its terminological 
structure as a guide.  This will thus divide our examination into the two discursive types cited above: 
historic and theoretic.  The differentiation here is crucial for one important reason: as this division is 
itself a result of the way the term has been defined, presenting these two discourses like this will 
provide our analysis in Part Two a more specific external comprehension against which to relate.  That 
is, just as our example above about Catholicism in Greene’s The Power and the Glory would be 
dependent upon both an external and internal understanding about the societal organization of 
knowledge about ‘Catholicism,’ approaching our analysis in Part Two would equally be dependent 
upon this sort of externalized discourse in order to more clearly understand the Atheism sourced from 
within McEwan’s texts.  Thus, our analysis below on how the term has been defined by both first-order 
and second-order influences, will elucidate a much more concise comprehension about the concept 
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itself.  In this way, when we begin to interpret the Atheism in McEwan’s two novels—such as 
Bernard’s shift from communistic Atheism to a direct rejection of a particular Theistic belief system in 
Black Dogs, or Joe’s scientific Atheism, established by his own interests, and then challenged by the 
unique Christianity of ‘Jed’ in Enduring Love—we will be doing so with a broader understanding 
about how the concept’s origins, development, and theoretical expansion came about.  Additionally, 
and as we will discuss shortly, this approach will likewise assist in eliminating some of the ambiguity 
concerning the ‘meaning’ of the term.  Or, as Buckley (1990) rightly states: “The term atheist is not 
hopelessly vacuous, but unless the instance to which it is applied and the meaning in which it is used 
are determined, its employment is profoundly misleading [emphasis in original].”35  It is to our 
practical examination of those discourses in which we now turn.  
 
3.4—Historical Discourse: ἄθεος and Atheism 
The lexical definitions that we will be examining in this first discourse might also be considered 
‘historical statements,’ in that, because they are couched in history, they are also affixed to the contexts 
within which they exist.36  In this way, we might also view them as ‘restricted’ or ‘regulated.’  While 
they might descriptively function as explanations or definitions by individuals within a distinct time 
and place, they are likewise limited to that time and place.  For this reason, they should not be seen as 
merely describing the word ‘Atheism,’ but instead understood as descriptions of the historical time and 
place within which the usage of that word itself is being used.  This recognition of the importance of 
context is essential to our analysis of McEwan’s texts, particularly because the Atheism found within 
them is equally dependent upon, and reflective of, these same sorts of contextual boundaries.  
Furthermore, because our chosen concept is, as we shall see, currently beset by a generalized attempt at 
combining the different lexical descriptions within this historical discourse into the theoretical one 
examined after, our discussion below will take the shape of a progressive review.  Beginning with an 
examination of the definitions of the term at it earliest genesis—which we shall refer to as ‘ἄθεος’—we 
will then turn toward its modern equivalent—demarcated from ‘general atheism’ with the capitalized 
‘A.’  While this will definitely benefit our antecedent comprehension about Atheism prior to our 
Ethnographic Criticism in Part Two, it is important to remember that this should not be seen as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990), 6. 
36 Baird, Category Formation and the History of Religions, 10. 
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stipulation of the Atheism we might find there.  Instead, the details about how the term has been 
defined within these two contexts will feed into our larger perception about how the signifier ‘Atheism’ 




On a discursive level, to initially be called ‘ἄθεος’ was to be labeled an outcast or heretic.  This is 
exhibited by definitions ranging from Drachman’s (1922) description as “severe censure and moral 
condemnation,”37 to more recent interpretations, such as Buckley’s (1990) synonymous affiliation of 
the word with terms like ‘invective’ and ‘accusation.’38  In fact, the manner with which this term has 
been described might find some correlations with contemporary notions about ‘anti-social’ behavior, a 
term used to admonish an individual for acting in a manner that might be deemed threatening to the 
harmony of the state.  However, these same discursive renditions find that even in its initial usage, 
ἄθεος was more often bound to some sort of religious heresy or impiety, and as a label given to 
someone for displaying dissenting beliefs and actions, it was a critical perception of that person for 
standing out as directing impiety against “the prevailing civic religions or the popular polytheistic 
superstitions of the masses.”39  In this way, it is described as a term employed in a vague manner and 
generally used as an ‘epithet of accusation’ against any person who “called in question the popular 
gods of the day.”40  For the same reasons, it is predominately perceived as a colloquial pejorative, an 
accusation made from one person to another, not unlike a “brand imprinted by one’s enemies.”41   
 
We see this evinced through a number of first-order discursive examples in which the nominal meaning 
of the term is transmuted within different administrative and religious contexts, from political 
declarations, to literary representations.  Perhaps the most popular first example of this is that 
pertaining to the account of Socrates’ trial and conviction.  Here we see a discursive classification of 
varying degrees, the meaning of ἄθεος ranging from an impiety that shows a general lack of respect 
toward the gods, to a lack of acknowledging the specific gods of the city of Athens, and/or the curious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 A.B. Drachmann, Atheism in Pagan Antiquity (Chicago: Ares Publishing, 1922), 5. 
38 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 9. 
39 J.P. Reid and B. Mondin, eds., “Atheism” in The New Catholic Encyclopedia (Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 2003), 822. 
40 Aveling, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 
41 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 9. 
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association of the term with poetry and philosophy.  As Reid and Mondin (2003) state: “it was not 
uncommon for philosophers, and especially poets, to be suspected of atheism and impiety.”42   
 
Definitions of ἄθεος built from this particular discourse reveal a meaning interconnected by certain 
points, but that equally do not perfectly overlap.  For example, and in order to substantiate his own 
description, Aveling (1907) cites Plato’s Apologia, sections 26d to 27a, wherein Socrates must defend 
himself against allegations that he denies the existence of the gods, as well as their function as it relates 
to the livelihood of Greek society.  Within this sample we see an ideal example of the term’s accusative 
nature as the accused—Socrates—accuses another—Anaxagoras—in order to define himself as 
something other than ἄθεος:   
Do I not even believe that the sun or yet the moon are gods, as the rest of mankind do?  ‘No, 
by Zeus, judges, since he says that the sun is a stone and the moon earth.’  Do you think you 
are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus, and do you so despise these gentlemen and think 
they are so unversed in letters as not to know, that the books of Anaxagoras the Clazomenian 
are full of such utterances?43 
 
Buckley equally picks up on this in his own description, broadening the distinction of ἄθεοι to include 
both Socrates and Anaxagoras, as well as Diagoras and Protagoras, the former for ridiculing the 
‘Eleusinian Mysteries’ by speaking openly about “what occurred within them,”44 and the latter for 
skeptically declaring: “about the gods, I do not have [the capacity] to know, whether they are not, nor 
to know what they are like in form; for there are many things that prevent this knowledge: the obscurity 
[of the issue] and the shortness of human life.”45  Adding to Aveling’s contention, Buckley concludes 
that Socrates’ ‘Atheism’ was nothing more than mere moral condemnation, blithely remarking, “one 
man’s theism proved to be his indictor’s atheism, the incarnation of impiety.”46  We see this continued 
with Bremmer’s description, where by also citing Aristophanes’ The Clouds, wherein the accused is 
depicted as “something like an atheist,”47 an additional ‘pre-Socratic’ layer is added to the accusative 
nature of the term seen above.  By basing his definition on the crimes described by Plato as “not 
acknowledging the gods the city acknowledges,” as well as introducing other, new powers—such as 
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43 Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 1, Harold North Fowler, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), section 26d, accessed online via 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+apol.+26d (accessed 17 June 2014).   
44 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 2-3. 
45 Protagoras, as quoted by Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 3. 
46 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 2-3. 
47 Jan M. Bremmer, “Atheism in Antiquity” in Michael Martin, ed. The Cambridge 
Companion to Atheism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 19. 
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daimonia—Bremmer’s stipulation shapes the discursive meaning of ἄθεος into a paradoxical 
association with terms of omission, such as ‘godless,’ ‘without gods,’ or ‘godforsaken,’ a 
condemnation seemingly reserved for “intellectuals who denied the gods of the city or any form of 
deity.”48  Expanding a bit more on this, he notes two specific points: first, in that the religious discourse 
of Athens was increasingly influenced by poets and philosophers, their religious criticisms had 
efficiently “eroded the traditional beliefs in the gods;” and second, that Plato’s ‘influential theism’ 
ensured a predominately ‘ancient’ type of Atheism different from its modern equivalent.49  In this way, 
Bremmer’s definition is shifting the accusative nature of ἄθεος from religious and/or political heresy, 
to an etymological rendition that more simply denotes ‘without.’ 
 
The incriminating quality of these examples is later transmuted into a descriptor of sedition, a term 
bestowed upon an action deemed injurious, with no allegiance to any particular political agency or 
religious belief.  As a nominal term, validated by the accuser in relation to the actions or statements of 
the accused, ἄθεος becomes, in one instance, the justification for putting to death first century 
Christians who, as Chidester (2001) notes, “refused to pay the proper respect or share in the public 
sacrificial meals dedicated to the Roman Gods,”50 and the validation of these same Christians’ 
monotheism against their accusers in the next.  As another first-order example, we can cite Polycarp, 
the Bishop of Smyrna, who before being martyred in 155 CE, uses the term when reproached by the 
Roman Governor overseeing his execution.  When asked to recant his impious ways and direct his 
fellow Christians to cease their dissent, he turns instead to the crowd of Pagans and yells, “Away with 
the Atheists!”51  Hyman (2010) refers to this as something akin to more direct ‘religious heresy,’ ἄθεος 
here looking more like a denial or rejection based upon a differing religious view.52  As he further 
notes, this pejorative sense of the term, where it takes up the impiety of rejection or denial by means of 
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heretical ‘dis-belief’ becomes more and more established as a political—socio-cultural—indictment.  
This is especially the case as it evolves across Europe and into the modern age, representing a distinct 
type of accusation until its shift toward self-description.  As he concludes, citing de Certeau (2000): 
“Atheism became the focus of not only a whole body of literature, but also of political measures, 
judicial sentences, and social precautions against atheists […] ‘The ‘atheists’ who first occupy the 
polemic are the ‘heretics’ of every church, the noncomformist believers and such.’”53 
 
These multi-layered discursive elements reveal a meaning broad in its interpretation, an etymological 
distinction that can mean, on one end, the rhetorical ‘doing away’ with the gods and their power, and 
on the other, the condemnation received for not believing in or worshipping the ‘proper’ gods 
according to one’s context.  For this reason, it becomes easy to regard the term as encompassing an 
“enormous paradox,” as Buckley defines it, embodied with “vastly divergent and even contradictory 
meanings.”54  To support this conclusion, we might cite Bullivant’s (2011) description, a ‘three sense’ 
interpretation shaped from Liddell and Scott’s conception (1940): “i) one who denies the gods (as with 
Socrates in Plato’s Apology), but is also used of ii) one abandoned by the gods or ‘godforsaken,’ as 
well as in the negative moral sense of iii) ‘godless’ or ‘ungodly’ [emphases in original].”55  While his 
first two ‘senses’ here do a decent job summarizing the discourse we have seen thus far, his addition of 
a third provides yet another discursive layer, ἄθεος here signifying an ‘absence,’ which he corroborates 
with a citation to the term’s usage in Ephesians 2:12: “without Christ, being aliens from the 
commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenant of promise, having no hope and without God 
(atheoi) in the world [emphasis in original].”56  This sort of terminological distinction is equally found 
in Hartley’s (2006) own reassessment of Hebrews 11:6, and the different types, translations, and 
expressions of ἄθεος in both the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures: from God’s absence during certain 
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rituals—Deuteronomy 31:17, 32:39, and 2 Kings 1:3, 6, 16—to the impiety of not accepting God by 
those who are knowledgeable of Him—Romans 1:19-21.57     
 
By means of these discursive examples, the term becomes less an empty signifier, and more a lexical 
distinction—made apparent by our use herein of the Greek spelling—meaning something in particular 
that is contextually dependent for its distinct specification.  By reading these examples as 
interpretations of contextualized discourse—such as that of Socrates or the early Christians—we can 
divert our focus from concretely defining it, as it existed during this time and place, and instead 
interpret the process by which the concept itself came to take shape.  
 
The process of using ἄθεος is thus bound to a type of endowment, a title given and involuntarily taken 
on.  With Socrates it is attached to both religious and non-religious piety, as well as social obligation, 
the term taking up the meaning of impiety as it relates to one’s socio-cultural requirements.58  Later, it 
embodies a sense of heresy, a means of describing the crimes committed by individuals—such as 
Polycarp, Justin Martyr, or even Christ59—who openly worship deities outside their cultural contexts.  
While these examples might lead to the notion that this represents a number of different types of 
ἄθεοι—such as Buckley’s argument that they “expose the paradoxical history of a continually 
ambiguous term”60—this sort of thinking is quickly rejected by our lexical interpretation.  That is, 
though his argument is poignant, Buckley’s conception is only true because his understanding of ἄθεος 
is imbued with his discursive understanding of modern Atheism, making the former all that more 
difficult to pin down.  The process, however, is quite simple.  Rather than stating that ἄθεος is the 
impious betrayal of one’s cultural duties, or the heretical belief of deities beyond one’s cultural 
pantheon, the process of being ἄθεος is fairly clear through its usage.  The term, and thus the discursive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See Donald E. Hartley, “HEB 11:6—A Reassessment of the Translation “God Exists”” 
(Trinity Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2006). 
58 See also Robb’s (1993) discussion of the criminal law of Athens, under which ἄθεος is a 
term given to an indicted individual who’s ‘disrespect toward the gods’ placed him under the canopy of 
‘ἀσέβεια,’ another generalized term for an act of impiety against the ‘civic cultus’ in which the impiety 
in question is defined as a direct assault on, or corruption of, the states’ ‘εὐσέβεια,’ a symbol of 
reverence required of all citizens.  Kevin Robb, “Asebeia and Sunousia: The Issues behind the 
Indictment of Socrates,” in G.A. Press, ed., Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, INC., 1993), 100-106. 
59 Fergusson makes the wider conclusion that Justin Martyr’s impiety, as seen from the 
perspective of Roman rule, would be regarded as both dangerous and subversive, so that “like Socrates 
and Jesus before him,” he was martyred for his faith.  See Fergusson, Faith and Its Critics, 15. 
60 Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism, 4. 
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means by which to make sense of the term as an ‘identity,’ signifies the process of bestowing an 
indictment upon an individual who is found to be challenging the cultural norm.  Thus, the discursive 
process by which it is defined within our field reveals less an ambiguous paradox, and more a specific 
means by which to classify an individual within that contextualized cultural norm.  In this way, this 
sort of lexical distinction clarifies our ambiguous understanding of the term so that it begins to mean 
something more specific “to someone sometime.”61  We may proceed, then, not with a ‘definition,’ but 
with the stipulated understanding that it represents the processual means by which to make sense of the 




Within the discourse analyzed below, the ‘modern’ in modern Atheism is delineated by three distinct 
gradations: an internalized conclusion that is ‘parasitic’ upon a certain type of Theism within the 
boundaries of a unique dialecticism; a critical assessment of God filtered through a lens of rational-
naturalism; and the progressive differentiation between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern,’62 symbolized by a 
transition from ἄθεος-as-accusation to Atheism-as-self-identification that is inextricably linked with an 
“all-encompassing mastery of reality by rational and/or scientific means.”63   
 
Like its predecessor, modern Atheism is best understood from within a modern context.  Yet, unlike 
Hyman’s contention that it emerged at the “precise moment at which philosophers and cultural 
historians locate the birth of modernity,”64 it does not simply ‘appear.’  Rather, its emergence is more 
reflective of a culmination, the product of philosophical developments such as the ‘studia humanitatis’ 
of the Renaissance,65 or the progressive rise and establishment of what Fergusson (2009) refers to as an 
empirical turn toward ‘natural science,’ based upon “theory and experiment rather than canonical 
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62 Citing Cassiodorus, Buckely also states that ‘modern’ was meant as a segregating device, 
separating not just time, but stages of philosophical thought.  See Buckley, At the Origins of Modern 
Atheism, 25-27. 
63 Hyman, “Atheism in Modern History,” 27-28. 
64 Hyman, “Atheism in Modern History,” 29. 
65 See Jim Herrick, Against the Faith: Some Deists, Sceptics, and Atheists (London: Glover & 
Blair, Ltd., 1985), 25; and Raymond W. Converse, Atheism as a Positive Social Force (New York: 
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texts.”66  These each act as ‘seeds of revival’ that, as Reid and Mondin declare, would eventually 
develop into a more specific “falling away from the Christian faith.”67  While this development appears 
to take place—predominately—in the context of the Enlightenment, for the sake of discursive clarity it 
is not enough merely to imply that modern Atheism is a product of that context.  Rather, it seems more 
often defined as a product of the philosophical developments of the renaissance and reformation 
‘coming-of-age’ within the Enlightenment.  For these reasons, then, the discussion herein concerning 
the discourse on defining modern Atheism will be pragmatically limited to this particular context. 
 
In our first gradation, Atheism is defined by its ‘parasitic’ or ‘dependent’ nature.  No longer used in a 
general sense—like we saw with ἄθεος—it becomes a signifier for a more specified conclusion in 
reference to a certain deity.  As such, Atheism as ‘A-Theism,’ or rather, as ‘A(modern)Theism,’ is seen 
as emerging from a distinctly internalized position shaped in reaction to a particular Christian 
monotheism.  This ‘internalization’ is expressed by a number of dependent terms, beginning with some 
of the earlier definitions such as those offered by Flint (1877) or Aveling, the latter of which adopts the 
notion of ‘opposition:’ “Atheism is that system of thought which is formally opposed to theism”68  In 
later definitions, such as that suggested by Fergusson, the reactive quality of modern Atheism is 
associated directly with the notion of ‘rejection.’  As he states: “in the west, atheism has come to be 
associated with the rejection of the God of the Christian faith, or the God of Judeo-Christian theism, or 
perhaps still more broadly the God of the three Abrahamic faiths.”69  He likewise sees this dependency 
as based upon a critical or judgmental perspective, the Atheist position “taking as its starting point the 
basic beliefs of a religion or society,” upon which a “revisionist or skeptical judgment” is raised.70  He 
substantiates this sort of reactionary stance with first-order examples such as Diderot and D’Holbach, 
whose almost outright denials of God’s existence began to shift the idea “beyond the limits of a 
reactive skepticism,” toward a more definitive ‘intellectual movement.’71         
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68 Francis Aveling, “Atheism” in The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume 2 (New York: Robert 
Appleton Company, 1907).   
69 Fergusson, Faith and Its Critics, 17. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., 23. 
	  
	   127 
Hyman characterizes this same response as ‘relational,’ supporting his own definition by amending a 
quote by Huyssen (1984) so as to argue that modern Atheism’s dependency on Theism works in the 
same way that ‘postmodernism’ is dependent on ‘modernism:’ “[Theism] as that from which [atheism] 
is breaking away remains inscribed into the very word with which [atheists] describe [their] distance 
from [theism].”72  Thus, as a ‘relational concept,’ Hyman’s conception perceives modern Atheism as 
something bound to a “peculiarly modern and innovative form of theism [emphasis in original],” in the 
same way in which that Theism is separate from the ‘pre-modern’ theism relational to ἄθεος.73  Based 
on an interaction with this modern Theism, Hyman’s conception also exhibits an internalized 
‘negation,’ arising not from any independent ‘modes of thought,’ but rather as the result of “certain 
intellectual moves within theology.”74  This idea of ‘negation’ is likewise found in earlier definitions 
such as that offered by Cohen (1921), who characterizes it as both historically and etymologically 
assured, with the ‘justification’ of Atheism located in the “untenability of the theistic position.”75  This 
sort of language is then equally taken up by Fabro (1968)—“it implies the negation of god, not as an 
end in itself, but as a means to an end”76—Cliteur (2009)—“atheism is nothing more than the denial of 
the claims of theism”77—and Smart (2012)—“‘Atheism’ means the negation of theism, the denial of 
the existence of God.”78  In that these discursive samples present an Atheism that is expressly defined 
“in terms of that which it takes to be denying,” the very meaning of the term itself is thus dictated by 
that upon which it is dependent.    
 
Buckley condenses this language into a particular dialectic, concluding that Atheism’s internal 
construction—its meaning—is both contradictory and contingent:    
The central meaning of atheism is not to be sought immediately in atheism; it is to be sought 
in those gods or that god affirmed, which atheism has either engaged or chosen to ignore as 
beneath serious challenge.  The history of the term indicates this contrast, and the analysis of 
its meaning suggests that it is inescapable: atheism is essentially parasitic.79 
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75 Chapman Cohen, Theism or Atheism: The Great Alternative (London: Pioneer Press, 1921), 
140. 
76 Cornelio Fabro, God in Exile: Modern Atheism (New York: Newman Press, 1968), 7.  
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While the use of ‘parasitic’ here might conjure the image of something that latches on to and feeds off 
a host until it dies, Buckley’s use is more akin to the idea that Atheism is, in fact, a transitional product 
of Theism, generated from within, and exemplified by the “intellectual process from god affirmed to 
god denied.”80  As such, not only does this demonstrate a uniquely specific type of dialecticism, it also 
depicts a ‘dipolarity,’ the notion wherein a pair of electric charges, attached to two poles of equal 
magnitude, are opposite in polarity.  As internally constructed, Atheism is no longer an autonomous 
abstraction—a trait unique to the use of ἄθεος—but is instead issued forth, borne of internal conflict 
and conclusion, and produced from a particular type of thinking that associates God as a ‘substance’ 
accorded a “specific place and function in the natural world.”81   
 
The association here of God as ‘substance’ speaks to this internalized rejection’s transmutation of the 
concept ‘God,’ not just in regard to its oppositional or relational stance, but to its sense of 
‘domestication’ as well.  This brings us to modern Atheism’s second gradation, the nominal 
transference from God-as-subject to God as an object of inquiry, a condition that we can discursively 
trace to the use of the rational-naturalism underscoring certain examples of ἄθεος, ‘re-emerged’ in our 
modern context.  Baggini (2003) identifies this as a translational constant between ἄθεος and 
Atheism—“the replacement of myth by rational explanation in general”82—that when filtered through a 
modern lens, takes up the nominal distinction of ‘science:’ a methodological term denoting an attempt 
at giving an “account of the workings of the world based on evidence and arguments that are available 
to and accessible by all.”83  In his own assessment, Fabro refers to this as an Atheism of ‘illuminism,’ 
an affirmation that argues for an “appeal to human reason alone to discover the ‘why’ of things and of 
our knowledge of them,”84 or what Hyman determines as a “desire for an all-encompassing mastery of 
reality by rational and/or scientific means.”85  As Baggini further clarifies:    
The emergence of atheism at this time fits in with the progressive story of atheism that sees its 
roots in the birth of Western rationality in Ancient Greece.  Just as naturalism and rationalism 
[…] were the fruits of the progression from myth to reason, so atheism as an avowed doctrine 
is the fruit of the progression to Enlightenment values.86 
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As it relates to our first gradation, this sort of ‘scientific thinking’ arises out of an internalized harmony 
between science and theology.  LeDrew (2012), citing Buckley, notes that modern Atheism arose not 
out of an external antagonism toward theistic belief, but out of an internal search for theological 
answers via rational means:  
Scientists […] thought it natural to ground apologetic arguments through empirical evidence, 
and were encouraged to do so by theologians and clerics alike.  Most prominent thinkers of 
the Scientific Revolution were passionate believers and many developed theological positions 
to accompany their naturalistic theories.87   
 
At the same time, these same theologians often believed that science “could and should do the 
foundational thinking for Christianity,”88 which in turn began to suggest a conception of God as an 
empirical ‘thing,’ an object embodied with a “definable ‘substance’ and identifiable ‘location.”89  As 
LeDrew further concludes: “When theologians decided that God was a thing of definite location and 
substance, it by definition became an object of scientific inquiry.” 90 
 
However, and though their early conclusions only hinted at God’s ‘lack of necessity’ for explaining the 
functionality of the universe,91 this slowly transitions from a relationship of internal consistency to a 
dichotomous contradiction, localized and clarified by LeDrew in the nineteenth-century with Darwin’s 
theory of evolution: 
This simple but astonishingly successful theory provided an answer to the riddle of the 
existence of life, which for thousands of years was answered with ‘God’, and thus provided 
atheism with an answer to the lacuna that had plagued it for centuries.  Darwin’s theory not 
only challenged the argument from design but nullified it by providing a rational, evidence-
based alternative explanation of the appearance of design in life.92 
 
Thus, what originated as a correlative position, is now transformed into an “atheistic scientific 
humanism,” a ‘coming of age’ that Masterson (1965) describes as a position built upon the idea that the 
scientific method is the “only norm of truth.”93  Once matured, this position takes on a more central and 
subjective place in the relationship between ‘man’ and ‘God.’  To explain this better, Hyman compares 
this nominal transference to the relationship between master and slave: as the ‘human-as-subject’ 
becomes the master of his world through the disciplinary exercise of applied reason and science, that 
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world becomes an object amenable to manipulation, understanding, and control.94  No longer governed 
by its master, the ‘subjective self’ is free to rightfully challenge the nominal position of God as the 
“creator and ‘author’ of all known reality.”95  As he further concludes, echoing Feuerbach’s (1841) 
first-order notion of religion’s anthropomorphic origins—“religion is human nature reflected, mirrored 
in itself”—when ‘God’ becomes understood as an object of thought, conceived in human terms, the 
essence of modern Atheism becomes that of a transition out of the Theism in which it originated.    
 
This sense of ‘transition’ characterizes our third gradation.  For Masterson, Atheism-as-transition stems 
from the growth and development inherent in the industrial revolution, an “enthusiastic commitment to 
the notion of change,”96 that arises out of the cultural shift from agricultural to industrial, and takes the 
shape of productive control:  
[man] has, so to speak, turned the classical universe over on its side, and the future signifies, 
not a heavenly paradise forever up above him, but rather something stretching out in front of 
him to be created and attained by his own effort. His relationship to nature is no longer one of 
direct and total dependence. It is indirect and transcendent in that by machines and technology 
he is gradually harnessing and controlling the universe to his own ends and purpose.97   
 
Representing an early discursive example that would eventually help shape Hyman’s modern 
description of the rise of the subjective self, Masterson’s notion here depicts what he refers to as the 
‘distinctive character of contemporary Atheism’ as inspired by the cultural climate within which it 
‘drew its inspiration:’ “The transition from a primarily agricultural society to our own industrial milieu 
has been accompanied by a profound transformation of our image of the world—a transformation 
involving serious repercussions on all dimensions of human existence, including religious belief.”98 
 
In a similar distinction, LeDrew’s own notion of modern Atheism’s sense of transition is divided 
between two types: ‘humanistic,’ which is focused on the religious byproducts of alienation, 
oppression, and human suffering, and ‘scientific,’ which he defines via its engagement with religion as 
‘ignorance.’  Characterized as ‘two streams of thought,’ he describes this split as based on 
epistemology, which is then ‘inaugurated’ by the “rise of the social sciences and a human-and social-
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centred view of religion.”99  In a further elucidation, based on Ruse’s (2010) argument that modern 
Atheism is defined by the ‘science’ between ‘methodological naturalism’ and ‘metaphysical 
naturalism,’100 he equally concludes that modern Atheism is more clearly defined in natural terms, 
rather than by “humanist philosophy or a sociological position.”101  This difference is essential to his 
discursive conception, as the separation between an Atheism that is ‘humanistic’ or ‘scientific’ might 
also be seen as the difference between ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary,’ the latter betraying a long 
tradition established by the former in it’s obsessive focus on what he calls ‘scientism:’ 
Popular Atheism today is becoming more and more indistinguishable from scientism and a 
drive to secure the cognitive, moral and ultimately political authority of the natural sciences, 
and thus betrays a long tradition of humanistic atheism derived from Enlightenment moral and 
socio-political critiques and later socialist projects.102 
 
This attempt at distinguishing the ‘humanistic’ from the ‘scientific’ brings us to a discursive stopping 
point, demonstrated by the differentiation within LeDrew’s conception of a categorical breakdown that 




We might also conclude here that this differentiation signifies a distinct difference between ἄθεος and 
Atheism, particularly concerning the latter’s shift away from the abstract nature of the former, toward a 
more determined and clear self-constructed identity.  In fact, this is nicely abridged by Buckley, who 
states: “there were men who judged themselves atheists, who called themselves atheists […] in the 
ancient world, and even more in the medieval world, this was unheard of […] ‘Atheist’ had been 
vituperative and polemic; now it became a signature and a boast.”104  Or, as Hyman likewise 
concludes: 
As a term of self-identification, a declaration of one’s own belief (or lack thereof), it does not 
really appear until the mid-eighteenth century when it is found among Parisian intellectuals, 
particularly Denis Diderot, who is widely recognized as being the first explicit and self-
confessedly atheist philosopher.105    
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These differences convey two very unique lexical discourses, as well as demonstrate the means with 
which scholars have determined the ‘meaning of Atheism’ from within their precise historical contexts.  
In our analysis in Part Two, many of the thematic influences that shape these discourses—such as 
modern Atheism’s dependency on certain ‘Theisms,’ as well as the transitional nature of that 
dependency—will become central to our interpretation of the Atheism represented in McEwan’s work.  
However, this only tells half of the term’s discursive story, the historic portion of the NSRN’s 
definition concerning the ‘lack’ of commitment to ‘God(s).’  In order to more comprehensively 
approach the Atheism in our Ethnographic Criticism to follow, we equally need to understand the 
discursive elements that make up the explicit or implicit—‘conscious’ or ‘unconscious’—ways in 
which scholars have begun to divide the term.  It is to this discussion in which we now turn.    
 
3.5—Theoretical Discourse: The Positive vs. Negative Paradigm 
The positive vs. negative paradigm is in many ways a fourth—possibly post-modernist—gradation of 
modern Atheism.  Differentiated between two experiential types concerning an individual’s knowledge 
and acceptance about God’s existence, this gradation is predominately defined by means of the 
difference between knowing and not-knowing, and/or having and not-having.  In other words, 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ depict a dichotomous reflection of every aspect concerning the ability to 
define an individual—either externally or internally—as ‘Atheist,’ the former encompassing a 
‘conscious,’ or ‘explicit’ rejection or denial of the Theist’s belief in the existence of God, and the latter 
consisting of an ‘unconscious’ or ‘implicit’ lack of belief in the existence of that Theist’s God.  
 
This ‘fourth gradation’ presents a number of issues for how we might more precisely approach the 
Atheism in Part Two, most notably concerning the way it begins to generalize the concept in order to 
encompass a much wider perception.  Because of this, we might say that the ‘positive vs. negative’ 
paradigm reflects a step backward: a post-modern rejection of the binary between Atheism and Theism, 
that leans on the thematic use of imputation and generalization that we find in the discourse on defining 
ἄθεος.  The following discussion will address this ‘step backward’ so as to further support our external 
comprehension of the elements that contribute to the societal organization of knowledge about the 
Atheism internalized in Black Dogs and Enduring Love.  Beginning with the theological-based origins 
of the paradigm itself, this discussion will touch on select influences in order to clarify how the term 
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has come to inspire a discourse not unlike that which complicates the definition of ‘religion;’ a 
discourse imbedded with categorical language about the existence of levels or types of Atheism,106 




The earliest description of a ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ Atheism comes from Aveling’s short definition in 
the second volume of the Catholic Encyclopedia, published in 1907.  He divides the term into two 
types under the broader category of ‘theoretic’ Atheism: positive as a dogmatic denial of “any spiritual 
and extra-mundane First Cause,” and negative as based “either upon the lack of physical data for 
theism,” or upon the “limited nature of the intelligence of man.”107  More specifically, his conception 
of the latter is theoretically bound to empiricism and reason, the ‘negative Atheist’ defined as a person 
for whom the “paucity of actual data available for the arguments proving the existence of a super-
sensible and spiritual God” proves evidential of that deity’s non-existence.108  Moreover, his 
conception of the ‘negative Atheist’ is underlined by two positions of neglect: agnosticism or 
materialism.  While both positions hold to the etymological condition of being ‘without’ God, he 
argues that the former takes the leading role in defining negative Atheism by “professing a state of 
nescience,”109 so that by a special kind of ignorant neglect—rather than materialist explanation—the 
negative Atheist separates God from the natural world.    
 
This first use of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ seems in many ways an echo of our previous discussion on 
the differentiation between ἄθεος and Atheism writ small, and this would not be an incorrect 
assessment.  After all, for Aveling, the ‘dogmatic denial’ innate in the ‘positivity’ of his positive 
Atheism aligns with the internalization and direct Theological rejection in modern Atheism’s first 
gradation.  Likewise, his negative Atheism is reminiscent of the general usage of ἄθεος in relation to 
the myriad ways one might be labeled as such.  This is not the case, however, with the discursive 
samples that follow.  For instance, Maritain’s (1949) conception takes up the paradigm to define 
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Atheism as wholly negative, not just by means of ‘negation,’ but also as a destructive or deconstructive 
‘abandonment’ of God:  
By negative atheism I mean a merely negative or destructive process of casting aside the idea 
of God, which is replaced only by a void.  Such a negative atheism can be only shallow and 
empirical, like the atheism of the libertins of the seventeenth century: it hollows out a vacuum 
at the center of the universe of thought which has taken shape for centuries around the idea of 
God, but it does not bother about altering that universe [emphases in original].110 
 
As demonstrated here, Maritain’s conception is quite polemical, his notion of negative Atheism leading 
toward an inevitable ‘freedom,’ an autonomy inexorably resolved with “suicide and self-
destruction.”111  This polemical assessment infects his conception of positive Atheism as well, as its 
depiction is based on notions of internal confrontation or war: “an active struggle against everything 
that reminds us of God.”112  As first-order discursive examples of this, he cites the suicidal engineer, 
Kirilov, of Doestoevsky’s Demons, Nietzsche’s ‘solitary atheism,’ the “academic, even fashionable” 
Atheism of existentialism, and the Scientific Atheism of Marxist dialectical materialism.113  Overtly 
negative in both forms, he concludes that Atheism, in either type, represents a ‘bursting forth,’ a “three-
century-old progressive degradation” of the ‘idea of God,’ founded upon, and nurtured by, the 
rationalism we see coming of age within the Enlightenment.114   
 
In a similar fashion to Aveling, Fabro’s (1968) conception is slightly more restrictive, defined in 
exclusive terms of ‘elimination’ or ‘exile,’ a radical negation of God in order to produce a “full life in 
the temporal dimension.”115  Though not as detailed in demarcating a distinct positive and negative 
binary, Fabro describes the “old kinds of atheism”116 as specifically negative, exclusively in reflection 
of the positive attributes associated with their modern counterparts, which he then describes as an 
amalgamation of both ancient and modern: “we shall directly see the most salient features of those 
forms of atheism that could be called constructive [positive] atheism, as opposed to the destructive 
atheism of the materialism of antiquity and of the illuministic currents.”117  This ‘positive’ type is 
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typified by an epistemology that, unlike its older equivalents, focuses on interpersonal salvation: “man 
must be edified and saved via man.”118   This again, and like Aveling’s, echoes our discussion above. 
 
Lastly, much like Fabro’s conception of positive Atheism as the promotion of a particular creed, 
Robertson’s (1970) terse definition constructs a type that expresses itself through structural rejection or 
denial.  Encompassing no more than four sentences in the epilogue to his Sociological Interpretation of 
Religion, Robertson states:  
By positive atheism we mean a cultural circumstance in which the constructive virtues for the 
human and socio-cultural condition of an anti-religious stance are upheld.  The adjective 
‘positive’ is appropriate here also because it highlights the secularization theme.  Positive 
atheism shares many of the concrete concerns of orthodox religious belief systems.  Its major 
manifestations are in humanist movements and organizations and the academic 
intelligentsia.119  
 
Arguing that positive Atheism stems from a comparison of ideals, in that the notion of such a classified 
type stems from an organized, or rather ‘focused Atheism,’ his conception furthers the point that to 
deem this sort of Atheism ‘positive’ means to show that it has a particular agenda, and is thus more 
organized than just the mere denial of the Theist’s belief in the existence of a conceptualized ‘God.’  In 
this way, his positive Atheism is designed in reflection of an unmentioned, though comparative, 
negative Atheism, absent of this sort of direct organization.   
 
Where these chronological examples reveal a somewhat disorganized use of conceptualized 
terminology—from Aveling’s designation of different cultural and historical ways of being Atheist, to 
Robertson’s use of ‘positive’ to denote a type of organized Atheism—by the 1970s, and with the 
influential conception made by Flew (1976), this theoretical disjointedness finds a commonality.  In 
fact, the influence of Flew’s contribution is so instrumental in shaping the positive vs. negative 
paradigm from this point on that we might better identify the discursive examples just examined as 
representing a ‘pre-Flew discourse.’  More specifically, out of his predisposed theory about the 
inherent nature of Atheism, this discourse picks up an axial re-conceptualization, a subjective 
modification of positive/negative into explicit/implicit, which we shall see imbedded in even the most 
objective definitions to follow.    
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The main thesis of Flew’s Presumption of Atheism is that Atheism is our default, implicit position 
concerning the existence of God, a thesis that shifts the meaning of the ‘positive vs. negative’ paradigm 
into “an entirely fresh perspective.”120  By ‘presumption’ here Flew does not mean a sense of 
presumptuousness, of bold insolence or arrogance, but of ‘presuming,’ a premise that is analogous to 
“the presumption of innocence in the English law.”121  Moreover, in presuming that humans initially 
begin as implicit Atheists, in that they are born without the knowledge of God’s existence, it is Flew’s 
contention that the “debate about the existence of God should properly begin from the presumption of 
atheism,” so that the ‘onus of proof’ in arguing about the existence of God “must lie upon the theist.”122  
This in turn re-translates the etymological make-up of the term itself, so that the alpha privative ‘A’ in 
Atheism becomes synonymous with similar terms such as ‘amoral,’ ‘atypical,’ or ‘asymmetrical.’  In 
this way, and given his notion of humankind’s natal origins without God, he identifies the negative 
Atheist as “someone who is simply not a theist,”123 because he or she “entirely lack[s] the relevant 
concept of God.”124             
 
As a ‘defeasible presumption,’ and under Flew’s influence, Atheism becomes an inherent negation, a 
trait shared by all individuals who, by nature of our complete ignorance at birth, begin life with an 
implicit absence of belief.125  This becomes, in mutated forms, the essence of the ‘positive vs. negative’ 
paradigm from this point on.  In fact, perhaps the key aspect of the paradigm, post-Flew, is the way in 
which the ‘negative’ characteristic is stretched beyond the limitations set forth by both the modern 
discourse, as well as the initial paradigmatic constructions by Aveling, Maritain, Fabro, and Robertson.  
While etymologically correct, the conception of an ‘implicit Atheism,’ of a universal absence of belief, 
not only removes Atheism from its relational dependency on modern Theism, it also converts it into a 
much broader category, a term once again applied to any unbounded conception of ‘religious’ doubt, 
rejection, or denial.  This manifests a return of sorts toward the discourse on defining ἄθεος, generating 
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a discursive equivocality that not only interacts with theistic ideologies, but now non-Theistic ones as 




Within the following discourse we find a predominant reliance upon the conflation of ‘negative’ with 
Flew’s sense of ‘negation’—without or absence—taking the shape of an innate implicitness.  
Chronologically, this begins slowly and then develops more broadly as the subject itself becomes more 
and more scholastically attractive.  To begin, like Masterson, Stein (1980) avoids the strict usage of the 
positive vs. negative paradigm, but his delineation between two types of Atheism, designated by 
‘having’ and ‘not having,’ still echoes Flew’s conception:    
The prefix ‘a-’ can mean ‘not’ (or ‘no’) or ‘without.’  If it means ‘not,’ then we have as an 
atheist someone who is not a theist (i.e., someone who does not have a belief in a God or 
gods).  If it means ‘without,’ then an atheist is someone without theism, or without a belief in 
God.126 
 
Furthermore, in dividing these two types between ‘Theological’ and ‘Atheistic’ he also re-translates the 
alpha privative ‘A’ as ‘denial’ for the former, and ‘without’ for the latter.  This pairing pits the 
theological definition against the Atheistic one, as if they stem from two opposing sides.  In what 
appears as his own depiction of Flew’s ‘onus of proof’ argument, Stein takes the theological 
definition—the ‘denial’ of the existence of God—as rhetorically designed to assist the theologian in 
arguing that there “are no atheists,” that the ‘Atheist’ would need to make a ‘leap of faith’ in order to 
come to this conclusion, which then eliminates the requirement of the Theist to “prove his position.”127  
Therefore, and in order to distinguish a practical differentiation between Theological and Atheological 
Atheism, he states: “If the atheist is simply without God, then he is not asserting anything […] on the 
other hand, the theist is asserting the existence of something (God), so the burden of proof is on 
him.”128  Additionally, Stein’s stipulation expresses a dependency on knowledge:     
Denying something means that you have knowledge of what it is that you are being asked to 
affirm, but that you have rejected that particular concept.  To be without a belief in God 
merely means that the term ‘God’ has no importance or possibly no meaning to you.  Belief in 
God is not a factor in your life.  Surely this is quite different from denying the existence of 
God.129 
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While Flew and Stein share a number of similarities, the greatest of these is perhaps their mutual 
assertion that Atheism is a default position—inherent negation—encroached upon by a Theism that has 
yet to acknowledge its onus of responsibility.   
 
With Smith’s first publication in 1989 and second in 1991, this concept of negation begins to solidify a 
normative place within the discourse.  Defined as “essentially negative in character,” Smith’s two-part 
conception of what he calls ‘critical Atheism’ is constructed in relation to either side’s “respect to their 
different causes of nonbelief,” on one end displaying an implicit ‘absence of belief’ by way of 
unfamiliarity, and on the other, an explicit ‘critical deliberation.’130  In both cases, though, he argues 
that at the “core of Atheism” there is an all-encompassing “lack of theistic belief.”131  In this way, in its 
most basic form, Smith’s Atheism reflects a specialized absence of belief, as an Atheist is not 
“primarily a person who believes that a god does not exist,” but rather is a person who “does not 
believe in the existence of god [emphases in original].”132   
 
Like Stein’s before him, Smith’s distinction between ‘believing not’ and ‘not believing’ is aligned with 
the privative nature of the term’s etymological roots.  In clarifying the process of ‘belief’ that 
characterizes both Theism and Atheism, and thus abridging the former as “belief-in-god’ and the latter 
as “no-belief-in-god,”133 Smith places an emphasis on the innate negativity of the latter, so that, even 
when read as “no belief in a god or gods,”134 his conception is still understood as either explicitly or 
implicitly, ‘without God.’  Likewise, as his notions are dependent upon a strict binary system that is 
itself dependent upon belief, as a ‘descriptive term,’ his Atheism might thus be contradictorily defined 
as a “particular kind of belief,” divided between two broad categories.135  Simply put, his explicit 
Atheism is defined as “the absence of theistic belief due to a conscious rejection of it,” while his 
implicit Atheism reflects “the absence of theistic belief without a conscious rejection of it.”136  
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The division between these two types is specific and complex, structured by means of criticism and 
ignorance.  Explicit Atheism, positive in its assertion that the Theist’s claim is false due to insufficient 
evidence, ‘absurd or contradictory’ claims, or an ‘unintelligibility’ concerning the concept of God, is 
defined as a deliberate rejection, clearly presupposing a “familiarity with theistic beliefs.”137  Echoing 
the parasitic nature of modern Atheism’s first gradation, as a ‘philosophical type,’ Smith also localizes 
this explicit Atheism as being both critical and anti-theistic.138  Conversely, his notion of implicit 
Atheism develops in direct opposition to the specific ‘rejection’ or ‘denial’ of explicit Atheism.  That 
is, because he sees an individual who is “unacquainted with theism,” such as those born without an 
“innate knowledge of the supernatural,” including “the child with the conceptual capacity to grasp the 
issues involved, but who is still unaware of those issues,” as being ‘unconscious’ of the belief that God 
exists, he easily defines this sort of individual as implicitly Atheist.139  Until they are introduced to the 
existence of the Theist’s God, they are “unable to affirm or deny its truth,”140 and are thus defined 
simply by their absence of belief.  Extending this absence even further, he applies this same logic to an 
individual who becomes consciously aware of the belief that God exists, but who then ‘refuses to 
commit’ to it, and thus remains either ‘undecided’ or ‘indifferent.’141   
 
While Smith’s is the first discursive sample to appropriate the argument that children, because of their 
congenital ignorance about God’s existence, are negative Atheists, his incorporation of ‘negative’ as 
relatable to a conscious awareness of, and then refusal to accept, the Theist’s belief in the existence of 
God, stretches the limits of negative Atheism toward a much broader category that is forced to 
incorporate both ignorance and neutrality under the purview of implicitness.  As we shall see, while the 
positive-explicit category remains roughly the same, this negative-implicit one continues to develop.  
This is especially the case with Martin’s four publications (1990, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c) wherein the 
augmentation of negative Atheism begins to further divide the positive/negative paradigm between 
types such as narrow and broad, or strong and weak. 
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By adopting Buckley’s and Hyman’s arguments that Atheism derives out of the context of Western 
monotheism, Martin states that it is within this boundary that the term makes its “clearest 
application.”142  Then, in adopting Smith’s conception that an Atheist is “someone without a belief in 
God, not necessarily someone who believes that God does not exist,”143 he defines positive Atheism as 
a ‘special case’ of negative Atheism, the two differentiated on one end by the belief that “there is no 
god or gods,” and on the other as that “derived from the Greek root.”144  In this same way, he further 
supports Smith’s contention that explicit denial is the leading characteristic that separates the positive 
from the negative.  This is perhaps most apparent in his association of agnosticism as ‘entailing’ 
negative Atheism because they both consist of an absence of belief that is not explicitly denied: “Since 
agnostics do not believe in God, they are by definition negative atheists.”145 
 
Though his conception seems repetitive of the discourse discussed thus far, Martin’s differentiation 
between broad/narrow and strong/weak contributes a somewhat new perspective.  Put simply, his broad 
positive Atheism consists of a “disbelief in all gods,”146 while his narrow positive Atheism consists of 
“disbelief in a theistic God.”147  Conversely, his broad negative Atheism consists of “the absence of 
belief in any god or Gods,” while his narrow negative Atheism consists of “the absence of belief in a 
theistic God.”148  This latter category receives further treatment in his Atheism: A Philosophical 
Justification wherein his conception of the broad and narrow forms of negative Atheism reflect a 
distinct post-Flew formula.   
A negative atheist, if we understand theism in the way it has been understood in modern 
times, would simply be a person without a belief in a personal god.  Atheism, so understood, 
would be compatible with deism, polytheism, and pantheism.  However, this construction of 
atheism seems to conflict not only with the original Greek meaning, but also with what past 
and present professed Atheists have meant.  Consequently, I use ‘negative atheism’ in its most 
fundamental sense to mean an absence of belief in any god or gods, not just the absence of 
belief in a personal god.  Let us call this the broad sense of negative atheism [emphasis in 
original].149  
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Divided further by degrees of resiliency or conviction, negative Atheism appears ‘weak’ because it 
does not share the strong explicit denial required of the positive Atheist.  That is, merely being 
‘without’ God is not necessarily to “deny the existence of any deity;” it could simply mean not having 
a belief in general.150  By this we can infer that Martin’s positive Atheism, explicit in its strong and 
narrow denial of the Theist’s belief in the existence of God, is formed in contrast to the weak, narrow, 
and negative sense of Atheism that merely means any person who does not, implicitly, have a belief in 
the existence of a narrowly defined Theistic God.  
 
With Martin we come again to a point of discursive transition, marked exclusively by his expanding 
the definition of negative Atheism as a general ‘absence’ of belief in any god or gods, which he defines 
narrowly—the foundation of positive Atheism—and broadly—an absence either by choice, or by 
ignorance.  Out of this broadening scope we begin to see an amplification of the term far beyond the 
internalized border established by its modern genesis, making way for a re-emergence of the sort of 
expansive and generalized language we saw shaping the meaning of ἄθεος, exemplified by Martin with 
an appropriation of ‘Atheism’ into the arduous discourse on defining religion.   
 
As an example, and by means of their comparatively ‘non-theistic’ nature, Buddhism, Jainism, and 
Confucianism each fall into Martin’s conception of Atheism due to their ‘lack’ of the Western 
monotheist’s belief in the existence of a singular omniscient deity.  These non-theistic religions are 
thus negative Atheist religions, both narrow and broad.  We see this quite clearly with his assessment 
of Buddhism:  
To be sure, it is not disputed that belief in a god or gods is a part of Mahayana Buddhism.  
The numerous bodhisattvas, the Buddha Amitabha, and the cosmic Buddha nature seem to be 
like the gods or god of Western religion.  What is disputed is whether original Buddhism was 
atheistic; or, what amounts to the same thing, whether Theravada Buddhism, which is 
generally recognized to be close to the original Buddhism, is atheistic.151 
 
Basing these conclusions on previous discursive perspectives—Stroup (1968), Pike (1948), and Smart 
(1967)—his interpretations are noticeably filtered through the positive/negative discourse thus far 
discussed.  As such, his classification of Jainism under the category of positive Atheism, and 
Confucianism—or at least Confucius—as negative Atheism, is further based upon an assessment that 
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sees the former as actively disbelieving that an “all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful being who 
created the universe exists,”152 while he contends that the latter, Confucius, “did not hold the view that 
an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God exists.”153  Where we might criticize these conceptions 
for being overtly theological in their substantive views on the definition of ‘religion,’ and though we 
might concede that his argumentation is valid given his broad conception of ‘religion,’ they equally 
provide for our interests here evidence of a shift that seems to permeate the discourse to follow.      
 
This ‘widening-the-scope’ of Atheism’s negative category seems in many ways like an accumulation 
of our analysis on ἄθεος and Atheism, a means by which both processes in defining these terms is 
applied to the larger definition of the concept itself.  It also dictates a re-conceptualization wherein 
‘Atheism’ is transmuted into an umbrella category under which a number of differing aspects of ‘being 
Atheist’ reside.  For example, in Hiorth’s two leading publications (1995 and 2003) we see this 
discursive shift embodied not just by a differentiation between positive/negative, but between the moral 
interest concerning pure/impure types, of which there are three varieties of the former—Theoretical 
Atheism, Non-Theism, and General Atheism—and two of the latter—Positive Atheism and Practical 
Atheism.154  Additionally, given this theoretical augmentation, he also refers to an indeterminate type 
of Atheism, the term used in relation to his five concepts, or in an unspecified manner, which he aptly 
calls ‘indefinite’ or ‘unspecified’ Atheism.155  Once again, where Hiorth’s conceptions offer intriguing 
theoretical re-interpretations, it is perhaps more pertinent to acknowledge the way in which these sorts 
of broadening amplifications seem to warrant un-fettered and creative freedom, such as we find in the 
biased discourses of Baggini (2003) and Eller (2004 and 2010).    
 
Where Hiorth’s Atheism is dependent upon the ability to speak and understand words in order to 
determine an individual an Atheist, thus dismissing any sense of implicit nature in defining negative 
Atheism,156 Baggini and Eller re-establish the term’s implicit nature in order to set right what they 
perceive as an imbalance generated by the modernist perception of Atheism’s dependency on Theism.  
Baggini’s conception begins with a critical rejection of the idea that Atheism is, in any way, in need of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Ibid., 223. 
153 Ibid., 229.      
154 Finngeir Hiorth, Introduction to Atheism (Pune: Indian Secular Society, 1995), 21-22 and 
34-35; see also Finngeir Hiorth, Atheism in the World (Oslo: Human-Etisk Forbund, 2003).     
155 Hiorth, Introduction, 35. 
156 Ibid., 23.  
	  
	   143 
Theism, dismissing in particular the idea that it is a ‘negative’ position due to a flawed translational 
misperception, which he calls an ‘etymological fallacy.’157  While his initial critique rightly points out 
the inherent necessity in understanding the discursive process essential in defining certain terms, his 
argument as a whole is heavily reliant upon a pre-conceived notion of Atheism as an innate position.  
This is demonstrated quite distinctly by his use of an illustrative hypothetical engagement with the 
process of belief.  He hypothesizes a world that is utterly void of the belief that there exists a Loch 
Ness Monster, into which he inserts an individual who suddenly begins to believe that it does.  Though 
this person provides no evidence, and is wholly unable to support their claim, others begin to believe 
the Monster exists as well, until these ‘Nessies’ soon make up the majority opinion.  Now, those 
individuals who do not, nor never believed, in the existence of the Monster are given the title 
‘Anessies,’ defined as such because their belief is seen as ‘parasitic’ on the normative or majority 
belief system held by their counterparts, the Nessies.  Though both the Nessies and Anessies began as 
equals in a shared implicit absence of belief in the existence of the Monster, the latter is found to be 
dependent upon the former, an exchange Baggini finds to be unfairly balanced.158    
 
Beyond his argument about the natural origins of mankind without certain beliefs, this example is also 
illustrative of the positive/negative discourse being appropriated by an a priori bias, Flew’s ‘onus of 
proof’ comingling with Smith’s conception of Atheism-as-inherent.  As well, Baggini’s attempt at 
rationalizing an Atheism without the ‘negative’ category, but that is still considered inherent, 
demonstrates a fascinating terminological shift.  For him, Atheism is positive in that it is the initial 
position, encroached upon by a growing belief system that then defines it as parasitic upon its reified 
position.  His Atheism, then, is not ‘negative’ in the sense that it is constructed via a negation of a 
belief, but is still ‘negative’ by means of Smith’s and Martin’s conceptions as signifying an implicit 
position—‘without,’ or simply the ‘absence,’ of a belief in God.  This same sort of conclusion is taken 
up by Eller, but in a more specific manner pertaining to the ‘natural’ stage of Atheism out of which 
Theists convert. 
 
Eller’s conception of ‘natural Atheism’ is constructed as a critical response to what he perceives as a 
‘false dichotomy,’ such as Martin’s definition, that sees ‘believing not’ and ‘not believing’ as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Baggini, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction, 7. 
158 Ibid., 8-10. 
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incorrectly considering two opposing positions: “indisputably, someone who maintains that there is no 
such thing as god(s) does not believe in them; to maintain otherwise is to be incoherent […] someone 
who believes in god(s) maintains that there is such a thing; to maintain otherwise is equally 
incoherent.”159  Adding to this, he argues that the proper dichotomy is that between Theism and 
Atheism, an opposition shaped by the fact that all individuals begin as ‘natural Atheists,’ without God, 
and then convert out of Atheism when they come to learn of, and take up, the belief that God exists.  
Seemingly heavily influenced by Flew’s ‘presumption of Atheism,’ Eller’s conception is a re-
evaluation of the positive/negative paradigm, specifically in relation to the nature of Atheism after it 
begins to be defined along a dyadic axis.   
 
Furthermore, this re-evaluation offers an interesting discursive interpretation, revealing a glimpse onto 
the influence these previous definitions have on one’s later conceptions.  As such, his definition of 
negative Atheism as a ‘negative case,’ the process of “highlighting the flaws of theism” or pointing out 
the “reasons not to accept a belief in god(s),”160 seems both counter to, yet also infected by, the 
concepts posed by Flew, Martin, and Smith.  Likewise, his definition of positive Atheism, as 
demonstrating both “what is wrong with theism” as well as “what is right with atheism,”161 seems a 
continuation of the arguments made by most post-Flew scholars.  More specifically, his argument that 
there is one, singular Atheism, and that it is naturally inborn in all people, seems heavily influenced by 
Smith’s conception of a negative Atheism defined merely by its complete lack of knowledge of the 
Theist’s belief in the existence of God.  While appearing discordant with his own conceptions, Eller’s 
contribution is nevertheless discursively nuanced: an influenced critique about the paradigm he himself 
is using to defend his own conception of a default, inborn Atheism.162   
 
The discursive influences of Flew, Stein, Smith, Martin, and even Baggini and Eller, are markedly 
reified in our last four examples.  For instance, Palmer’s (2010) is heavily motivated by Flew’s, 
Martin’s, and Smith’s explicit/implicit dichotomy, making the distinction that those individuals who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 Jack David. Eller, “Chapter 1: What is Atheism?” in Phil Zuckerman, ed. Atheism and 
Secularity–Volume 1: Issues, Concepts and Definitions (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 6.   
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 7-8. 
162 Jack David Eller, Natural Atheism (Austin: American Atheist Press, 2004), 161; as well, as 
a substitution for positive/negative he additionally offers an obscure dichotomy of 
‘complete/incomplete.’ 
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are simply “devoid of any god-belief,”163 such as infants, are ‘negative Atheists’ in their unfamiliarity 
with the idea that God exists, and are thus ‘un-concerned’ with God’s existence: 
In other words, perhaps we should agree that an atheist is not someone who, having tested the 
appropriate theological argument, concludes that these arguments are spurious and that no 
such being exists; but rather, that an atheist is someone marked by the absence of belief: he or 
she simply has no belief in God.  On these terms, the atheist is, properly speaking, not 
concerned with the matter of God at all.  For how can one repudiate something when one has 
no conception of what one is denying [emphases in original]?164    
 
Moreover, Palmer also borrows from Smith’s ‘core of Atheism,’ that the concept is defined simply by a 
lack of Theistic belief, by shaping his definition around the idea that both negative and positive 
Atheists—the latter becoming a catch-all term that defines both Christians and Hindus alike for 
denying each other’s beliefs165—are negative Atheists in so far that both imply a lack of Theistic belief.  
In establishing his ‘Atheist’s Creed,’ he further reveals these influences in order to declare that 
negative Atheism is merely positive Atheism “without the arguments.”166 
 
Likewise, we see these ideas permeate texts meant for a wide and otherwise non-professional 
readership, such as Walters’ (2010) Atheism: A Guide for the Perplexed, and the wikipedia.org article 
on the concept, both of which divide it along the lines of positive/negative, explicit/implicit, and 
strong/weak.  Walters simplistically defines this distinction under ‘overt disbelief,’ as well as between, 
“(a) positive atheism, an active disbelief in God,” and “(b) negative atheism, the absence of belief in 
God.”167  Additionally, and by following Palmer, he declares that all positive Atheists are “necessarily 
negative atheists,” but that the “converse doesn’t hold,” adding a further subdivision between 
‘militant’—the direct rejection of Theism in a specifically polemical way—and ‘moderate’—an 
Atheism that does not proselytize.168  The Wikipideia.org article is a bit more detailed, briefly covering 
the geneses of the term, as well as offering a number of statistical and philosophical sources pertaining 
to the range of Atheism.  However, the section on the ‘definition’ of Atheism is specifically directed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Michael Palmer, The Atheist’s Creed (Cambridge: The Lutterworth Press, 2010), 16. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Palmer states: For when a Christian rejects, say, the gods of Hinduism, he or she 
presumably has reasons for this rejection, and so acts, towards the Hindu at least, as a positive atheist.  
In this respect, all theists act like positive atheists when they provide grounds for denying the existence 
of all other gods except their own.” Palmer, The Atheist’s Creed, 18. 
166 Ibid., 19. 




toward the differentiation between positive/negative and implicit/explicit, including two independent 
articles on each.169           
 
While Walters,’ Baggini’s, and the Wikipedia.org article are meant for a readership beyond the limits 
of ‘academia,’ Bullivant’s introductory definition in his and Ruse’s co-edited Oxford Handbook of 
Atheism seems slated more toward a consensual discussion for scholars inside the academy.  However, 
in that it appears as a protraction of his own previous publications, the language he uses is also clearly 
influenced by the discourse discussed above.  For example, in his 2011 response to the NSRN glossary, 
he puts forth a definition more focused on ‘belief’ than ‘commitment,’ which he argues is far less 
controversial: “a lack of belief in the existence of a god or gods.”170  Then, in his The Salvation of 
Atheists (2012) he expands this definition so that it is more reflective of the discourse pertaining to the 
positive/negative dichotomy: 
For the purposes of this study, then, the word ‘atheist’ will signify the following: a person 
who is without a belief in God (or gods).  This encompasses both those who believe that God 
does not exist, and those who, while not necessarily disbelieving, do not possess a belief in 
God’s existence either.  Among others who follow this broad, neutral definition of ‘atheist,’ 
these two categories are often designated ‘positive atheism’ (believing-not) and ‘negative 
atheism’ (not-believing) respectively (e.g. Robertson 1970: 238; Flew 1976: 14; Martin 
2007a: 1) [emphasis in original].171 
 
For utilitarian reasons, Bullivant fully adopts this positive/negative paradigm for his introductory 
definition in The Oxford Handbook as well.  After specifying that his definition is built upon two 
decisions based on the meaning and scope of the alpha privative ‘A,’ as well as its relationship to 
Theism, his ‘Atheism’ becomes a broad absence, thus permitting it to function “as an umbrella concept, 
comprising a range of significantly related positions and phenomena.”172  In this way, his negative 
Atheism is defined as being “consonant with our basic definition of absence [emphasis in original],” 
which encompasses differing types of ‘agnosticism,’ a concept itself based on both evidence and 
indecisiveness, that further incorporates “any person who does not, at present, have a belief in the 
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(accessed 7 July 2014). 
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existence of a God or gods.”173  His positive Atheist is then defined as “someone who is not only 
without such a belief, but [who] holds a specific belief,” so that “positive atheism implies negative 
atheism, but not vice versa,”174 an almost direct reference to Palmer’s ‘Atheist Creed,’ and Walter’s 
Guide for the Perplexed.   
 
Lastly, and in order to make clearer sense of his definition, he offers a ‘taxonomic’ comparison: 
To adopt a zoological metaphor, it might be helpful to think of atheism as a ‘family’, divisible 
into two ‘genera’ (negative and positive), each made up of various ‘species’ (agnosticism, 
Promethean antitheism, etc.). This taxonomic approach to atheism permits exploration of a 
diverse range of stances and worldviews, united by their shared absence of theism.175 
 
While his use of positive/negative is here made in order to provide his edited volume a ‘standard’ 
definition upon which each contributing voice might relate, it is also heavily influenced by a discursive 
genealogy that, one might argue, is less about offering a meaning of Atheism that might best support a 
wide-ranging discussion, and more about the influences of that discourse on how a concept comes to 
mean what it means to certain people at a certain time.  This is perhaps best illustrated by his direct 
correlation with the implicitness of Atheism-as-absence that he locates between ‘Atheism’ and other 
alpha privative terms: “hence anaerobic respiration occurs in the absence of oxygen, but it is not, in 




With this final example, our survey of the positive/negative paradigm and its influence on the discourse 
on defining Atheism comes to a point of termination.  From here, we turn to this Chapter’s conclusion 
with a brief summary of the examinations made herein, as well as a further substantiation about how a 
discursive analysis such as this might prove beneficial to our Ethnographic Criticism in Part Two.    
 
3.6—Conclusion: The Process, Not a ‘Standard’ Definition 
Bullivant’s definition in The Oxford Handbook is designed for the explicit purpose of supplying a 
stipulation that might express the intent of each of the various subject areas and genres within his 
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edited volume.  For this reason, he makes the case that supplying a “generally agreed-upon, serviceable 
(if not perfect), scholarly definition,” offers a great deal of ‘utility’ to the process.177  This is not, 
however, a simple task.  As he rightly points out: 
A too-narrow definition may inadvertently airbrush out all kinds of interesting potential data, 
while a too-broad one may capture a large number of ‘atheisms’ with few meaningful 
connections between them. Alternatively, a definition that is too idiosyncratic, or culturally 
bound, may obviate comparisons with other work ostensibly on the same subject. 
Furthermore, and quite obviously, the sheer lack of agreement creates a great deal of, at best, 
time-consuming effort, and at worst, hopeless confusion, for all concerned.178 
 
As he fittingly articulates here, stipulating a definition is difficult work.  It requires an intimate 
knowledge of the definitions that have come before, and in order to be both a summation and a fresh 
contribution, it must subsequently be built upon some sort of pre-existing discourse.  Bullivant does not 
fail in this endeavor.  However, where we might suggest a failure on his part, based on our discursive 
analysis herein, is in the offering of a definition at all.  That is, where he makes the argument that a 
‘standard’ definition is necessary when “drawing together dozens of scholars, from widely diverse 
disciplines, and several continents,” so that his assemblage becomes a “microcosm of the scholarly 
study of atheism,”179 his mistake is in attempting to create a definition that might broadly address each 
of these discourses, yet be narrow enough to stay true to the subject under examination.  This is further 
demonstrated by his reasoning: “with different authors defining the term in different ways, like-for-like 
comparisons between chapters would become next to impossible.”180  He refers to this conglomerate of 
voices as a ‘Babel Handbook of Atheism,’ conceding that while it might offer some value in that “each 
individual chapter could well constitute an exemplary and illuminating piece of scholarship,” in the end 
it would inevitably become what he calls a “frustrating morass of contradictions and cross-
purposes.”181   He thus laments: “such, writ large, is the state of the scholarly study of atheism 
today.”182  Again, this is not incorrect.  Nor is it that absurd of a methodology, especially in 
consideration of the differences we have seen here on how the term has been defined.  However, for 
our intentions, and since we are focused here less on defining the term itself, and more on how 
individuals—such as the characters we will examine in Part Two—go about using, as well as 
contributing to, this discourse, it is rather impractical.   
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As we stated in the introduction, our use of Discourse-as-theory, and thus our analysis of the different 
ways in which this term has been defined, has given us the opportunity to replace the necessity of 
summarizing this ‘frustrating morass of contradictions’ into a generalized and essential stipulation, 
with a focus on identity construction.  That is, by examining this discourse, and in that way gaining a 
comprehensive understanding about the influences that shaped it, we find ourselves here less in need of 
a ‘stipulation’ going forward, as we now have a larger perception of the ways in which an individual 
might use this discourse—or, if nothing else, be emulative of it—in their process of identification.  We 
might even argue that this is the precise point in which we could stipulate a ‘lack of utility’ in 
Bullivant’s pragmatic definition for the Oxford Handbook: rather than create a stipulation that might 
encompass every voice within the Handbook, describing each of those Chapters as contributing voices 
to a discourse on the broader ‘meaning’ of Atheism not only alleviates the need to begin the text with a 
‘definition,’ it also provides a more open and accessible comprehension of the various ways in which 
the term has come to be identified.  For this reason, and for our intentions herein, rather than state here 
what Atheism ‘is,’ or ‘might be,’ for the benefit of our analysis of McEwan’s novels in Part Two, our 
discursive understanding drawn out above likewise appears far more useful than a definition.   
 
This brings us once again to our earlier example of Greene’s representation of Catholicism in The 
Power and the Glory.  As we previously stated, in order to approach the novel with the intent of using 
it as a source for interpreting a particular type of Catholicism, we would need to have already 
established an external understanding about the concept ‘Catholicism’ that might be internalized within 
its pages.  This would demand a comprehension of both the historical—lexical—and theoretical—
essentialist—influences that might shape it.  As we have seen, this would normally be resolved via a 
stipulated definition.  Yet, our analysis here has equally provided for us the same sort of broad and 
external comprehension.  In this way, when we begin analyzing the Atheism within McEwan’s two 
novels, such as that represented by Bernard and Joe teased above, we can link that internalized 
representation with this external perception.  Then, as we begin to further assess how it is that they 
shape these identities, such as through the use of a particular rational thinking, or in dependent 
reference to an established ‘Theistic’ position, we will be doing so with a more distinct assurance about 
the ‘meaning’ of that Atheism in that specific context.  Lastly, and in a more ‘anthropological’ fashion, 
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we will equally be free of any sort of bias or pre-determined ideas about whether that Atheism is ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ as it pertains to a ‘stipulation,’ either broadly or narrowly defined.  This has been, in 




With the pragmatic use of Discourse Analysis established here we can likewise conclude with our 
larger introduction of Ethnographic Criticism.  Beginning with our discussion on how it grew out of the 
Literary Turn’s influence on both ethnographic construction and the reading of fiction as ethnography, 
as well as on similar influences of the Ethical Criticism that predominates the scholarship of McEwan’s 
fiction, this addition rounds out this introduction by providing a sense of clarity about the concept on 
which we intend to focus our examination.  However, as we enter this Thesis’ second Part, and before 
we begin that analysis, we must first turn to a short, yet essential, discussion that will, on one end, 
present a brief description of the experimental style and structure of our examination, while on the 
other offer a critical assessment about the possible consequences that might arise from treating fictions 
as if they are ethnographies.  This will additionally consider how our doing this might alter the place of 
the author within that sort of consolidation, and thus further our discussion about the dangers of 
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CHAPTER FOUR—ETHNOGRAPHIC CRITICISM: STYLE AND STRUCTURE 
 
“Joy: I hear the “Kiriwina” [another name for the Trobriands; 
more strictly the northern province of Boyowa].  I get ready; little 
gray, pinkish huts.  Photos.  Feeling of ownership: It is I who will 
describe them or create them.  Ashore; comical fences; miserable 
houses on pilings; […].  The women ran away.  Under each house 
implements for making pots.  Yellow ochre pots lie under each 
house.  –I try to talk to them; they run away or tell lies.” 
 
—Bronislaw Malinowski, Diary Entry, 1 December 19171 
 
 
4.1—Introduction: Ethnographic Criticism Described 
 
Throughout the three Chapters of Part One, our description of Ethnographic Criticism performed two 
duties.  First, through three distinct reviews of established methodological and theoretical discourse, we 
situated the meaning of Ethnographic Criticism within a solid foundation.  In this way, rather than 
claim that it arose ex nihilo, linking it to notions of literary anthropology, literary criticism, and 
discourse analysis, provided for us a base upon which to depend, as well as build.  Second, by citing 
these influences, we equally revealed how we might conduct an Ethnographic Criticism for our chosen 
concept.   
 
In the first Chapter, our examination about the theoretical shift in defining the ‘doing’ of anthropology 
as the construction of a text—rather than as just observations made in the field—led us to a discussion 
about how writing ethnography like a novel, might lead to reading a novel for ethnographic insight.  
This in turn provided for us our own justification, a permission of sorts to do the same, albeit somewhat 
imprecisely defined.  In the second Chapter this was then substantiated by our examination of Ethical 
Criticism, and the manner with which this type of textual analysis is similar to, but not identical of, 
reading fiction ‘ethnographically.’  In order to combine these two methodological approaches so that 
we might better define our own, we then ‘ethnocritically’ married them in an effort to focus more on 
identity construction within the context of our chosen sources.  In this way, not only did this better 
clarify the uniqueness of our approach, it also christened it as the offspring of this union, revealing 
particular hereditary traits alongside its own individuality.  
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Likewise, this ‘uniqueness’ was further established by our examination of Atheism in the third Chapter, 
and the means with which we ‘defined’ that concept.  By locating our need to construct Ethnographic 
Criticism as a result of the ambiguity currently afflicting the meaning of the term itself, our choice to 
examine the discursive elements that have contributed to its definition, rather than ‘define’ it, offered 
for us a unique opportunity to both remove ourselves from this equivocality, while at the same time 
construct an ‘external’ comprehension about how the concept might be ‘internalized’ in McEwan’s 
novels.  Said differently, our examination of the term’s ‘second-order’ discourse—how it has been 
defined—likewise offered us a broad insight about its ‘first-order’ discourse—how individuals have 
either defined themselves, or been defined by others.  While the intent of that Chapter was not directly 
focused on providing our Ethnographic Criticism another methodological component—especially as 
our use of Discourse Analysis was designed as a ‘Discourse-as-theory’—our use of it has nevertheless 
given our approach another layer of methodological nuance.  In this way, while McEwan’s novels will 
be treated here as ‘ethnographic texts,’ they will also be considered as ‘discursive samples:’ the 
Atheism presented within exemplifying both a holistic representation, as well as a discursive example, 
of a concept bound within the context of its creation.  
 
Where at this point we might ‘traditionally’ move from here to our actual use of Ethnographic 
Criticism, because of the experimental nature of this analysis we must first pause to consider two 
fundamental issues.  We provide these here, rather than in the conclusion, not only because of their 
influence on the style and structure of that analysis, but because they also offer a particular 
‘justification’ for our not merely presenting it in a manner more expected of a case-study examination.  
Our reasoning for this is partly due to our marriage between the methodologies of the first and second 
Chapters, and how that in turn influenced our shift from reading fiction ‘ethnographically’ to reading 
fiction ‘as ethnography.’  This is also due to the fact that our reading McEwan’s novels like this is the 
result of a fascinating marital defect, a blurring of the distinction between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ that 
likewise might lead us toward the notion that everything is fiction, and thus entirely ‘made-up.’  
Therefore, while with our analysis of the identity construction within Black Dogs and Enduring Love 
we might identify these texts as fictional representations without the requisite need of an ancillary 
ethnographic account—Eriksen’s ‘description,’ rather than ‘source’—our use will move beyond this 
type of demarcation by reading them instead as uniquely ‘fictionalized’ auto-ethnographies.  While this 
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will indeed benefit our argument that the novel might offer as authentic or authoritative a source for 
cultural insight as the ethnography, this transmutation likewise alters the differentiation between 
writing that is designed and writing that is invented.  Explicating these issues will not only assist the 
reader in understanding the reasoning behind the style and structure of the ‘text’ that follows, it will 
also act as a theoretical reinforcement for our argument concerning the dangers and repercussions of 
using such an unorthodox approach.  For the sake of pragmatic clarity, and to borrow from our earlier 
structural format in the first Chapter, we might delineate this discussion as guided by ‘discourse’ and 
‘signature.’       
 
4.2—Discourse, Signature, and the Role of the Author 
As we saw in the first Chapter, within the context of the Literary Turn discourse essentially means 
‘form’ and ‘format.’  Stylistically, it also means that a ‘text’ needs to be able to represent or recreate a 
specific concept—such as Atheism—in such a way that it becomes mimetic of ethnographic style.  
That is, it needs to look, and read, like ethnography.  For this reason, the language that it uses to do this 
tells its story with a particular voice.  This is eventually defined by a type of ‘realism,’ a style of 
writing ‘borrowed’ from fiction, and employed in order to give one’s text the ability to evocatively 
present a complete representation of a total culture by means of selective parts.  Affirmed throughout 
our review by examples ranging from Malinowski’s Argonauts, to the auto-ethnographies of Jackson, 
Knab, and the Prices, this realism also foundationally encouraged the self-reflective style of the latter, 
as well as the experimental justification for examining the novel as a ‘case-study,’ ‘source,’ or 
‘description’ of a particular social reality.  
 
However, there appears here a worrying oversight, the origins of which we might locate within our 
discussion of the ethnographic novel and the novel as ethnography at the end of the first Chapter.  This 
derives exclusively from an issue concerning narrative style, and how the character of the voice telling 
us the story has radical consequences on how we might perceive the insight from within.  For reasons 
of practicality, a short outline of the narrative styles thus far examined might assist here.  To begin, if 
an ethnography is written from a third-person perspective and omnisciently provides details about a 
culture, we might classify it as a ‘traditional,’ ‘realist,’ or ‘functionalist’ ethnography, exemplified by 
Malinowski’s Argonauts.  If it is written from a third-person omniscience, but focuses, like a novel, on 
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a particular individual or individuals, as if they are characters, then it becomes something akin to a 
‘life-history’ or ‘case-history,’ such as we saw with Tuhami or Moroccan Dialogues.  Then, if the 
narrative style shifts from third to first-person, wherein the author—ethnographer—transforms him or 
herself into a ‘quasi-insider’ in order to become a character within the text itself, it becomes an auto-
ethnography, such as those cited above.  In these ways, we might rightly conclude that just as the 
writing style alters the type of ethnography being constructed, so it also changes the type of 
ethnographic insight we might derive from it.  We should also note that this does not change when we 
shift our attention from writing texts to reading them, such as our use of the novel ‘as ethnography.’ 
 
This brings us to the issue of signature.  Signature refers to the author’s role in constructing how the 
culture is revealed within the text, and thus represents a conscious decision about how he or she intends 
to literarily ‘recreate’ that culture.  However, this is also a stylistic decision, which, after the Literary 
Turn, leads to a number of creative illustrations, such as auto-ethnography.  With these examples, 
signature equally addresses the ‘existence’ or ‘presence’ of the author in the text.  That is, where 
ethnographies were once exclusively written from a strict omniscience—the ‘X’ do this—a more 
creative means of construction begins to ‘reveal’ the author in the text: I saw the ‘X’ do this.  This 
revelation, the exposure of the method in the magic, equally alerts us to the fact that the ethnographic 
text, though factually scientific in its intent, is just as equally ‘fictional’ because it is an artifice formed 
by conscious choices and shaped by literary and stylistic influences.          
 
While this further assists our discussion above about the different classifications of ethnographic 
writing, when we transition from writing to reading, this quite subtly influences how we might 
determine a novel as either an ethnographic source or description.  As we recall, Eriksen defined the 
former as ‘substantiating evidence,’ the novel-as-source acting as a secondary text to an ethnographic 
one that, while offering cultural insight, is still dependent upon that ethnography in order for the reader 
to truly appreciate or understand how the culture is being fictionally revealed.  As an example, he cited 
Mittleholzer’s A Morning at the Office.  Conversely, the novel-as-description is able to stand on its 
own: the culture revealed within is so nuanced and specific that it appears like an ethnography.  As an 
example, Eriksen cited Naipaul’s, A House for Mr. Biswas.  With the latter, and based on the narrative 
style of A House for Mr. Biswas, we can agree that his citation is correct.  After all, it reads like an 
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ethnography, but more specifically, like an example of our second classification above: a biographical 
third-person account like Tuhami or Moroccan Dialogues.  However, when we consider the way an 
auto-ethnography stylistically presents its data via a self-reflective, and thus first-person narrative, and 
then equally consider that after the Literary Turn this style of writing is not only accepted, but arguably 
appears more accurate than a ‘traditional’ ethnography, then our perception of the author’s signature 
takes on an entirely different meaning.  This brings us to our ‘fascinating defect.’   
 
While A House for Mr. Biswas might act as an exemplary ‘ethnographic description,’ and thus provide 
for us a theoretical rationale for reading fiction as ethnography—or, if nothing else, 
‘ethnographically’—it also inspires a rather specific critique.  As an ethnographic description, we can 
read this novel like an ethnography, justified in large part by its looking like a third-person omniscient 
case-history.  This is, as we have seen, a progressive conclusion made in part by the creative writing 
style of texts like Tuhami and Moroccan Dialogues.  Because these ethnographies employed a style 
more literarily similar to a novel, so this novel might be accepted as something applicable to our 
interests in researching an individual’s culture.  However, even with this legitimized via our discussion 
of the Literary Turn’s influence on writing and reading ethnographic ‘texts,’ there appears here an 
oversight concerning this same method of experimentation with a novel that presents its data via a 
narrative style similar to a self-reflective auto-ethnography.  In other words, because the textualized 
culture found within any sort of ethnographic text is dependent upon an author for its very existence, 
and because acknowledging that author’s role in shaping the ‘voice’ of that text is integral to our 
perception of the culture revealed within, when reading a novel that reads like a first-person auto-
ethnography, we need to consider how this might drastically modify the character of the novelist in that 
process.   
 
As an example of our meaning here, let us consider Jackson’s curious self-reflective self-inclusion in 
Barawa.  Within his text he has fictionalized himself so that he might become a ‘character’ alongside 
the ‘fictionalized’ forms of his informants.  In this way he is just as equally ‘manufactured’ and 
‘invented’ as they are.  Yet, he still exists in the ‘real world.’  We can locate him using the sort of 
modern technology applicable to us in proving his ‘realness,’ such as his profile on Wikipedia.org,2 or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Jackson_(anthropologist) (accessed 4 August 2014). 
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his faculty description at Harvard University’s website.3  He exists, alongside us, as a fully formed and 
living individual.  We might also do the same with his manufactured informants by locating them ‘in 
the field’ or, if nothing else, by locating evidence of their existence that could corroborate their ‘real 
world’ existence.  This is not too unlike our earlier discussion in the Introduction about the ‘realness’ 
of Henry VIII, Ann Boleyn, and Thomas Cromwell in Mantel’s Wolf Hall and Bring up the Bodies.  
However, this does not work for the novelist, for two reasons.  First, the novelist does not ‘create’ him 
or herself as a character in the same way as Jackson does in Barawa.  If they did, their text would cease 
being a ‘novel’ in the sense that the story they are telling is merely a ‘fictionalized’ version of their 
lives, and would thus be classified as a type of self-reflective auto-ethnography.  Second, because the 
novelist is not fictionalizing him or herself, the narrator of their text is a wholly different and entirely 
separate individual.  While we might be able to isolate traits or references that might link these two 
individuals, they are, for reasons of literary style, completely different individuals.  In this way, when 
we read a first-person fictional narrative as ethnography, the author of that novel ceases to exist.  This 
is a stylistic consequence, just as much as it is a pragmatic one.  On one end, even though we know that 
the novelist has created the text, and though we understand that they are the sole author, when we filter 
our perception via an ethnographic lens, we must also accept that the ‘author’ whose signature we find 
throughout is not the author who actually wrote it.  On the other, acknowledging that a first-person 
narration has both an ‘external’ and an ‘internal’ author would mean that we would be required to 
assess these sorts of texts from a ‘hybridized’ or ‘two-author’ perspective.  This would not only 
drastically alter how we might interpret this sort of text ‘ethnographically,’ it would likewise require a 
multi-layered discursive approach on a number of external and internal levels.  While this is not an 
otherwise impractical style of analysis, it is not the same as using fiction ‘as ethnography.’      
 
To further explain the distinction here, let us turn from Jackson to our chosen texts.  While we might 
acknowledge that McEwan is the author of these novels, and in that way also acknowledge that they 
were shaped and formed from his imagination, Jeremy and Joe are the ones who are speaking to us.  
They are the ones shaping their respective narratives, sharing their experiences, and providing us with 
first-person details about Atheism, either as it is perceived, or self-defined.  For these reasons, when we 
empathetically enter their world by reading their accounts, such as we might do when reading an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 http://hds.harvard.edu/people/michael-d-jackson (accessed 4 August 2014). 
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ethnography, we are entering their world, not McEwan’s.  Thus, because they are first-person 
narratives, and because we will be examining them as ethnographic descriptions, their transition from 
novels-as-description to novels-as-ethnography dictates an entirely different sort of analytical 
approach.  Therefore, in order to examine them as ethnographic descriptions, such as Eriksen did with 
A House for Mr. Biswas, we would need to assess them as ‘amateur insider accounts,’ rather than 
‘novels.’   
 
To be a bit more specific, in order to read them as ethnographic descriptions our examination will need 
to treat them as certain types of auto-ethnography: Black Dogs as ‘auto-ethnographic’ in that Jeremy is 
an outsider, writing from an insider’s perspective; and Enduring Love as ‘auto-ethnographic’ in that 
Joe is an insider, writing from within an insider’s perspective.  By shaping our analysis in this way, 
McEwan can play no part in our examination.  Rather, we will need to transition him into a realm 
neither like, nor unlike, Barthe’s post-structuralist conception of the ‘death of the author.’  However, 
where Barthe’s removal was made in order to eliminate the limitations we might find in recognizing 
the author’s influence on the text itself,4 ours is made for us by mere methodological consequence.  
That is, while this sort of experimentation might seem like our own creation, it should more accurately 
be perceived as a continual point along the progression that started with the Literary Turn, which is 
perhaps best exemplified by the blurring of fact/fiction in the ethnographic novel.  Only here, we might 
argue that it is a bit more theoretically realized.  By classifying a novel as a ‘description,’ which then 
defines its cultural insight as independent of any existing ethnography, and then in considering how the 
style of that novel might dictate the type of insight it provides us, when it comes to declaring who it is 
who ‘authors’ a first-person ethnographic description, our inevitable conclusion would argue in favor 
of the individual actually telling the story.  In the case of Black Dogs and Enduring Love, the ‘authors’ 
of these texts are Jeremy and Joe.  This is, perhaps, the central inspiration for the style and structure of 
our analysis to follow, and it equally inspires a slight emendation of our hypothesis from the 
Introduction: if we were to read a novel as an auto-ethnography, defined as such because it appears to 
have been written by the character telling us the story, rather than the novelist who authored it, what 
would our analysis of that novel look like?  The ‘text’ that follows is our answer.       
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author” in Roland Barthes, Image / Music / Text, 
Stephen Heath, trans. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 142-7. 
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4.3—Conclusion: A Text Meant to Shock   
The following case-study will be presented as an independent ‘text:’ a fictionalized first-person 
analysis of two primary source accounts focused on Atheist identity construction.  These accounts will 
likewise be described as having been written by two individuals—identified as ‘Jeremy’ and ‘Joe’—
who exist wholly separate from Ian McEwan’s imagination.  In a similar way, the author of this ‘text’ 
will be a fictionalized version of the author of this Thesis, a modified literary formulation reflective of 
the fictional inclusion of the author within an auto-ethnography: where an auto-ethnography 
fictionalizes the ethnographer’s data in order to achieve a more literary accent, this text will fictionalize 
a textual analysis in order to achieve a more ethnographic one.  Additionally, because it is the result of 
the marriage we have spoken of throughout this Thesis, it should also be understood as an 
amalgamation of the literary experimentation we saw with Jackson, Knab, and the Prices, and the close 
thematic literary criticism we saw in texts like Schemberg’s “Achieving At-one-ment.”  For these 
reasons, it will take on the appearance of a unique type of consolidation, a cross between a short 
analytical monograph and a specialized journal article.  Likewise, this correlation is not only reflective 
of the length, format, and aesthetic design of the text, but of the content as well.  In regard to the latter, 
and because it is the result of the discourses described in the first, second, and third Chapters, in some 
instances there will appear echoes of the theoretical discussions found within this Thesis’ Part One, 
such as the permission of experimental approaches in researching difficult cultural categories—like 
Atheism—as well as substantiating arguments about the influence of discourse on identity 
construction.  These echoes are by all means intentional, and are used in order to not only link the 
text’s theoretical base to the arguments made herein, but to add a more literarily ‘real’ feel to the 
narrative itself so that it can ‘stand alone.’         
 
Furthermore, while it might ‘go without saying’ that this experimentation, like Crapanzano’s Tuhami 
or Dwyer’s Moroccan Dialogues, is meant to ‘shock,’ it is also meant as a continuation of the 
theoretical disturbances initiated and inspired by those texts.  As such, its genesis derives from within 
that discursive sphere of influence, not only as another point along the progression begun with the 
Literary Turn, but as a step forward that equally challenges the same normative ideologies contested by 
those experimentations.  In other words, just as Tuhami and Moroccan Dialogues led to the 
ethnographic novel and the fictionalization of ethnographic data in the name of literary adaptation, so 
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this analysis will represent a measured response: a reflection of the co-existence of the novel and the 
ethnography as correlative siblings, that also speaks to the reality that any textual representation is, as 
Malinowski claimed, ‘described’ and ‘created’ by the author’s intentions.  
 
To conclude, then, while this text is the result of a certain ‘defect,’ the familial offspring of the 
experimentation inspired by these preceding examples, and since it is reminiscent of Geertz’s 
metaphorical description of the ethnographer as a ‘mule’ unsure of his or her identity after the Literary 
Turn—though less a ‘bastard-type’ than a ‘bi-racial’ amalgamation—the way that we have chosen to 
design this analysis should also be recognized as a critical reminder of the marriage that 
methodologically inspired its creation.  More specifically, our choice of adopting this stylistic 
‘fictionalization’ is not only meant to assist our analysis of McEwan’s writing by making his characters 
‘real,’ it is also designed to remind the reader that doing this, and in essence, by re-evaluating the 
difference between ‘fiction’ and ‘ethnography,’ we are precariously moving into a theoretical discourse 
where everything is fiction.  In this way, not only will this be an example of the ‘merits’ in using such a 
‘non-traditional’ approach—such as Ethnographic Criticism—as a means of achieving a certain type of 
cultural comprehension, it will equally provide a cautionary criticism about the risks of doing that to a 
certain extreme.  In other words, while the discussions in Part One have worked to establish this 
Thesis’ ‘plot’—the description of Ethnographic Criticism—the following ‘text’ will be a physical 
example of its ‘sub-plot:’ the repercussions of reading fiction as ethnography.  After this analysis, and 
for the benefit of our argument that this might determine that all texts are ‘fictional,’ we will present a 
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THE MERITS OF NON-TRADITION 
 
Amateur Textual Sources, and the Establishment of an ‘Ethnographic Understanding’ of Late 




As a concept of inquiry, Atheism is—at present—a very disorganized ideology.  That is, 
while Atheists are not shy in their critiques of organized religion, they themselves are 
not necessarily organized into what might be considered a ‘tribe’ or easily accessible 
cultural unit.  Likewise, there persists an equally disorganized ambiguity in defining the 
term itself.  For these reasons, as well as in light of a lack of established ethnography on 
British Atheism, this study will attempt to mitigate the equally difficult task of 
conducting a ‘traditional’ participant-observation of Atheism by using a non-traditional 
approach.  That is, this examination will offer an alternative means with which to 
formulate an ‘ethnographic understanding’ about how Atheists construct their identities 
by analytically relying on non-traditional sources written by two ‘ethnographic 
insiders.’  By utilizing these sources as different types of ‘auto-ethnography,’ the intent 
of this approach will be to formulate a cultural comprehension about Atheist identity 
construction, as it is expressed through dialogical and interactional validation, along a 
spectrum of nominal and virtual differentiation.  As discursive sources, these texts will 
function as substitutions, and thus make the argument that in situations where it might 
be difficult to conduct a traditional ethnographic interpretation, a more experimental 
reliance upon the non-traditional can present something akin to an equally authentic, if 





































For without whom this would not be possible 
 
“Storytellers know that people enjoy tales that explain to them the origin of things, the way things 
come to be the way they are.  This story is no different.  Every story has an author, some teller of lies.  
Do not imagine that a storyteller is unaware of the effect of every word they choose.  Do not suppose 
for a moment that an impartial observer exists.”  
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The purpose of this analysis is to defend the use of seemingly non-traditional—amateur—sources for 
their ethnographic insight on British Atheism between the years 1985 and 2000.  I have chosen to use 
these sources for three reasons.  First, there is currently a lack of more traditional types of ethnography 
on the subject of Atheism within this context (see the in-process works of Engelke,1 Mumford,2 Catto 
and Eccles,3 and Aston4).  As well, current definitions of Atheism have been increasingly established 
upon otherwise ambiguous origins (Quillen 2015), making it difficult to clearly specify what it is we 
mean when we use the term beyond a very broad and general stipulation.  Lastly, Atheists are—at 
present—not very well organized,5 so that a direct and specific focus on Atheism-as-identity suffers 
drastically from a lack of organization analogous to a ‘tribe’ or ‘cultural unit.’   
 
My non-traditional sources represent two distinctly ‘ethnographic’ points-of-view.  They were written 
by individuals within the context of my inquiry, and are both auto-ethnographic (Marcus and Fischer 
1986, Fernea 1989, Reed-Danahay 1997, and Sikes 2006) in nature.  Moreover, they are in many ways 
indicative of pre-functionalist sources, such as those that came before Malinowski’s (1922) Argonauts 
of the Western Pacific.  As well, while they were written by two individuals who show no relation to, 
nor familiarity with, one another, their insights are rather interestingly correlative.  These insights, 
which I hope to elucidate more clearly below, offer an ideal source for how Atheism is progressively 
defined within a particular context.  It should also be noted that though neither of these authors admit 
formal training in participant-observation, nor in ethnographic construction, their texts mimic many 
ethnographic themes and styles, which I believe is quite advantageous.  Lastly, because they do not 
function as ‘true’ ethnography, and nor should they be defined as such—due in large part to the 
amateur nature of their construction—I will be using them as discursive sources (Gee 2005, Fairclough 
2003, von Stuckrad 2003, 2010, 2013, and Taira 2013), textual representations of particular language 
usage, with which I will attempt to form a sort of ‘ethnographic understanding.’             
 
Structurally, this analysis will be divided into three parts.  In the first, I will briefly stipulate the 
precarious nature of ‘defining’ Atheism, and how that issue leads to a discursive-based focus on 
‘identification.’  In the second, I will describe both the texts, and the authors, as well as how they 
might mimic, and thus serve, as ethnographic sources.  In the third, I will analyze the Atheism 
described by these individuals using Jenkins’ (2004) two-part binary paradigm of nominal/virtual and 
similarity/difference, which are in turn dependent upon notions of interactional validation.  To 
conclude, I will reiterate my reasons for turning to non-traditional ethnographic sources, as well as 
defend my use of amateur texts in relation to the more experimental aspects of modern—or perhaps, 
post-modern—theories of anthropology. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matthew Engelke, “In spite of Christianity: Humanism and its Others in Contemporary 
Britain” (Non-Religion and Secularity Research Network Annual Lecture: London School of 
Economics, 28 November 2012), 10-11. (Available to download via the Economic and Social Research 
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Council website at: http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-esrc/grants/RES-000-22-4157/outputs/read/933e529e-
a881-4ac2-9b7b-324f94acb06a. Accessed 12 January 2014) 
2 Lorna Mumford, “Atheism and Anthropology: Researching Atheism and Self-Searching 
3 See their research profiles, and an overview of the project, on the University of Lancaster 
webpage via: http://www.research.lancs.ac.uk/portal/en/projects/the-young-atheists-investigating-
secularism-today-amongst-britons-ages-1325(f2d5bc15-a31a-485e-b3b7-35beff92aaa6).html (accessed 
15 February 2014). 
4 See Aston’s research profile at the Goldsmith’s webpage via: 
http://www.gold.ac.uk/anthropology/current-students/katieaston/ (accessed 15 February 2014). 
5 This lack of organization is slowing becoming less of an issue as the growth of groups like 
the British Humanist Association, the Humanist Society of Scotland, and American Atheists, are 
matched by the advent of Sunday Assemblies around the globe.  However, even though these groups 
are beginning to look something like a tribe or cultural unit, the terminology their members ascribe to, 
as well as the language they use (see the first two issues) are in no way—as yet—crystalized enough to 
justify my argument here as unsound.   
	  
	  




Based on a discursive analysis of the academic definitions of Atheism, I previously made the 
theoretical conclusion that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to stipulate a concise ‘definition’ of 
that term (see Quillen 2015, Chapter Three).  I formed this conclusion from two issues.  First, within 
this discursive field we find two specific categories (Baird 1970): lexical (ancient—‘ἄθεος’—and 
modern—‘Atheism’), and real (‘positive vs. negative’ or ‘explicit vs. implicit’).  The first category is 
built upon first-order discursive sources, and is thus historical in nature.  Within this first category we 
can further locate the term’s etymological origins within two ‘geneses,’ points along the chronology 
where it became an identifier and was thus used to define either an other, or oneself.  As such, ἄθεος is 
defined as a political imputation, a term bestowed upon an individual whose beliefs and actions appear 
threatening to the state’s status quo.1  Here, it is mimetic of a type of censure, similar to how ‘anti-
social’ takes on a certain meaning when applied to disruptive or disorderly behavior.  Used generally 
and without specific conceptual boundaries, it became quite universal, so that geographically and 
religiously disparate individuals such as Socrates (d. 399 BCE) and Polycarp (d. 155 CE) were both 
condemned and executed for being ἄθεοι.  With the second genesis, the emergence of Atheism 
appeared as a product of the re-emergence of rational-naturalistic philosophies between the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, where from within Theological discourse there arose a self-
imposed identity built upon a dialectic dependency concerning the existence of ‘God.’2  Parasitic 
(Buckley 1990) to a particular type of Christianity, this modern Atheism was defined by individuals 
who through a nominative shift between themselves—once God’s subjects—and God—now an object 
of their empirical examination—found themselves as specifically ‘A-Theistic.’  While these two 
categories offer an insightful look at how the term, as well as the conceptual meaning underscoring the 
use of the term, has evolved and progressed across differing contexts, it also led to an issue of 
consensus.  In an attempt at defining the term generally, and in order to ensure that one’s stipulation of 
‘Atheism’ embodied both geneses, the scholarship under analysis began to create its own discursive 
field.  This became my second issue. 
 
As the result of theoretical stipulations, fostered by theological and anti-theological discourse, the 
second category—real, or essential definitions—inevitably led to the idea that within the concept of 
‘Atheism’ there existed different ‘types.’  As such, there arose a new categorical method of defining 
the term within a dubiously demarcated positive and negative paradigm.3  Built upon certain 
theological origins4 and differentiated by notions of ‘explicitness’ and ‘implicitness,’ this theoretical 
category is heavily influenced by a method of generalization wherein the myriad ‘pragmatic’ re-
conceptualizations equally spawned a number of problematic associations.  For instance, the term is 
now used freely to define what some (such as Martin 2007b) normatively refer to as ‘Atheist religions,’ 
those religious beliefs and practices that were once deemed ‘non-Theistic’ in their differentiation from 
Christianity.  Likewise, when applied in an overtly general style, the term has become indicative of any 
sort of skepticism, doubt, rejection, or indifference to any sort of supernatural or mystical belief, 
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practice, or ideology.  From here, we find even broader conceptions emerging, such as social 
theoretical categories like ‘ir-religion,’(Campbell 1971) ‘un-belief,’(Marty 1966, Bellah 1971, Budd 
1977, Habgood 2000) and ‘non-religion’ (Lee 2011, 2012a, 2012b).  As I argued previously, this 
theoretical discourse is symptomatic of a scholarship that is either ignorant of the lexical geneses in my 
first category, or pragmatically dismissive of these origins in favor of more useful—and easier—
general interpretations.   
 
Because of these two issues, and in order to remove my contribution from this discussion, I elected to 
offer neither a stipulation, nor a definition.  Rather, I promoted the benefits of a discursive analysis of 
these definitions, as this method allows us to instead concentrate on how the term has been shaped, 
which in turn reveals the process involved in identifying, or in being identified as, an ‘Atheist.’  This 
further eliminates the need to ‘define’ the term at all.  That is, rather than stipulate an external, and thus 
general meaning that might encompass each and every ‘type of Atheism’ that might be displayed, 
allowing individuals to speak for themselves offered a more nuanced and specific internal perception.  
In many ways mimetic of anthropological observation, this method pragmatically removed my 
discussion from within the theoretical ambiguity currently afflicting the ‘study of Atheism,’ allowing 
my assessment the freedom to perceive the term as an expressed and embodied type of identity.         
 
Moving from the process of defining the term to examining the manner with which the term is 
discursively used in the construction of an identity, my focus herein will be on the formation of 
‘Atheism-as-identity,’ the methodology of which I will elucidate here.  Signifying an action that is 
‘done’ rather than simply ‘had,’ Jenkins classifies this process as a multi-dimensional reflexive 
activity: the human capacity of charting ‘who we are’ along a map of discovering ‘who others are,’ 
both as individuals, as well as members of collectivities (Jenkins, 5).  In this way, identity construction 
is interactional, and is thus incapable of being formed within a void.  Along similar lines, Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) classify identity as something that is shaped by ‘social processes’—like Jenkins’ 
notion of collectivities—that is then “maintained, modified, or even reshaped by social relations,” 
which are themselves “determined by the social structure” within which they exist (Berger and 
Luckmann, 194).  As they contend, these social structures engender ‘identity types,’ which they isolate 
as verifiable examples of identity “observed in everyday life” (Ibid. 195).  A nod to Weber’s (1949, 90-
114) notion of the ‘ideal type,’ the process of identifying relatable characteristics within particular 
phenomena, these appear as assertions that might be confirmed or refuted by means of ‘pre-
theoretical,’ and thus, ‘pre-scientific’ experience.  In this way, identity construction stems from a 
progression determined by a relational construct: the “phenomenon that emerges from the dialectic 
between individual and society” (Berger and Luckmann, 195).  Formed by a type of ‘routinization’ 
wherein the meanings behind actions become ‘embedded’ within a “general stock of knowledge,” these 
dialectical movements signify a narrowing of choices that eventually become institutionalized as 
‘patterns of activity’ when individuals acknowledge their doing them through communication with 
other individuals who are themselves doing them as well (Ibid. 71).  This process thus further alleviates 
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the need to perpetually define each and every situation, while at the same time develops a sense of ‘the 
way things are’ within a now “substantial, and secure, environment” (Jenkins, 158). 
 
This collective environment involves both inclusion and exclusion: “our similarity is their difference 
and vice versa [emphasis in original]” (Ibid. 102-103).  According to Jenkins, a group or ‘human 
collectivity’ comes to exist when members of that group both recognize the existence of the group 
itself, as well as their membership within it (Ibid. 9).  In this way, a group cannot exist without the 
cohesion of individual identities, nor can they behave or act independently or have a “definite, bounded 
material existence in time and space” (Ibid. 10.)  This equally speaks to a categorization of the ‘Other:’ 
“defining ‘us’ involves defining a range of ‘thems’ also” (Ibid. 102).  It is here, within this notion of 
similarity and difference, as well as within the inclusivity of excluding others, where we discover 
“what we are in what we are not” (Ibid. 103).  Jenkins delineates this via three ‘orders,’ the second of 
which I will apply herein: the ‘interaction’ order, or “the human world as constituted in relationships 
between individuals, in what-goes-on-between-people” (Ibid. 39).5 
 
The dialectic quality of this sort of inclusivity derives from an “internal-external dialectic of 
identification [emphasis in original]” (Ibid. 40).  By this is equally meant the “simultaneous synthesis 
of (internal) self-definition and the (external) definitions of oneself offered by others,” what might 
better be defined as a concept of ‘selfhood’ (Ibid.).  With an emphasis on the equality between 
‘similarity’ and ‘difference’ in the inherent dialectic within the collective differentiation seen above, 
selfhood is defined by Jenkins as “a way of talking about the similarity or consistency over time of 
particular embodied humans” (Ibid. 102).  This ‘embodiment,’ though an essential aspect of the 
differentiation made between the self and others—“individuals identify themselves and are identified 
by others, in terms that distinguish them from other individuals” (Ibid.)—is also dependent on 
similarity.  This is perhaps the overall crux of Jenkins’ argument: dialectic is not merely about the 
difference between two opposing ideas, it is also about the internalized similarities as well.  When 
applied to the process of identification, this paradoxical notion of ‘attachment with’ and ‘differentiation 
from,’ signifies a “game of playing the vis-à-vis” (Ibid. 18)6 between seeing oneself as similar to those 
who see themselves as different from others.  This is itself signified by an amendment from ‘similarity 
or difference,’ to ‘similarity and difference.’    
 
Lastly, as a social construction, the process of identification requires ‘validation.’  That is, it requires 
an acknowledgement by others in order to exist, a process described by Goffman (1959) as the 
‘presentation of the self’ (Goffman, 6-24).  Applying a ‘dramaturgical analysis’ to the study of 
interaction, and citing within the face-to-face—vis-à-vis—confrontation between individuals a sense of 
choice not unlike the way in which an actor might ‘switch’ or ‘change’ their persona in order to 
become someone wholly different from themselves, Goffman’s conception offers a ‘presentational’ 
aspect to an individual’s process of meaning-making.  As it necessitates not just a choice on the part of 
the individual in how he or she desires to be seen through the eyes of another, but also requires the 
interaction with an individual against whom he or she defines him or herself as different, this 
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‘presentation’ both entails and dramatizes the “interface between self-image and public image 
[emphases in original]” (Jenkins, 42).  This additional paradigmatic distinction between 
insider/outsider applies one final layer to the process of identity construction: “not only do we identify 
ourselves in the internal-external dialectic between self-image and public image, but we identify others 
and are identified by them in turn” (Ibid.). 
 
My use of this methodological understanding herein will focus on the merits of both ‘similarity’ and 
‘difference,’ within the context of interactional validation, so as to translate the Atheist identities 
presented below as singular examples from within a larger group: Atheists defining themselves through 
dialogical validation who equally represent individual identifications within the larger group 
‘Atheism.’  This being the case, and in light of Jenkins’ statement that “identification makes no sense” 
without the context within which face-to-face relationships exist (Jenkins, 6), I turn now to an 
introduction of my sources themselves. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Muller 1888, Aveling 1907 [1913], Drachmann 1922, Buckley 1987 [1990], Smith 
1991, Kahn 1997, Gordon 2002, Baggini 2003, Reid and Mondin 2003, Hartley 2006, McGrath 2006, 
Bremmer 2009, Fergusson 2009, Hyman 2009, and Palmer 2010. 
2 See Masterson 1965, Fabro 1968, Herrick 1985, Buckley 1990, Smith 1991, Pasquini 2000, 
Gordon 2002, Baggini 2003, Converse 2003, Reid and Mondin 2003, McGrath 2005, Fergusson 2009, 
Hyman 2009 and 2010, and Ledrew 2012. 
3 See Flew 1976, Stein 1980, Smith 1989 and 1991, Martin 1990, 2007a, 2007b, Hiorth 1995 
and 2003, Baggini 2003, Eller 2004, 2010, Cliteur 2009, Hyman 2009, Palmer 2010, Walters 2010, 
Bullivant 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, Hartley 2006, and Quack 2012. 
4 See Aveling 1907 [1913], Maritain 1949, Masterson 1965, Edwards 1967, Fabro 1968, 
Robertson 1970, 
5 The other two orders: the ‘individual’ order—“the human world as made up of embodied 
individuals and what-goes-on-in-their-heads;” and the ‘institutional’ order—“the human world of 
pattern and organizations, of established-ways-of-doing-things.”  Jenkins, Social Identity, 39. 
6 See also James A. Boon, Other Tribes, Other Scribes: Symbolic Anthropology in the 
Comparative Study of Cultures, Histories, Religions and Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, 26.  
	  
	  




My first text was written by a man named ‘Jeremy.’  Of the few details he provides about his family 
and early life, we know that he was born in 1947, and that he lost his parents in a ‘road accident’ in 
1956 (Jer. 9).1  His father served in the infantry during World War Two, survived the evacuation of 
Dunkirk in May of 1940, fought in North Africa, and received a bullet wound to his right hand during 
the Normandy invasion on 6 June 1944 (Ibid. 136).  During the war his mother worked in a munitions 
factory near Colchester.  After his father was released from military service—‘demobbed,’ as Jeremy 
calls it—his parents married and purchased the house in Notting Hill in which he and his older sister, 
‘Jean,’ were born. 
 
After their parent’s death, Jeremy and his sister lived with an aunt until around 1958 when they were 
‘ejected’ on account of Jean’s promiscuous behavior (Ibid. 15).  Returning to their deceased parents 
home, they lived together until he left to begin a degree in history at Oxford University in 1965.  Jean 
gave birth to her daughter, ‘Sally,’ in 1961, and married into an abusive relationship with a man named 
‘Harper’ in 1963.  Jean and Harper separated shortly after Jeremy’s departure (Ibid. 16).  In a short 
side-note, he briefly mentions that Sally gave birth to a son in 1982, but was restricted custody two 
years later for abusive behavior (Ibid. 68).  Her present location—in 1989—is given as a ‘hostel in 
Manchester.’           
 
Jeremy left University without completion in his fourth term (Ibid. 18), and held a number of different 
jobs throughout the late 1970s and 1980s: in 1978 he was a ‘television researcher’ (Ibid. 108); in 1981 
he was an administrator of a “moderately successful provincial theatre company” (Ibid. 105); and in 
1989 he was the head of a “small publishing company specializing in textbooks” (Ibid. 74).  He met his 
wife, ‘Jenny,’ in Poland in October 1981, when they were both acting as British cultural representatives 
to an international delegation held in Warsaw on the Solidarity Movement (Ibid. 107).  They married in 
August 1982 (Ibid. 113), and—at the time of his writing—had four children (Ibid. 10), the youngest, 
‘Alexander,’ who was born in 1983 (Ibid. 30). 
 
Jeremy’s text itself is divided into Four Parts, each devoted to a specific topic, and demarcated by style.  
In Part One he describes the final interview he conducted with his mother-in-law, ‘June,’ before her 
death at the age of 67 from a rare form of leukaemia in 1987 (Ibid. 29).  In Part Two he describes a 
similar conversation that he shared with his father-in-law, ‘Bernard,’ in Berlin on 10 November 1989.  
Part Three is a heavily self-reflective description of Jeremy’s state of mind directly after his trip with 
Bernard.  Part Four is his mostly objective re-telling of an event that marked the definitive genesis of 
June and Bernard’s 40-year marital estrangement.  Stylistically, Jeremy admits that his original 
intention with the text was to chronicle June’s life before her death, though states that this plan began 
to digress, what he calls a ‘divagation,’ after his conversation with Bernard.  Instead, the text appears 
more akin to a ‘case-history,’ which I will discuss in more detail below.  It is in this focal re-direction 
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where he also acknowledges his own personal philosophical interests in recording the nuances of June 
and Bernard’s disaffection.  Admitting that the death of his own had engendered a life-long obsession 
with ‘other people’s parents’ (Ibid. 9), as well as inspired a sense of philosophical ‘emptiness,’ he is 
admittedly drawn to their four-decade separation predominately because it is one based on religious 
ideology.  That is, because he introduces himself as something analogous to an individual wholly 
apathetic to religious belief, a product perhaps of late twentieth-century secularization,2 their obsession 
and use of ‘religion’ becomes for him a sort of mystery needing to be solved.   
 
For him, Bernard and June’s religious views are ‘extremities.’  On one end, he depicts Bernard’s 
‘invincible Atheism,’ which originated with his devotion to Communism, as an ‘arrogant’ closing off 
and denial of supernatural beliefs (Ibid.).  On the other, he finds himself defending Bernard’s position 
against June, describing her expressions of faith and belief as stifling and asphyxiating (Jer. 20).  In this 
way, Jeremy’s curiosity in stationing himself between their opposition generates his overall sense of 
interest, so that his text becomes indicative of his efforts in discovering some objective equilibrium 
between the two: “[Bernard] and [June] are the extremities, the twin poles along whose slippery axis 
my own unbelief slithers and never comes to rest” (Ibid. 19).       
 
That is, unlike June and Bernard, whom he describes as ‘beginning together as communists,’ and 
whose appetite and capacity for ‘belief’ never quite diminished (Ibid. 18), Jeremy’s ‘un-belief’ seems 
to be the result of a developed implicitness.  Namely, where he confesses that his worldview is not 
based on a particular sense of rational skepticism or an empathetic acceptance, his is an ‘unbelief’ that 
appears like a self-employed and practical liminality.  This in turn develops into a pragmatic 
disinterest, a useful inability to define himself through either of their beliefs:  
In conversations with them over several years, I discovered that the emotional void, the 
feeling of belonging nowhere and to no one that had afflicted me between the ages of eight 
and thirty-seven had an important intellectual consequence: I had no attachments, I believed in 
nothing.  It was not that I was a doubter, or that I had armed myself with the useful skepticism 
of a rational curiosity, or that I saw all arguments from all sides; there was simply no good 
cause, no enduring principle, no fundamental idea with which I could identify, no 
transcendent entity whose existence I could truthfully, passionately or quietly assert (Ibid.).   
 
As I will explain below, Jeremy’s disassociation, particularly as the narrator and auto-ethnographer 
here, becomes quite methodologically useful.  His sense of ‘disinterest,’ of separation and indifference 
to their positions, allows him the ability to describe, classify, and compare June and Bernard so that 
they become representations.  This resembles a type of ‘vivid empathy,’ which Smart (1973a: 72) 
labels as the action of suspending one’s disbelief in the immersion of the observer into a particular 
social world.  Jeremy’s innate skepticism—which I argue is not the same as being void of an opinion—
affords him the ability to ‘bracket-out’ their positions in order to achieve a methodological and 
practical state of ‘agnosticism.’  Practical in the sense that it is built upon an impartial responsibility, 
this agnosticism reflects a duty to uphold a ‘value-free’ point-of-view, so that, as Cox (2003) asserts, 
the “tasks of describing, classifying, and comparing” (Cox, 2) the subjects at hand are not reduced to a 
devalued and biased critique.   
         
The Merits of Non-Tradition 
	   9 
Taken at its etymological face value and applied methodologically, this procedural ‘lack-of-
knowledge’ becomes the means by which an observer asserts neither positive nor negative affirmations 
about what Berger (1990)3 calls the “ultimate ontological status” (Berger, 100).  That is, the observer is 
meant to maintain an objective position, so that his or her own beliefs are “kept strictly apart from the 
theoretical analysis” (Ibid. 180).  
 
Though seemingly ‘un-trained’ in the art of ethnographic construction, Jeremy’s agnosticism, whether 
shaped by his early loss, or the discursive influence of secularization, provides for him a beneficial 
methodological perspective.  That is, his worldview affords him the position with which to 
descriptively represent the dialogical and dialectical aspects of June and Bernard’s identity 
constructions.  Likewise, and though it reads as an amateur cultural account, when paired with this 
methodology I believe the structure of his text takes on certain stylistic notions suggestive of more 
professional ethnography, such as the ‘sharp separation’ (Bruner 1993, 5) made between the ‘personal 
narratives’ of Parts One through Three, and the discursive elements found within the ‘interpersonal 
confrontations’ (Clifford 1986, 14) throughout.   
 
Moreover, because of his methodological perspective, as well as the style with which he has designed 
his text, I am additionally comfortable in categorizing Jeremy’s narrative as ‘auto-ethnographic’ via 
one half of Reed-Danahay’s two-part definition: a ‘biographical type’ wherein the author/ethnographer 
focuses his or her writing on a particular individual through a first-person narrative representation 
(Reed-Danahay 1997, 5).  As a fusion of the ethnography and the biography, this type of auto-
ethnography tells what is referred to as a ‘case history,’ what Brandes (1982) calls ‘ethnographic 
autobiography,’ a first-person narrative “recorded and edited by a professional anthropologist” that 
focuses heavily on the “psychosocial and developmental stages of an individual's life” (Brandes, cited 
by Reed-Danahay 2001, 409).  Inherently self-reflective in that the author of such a text becomes both 
a voice within the narrative, as well as is openly acknowledged as the artificer responsible for the 
construction of that text itself, this type of auto-ethnography provides a highly nuanced illustration of a 
singular representative, isolated within a particular milieu.  A good comparative example of this type of 
text would be Crapanzano’s (1980) Tuhami, a case-history that, like Jeremy’s, focuses on the 
interactional dialogue between the author and his subject(s), wherein the culture revealed is filtered 
through a biographical lens.  This type might also be stylistically defined as a first-person ethnographic 
narrative focused on an ‘other,’ such as the auto-ethnographic novels written by Jackson (1986), Knab 
(1995), and Richard and Sally Price (1995).  Where with these texts the authors have ‘fictionalized’ 
themselves so as to become ‘insiders’ within the culture they mean to represent—providing their 
narratives with a sense of inclusivity, and thus narrative authenticity—Jeremy’s text equally offers a 
perspective that deftly balances the difference between insider/outsider, affording his own textual 
representation a sense of authority that might not be apparent in a more objective or empirical source.  
For this reason especially, I believe his text becomes something more than just a mere amateur account.  
It becomes, which I will argue in my summation, something far more anthropologically valuable. 
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1 For practical reasons, I have chosen to shorten my citations to name and page number.  
However, as both of these texts exist as monographs, their original titles and publication information 
can be found in in the Bibliography.   
2 While secularization, and the thesis that bears its name, is indeed a contestable and widely-
discussed concept, for my intentions herein the focus of my analysis will be on June and Bernard’s 
discursive Atheism.  Therefore, though a discussion of the influence of secularization on Jeremy’s 
position between them would likely offer an interesting discussion, it will not be examined herein.  For 
those readers interested in the discourse on the secularization thesis, see Berger (1967: 107, 1990: 106); 
Martin (1978: 2-9); Casanova (1994, 20); Davie (1994: 4); Bruce (2002: 3); Brown (2009: 9-10); 
Woodhead (2008: 189); Zuckerman (2007: 49); and Smith (2010: 2-7). 
3 Originally coined by Berger as ‘methodological atheism’ in 1967, it was later amended to 
‘agnosticism’ by Smart in 1973.  See Berger (1967), 100 and 108; and Smart (1973a), 160.  See also 
Cox (2003), 2-4; Fitzgerald (2000), 56; Porpora (2006), 57; and McCutcheon (1999), 6-8 and 367-368.  
	  
	  




My second text was written by a man named ‘Joe.’  Though equally a first-person narrative, Joe’s text 
differs thematically from Jeremy’s by appearing in certain ways formally similar to a novel.  For 
example, ‘characters’ are gathered at the beginning in respect to an event that ultimately directs their 
progressions toward conflict and resolution.  They are then placed within a narrative world wherein 
their conflicts become dialogical interactions, which serve to validate Joe’s philosophical perceptions 
of that world.  It reads very much as artifice, as something structured in such a way so as to offer the 
ideal backdrop for Joe’s ideologies to ‘take shape’ and find representation.  In this way, where 
Jeremy’s text appears ideally reflective of the progressively objective method in ‘properly’ 
constructing ethnographic accounts, Joe’s here seems do to the same, but with the artificial nature of 
constructing an engaging fiction.  This does not, however, denote the text as ‘false’ or ‘made-up.’  
Even when we read segments of his story that seem humorously unreal, such as his acquiring a 
handgun for protection from a ‘family’ of ex-hippie drug dealers (Joe. 192-202), we are assured by a 
number of secondary references and descriptions—such as letters inserted into his text—as well as an 
added appendix—an academic paper re-printed from the British Review of Psychiatry (Wenn and 
Camia, 1997)—that Joe’s artifice is based in fact. 
   
Like Jeremy’s, Joe’s text is heavily dependent upon dialogue, so that the cultural insight we might 
gather from reading it appears within interactional conflicts and communication.  What he refers to as 
“threading single perceptions into narrative” (Joe. 30), this gathering of dissimilar voices coincides 
with a catalytic event at the start of his account that, though described through his own interpretation, 
becomes something told, re-told, and re-evaluated throughout.  The event is an accident, the result of 
which ends with the death of a man named ‘John.’  Joe describes his involvement in this event as 
marking a moment of significant change in his life, a ‘pinprick’ on his life’s map, and a moment that 
serves as both a beginning, and an end: “at that moment a chapter, no, a whole stage of my life closed” 
(Ibid. 8).  As well, because Joe has chosen to begin his text at this point, it serves to separate the 
antecedent moments that precede it from the philosophical arguments and interactions that follow.  In 
this same way, because it is his creation, he is at center, so that the transition marked by the accident 
equally demarcates the manner with which he might define himself against the other individuals 
involved.   
 
The accident takes place in the Chiltern Hills on a Sunday1 afternoon in early summer 1995.2  At the 
time of the accident, Joe is forty-eight3 years old, and is accompanied by ‘Clarissa,’ who Wenn and 
Camia describe as his ‘common-law wife’ (Wenn and Camia, Appendix 1, 237).  Likewise, where Joe 
is described as a ‘well-known science writer,’ Clarissa is identified as an English Professor who 
specializes in Romantic literature (Ibid.).  This polarity of academic interests marks the dialecticism 
inherent in Joe’s pre-accident stage of life.  It will also return later in my discussion of his Atheism 
below.  Because Clarissa has just returned from a research trip to Boston, Joe describes the moments 
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leading up to the event as a romantic reconciliation: “for this was a reunion after a separation of six 
weeks, the longest Clarissa and I had spent apart in our seven years” (Joe. 3).   
 
In his initial description, Joe focuses on certain elements, shifts attention and returns, a ‘slowing down’ 
that he, as the creator of this particular perspective, utilizes for a specific type of effect.  For my own 
purposes, I will briefly here touch on how the accident tests Joe’s established sense of identity, as well 
as how it brings into his life a secondary interactional perspective.  As he describes it, the cry that 
interrupts his and Clarissa’s reunion comes from a man named ‘James,’ who is struggling to control a 
large grey balloon, inside the basket of which is James’ grandson, ‘Harry.’  The wind has picked up 
and the balloon is lifting away, carrying Harry with it.  Joe describes his reaction as sub-consciously 
instantaneous and made without hesitation.  Along with four others, he joins into a collective that, as he 
depicts it, is chaotically flawed by a “fatal lack of cooperation” (Ibid. 2).  Each of the men involved 
attempt to take control of the situation by grabbing onto individual ropes, and their brief pause to argue 
is suddenly interrupted by a gust of wind that lifts the balloon, as well as four of their party—including 
Joe—into the air.  Just as they are lifted off the ground, one man lets go, prompting an immediate 
moral dilemma, and eventual justification, for Joe’s own decision to follow.  This choice becomes a 
major discussion point throughout his text, summarized at this early stage as a choice made by means 
of a deeper ‘mammalian conflict’ to survive: “Hanging a few feet above the Chilterns escarpment, our 
crew enacted morality’s ancient, irresolvable dilemma: us, or me” (Joe. 14-15).  Merely bruised by his 
fall, Joe is joined by ‘Toby,’ a fifty-eight year old unmarried farm laborer (Ibid. 12), whose ankle is 
broken (Ibid. 15); ‘Joseph,’ Toby’s sixty-three year old associate (Ibid. 12) who is unharmed (Ibid. 15); 
and ‘Jed,’ a twenty-eight year old unemployed resident of Hampstead (Ibid. 12), who is equally 
uninjured.  These four men—James runs after the balloon—watch from the ground as it rises higher 
and higher, carrying with it John who, as Joe describes him, is a father and doctor within whom the 
“flame of altruism must have burned a little stronger” (Ibid. 15).  They all watch helplessly as John 
slides to the end of his rope, remains there for a moment, and then lets go, falling to his death.  In the 
immediate aftermath, Joe, who reflects on his mood as being ‘wild’ and ‘excited,’ descends alone 
toward the field to confirm John’s death.  He is eventually followed by Jed, which sets up the 
interactional relationship toward which my examination of his text will be directed. 
 
Jed becomes Joe’s dialectical opposite, but he offers a much more nuanced reason for this.  Described 
by Wenn and Camia as suffering from a “pure (primary) form of de Clerembault’s syndrome” (Wenn 
and Camia, ‘Appendix 1,’ 237), Jed is inflicted with a unique delusional and neurological disorder 
focused on a maniacal type of ‘love,’ which is diagnostically defined by Enoch and Trethowan (1979) 
as:  
A delusional conviction of being in amorous communication with another person, this person 
is of much higher rank, has been the first to fall in love, and the first to make advances, the 
onset is sudden, the object of the amorous delusion remains unchanged, the patient gives an 
explanation for the object’s paradoxical behavior, the course is chronic, hallucinations are 
absent and there are no cognitive defects (Enoch and Trethowan, 42). 
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Jed becomes emotionally obsessed with Joe, and these obsessions take on a very unique characteristic.  
He intertwines his illness with his religious convictions, so that the focus of his fixation on Joe is a dual 
obsession.  As Wenn and Camia point out, because Joe is a ‘well-known science writer’ who writes 
from an ‘Atheistic’ point-of-view, Jed’s focus on him transforms into a neurological type of 
evangelism: “[Jed] realized that the task set him by God was to return [Joe]’s love and to ‘bring him to 
God’” (Wenn and Camia, ‘Appendix 1,’ 237).  It is for this reason that Wenn and Camia chose to use 
his interactions with Joe for their case study, and also why I have chosen it for my own. 	  
 
Though clearly biased by Joe’s point-of-view, I believe their exchanges offer an ideal and accessible 
insight into the interactional degree by which identities, such as Joe’s Atheism, are constructed and 
validated within dialogical confrontations.  Like Jeremy’s text, I will be using Joe’s as a particular 
discursive source, a microcosmic example—or case study—with which to anthropologically 
understand the way in which Joe’s Atheism is structured, first through the interests he uses to justify 
the moral and philosophical dilemma of John’s death, and then through conversations with Clarissa and 
Jed wherein it takes on a more ‘positive’ promotion of certain ideals, rather than merely the negation of 
another’s.   
 
As a final introductory note, I might concede that Joe’s purpose for writing this text stems from nothing 
more complex than a cathartic attempt to reduce the dissonant guilt felt in letting go and allowing 
John’s death.  As he himself admits: “I had helped kill [John]” (Joe. 32).  This, we might argue, would 
seemingly mar his text with subjective traits such as opinion, prejudice, and vindication, thus removing 
it from any sense of the objectivity required of a formal or professional ethnographic account.  I do not 
disagree with this.  However, I also do not believe it presents a strong enough argument to justify my 
not using it.  It is because Joe has written this text to justify his beliefs and actions, and especially 
because he does this in reflection of others—but particularly to Jed—that I argue this text’s value and 
accessibility.  The Atheism we shall find expressed within Joe’s description is not just biased and 
endorsed by his own voice, it is also pure and unadulterated for the same reasons.  For my use herein, 
Joe is not just a fellow author, placing together statements to formulate an argument, he is an informant 
as well, and his story, whether or not it is entirely fabricated through the editorial lens of his 
convictions, speaks to us as a holistic representation.  It is, quite metaphorically, similar to his own 
description of the accident itself: “a kind of furnace in whose heat identities and fates would buckle 
into new shapes” (Joe. 3). 
 
Thus, were I to define Joe’s text as a type of auto-ethnography, it quite ideally fits within the category 
not only of Reed-Danahay’s second description—an ethnographic text wherein the author’s own 
culture is at focus—it also matches the more literary definition of auto-ethnography made by Ellis 
(2004): “research, writing, story, and method that connect the autobiographical and personal to the 
cultural, social, and political” (Ellis 2004, xix).  In a more direct manner, Joe’s text is auto-
ethnographic in that it represents an overlap between the science of ethnography and the art of fictional 
writing, a link that Ellis made previously with Bochner (2000) between forms of the latter—short 
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stories, poetry, fiction, novels, photographic essays, personal essays, journals, fragmented and layered 
writing, and social science prose—and how the former becomes an amalgamated text wherein the 
notions of “concrete action, dialogue, emotion, embodiment, spirituality, and self-consciousness” 
appear as “relational and institutional stories affected by history, social structure, and culture, which 
themselves are dialectically revealed through action, feeling, thought, and language” (Ellis and 
Bochner 2000, 739).  However, where we might locate in Joe’s ‘fictionalized’ narrative a correlation 
between his text and the literary qualities described here and found within the auto-ethnographies cited 
above by Jackson, Knab, and the Prices, this would be a somewhat inaccurate association as he has not, 
necessarily, fictionalized himself in order to become an insider within his ethnographic narrative.  
Rather, his placement in the text is far more reflexively autobiographical, as the culture on which his 
text is focused is his own: a ‘life-history,’ rather than ‘case-history.’  In this way, his narrative is less an 
ersatz native representation—the fictionalized placement of one’s self into a narrative in order to 
appear from an authoritative native position—and more a uniquely nuanced revelation about how his 
own identity is shaped via the interactional and dialogical relationships he shares with others.  
Therefore, I might concede here that his text is auto-ethnographic in two ways: first as a personal 
reflection of his own culture, textualized via a very specific type of ethnographic formula, 
differentiated from Jeremy’s text as a first-person narrative focused on self, rather than other; and 
second, as an ethnographic example of that culture made available to an audience for the express 
purposes of an anthropological criticism.  Consequently, and as I argued above concerning Jeremy’s 
text, Joe’s ‘novel’ therefore becomes something more than just an amateur account.  As mentioned 
above, I will discuss this a bit more thoroughly in the summation following my analysis.          
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Joe tells us on pages 36 and 81: “Tomorrow was Monday…” and “upset by Sunday.”    
2 We can infer from a reference to Keats’ upcoming two hundredth birthday—“[…] but with 
his two hundredth birthday coming up” (8)—that the event occurs 200 years after 1795, and thus just 
before 1995. 
3 Though Joe never provides it, through his description of Jed—“he was twenty-eight” (12-
13)—and in self-reflection—“he was twenty years younger” (65)—we can deduce he is age. 
	  
	  




Because the Atheism within these two accounts represents a progressive shift, signified by their 
chronological differentiation—and thus discursive influences and inspirations—I shall analyze them 
separately.  This does not mean that they do not overlap in many instances.  Rather, I simply believe 
my examination would appear more concise and detailed were I to present them individually.  
Likewise, this will on occasion demand that I adopt certain experimental methodologies, allowing the 
subjects within this analysis to ‘speak for themselves’—such as we see with Dwyer’s (1982) Moroccan 
Dialogues—which will require certain citations to be made in full.   
 
THE ATHEISM IN JEREMY’S TEXT 
 
In telling June and Bernard’s story, Jeremy is dependent upon a culmination; first in compiling his 
notes on the interviews he conducted with them, then in seamlessly blending those different voices into 
a coherent narrative.  This process is inherent in the format of his account, the ethnographic merits and 
similarities of which I will discuss in more detail below.  Because of this ‘culmination,’ his text is as 
equal of an artifice as Joe’s, built upon decisions that he has made in the process of telling someone 
else’s story.  For this reason, the Atheism that I will be locating within will appear in many ways like a 
copy of a copy, one of the intrinsic issues of using sources such as this, or any source not built upon 
ones’ own artifice.  Said differently, the cultural representation I will be discussing will be seen 
through a filter.  I never met June, and I am not sure whether Bernard is still alive.  Nor have I met 
Jeremy, and my efforts in contacting him have proven regrettably fruitless.  Nevertheless, given the 
distressing lack of ethnographic sources about this significant stage in the development of British 
Atheism, particularly that pertaining to the downfall of Communism, I believe the identity construction 
from within Jeremy’s artifice is too essential to dismiss.   
 
That being said, Jeremy’s focus does not appear to be specifically about religious identity construction.  
Though this plays an intimate role in inspiring his reason for initially composing June’s memoir, his is 
not meant, at least as I perceive it, to be read as a cultural source.  In fact, I might even argue that it 
does not fulfill the requirements necessary of this distinction until after one reads his self-reflective 
Part Three.  That is, it is only after he has offered us a comparative glimpse of June and Bernard’s 
opposition, and then an acknowledgement of his own role as intermediary, that his text begins to afford 
us the opportunity to transform them from discursively historical ‘characters’ into cultural 
‘informants.’  Isolated, their stories are excellent discursive snapshots of their individual, or even 
collective, identities within a particular context validated by similar and like-minded interactions—
such as Communism.  However, it is only after they are placed into a face-to-face confliction with each 
other that these individual identities become fully formed cultural representations created through 
interactional dissimilarity.  It is in the transformation from similarity and difference where I argue we 
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might utilize them as holistic representatives that, thanks to Jeremy’s Four Part artifice, is readily 
accessible.  For these reasons, my analysis will be made in three parts: first, I shall begin with their 
beginning, with a brief introduction to their lives, marriage, and separation; second, I will turn to their 
collective and analogous Communism; and third, I will turn to their disaffection and difference.  
Across the latter two points, the Atheism from within Jeremy’s text will reveal itself as progressive in 





June was born in 1920.1  Just prior to her eighteenth birthday, she lived for a summer in France with a 
family ‘just outside Dijon,’ where she learned to cook.  She later reflected that it was because of this 
experience that a ‘youthful conviction’ implanted in her mind that there was “no better place on the 
planet than France” (June quoted, Jer. 38-39).  That same year she joined the Socialist Cycling Club of 
Amersham.  Jeremy recalls that this marked the moment where she first informally learned about 
communism, first through casual conversations with fellow members, and then with members of 
similar clubs that, according to her, “had affiliations with the Communist Party” (Ibid. 39).  When 
questioned, she describes these as benign discussions, filled with gossip: “what was wrong with 
England, the injustices and the suffering, how could it be put right, and how these things were set to 
rights in the Soviet Union” (Ibid.)  She did not officially join the Communist Party until 1946, two 
years after meeting Bernard, while working as a French linguist in liaison with the Free French.  More 
specifically, she acted as a translator on a project “involving the adaptation of treadle sewing machines 
to power generation” (Jer. 135). 
 
Though Jeremy does not provide us with the year of his birth, I am comfortable with the assumption 
that based on certain references Bernard was born around the same time as June.  He attended a public 
school as a child and graduated from Cambridge with a degree in science.  His early education seems 
to have affected a life-long interest in what he refers to as the “elation and limited certainties of 
science” (Bernard quoted, Jer. 19).  When he met June in 1944, he was working a job in Senate House 
that he describes as ‘peripherally connected’ with the intelligent services, dealing with the “supply of 
special items,” or ‘problems,’ which Jeremy translates as the manufacturing of “silent power 
generation for the operation of wireless transmitters in remote French farmhouses where there was no 
electricity supply” (Jer. 135).  He spent the war as a civilian.    
 
As mentioned above, Bernard and June did not officially become members of the Communist Party of 
Great Britain until 1946 when they joined together at the headquarters in Gratton Street, a ‘day or two’ 
after their wedding, and a week before they departed for their honeymoon in Italy and France (Ibid. 26-
27).  As befitting two young communists, this initial trip was a conservative and practical one.  Yet, the 
events that they experienced would have dire effects on both their notions of self, as well as on their 
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marriage.  For these reasons, Jeremy’s individual discussions with them orbit around these early days, 
and the précis that I present herein is based upon all three interpretations.   
 
From Calais, they crossed the channel and entered Europe through the Mediterranean Spring, arriving 
in Lerici, in northern Italy, in mid-June (Ibid. 137).  In Italy they volunteered at a Red Cross packing 
station for six weeks.  It was at this time that June became pregnant with their first child, Jenny (Ibid. 
138).  They left Italy in early August, and made their way to France, through Genoa.  From there they 
traveled south through Provence where, not expected back in England for another two weeks, they set 
off on a ‘short walking tour’ (Ibid.)  They made their way through the Langeudoc, a region of Southern 
France, and across the Causse de Larzac, where they stopped to rest at an ancient burial site known as 
the Dolmen de la Prunarede, above the village of St. Maurice de Navacelles.2  A few days later they 
continued their journey toward Le Vigan, in the Arre Valley, following a path atop the Gorge de Vis.  
It was at this point where June experienced a profound emotional transformation.  
 
Distracted by a herd of caterpillars, Bernard allowed June to walk ahead.  Alone, and moving beyond a 
‘hairpin bend in the track,’ she came across two black dogs, which she later describes to Jeremy as 
‘mythical’ looking and ‘unnatural’ in size (Ibid. 144).  The dogs approached her and, after she failed to 
frighten them off, one attacked.  Defending herself with a penknife, she wounded the dog repeatedly in 
the stomach, until they retreated back down the trail.  After finding her a few minutes later, though 
frightened and reasonably unharmed, Bernard conceded to return to the village of St. Maurice de 
Navacelles. 
 
After a night at the Hotel del Tilleuls,3 they began their journey home to England, returning to their 
luggage in Lodeve, via the Causse de Larzac, and through the villages of Les Salces and St. Privat.  By 
means of an accidental turn, they found themselves walking in the wrong direction.  What June would 
later deem providence, they encountered a shepherd who guided them back toward their destination 
and the bergerie that would become June’s home for the next forty years (Ibid. 170).  
 
On their return to England, June renounced her membership in the Communist Party, as well as her 
beliefs in communism in general.  Though never officially divorced, she and Bernard separated in 1951 
after the birth of their third child.  June settled permanently in France, and in her time there she 
engaged in isolated reflection, dabbling in Christian mysticism, and writing a number of texts 
pertaining to an indistinct collection of supernatural and metaphysical ideologies, eastern philosophy, 
and esoteric practices.  In a letter cited by Jeremy to her daughter, Jenny, she referred to these interests 
as “short-term, practical, realizable goals” (June cited, Jer. 171).  She wrote and published three books 
over the course of twelve years between the 1950s and 1960s: Mystical Grace: Selected Writings of St. 
Teresa of Avila, Wild Flowers of the Langeudoc, and a ‘short practical pamphlet,’ simply called Ten 
Meditations (Ibid. 172).   
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After their separation, Bernard lived alone in a flat on Addison Road in West London, near Shepherd’s 
Bush (Jer. 71).  In 1953 he traveled to Berlin as part of an ‘unofficial delegation of British 
communists,’ that he claimed were sent to “express reverent concern to the East German party about 
the way they put down the Uprising” (Bernard quoted, Jer. 82-83).  He remained a member of the 
Communist Party until 1956.  In conversation with Jeremy he claims to have considered leaving in 
1953, that he should have “gone in forty-eight,” and that it was the eighteen-day defeat of the 
Hungarian Uprising against The People’s Republic of Hungary that proved “the last thing” (Ibid. 89).  
He joined the Labour Party, and was a self-proclaimed ‘voice of reason’ during the Suez Crisis in 
1956.  He wrote a well-received biography on Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein, the second President of 
Egypt; became an ‘acceptable radical’ on a number of BBC discussion programs; was elected a Labour 
MP in 1964 after failing ‘honorably’ in 1961 (Jer. 171); sat on committees on broadcasting, the 
environment, and pornography (Ibid. 38); and returned to Berlin in 1966 to attend a “conference on the 
Wall on its fifth anniversary” (Ibid. 82-83). 
 
June returned to England in 1982 due to illness, where she remained for the last five years of her life at 
the Chestnut Reach Nursing Home in Wiltshire.  After her death in 1987, she was buried with an 
Anglican service in a Norman churchyard (Ibid. 62).  Bernard maintained his public profile, though not 
as actively as before his wife’s death.  He joined the private Garrick Club in London in 1985 (Ibid. 70), 
and continued writing.  He returned once more to Berlin in 1989, accompanied by Jeremy, to witness 




For June and Bernard, communism served a metaphorical and practical purpose in their early lives.  As 
an ideology it bound them together both as individuals, as well as within a collective group; a 
foundational entity not only defined by the incorporation of ‘sameness’ within their marriage, but also 
by the opposition that would later separate them.  Likewise, it contextualizes their story.  It places them 
within a milieu defined by real people in real places in real time.  It provides an utterly simplistic 
correlation with a ‘Communistic Atheism’ that I might source from within an established discourse, 
such as that shaped by Beemans (1967), Blakely (1964), Hiorth (2003), Husband (2000), Marsh 
(2011), and Thrower (1983), to name but a few.  Yet, I do not intend this to be a précis or summation 
of what it discursively meant for them to be ‘Communists.’  Jeremy’s text, as well as even a cursory 
review of the literature just cited, does that for us.  Rather, my interest in their communistic marital 
origins stems from the way their later disaffection from similarity to difference might offer an insight 
into how their assertions of ‘Atheism’ are indicative of a particular progression.     
 
In Jeremy’s introduction, he naturally asserts that their early membership was inextricably linked to 
romantic and youthful notions about the ‘way forward:’ “Beyond all their hopes for a sane, just world 
free of war and class oppression, they feel belonging to the Party associates them with all that is 
youthful, lively, intelligent, and daring”(Jer. 27).  In her own description, June makes use of this shift 
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from individual self into an organized group—such as the Social Cycling Club of Amersham—in order 
to establish a more defined sense of ‘self.’  As she herself states, when complemented with quasi-
puerile notions about friendship or sexual progression, this sort of interactional validation amongst 
like-minded individuals engenders a certain type of nostalgia:  
Right from the start, the Party and all it stood for, all that mumbo-jumbo about the common 
ownership of the means of production, the historically and scientifically ordained inheritance 
of the proletariat, the withering away of the whatever, all that fandangle, was associated in my 
mind with beech woods, cornfields, sunlight, and barreling down those hills, down those lanes 
that were tunnels in summer.  Communism, and my passion for the country side, as well as 
my interest in one or two nice looking boys in shorts—they were all mixed in, and yes, I was 
very excited (June quoted, Jer. 40).           
 
As she later concedes, there is an ‘inseparableness’ from her youth and her first dealings with 
Communism: “The point about the cycling club was that Communism and my love of the countryside 
were inseparable—I suppose they were all part of those romantic, idealistic feelings you have at that 
age” (Ibid. 41).  Moreover, and seemingly correlated with her sexual progression, June’s early 
reflection seems intrinsically concomitant with her marriage to Bernard, so that the ideologies of one 
appear to co-exist with the unionization of the other:  
Whenever we talked about the world beyond ourselves, we talked about communism.  It was 
our other obsession.  We decided to forgive the Party its stupidity at the beginning of the war, 
and to join as soon as there was peace and we had left our jobs.  Marx, Lenin, Stalin, the way 
forward, we agreed on everything.  A fine union of bodies and minds!  We’d founded a 
private utopia, and it was only a matter of time before the nations of the world followed our 
example.  These were the months that shaped us.  Behind all our frustration over all these 
years has been the wish to get back to those happy days (Ibid. 58).   
 
Even in own his objective description, Jeremy equally adopts this correlation:  
[Bernard] and [June] were members of the Communist Party, and they were talking of the way 
ahead.  For hours, intricate domestic details, distances between villages, choices of footpaths, 
the routing of fascism, class struggle, and the great engine of history whose direction was now 
known to science and which had granted to the Party its unalienable right to govern, all 
merged to one spectacular view, a beckoning avenue unrolling from the starting point of their 
love (Jer. 139).   
 
These embedded ‘selfhoods’ are here intertwined and entangled, validated by their similarity with one 
another—and thus differentiation from others—and institutionalized via their marriage vows and Party 
membership.  As an ‘institutional base,’4 the inter-related combination of their marriage—which 
fails—with their membership in the Party—which they both eventually leave—serves as a point-of-
origin or genesis.  Communism represents their coming together, as well as their separation.  It is a 
metaphor for their union and disunion, and equally shapes the way in which their opposed identity 
constructions take shape.  However, as an example of ‘Atheism,’ it serves a more typographical 
purpose that I intend to avoid. 
 
At this point, I might state rather simplistically that as communists, Bernard and June began their lives 
together as certain types of Atheists, a statement which is true, yet also rather indolent.  That is, if I 
were looking for definitive examples of Atheism within Jeremy’s text, I could conclude here that this 
matches a certain definition of Atheism pertaining to Marxist reductionism, or Soviet State Atheism, or 
Scientific Atheism.5  Which, I acknowledge, would not be an incorrect conclusion.  However, as my 
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interests are more discursively oriented, I shall instead focus here on how their disaffection came to 
notably define Bernard’s progressive sense of Atheism from establishment to dis-establishment, so as 
to better understand the dialectical procedure inherent in my wider understanding of Atheism as 




As ‘representations,’ June and Bernard beginning as Communists also means that they begin as equals.  
From here Jeremy describes their constructions as based upon descriptions of each other, validations 
made by imputation and critique, so that June, according to Bernard’s pained acknowledgment of her 
‘certainties,’ becomes a sort of ‘catch-all’ vessel for a wide-range of supernatural and mystical beliefs: 
“unicorns, wood spirits, angels, mediums, self-healing, the collective unconscious, the ‘Christ within 
us’” (Bernard cited, Jer. 46).  In contrast, according to June, Bernard’s maintained skepticism and 
scientific rationality beyond Communism places him in equal opposition: “[Bernard] thinks I’m a silly 
occultist, and I think he’s a fish-eyed commissar who’d turn in the lot of us if it would buy a material 
heaven on earth” (June quoted, Jer. 52).  Jeremy establishes this oppositional tension in the prologue, 
so as to mark June and Bernard as stereotypical extremes: “rationalist and mystic, commissar and yogi, 
joiner and abstainer, scientist and institutionist, [Bernard] and [June] are the extremities” (Jer. 19).  
This ‘stereotyping’ shapes them into a structure, a two-sided entity that, as Jenkins specifies, embodies 
the ‘simultaneous synthesis’ of “(internal) self-definition and the (external) definitions of oneself 
offered by others” (Jenkins, 40).  In this way, my focus on Bernard is really a focus on his external and 
internal formation of ‘selfhood,’ based on his opposition to June, as well as on her position as his 
reflective opposite.  To make sense, then, of his Atheism post-communism, it is essential to understand 
against what he is defining himself, and being defined by.  This process is mimetic of the way in which 
certain scholars, notably Hyman (2009, 27-29) and Buckley (1990, 15), have defined modern Atheism 
as being ‘parasitic’ or dependent on a particular type of ‘Theism.’6  My analysis and interpretation of 
Bernard’s Atheism is in essence a continuation of their conceptualizations, only writ small, and isolated 
to a particular case.  Therefore, as they conclude about the means by which we understand ‘modern 
Atheism’—“the central meaning of atheism is to be found, not in atheism, but in the theism of which it 
is the denial” (Ibid. 338)—so shall my interpretation of Bernard’s Atheism be shaped by first 
understanding June’s ‘Theism.’     
 
The locus of June and Bernard’s separation originates with the event on their honeymoon when June is 
attacked by the two dogs.  More directly, it stems from the combination of her perceived manner of 
survival and her later discovery of the local village’s myth about them; both of which profoundly 
impact her political and religious beliefs.  In later discussion with Jeremy, she admits to a symbolic use 
of the two dogs, both in reflection of Bernard’s understanding of their meaning in her life, as well as 
how her interaction with them came to shape her perception of the world:  
I’m not saying these animals were anything other than what they appeared to be.  Despite 
what [Bernard] says, I don’t actually believe they were Satan’s familiars, Hell Hounds or 
omens from God, or whatever he tells people I believe.  But there is a side of the story he 
The Merits of Non-Tradition 
	   21 
doesn’t care to emphasize.  Next time you see him, get him to tell you what the Maire of St. 
Maurice told us about those dogs.  He’ll remember.  It was a long afternoon on the terrace of 
the Hotel des Tilleuls.  I haven’t mythologized these animals.  I’ve made use of them. They 
set me free.  I discovered something (June quoted, Jer. 59).   
 
That the ‘side of the story’ Bernard seems to be ignoring—according to June’s own assumption about 
his opinion—is later revealed to be an insinuation that they were used by German soldiers as tools of 
fearful pacification such as rape, does indeed shape June’s use of them into a much wider metaphor.  
They come to embody the evil of the War, of the inherent evil in mankind, and her interaction with 
them marks for her a point of re-orientation.  As well, and like her interactions with Bernard and 
Jeremy, it also acts as a momentary validation for her individualized concept of ‘religion:’ “I met evil 
and discovered God” (Ibid. 60).   
 
That is, her conception of religion arises out of this singular experience, made all the more important to 
my analysis as it is the only description provided by Jeremy of what I shall herein refer to as her 
‘Theism.’  This does not, however, denote a type of ‘Theism’ that one might associate with a particular 
‘monotheism,’ such as Christianity or Islam.  Rather, I shall use the term here as she herself does, a 
lexical stipulation based upon a number of examples when she defines her religious outlook.  These 
examples are centered on her ‘meeting evil,’ and built upon a lifetime’s reflection.  For instance, in 
defending her use of the dogs as symbolic of her ‘awakening,’ and counter to the assumption that the 
event was nothing more than the imaginative workings of a “young girl frightened by a couple of dogs 
on a country path” (Ibid. 59), June proclaims:           
I suppose all the great world religions began with individuals making inspired contact with a 
spiritual reality and then trying to keep that knowledge alive.  Most of it gets lost in rules and 
practices and addiction to power.  That’s how religions are.  In the end though it hardly 
matters how you describe it once the essential truth has been grasped—that we have within us 
an infinite resource, a potential for a higher state of being, a goodness (Ibid. 60). 
 
Then, in describing the process by which an individual might make use of this ‘resource’ by fully 
entering the present, and thus locating ‘infinite space’ and ‘infinite time,’ what she refers to as ‘God’ 
(Ibid. 42), her description veers into an adoptive accumulation of different metaphysical and spiritual 
ideologies:    
Call it God, or the spirit of love, or the Atman, or the Christ or the laws of nature.  What I saw 
that day, and on many days since, was a halo of coloured light around my body.  But the 
appearance is irrelevant.  What matters is to make the connection with this centre, this inner 
being, and then extend and deepen it.  Then carry it outwards, to others.  The healing power of 
love (Ibid. 60).   
 
Jeremy’s objective description of this event, of her finding the center within herself, and thus ‘God,’ 
takes the shape of a hierophany, in that the ‘sacred’ is revealed to her:  
[June] whispered, ‘Please go away.  Please, Oh God!’  The expletive brought her to the 
conventional thought of her last and best chance.  She tried to find the space within her for the 
presence of God and thought she discerned the faintest of outline, a significant emptiness she 
had never noticed before, at the back of her skull.  It seemed to lift and flow upwards and 
outwards, streaming suddenly into an oval penumbra many feet high, an envelope of rippling 
energy, or, as she tried to explain it later, of ‘coloured invisible light’ that surrounded her and 
contained her.  If this was God, it was also, incontestably, herself.  Could it help her?  Would 
this Presence be moved by a sudden, self-interested conversion?  An appeal, a whimpering 
prayer to something that was so clearly, so luminously, an extension of her own being, seemed 
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irrelevant.  Even in this moment of extremity she knew she had discovered something 
extraordinary, and she was determined to survive and investigate it (Jer. 149-151). 
 
Again, we are left to take this description at face-value.  It is based on information revealed to us 
through Jeremy’s description of his last interview with June, as well as on details told to him over the 
years not represented.  Additionally, we must also consciously acknowledge the act of creative artifice 
involved in Jeremy’s textual re-creation.  Nevertheless, as a definitive contribution to her ‘Theism,’ 
this conversion plays a major role in how June comes to define Bernard’s Atheism after their shared 
rejection of communism, as well as how he defines himself in reflection of it.  In this way, I might also 
conclude that referring to her belief structure as a unique type of ‘Theism’ is based heavily on her 
establishing it through a dependent rejection of the Atheism that she and Bernard share prior to her 
interaction with the dogs.   
 
This is equally mimetic of Jenkins’ concept of the ‘interaction order’—“it is not enough simply to 
assert an identity; that assertion must also be validated, or not, by those with whom we have dealings” 
(Jenkins, 42)—which is in itself equally mimetic of Jeremy’s description of Bernard: “[Bernard]’s 
habits of private conversation had been formed by many years of public debate […] a fair bout of 
adversarial discussion was what would bring us to the truth” (Jer. 72).  From June’s perspective this 
aspect of Bernard’s personality is indicative of his communistic focus on the ‘way ahead,’ a 
manifestation of his oppositional inability to, as she says, reflect: “He’s never known a single 
moment’s awe for the beauty of creation” (June quoted, Jer. 43).  June refers to this as a myopic sense 
of ‘stagnation’ (Jer. 38), which Jeremy editorializes as her larger critique of Bernard’s rationalism, 
explained by her comparison of the two men as sharing a ‘dryness’ and ‘distance’ (June quoted, Jer. 
53).       
 
In that the ideas “by which [June] lived her life were also the ones by which she measured the distance 
between Bernard and herself” (Jer. 43), so too does Bernard’s defense of himself in reflection of her 
statements, as well as his own descriptions of her beliefs, reveal his own identity.  Early in his 
discussion with Jeremy, he makes the argument that, in fact, June was the better Communist, citing her 
early political passion and positing the assumption that, like her obsessive focus on finding her ‘Theist 
center,’ she was always in search of something to fill the void within herself (Bernard cited, Jer. 74 and 
81).  As such, he asserts that unlike his own experience, her separation by conversion did not afford her 
the proper ‘crack’ under the collapse of Communism to warrant her views a proper perspective: 
And that’s the difference between [June] and me.  She left the Party years before me, but she 
never cracked, she never sorted the fantasy from the reality.  She swapped one utopia for 
another.  Politico or priestess, it didn’t matter, in essence she was a hardliner (Bernard quoted, 
Jer. 90). 
 
Later in the same conversation he details a story about where he first witnessed the early hints of both 
her disaffection from Communism—and thus their marriage—as well as of the “hocus-pocus that filled 
her life from then on” (Ibid. 81).  Claiming the story itself as evidence that her conversion was not a 
momentary revelation about the power and glory from within, this interactive description offers 
Jeremy—and thus us—a glimpse of his own ‘dry’ and ‘distant’ rationalism.  The story is about their 
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first fight, on a railway platform in Provence, a week prior to June’s interaction with the dogs.  While 
waiting for a train, Bernard recalls catching a dragonfly, a Sympetrum Sanguinem.  When he turns to 
June for help in gathering the insect for his collection, carefully handing it to her to retrieve his ‘killing 
jar,’ he recalls a sense of ‘cold logic’ coming over her.  When answering her inquiry whether his 
intention is to kill the insect with an impassive response, he notes that she hesitates, only relenting after 
warning her that letting it go would be an unforgiveable act.  To this, and after her reluctant obedience, 
he describes her as suddenly breaking into an ‘almighty rage,’ an emotional outburst that provides us 
with Bernard’s perception of her perception of him:     
I was cold, theoretical, arrogant.  I never showed any emotion, and I prevented her from 
showing it.  She felt watched, analysed, she felt she was part of my insect collection.  All I 
was interested in was abstraction.  I claimed to love ‘creation’, as she called it, but in fact I 
wanted to control it, choke the life out of it, label it, arrange it in rows.  And my politics were 
another case in point.  It wasn’t injustice that bothered me so much as untidiness.  It wasn’t 
the brotherhood of man that appealed to me so much as the efficient organization of man.  
What I wanted was a society as neat as barracks, justified by scientific theories (Ibid.)   
 
This description, told through Bernard’s memory and then narrated by Jeremy, is not merely a 
description, it’s a validation as well, provided by Bernard’s defense.  He recalls arguing for the merits 
of entomology, claiming that entomologists, in their collection, classification, and study of the insect 
world reflect a special kind of affection: “If you learned to name a part of the world, you learned to 
love it” (Ibid. 77-78).  Furthermore, he continues by arguing that his interest in ‘ideas’ is merely 
indicative of his hope for a better, more organized, and less violent future.  Then, with June’s response 
to his justification, he learns that she is pregnant, a revelation that, for him, equates her sudden 
emotional defense of the life of an insect with fears of retribution, which he describes as such:      
Holding a little insect in her hands made her feel responsible not only for the life that was 
growing inside her, but for all life, and that letting me kill that beautiful dragonfly was an 
awful mistake and she was sure that nature would take its revenge and something terrible was 
going to happen to the baby (Ibid. 78).   
 
To this notion, Bernard recalls his ‘idiotic’ attempt at pacifying her misguided emotions with 
explanations of ‘Darwin,’ stating: “there was simply no place in the scheme of things for the kind of 
revenge she was talking about” (Ibid. 79).  This latter response, his use of ‘Darwin’ to assuage June’s 
‘nonsensical’ thoughts, manifests itself later when, alone at a café and remembering June’s fears, he 
‘comes to himself’ through personal—internalized—introspection:       
I tried hard to imagine what it would be like to believe, really to believe, that nature could take 
revenge on a foetus for the death of an insect.  She’d been deadly serious about it, to the point 
of tears.  And honestly I couldn’t.  It was magical thinking, completely alien to me (Ibid. 79-
80).  
 
When pressed by Jeremy if, in fact, Bernard had never felt some sense of ‘superstition,’ or ‘tempting 
fate,’ he responds: 
That’s just a game, a manner of speaking.  This belief that life really does have rewards and 
punishments, that underneath it all there’s a deeper pattern of meaning beyond what we give it 
ourselves—that’s all so much consoling magic. […] Perhaps all I’m saying is that sitting there 
with my drink in that hot little square I was beginning to understand something about women 
and men (Ibid).  
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Not only does this anecdote about their fight reveal a gender-specific association in Bernard’s mind 
about the inherent ‘spirituality’ of women over men, it also reveals to us a glimpse into the process by 
which his ‘Atheism’ is shaped in reflection of June’s beliefs after he leaves the “established-ways-of-
doing-things” (Jenkins, 39) of the Communist Party in 1956.  In fact, without the structural influence of 
communism, Bernard’s belief system would be amorphous without June’s conversion.  While his 
political concerns are eventually replaced by what Jeremy refers to as a “thirty years’ devoted 
advocacy of numerous causes for social and political reform” (Jer. 19), and though he maintains a 
philosophical devotion to the “elation and limited certainties of science” (Ibid.), his ‘Atheism’ is not 
entirely distinct without June’s ‘self-protecting fatalism’ and ‘unbounded credulousness’ (Ibid. 45).	  
 
Perhaps, then, a more accurate assessment of Bernard’s Atheism, given the limitation of our data, 
would be to describe it as a ‘shift in focus,’ where its dependency upon certain political ideologies 
evolves toward a more direct dialecticism.  It is this ‘shift’ that I believe best describes it, a sort of 
‘liminoid’ position defined as the phase “between leaving one post and taking up another” (Turner, 
1974, 55).  This is a position privy to amendment, incorporating the essence of a ‘tabula rasa’ (Turner, 
1967, 99), which due to its position as neither established, not dis-established, is ultimately dependent 
upon a type of validation.  Because his Atheism beyond communism shifts from offering an established 
argument about the non-existence of God to a negation of June’s established belief system in reflection 
of the communism she herself has disaffected from, his liminal Atheism is thus shifted from a type of 
positive to negative, defined here as differentiated by presentation and refutation, such as that described 
by Martin (2007a): “Negative atheists attempt to establish their position by showing that the standard 
arguments for the existence of god are unsound […] Positive atheists attempt to show that there are 
good grounds for disbelieving in God” (Martin, 89). 
 
Problematically, the dialectical means by which Bernard’s post-communist Atheism is validated by 
June’s conversion is most apparent in Jeremy’s Third Part, wherein his depiction of his attempt at 
trying to combine their conversations is akin to a self-reflective description.  This brings us to a brief 
theoretical stopping point.  That is, as this section reflects Jeremy’s personal narrative about his 
subjects, and thus depicts their interactions via his assumptions about what they might have said, rather 
than what they are actually saying, the information that we receive is filtered through a secondary 
perspective.  This is perhaps where our use of these sorts of ‘non-traditional’ sources is most 
challenging.  Because this section is built upon Jeremy’s interpretations, rather than the person-to-
person observation or experience we find in Parts One and Two, we are incapable of deciphering the 
difference between his opinion and what might be accurate data.  However, I am perfectly comfortable 
using the following descriptions for that very reason, as part of my utilizing these types of non-
traditional sources is critical in nature.  Though the following data is derived from Jeremy’s personal 
reflection, I fail to see the difference between his manufactured interactions, and the manner with 
which a traditional ethnographer does the same with his or her subjects.  This is, I suppose, more 
indicative of the difference between a functionalist ethnography, and a diary or fieldwork account, such 
as those by Leiris (1934), Bohannon (1954), Levi-Strauss (1955), or even Malinowski (1967).  
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Furthermore, like any sort of textual re-creation, I believe this section is representative of the manner 
with which any sort of author translates individuals into ‘characters,’ a translation that is itself 
indicative of the author’s own liminal stage between observer and writer.  For these reasons, the data 
discussed below, though sourced from a different sort of perception, will be examined as equally 
valuable, offering yet another nuanced addition to the manner with which Bernard’s Atheism takes 




Jeremy’s constructed dialogue arises out of his using June and Bernard in reflection of his own reaction 
to an implicit feeling of fear or apprehension while standing alone—and in the dark—in June’s empty 
home in France.  After arriving to prepare the house for his family’s later arrival, and directly after his 
conversations with Bernard in Berlin, Jeremy encounters what he describes as June’s ‘ghostly 
remnant.’  What’s more, feeling as if being watched and groping through the kitchen in search of a 
light switch, he describes himself as responding to some sort of unseen danger:  “I was trapped 
between my reason, which urged me to move quickly, turn on the power and see by bright artificial 
light how ordinariness simply continued, as it always did; and my superstitious dread, whose simplicity 
was even greater than the everyday” (Jer. 115).  Eventually lighting a candle and discovering a 
scorpion poised on the light switch—thus justifying his apprehension—his initial confusion between 
rationalism and superstition takes the shape of an internalized dialogue between his own mental 
incarnations of Bernard and June.  This then transforms into a validation—his validation—between 
their positions.  He records this conversation for pragmatic reasons, both in order to bring together his 
observations of Parts One and Two, as well as to create a basis with which to shape his objective 
interpretation of Part Four.  He begins with June: 
[June] was impatient.  ‘How can you pretend to doubt what’s staring you in the face?  How 
can you be so perverse, [Jeremy]?  You sensed my presence as soon as you stepped into the 
house.  You had a premonition of danger and then confirmation that you would have been 
badly stung if you had ignored your feelings.  I warned you, protected you, it was as simple as 
that, and if you’re prepared to go to such lengths to keep your skepticism intact, then you’re 
an ingrate and I should never have put myself out for you.  Rationalism is a blind faith.  
[Jeremy], how can you ever hope to see (June depicted by Jer., 117)?  
 
In response, Bernard’s apparition argues the merits of reason and rationalism: 
 
[Bernard] was excited.  ‘This really is a useful illustration!  Of course, you can’t rule out the 
possibility that a form of consciousness survives death and acted here in your best interests.  
You should always keep an open mind.  Beware of dismissing phenomena that don’t accord 
with current theories.  On the other hand, in the absence of certain proof either way, why leap 
straight to such a radical conclusion without considering other simpler possibilities (Bernard 
depicted by Jer. 117-118). 
 
Moreover, Bernard’s position continues with his sense of rationalism, providing Jeremy a point-by-
point empirical explanation, beginning with the origin of his perception of her ‘presence:’ 
You’ve frequently ‘sensed [June]’s presence’ in the house—simply another way of saying that 
it was once her place, is still full of her things and that being here, especially after an absence 
and before your own family has filled up the rooms, is bound to prompt thoughts of her.  In 
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other words this ‘presence’ was in your mind, and projected by you on the surroundings (Ibid. 
118).  
 
Next, he offers a psychological explanation for Jeremy’s feeling of foreboding or unease in the dark 
house, based on discursive cultural sources, as well as on Jeremy’s own memories:  
Given our fear of the dead, it’s understandable that you were wary as you stumbled through 
the house in darkness.  And given your state of mind, the electricity cupboard on the wall was 
bound to seem a frightening object—a patch of extra blackness in the dark, wasn’t it?  You 
had the buried memory of finding a nest of scorpions there.  And you ought to consider the 
possibility that in poor light you discerned the scorpion’s shape subliminally (Ibid.)   
 
Lastly, Bernard’s apparition addresses the sense of justification Jeremy finds in discovering the 
scorpion, dismissed here as merely an aspect to be expected of this type of house, in this part of the 
world.  As well, he concludes this first defense with a philosophical argument akin to the idea of the 
Problem of Evil:   
And then the fact that your presentiments were justified.  Well, dear boy!  Scorpions are 
common enough in this part of France.’  Why should a spirit from beyond the grave put itself 
out to save you from a minor injury?  If this is the level of the dead’s concern, why aren’t they 
interceding to prevent the millions of human tragedies that happen every day (Ibid.)?    
 
This first bout of ‘statements’ and ‘counterstatements,’ as Jeremy calls them, soon divulge into a much 
larger validation between June’s Theism and Bernard’s Atheism, a dialogical interaction shaped by 
Jeremy’s literary position as intermediary:  
‘You wouldn’t believe it anyway.  I looked after [Bernard] in Berlin, and you last night 
because I wanted to show you something, I wanted to show you how little you know about the 
God-made, God-filled universe.  But there’s no evidence a sceptic can’t bend to fit his own 
drab tiny scheme…’  ‘Nonsense,’ [Bernard] murmured into my other ear.  ‘The world that 
science is revealing is a scintillating, wondrous place.  We don’t have to invent a god just 
because we don’t understand it all.  Our investigations have hardly begun’ (June and Bernard, 
depicted by Jer. 118-119)! 
 
From here, this dialogue shortens to somewhat petty rejoinders:  
‘There’s God,’ said [June,] ‘and there’s the Devil.’ 
‘If I’m the Devil,’ said [Bernard,] ‘then the world’s no bad place at all.’ 
‘It’s [Bernard]’s innocence that’s precisely the measure of his evil.  You were in Berlin, 
[Jeremy].  Look at the damage he and his kind have done in the name of progress.’ 
‘These pious monotheists!  The pettiness, the intolerance, the ignorance, the cruelty they’ve 
unleashed in their certainty…’ 
‘It’s a loving God and he’ll forgive [Bernard]…’ 
‘We can love without a god, thank you very much.  I detest the way Christians have hijacked 
that word’ (Ibid.). 
 
Later, Jeremy describes their arguments as infecting his work around the bergerie, and thus his 
narrative: “The next day, when I was pruning the peach trees in the orchard, [June] said the tree I was 
working on and its beauty were God’s creation.  [Bernard] said we knew a great deal about the way this 
and other trees evolved and our explanations did not require a god” (Ibid.).  At this point, Jeremy’s 
account veers away from June and Bernard and begins to further establish his position as artificer, 
illustrating his anxiety as based on responsibility which, though insightful about his own perceptions of 
the process of constructing such an account, is not a necessary element in the establishment of 
Bernard’s Atheism. 
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Δ  
 
I shall conclude here with the resolution that throughout this examination, and especially in reference 
to the dialogue above, the Atheism from within Jeremy’s account represents a unique sort of 
progression.  It begins with a commonality and is established via June and Bernard’s marriage.  From 
there it shifts into a realm of disassociated liminality, no longer linked with the politics or established 
base of communism.  Then, with June’s conversion, it becomes a negation, a direct response to an 
other’s beliefs.  It depicts a philosophical position dependent on another philosophical position, such as 
we see in modern definitions from individuals like Buckley (1990), Martin (1990, 2007a, and 2007b), 
Hyman (2009, 2010), and Reid and Mondin (2003).  It is also, as we see with Bernard’s responses to 
June’s beliefs, as well as in Jeremy’s constructed interactions, dependent on rationalism, reason, and 
naturalism, asserting a quasi-positive response to the negation of its initial dependency.  This offers 
another insightful aspect, namely the association of Atheistic thinking with scientific thinking, as if the 
one is built within and atop the other.  This association will link this first account with Joe’s, in that 
Bernard’s subtle use of ‘scientific rationalism’ in order to return to the positive assertions he once knew 
with communism, will become a major characteristic of that second text’s translation of the dialectic 
between he and June as one that exists between religion and science.                
 
THE ATHEISM IN JOE’S TEXT 
 
While Jeremy’s text establishes a sort of ‘nominal Atheism,’ a dialectic-based and dialogically 
represented means of deciphering the process by which Bernard’s Atheism is validated against June’s 
unique Theism, the experiential qualities between his and Joe’s differ in a number of ways.  Notably, 
Bernard’s Atheism might best be described as ‘developing,’ shifting from one type to another: 
communism, to liminal, and then reflective of June’s conversion.  In comparison, Joe’s Atheism might 
best be described as ‘developed.’  When he first introduces himself, his belief system is fairly well 
established, which we initially discover through his narration, and then through certain interactional 
validations.   
 
The nominal-virtual distinction between these two texts—and these two individuals—is in many ways 
mimetic of the discursive development of defining Atheism cited in the stipulation above.  While the 
‘name,’ or ‘label,’ used to represent a certain identity might stay the same across a number of varying 
discourses, the ‘experience,’ or rather, the use of the term in practice, can differ quite drastically.  
Consider for example the ways in which the ‘Atheism’ imputed upon certain individuals differs from 
that which is later ‘self-adopted’ between ancient and modern, as well as how the different meanings of 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ fluctuate across time and context.  The ‘nominal’ aspect of Atheism maintains 
while the virtual aspect fluctuates, adjusts, and evolves.  Of course, this is not technically accurate in 
consideration of new terminology employed to re-brand the term ‘Atheism,’ such as ‘ir-religion,’ 
‘unbelief,’ or ‘non-religion,’ the use of which, in reference to this discussion, seems all the more 
problematic.  The ‘virtual,’ then, differentiates from its nominal counterpart in that it “exists for 
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practical purposes rather than in name or by definition” (Jenkins, 99).  That is, the virtual affords 
meaning to different nominal uses: “virtual identification is what a nominal identification means 
experientially and practically over time, to its bearer” (Ibid.). 
 
For this reason, both Bernard and Joe belong to the same community: they are both nominally Atheistic 
and thus share a similar, symbolic identity.  However, they do not share the same experiential type of 
Atheism, predominately due to their differing contexts.  Therefore, their Atheism is both similar and 
different, and it is in recognizing the particularities of the latter that I believe will prove most useful, 
especially in deciphering the symbolic role their two Atheisms play in distinguishing the qualities 
inherent in how that term is defined across both texts.  Thus, the following examination of Joe’s 
account should be seen as part of a wider discussion of the “virtual dimension of communal 
identification” (Ibid. 140), my two microanalyses of Bernard and Joe combining to form a larger macro 
discussion.  
 
This analysis will take up three distinct sections: first, I will discuss certain points that reveal Joe’s own 
self-described Atheism via the interests7 that shape his non-interactional identification, his reductionist 
description of the origins of religion, and the narrative origins of his Scientific Worldview; second, I 
will then briefly examine how this Atheism is validated in reflection of Clarissa’s perception of these 
same things; and third, I will examine how Joe defends his Atheism in reflection of Jed’s 




As Joe describes it, the choice to begin his account with the accident is one determined by the 
consequences that came after it, based themselves on the choices and actions made by each of the 
participants involved.  Admittedly an ‘artifice’ (Joe. 17), his text is a collection of memories, offering 
us the opportunity to view the re-orienting aftermath of the accident, as well as its influence on those 
involved, through his perspective.  For my intentions, this viewpoint is significant because it 
additionally affords us the opportunity to view how the accident marks the exact moment when Joe 
must consider, or even re-consider, the way his Atheism has shaped his perception of the world.  This 
is almost like a recalibration of sorts, so that the self-reflective aspect of his first-person narration is 
also an invitation to view the intimate process intrinsic to his internally formed, and outwardly 
validated, construction of identity.  This recalibration is effected in two ways.  First, his established 
belief system must suddenly take into account a philosophical re-assessment.  That is, after the 
sacrifice and death of John, the cold objectivity of his rationalism must confront an epistemological 
crisis of sorts.  Second, in the days following the accident, Joe must also take into account the opposing 
views about John’s death expressed by others.  This second aspect becomes even more challenging 
when it is against these opposing views that his Atheism is externally validated through dialogical 
interaction.  As we shall see, this results in a ‘clinging’ of sorts.  As Joe’s initial Atheist interests 
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become anchors of an almost sacred nature, the scientific discourse that once benignly shaped his 
identity shifts into a somewhat infallible doctrine  
 
In this way, the accident ‘fixes a transition’ for Joe, creating a “divergence from the expected” (Joe. 18) 
that challenges his rational notions about the origins of morality, altruism, and the genetic-based 
cognitive urge to survive.  He isolates this in his description of the chaotic disorganization just as the 
balloon lifted their group into the air:  
We never had that comfort, for there was a deeper covenant, ancient and automatic, written in 
our nature.  Co-operation—the basis of our earliest hunting successes, the force behind our 
evolving capacity for language, the glue of our social cohesion.  Our misery in the aftermath 
was proof that we knew we had failed ourselves.  But letting go was in our nature too.  
Selfishness is also written on our hearts.  This is our mammalian conflict—what to give to 
others, and what to keep for yourself.  Treading that line, keeping the others in check, and 
being kept in check by them, is what we call morality.  Hanging a few feet above the Chilterns 
escarpment, our crew enacted morality’s ancient, irresolvable dilemma: us, or me (Joe. 14-
15). 
 
His conception of morality here, poised somewhere between altruism and selfishness, depicts a type of 
cognitive dissonance, the resolution of which is defined by Festinger (1957) as motivated by the search 
for consonance (Festinger, 3).  In his justification for putting the child’s life at risk in order to save his 
own, Joe’s conception of ‘morality’ suddenly overlaps with his scientific thinking, so that the 
discomfort felt in his attempt at rationalizing the inconsistency between altruism and egoism, is 
assuaged by an equally rationalized consonant solution: “suddenly the sensible choice was to look out 
for yourself” (Joe. 15).  Moreover, his scientific justification for letting go the rope, regardless of any 
sense of cultural morality or ethical norms, is depicted as a sort of ‘equation,’ a calculated response 
wherein his desire to “save the boy” is measured against quantifiable notions about survival: 
Almost simultaneous with the desire to stay on the rope and save the boy, barely a neuronal 
pulse later, came other thoughts in which fear and instant calculations of logarithmic 
complexity were fused.  We were rising, and the ground was dropping away as the balloon 
was pushed westwards.  I knew I had to get my legs and feet locked around the rope.  But the 
end of the line barely reached below my waist and my grip was slipping.  My legs flailed in 
the empty air.  Every fraction of a second that passed increased the drop, and the point must 
come when to let go would be impossible or fatal.  And compared to me [Harry] was safe 
curled up in the basket.  The balloon might well come down safely at the bottom of the hill 
(Ibid. 13-14).    
 
Joe’s dual instinctual drive to help—implicit in his immediate reaction to James’ call—as well as save 
himself—his letting go the rope—fuses into what Festinger refers to as two ‘non-fitting relations,’ 
immediately resolved by the added variable of an individual dropping to the ground, an antecedent 
condition that for Joe leads to an action “oriented toward dissonance reduction” (Festinger, 3).  As he 
himself sates: “the child was not my child, and I was not going to die for it.  The moment I glimpsed a 
body fall away—but whose?—and I felt the balloon lurch upwards, the matter was settled; altruism had 
no place. Being good made no sense” (Joe. 15). 
 
The philosophical basis of Joe’s introduction here is something I will continue to address throughout 
my analysis of his text.  Additionally, it seems to play a major underlying purpose in his writing it in 
the first place, as if putting into words the justification for his decision acts as a continual form of 
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cathartic dissonance reduction.  In this way, his description presents itself as both a rationalization that 
further mimics a ‘making-sense’ of the worldview that sponsors it, as well as offers an awareness about 
how that worldview shapes itself into an identity both challenged and validated by opposition.  In 
reference to the epistemological process of the former, his text provides us a two-part insight: first, in 
his reductionist—scientific—explanation for the oppositional religious means by which he is 
scientifically rationalizing the tragedy of the event, and second, in how that rationalization shapes his 
own personal vocation.  As examples of his ‘interests,’ I hope to use these aspects as clues in shaping 
an interpretive understanding of his process of self-identification.    
 
One such aspect is located within three reactionary instances wherein his rationalism dictates a 
philosophical description about the origins of religious belief.  Briefly précised above, the first appears 
after his description of John’s fall.  In his solitary effort to confirm the man’s death, Joe depicts himself 
as approaching John’s body with a sense of calm—“he was sitting upright, his back to me, as though 
meditating” (Ibid. 22)—that manifests into an irrational pacification, the idea that perhaps some sort of 
unknown ‘technique’ or ‘physical law’ might have saved him: “that he should sit there so quietly in the 
field, as though he were collecting himself after his terrible experience, gave me hope and made me 
clear my throat stupidly and say, knowing that no one else could hear me, ‘Do you need help’” (Ibid.)?  
However, just as briefly as this logical pacification works to calm his fears, it is unjustified by his 
realization that John’s appearance is anatomically anomalous: 
And seeing that, I became aware that what I had taken for calmness was absence.  There was 
no one there.  The quietness was that of the inanimate, and I understood again, because I had 
seen dead bodies before, why a pre-scientific age would have needed to invent the soul.  It 
was no less clear than the illusion of the evening sun sinking through the sky (Ibid.). 
 
His rationalism restored, his description immediately turns into a scientific explanation.  Tellingly, he 
refers to this as a safeguard: “these were the thoughts with which I tried to protect myself as I began to 
circle the corpse” (Ibid).  He has, as we might infer critically, replaced one safeguard with another, the 
supplanting of the ‘pre-scientific’ and superstitious thinking of the past, exchanged with a rational and 
scientific explanation.  As he further describes: 
The closing down of countless interrelated neural and bio-chemical exchanges combined to 
suggest to a naked eye the illusion of the extinguished spark, or the simple departure of a 
single necessary element.  However scientifically informed we count ourselves to be, fear and 
awe will still surprise us in the presence of the dead.  Perhaps it’s life we’re really wondering 
at (Ibid). 
 
On a second occasion, this sort of juvenile ‘pre-scientific’ pacification returns later, when he describes 
a distracted sense of foreboding or danger while conducting research at the London Library.  Occurring 
a few days after the accident, he depicts himself as drawn outside onto St. James Square, “right on the 
spot where the policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, had been shot dead by a Libyan from a window across 
the road” (Ibid. 44).  Seeing a small memorial of flowers tipped over onto the sidewalk, he instinctively 
sets them back into place, an action that, again, brings to mind a rational explanation for such 
superstitious actions:  
At my feet was a little bunch of marigolds tied with wool, such as a child might bring.  The 
jam jar they had arrived in had been knocked over and had a little water inside.  Still glancing 
about me, I knelt and returned the flowers to the jar.  I couldn’t help feeling as I pushed the jar 
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closer to the railings where it might escape being kicked over again that it might bring me 
luck, or rather, protection, and that on such hopeful acts of propitiation, fending off mad wild 
unpredictable forces, whole religions were founded, whole systems of thought unfurled (Ibid. 
44-45)   
 
Up to this point, these two instances represent distractive pacifications, products of his post-accident 
search for consonance, wherein his rationalism interjects and overpowers what he seems to describe as 
implicit or instinctual turns to the supernatural or superstitious. 	  
 
In his third description, these pacifications are replaced by the memory of an earlier and more direct 
scientific explanation of the genetics of religious belief.  At this point his narrative his heavily infected 
by Jed’s obsession—see below—so that this remembrance is made in reaction to those interactions, a 
product—like the first two with the accident—of a different sort of pacification.  The memory is that of 
a radio interview given a year prior about the hypothesis that there might be what he refers to as a 
“genetic basis to religious belief” (Ibid. 159).  This description, which he forms into two parts, is made 
in response to a two-part question: “might there be a genetic basis to religious belief, or was it merely 
refreshing to think so” (Ibid.)?  First, he offers an initial argument that there are correlative links 
between the ‘selective advantage’ and ‘social advantage’ of holding to a religious ideal, which he 
stipulates as ‘faith:’ 
If faith conferred selective advantage, there were any number of possible means, and nothing 
could be proven.  Suppose religion gave status, especially to its priest caste—plenty of social 
advantage in that.  What if it bestowed strength in adversity, the power of consolation, the 
chance of surviving the disaster that might crush a godless man.  Perhaps it gave believers 
passionate conviction, the brute strength of single-mindedness (Ibid.) 
 
Second, in addressing this question to the concept of a ‘group dynamic,’ Joe makes the case that 
‘religious belief’ brings with it a communal aspect, acting as a bonding agent across singular cultures, 
which are then infected by ideologies to the point of supremacy over an other.  This inevitably leads 
toward the suppression of that other and the rising fitness and survival of the initial group: 
Possibly it worked on groups as well as on individuals, bringing cohesion and identity, and a 
sense that you and your fellows were right, even—or especially—when you were wrong.  
With God on our side.  Uplifted by a crazed unity, armed with horrible certainty, you descend 
on the neighbouring tribe, beat and rape it senseless and come away burning with 
righteousness and drunk with the very victory your gods had promised (Ibid.). 
 
Given his precedential nod toward the narcotic effect of conciliation inherent in ‘religious beliefs’ from 
his previous two descriptions, he concludes here that given enough time and the right environment, as 
an evolutionary entity, ‘religion’ could provide certain groups the fitness they would need to pacify and 
outlive others: “repeat fifty thousand times over the millennia, and the complex set of genes controlling 
for groundless conviction could get a strong distribution” (Ibid.) 
 
While these three examples provide further introduction to Joe’s interests, clearly dictated by a 
particular discourse and infused with biological language, they also generate a particular viewpoint 
concerning his understanding of, and opposition to, religious belief.  Because of his dependency on—
even supplication to—the scientific thinking used to replace the superstition of those beliefs, I shall 
henceforth refer to this position as his ‘Scientific Worldview.’  Thus, the view that we are seeing here, 
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prior to its interactional validation, appears to be ‘positive’ in the sense that it is presenting an 
argument for an ideal, rather than merely denying one with which it disagrees.  This is even more 
apparent when we compare it to Bernard’s ‘negative’ type above.  However, as we are at this stage 
without any sort of interactional validation, this view should not be defined, for reasons of clarity, as a 
‘type of Atheism.’  While the notion of ‘God’ is only mentioned briefly within his third example, his 
explanations here are merely of general superstitious beliefs inherent to his broad notion of ‘religion.’  
In the first, it is directed at the idea of a ‘soul.’  With the second it deals with the ritualistic notion of 
good deeds resulting in protection or ‘luck.’  With the third, his evolutionary description is merely 
trying to make sense of the ‘fitness’ of religious belief and how it might bolster, as well as justify, 
cultural embattlement and survival.  At this point, then, his interests only ‘look like’ Atheism, based on 
the general notion that any sort of skepticism or explanation void of supernatural answers might be, in 
some way, ‘Atheistic.’  Likewise, and as mentioned above, these early interests appear somewhat 
mimetic to Bernard’s post-communist liminal Atheism: negative in their rejection of an established 
ideology, yet also positive in the promotion of something different (see the above reference to Martin 
2007a, 89).  Thus, rather than being merely a dependent refutation of an established belief—‘I do not 
believe X’—Joe’s position, his Scientific Worldview, is offering its own explanation—‘I believe X.’  
These theories are liminal at this point because, though negative and positive in their acknowledgment 
and refutation of something already established, they are yet without a direct or specific entity, such as 
we shall find in his interactions with Clarissa and Jed.  First, however, this Scientific Worldview needs 
a bit more nuancing, which can be found within his broader use of narrative.         
 
Though appraising himself as a marginal outsider to his own profession, his text is steeped in 
references—some even cited in his acknowledgements—to a discourse focused on cognitive and 
biological theories.  Likewise, from an outside perspective we might equally trace influences provided 
by what Richardson (2001) refers to as the ‘Decade of the Brain,’ a context embedded with textual 
citations to neuro-scientific research such as neuroimaging, molecular biology, genetics, 
psychopharmocology, and cognitive science (Richardson, 181).  Picked up by Bryce, Adams, and 
Coyle (2000: 8-14), this discourse develops into a theoretical ‘hybridization,’ the linking of ‘the study 
of the mind’ with the ‘study of the brain.’  We see this take shape in Joe’s account via his references to 
sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, re-conceptualized for his interests as a Social Science 
Model (Joe. 69).  Given his own orientations, we can further source his worldview as developed upon 
such notions as Pinker’s (1994) discussion of language as a cultural development, Damasio’s (1994) 
contention that feelings and emotions are related to nerve system development, or Wright’s (1995) 
summation of evolutionary psychology as determined by human emotion: “altruism, compassion, 
empathy, love, conscience, the sense of justice—all of these things, the things that hold society 
together, the things that allow our species to think so highly of itself, can now confidently be said to 
have a firm genetic basis” (Wright, 26.).  
   
Aside from his previous citation to a genetic understanding of religious belief, his reliance on 
evolutionary psychology is perhaps best demonstrated via his brief rejoinder to Clarissa on the 
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biological meaning behind the human capacity to smile (Joe. 69-70).  Focused on the re-examination of 
human nature, and sourcing his conception from Dawkins (1976 [2006]) and Wilson (1975), Joe 
contends that human beings “do not arrive in this world as blank sheets,” or, as he describes, as “all-
purpose learning devices” (Joe. 69-70).  Nor, he continues, are they mere ‘products’ of their 
environments.  Rather, Joe’s understanding derives from an evolutionary and naturalistic position: 
We evolved like every other creature on earth.  We come into this world with limitations and 
capacities, all of them genetically prescribed.  Many of our features, our foot shape, our eye 
colour, are fixed, and others, like our social and sexual behaviour, and our language learning, 
await the life we live to take their course.  But the course is not infinitely variable.  We have a 
nature.  The word from the human biologists bears Darwin out; the way we wear our emotions 
on our faces is pretty much the same in all cultures, and the infant smile is one social signal 
that is particularly easy to isolate and study.  It appears in !Kung San babies of the Kalahari at 
the same time as it does in American children of Manhattan’s Upper West Side, and it has the 
same effect (Joe. 70). 
 
Where Dawkins’ ‘neo-Darwinist’ picture of the self seems to inspire Joe’s idea of the human body 
genetically disconnected from external influences, it is Wilson’s theory of ‘gene-culture co-evolution’ 
that has the greater influence, particularly his conception of ‘sociobiology’ that sees human behavior as 
being amenable to evolutionary analysis through the interconnectivity of biology and social 
interactions.  In fact, in his own description Joe quotes from Wilson’s On human Nature (1978) in 
order to justify his argument that a human trait such as an infant smile is really the result of an innate 
reaction to the preservation of genes, rather than for any individual purpose: 
In Edward O. Wilson’s cool phrase, it ‘triggers a more abundant share of parental love and 
affection.’  Then he goes on, ‘In the terminology of the zoologist, it is a social releaser, an 
inborn and relatively invariant signal that mediates a basic social relationship’ (Wilson 
quoted, Joe. 70). 
 
When assimilated to his moral and reductionist interests, these narrative influences combine to form a 
more distinct basis for his Scientific Worldview.  While I again concede here that this consists of a 
formalized and developed identity, shaped and defined by a more positivistic position in reflection of 
his instinctual justifications for letting go the rope—and thus reducing religious belief to soporific 
superstitions—I also acknowledge that it still does not represent a fully-formed type of ‘Atheism’ in 
and of itself.  Even when influenced by external stimuli such as Ridley’s (1999) flippant use of Biblical 
narration to introduce the origin and power of genetics,8 or Dawkins’ reduction of ‘God’ to the product 
of a particular cultural evolution that is replicated and transmitted through parasitic imitation,9 Joe’s 
‘Atheism’ is still not entirely concretized.  That is, though it is developed and moderately established 
via the particular interests he has made available to us through his text, it is not culturally validated and 
fully constructed without complementation.  It is to this interactional order in which I now turn. 
                     
Δ  
 
While an individual ‘identification’ is essential in developing a sense of self, ‘selfhood’ does not 
develop in mere isolation.  As we have seen, it is instead ‘socially constructed,’ and is thus never 
‘unilateral’ (Jenkins, 40 and 42).  While Joe and Clarissa represent two differing perspectives 
concerning the accident, as well as how one might proceed in coping with this sort of tragedy, their 
opposition is not necessarily the most pertinent in deciphering the nuances of Joe’s Atheism.  Yet, my 
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dismissal of their dialectic would equally prove detrimental to my anthropological reading of Joe’s text 
due to the interactional validation it provides prior to his confrontations with Jed.  Therefore, my 
examination of how Joe has set up—formed—Clarissa’s oppositional position in relation to his own 
will be predominately shorter than my discussion of his and Jed’s, and should thus be seen as more of a 
transitional conduit.    
 
Joe and Clarissa are partners throughout the narrative, and as they are bound by their affections for one 
another they equally represent two sides of a relational structure.  Likewise, their identities are joined 
within a collective by their like-minded beliefs, in some ways reflective of June and Bernard’s 
origination in communism.  Joe illustrates this through a description of their ‘post-mortem’ discussion 
on the night of the accident, where through the ritual of re-living their emotions and experiences, their 
differing perceptions are accommodated into a single narrative.  
 
For his perspective, Joe’s state of mind is reflective of the interests I have thus far discussed:  
He had been on the rope so long that I began to think he might stay there until the balloon 
drifted down, or the boy came to his senses and found the valve that released the gas, or until 
some beam, or god, or some other impossible cartoon thing came and gathered him up.  Even 
as I had that hope we saw him slip down right to the end of the rope.  And still he hung there.  
For two second, three, four.  And then he let go.  Even then, there was a fraction of time when 
he barely fell, and I still thought there was a chance that a freak physical law, a furious 
thermal, some phenomenon no more astonishing than the one we were witnessing would 
intervene and bear him up.  We watched him drop.  You could see the acceleration.  No 
forgiveness, no special dispensation for flesh, or bravery, or kindness.  Only ruthless gravity 
(Joe. 16).       
 
Then, through his description of their discussion, Joe reveals to us Clarissa’s seemingly mirrored and 
amended response, inflected through a quote from Milton’s Paradise Lost—“Hurl’d headlong flaming 
from th’Ethereal Sky” (Milton, quoted by Clarissa, cited by Joe. 29)—that demonstrates in the same 
manner how her perception is built upon her own vocational interests: 
What had come to mind were angels, not Milton’s reprobates hurled from Heaven, but the 
embodiment of all goodness and justice in a golden figure swooping from the cloud base to 
gather the falling man in its arms.  In that delirious thought-rich second it had seemed to her 
that [John’s] fall was a challenge no angel could resist, and his death denied their existence.  
Did it need denying, I wanted to ask, but she was gripping my hand and saying, ‘He was a 
good man,’ with a sudden pleading note, as though I were about to condemn him.  ‘The boy 
was in the basket, and [John] wouldn’t let go.  He had children of his own.  He was a good 
man. (Clarissa, cited by Joe. 31). 
 
Next, and directly after this description, he associates Clarissa’s more romantic or imaginative 
perception as based on her maternal instincts, noting her association of John’s death with the fact that 
he was a ‘father,’ as well as a ‘good man.’  This is all the more poignant when he reveals to us 
Clarissa’s physical inability, due to a botched ‘routine surgical procedure,’ to bear children.  Though 
this ‘feminized’ perception is never again taken up within his own narrative, it is nevertheless telling of 
the gendered differentiation between them.  However, this diverts from June and Bernard’s more direct 
disaffections by Joe’s description of his and Clarissa’s later discussion about the ‘meaning’ of John’s 
death.   	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As it is later revealed, soon after the chaos of the accident the boy was able to overcome his fears and 
navigate the balloon to safety, in essence making John’s death pointless.  He had, as Joe remarks, ‘died 
for nothing’ (Joe. 32).  To this notion, and especially in regard to Joe’s perception that he had “helped 
kill [John]” (Ibid.), Clarissa herself struggles with the meaninglessness of John’s sacrifice by arguing: 
“It must mean something” (Clarissa quoted, Joe. 32).  This, as Joe asserts, is not necessarily a nod 
toward Clarissa’s June-like conversion, as she affirms—“Don’t worry, Joe.  I’m not going weird on 
you” (Ibid.)—and he later confirms—“[Clarissa] has never expressed the remotest interest in the new-
age package” (Joe. 86).10  However, it is still a particular ideology against which he struggles: 
I’d never liked this line of thinking.  [John’s] death was pointless—that was part of the reason 
we were in shock.  Good people sometimes suffered and died, not because their goodness was 
being tested, but precisely because there was nothing, no one, to test it.  No one but us (Ibid. 
32).11 
 
Clarissa regards Joe’s rationalism here, in particular toward his simple response, “we tried to help and 
we failed” (Ibid. 33), as being ‘child-like,’ which he in turn perceives as a critical association of his 
thinking as a “kind of innocence” (Ibid.).  She later validates this criticism—as well as Joe’s Scientific 
Worldview—by referring to his earlier discussed biological and genetic perception of the smile as 
“rationalism gone berserk” (Clarissa quoted, Joe. 70).  This exchange, which I will quote in full below, 
is perhaps where I might concede the most direct correlation between Joe and Clarissa and June and 
Bernard, with the further acknowledgment that these individuals show no evidential connection to one 
another.  In response to his neo-Darwinist theories, Joe describes Clarissa’s critique of his ideologies as 
a sort of “new fundamentalism” (Ibid.), a line of thinking developed along a reductionist progression, 
and infected throughout with a myopic focus on significant parts, rather than on the ‘whole:’          
‘Twenty years ago you and your friends were all socialists and you blamed the environment 
for everyone’s hard luck.  Now you’ve got us trapped in our genes, and there’s a reason for 
everything!’  She was perturbed when I read Wilson’s passage to her.  Everything was being 
stripped down, she said, and in the process some larger meaning was lost.  What a zoologist 
had to say about a baby’s smile could be of no real interest.  The truth of that smile was in the 
eye and heart of the parent, and in the unfolding love which only had meaning through time 
(Clarissa quoted and cited, Joe. 70). 
 
Joe’s embodied self, shaped by his internal self-definition, and ‘presented’ to Clarissa via these two 
interactions, encapsulates the transformation of one’s self-image into a public image, so that we can 
see, through Joe’s response to Clarissa’s romantic notions about John’s death, as well as to her more 
maternal critiques of his genetic understanding of the smile, are imbued throughout with the scientific 
interests that shape his self-image.  However, while founded on types of opposition, their dialectic is 
not directly oppositional between Theism/Atheism.  Rather, like his critical assessment of ‘religious 
belief’ above, their interactive collectivity here is more indicative of how his interest-based self-image 
has transformed into a public image which, as we shall see next, will become more progressively 
defined as an ‘Atheism’ when Clarissa’s position within this interactional order is exchanged with 









One of the major side effects of Jed’s affliction is a solipsistic worldview, so that his notion of 
‘Theism’ is manifested into a singular obsession with ‘bringing Joe to God.’  That is, because there is 
no reality outside his own, his perception of the world is only viewable through this filter.  This—
almost too perfectly—sets up an ideal dialectic between he and Joe who, as the artificer of their eight 
interactions, makes use of Jed in a manner quite mimetic of June’s black dogs.  Consequently, the 
analysis below is dependent on his interpretation, and thus should not be deemed an accurate nor 
objective description of Jed’s Theism.  Rather, and as I intend to use these eight instances—divided 
between face-to-face confrontations and letters from Jed to Joe—Joe’s interpretation gives us an 
insight into his own identity development via reflection and critique.      
 
In their first face-to-face interaction, Joe describes Jed’s religiosity as a benign coping mechanism, his 
invitation to Joe to ‘pray together’ embodying an experiential or ritual aspect of his world-view.  Joe 
further contextualizes this dialogue as taking place just after the accident, and immediately after his 
rational reminder about the neurological vacancy in John’s body.  In this way, this encounter acts as a 
contiguous validation, Jed’s request providing Joe’s narrative a correlative anthropological service.  He 
describes himself as offering a polite declination—“‘I’m sorry,’ I said pleasantly.  ‘It’s not my thing at 
all’”(Joe. 25)—which is greeted with a further entreaty: “Look, we don’t know each other and there’s 
no reason why you should trust me […] [e]xcept that God has brought us together in this tragedy and 
we have to, you know, make whatever sense of it we can” (Jed quoted, Joe. 25).  Again, Joe describes 
himself as apologetically refusing.  It is here where his description begins to present Jed’s solipsistic 
disappointment, his inability to accept that Joe is incapable of sharing his own view of things: “I don’t 
think you understand.  You shouldn’t, you know, think of this as some kind of duty.  It’s like, your own 
needs are being answered?  It’s got nothing to do with me, really, I’m just the messenger.  It’s a gift” 
(Ibid).  At this point in the narrative, and after Joe depicts himself as taking on a tone of finality in his 
last rejection, their conversation becomes more dialogical, which I amend here without Joe’s 
commentary:   
Jed: What is it exactly that stands in your way?  I mean, are you able to tell me, do you       
        actually know yourself what it is? 
Joe: Nothing.  Nothing’s standing in my way. 
Jed: Then why don’t you take a chance on it. You might see the point of it, the strength it can  
        give you.  Please, why don’t you? 
Joe: Because, my friend, no one’s listening.  There’s no one up there  
(Joe and Jed, in dialogue, Joe. 26). 
 
Through Joe’s description this initial dialogue gives us a simplistic introduction, depicting these two 
individuals as mirrored or dependent variables.  Both men, regardless of Joe’s hand in designing this 
interaction, are presented here as stereotypical representations, their final bit of dialogue almost 
perfectly matched in tone.  Likewise, it also provides an initial alignment of Joe’s Scientific Worldview 
with a specific entity, the rationalism used just prior to this interaction now attached to the belief of an 
Other.  
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With their second interaction, these introductory notions begin to crystalize.  Where with the first Joe’s 
Atheism is merely hinted at, here it begins to take on a more specific shape, validated not only by Jed’s 
impassioned requests, but by his clearly deranged mental state as well.  Joe describes this conversation 
as taking place on the street outside his and Clarissa’s flat.  He has reluctantly agreed to speak with Jed, 
and finds his mood erratic and tense, yet albeit intriguing, describing him here as less ‘menacing’ as 
before, and more fragile, agitated, or desperate.  Jed refers to himself as a victim, Joe’s victim, and 
confusedly states: “you love me, and there’s nothing I can do but return your love” (Jed quoted, Joe. 
63).  He begins to cry and declares that there is a ‘reason’ for their attachment, a ‘purpose’ that he 
describes as such: 
To bring you to God, through love.  You’ll fight this like mad because you’re a long way from 
your own feelings?  But I know that the Christ is within you.  At some level you know it too.  
That’s why you fight it so hard with your education and reason and logic and this detached 
way you have of talking, as if you’re not part of anything at all?  You can pretend you don’t 
know what I’m talking about, perhaps because you want to hurt me and dominate me, but the 
fact is I come bearing gifts.  The purpose is to bring you to the Christ that is in you and that is 
you.  That’s what the gift of love is all about.  It’s really very simple [emphasis in original] 
(Ibid. 66)? 
 
Throughout his description, Joe’s perception of Jed’s religious beliefs shifts in and out of focus, 
offering an insight into his own disorganized intentions in shaping this confrontation in the way that he 
has.  As he himself states: “the language [Jed] was using set off responses in me, old emotional sub-
routines” (Joe. 67).   
 
By filtering Jed’s emotional state through a lens of his Scientific Worldview, his depiction is clearly 
influenced, so that his diagnosis characterizes Jed as an individual suffering from a psychological or 
medical derangement awaiting a cure.  In this same way, by linking Jed’s religious ideologies with his 
illness, Joe’s seemingly implicit notions about the ‘soul’ or experiential propitiation become 
intertwined with the idea that when Jed is cured of his mental affliction, he would likewise be cured of 
his religiosity.  Hence, with this interaction, Joe’s Atheism appears less like the product of mere 
rejection or denial, and instead like something imbued with his particular type of rationalism.  
 
Though significantly shorter than the previous two, their third face-to-face interaction pushes Joe into 
an identity crisis.  After realizing that Jed’s obsession is not something that will “be over by the end of 
the day” (Joe. 73), he describes himself as turning to his writing as a consolation, a coping mechanism 
wherein he seeks out the tangible and empirical.  It is here where he first describes himself as 
marginalized or parasitic upon the scientific community, and when he first introduces his genetic 
explanation of the infant smile.  This is also where he admits that his efforts in diagnosing Jed’s 
affliction bring back old anxieties about whom he perceives himself to be.  By his own description, he 
places himself between two worlds: on one end, he again finds his rationalism intermixing with his 
diagnosis, so as to further develop his Scientific Worldview by means of transmuting Jed’s religiosity 
into a product of his illness; on the other, these interactions are causing him to self-examine his place 
within the collective group out of which his sense of self might once have derived.  Akin to Bernard’s 
liminal Atheism, Joe’s worldview is being both established and dis-established, given meaning by 
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Jed’s neurotic Theism, yet also reminding him of his place outwith the communal organization within 
which he was once an active member.  His crisis here is evocative of an autonomous self-perception, or 
rather, of an alienation and externalization, what Jenkins refers to as a type of anxious isolation 
indicative of an “existential world in which individual moral judgments derive from personal 
preference or feeling, rather than from external authority or the responsibilities of position” (Jenkins 
51).12 
 
While this crisis seems to play a major role in defining both Joe’s own identity, as well as Jed’s role in 
shaping it, it also leads to a curious orientational change, a metaphorical narrative shift that mimics his 
confessional description of self as “an outsider to my own profession” (Joe. 77).  Switching the 
narrative point-of-view from himself to Clarissa, Joe’s self-perception gains an external validation, 
allowing him to engage with himself as if from another’s viewpoint.  Likewise, Joe-as-Clarissa’s 
interpretation is quite reflective of his earlier description of his first interaction with Jed, so that his 
crisis-of-self appears to originate within a sort of consonant protection aimed at pacifying the anxiety 
that has arisen out of his sense of isolation: “the department, the professors and peers and the office he 
says he needs are irrelevant, but they’re his protection against failure because they will never let him 
in” (Ibid. 82-83).  Furthermore, this equally seems to suggest that his own self-perception is just as 
mired in obsession as Jed’s:  
He is back with this old frenzied ambition because he’s upset—Sunday is getting to him in 
different ways too.  The trouble with [Joe]’s precise and careful mind is that it takes no 
account of its own emotional field.  He seems unaware that his arguments are no more than 
ravings, they are an aberration and they have a cause.  He is therefore vulnerable, but for now 
she cannot make herself feel protective.  Like her, he has reached the senseless core of 
[John’s] tragedy, but he reached it unaware (Ibid. 83). 
 
This is more accurately validated in a letter written by Clarissa and added to Joe’s text toward the 
conclusion:  
As the [Jed] thing grew I watched you go deeper into yourself and further and further away 
from me.  You were manic, and driven, and very lonely.  You were on a case, a mission.  
Perhaps it became a substitute for the science you wanted to be doing.  You did the research, 
you made the logical inferences and you got a lot of things right, but in the process you forgot 
how to confide” (Clarissa, quoted, Joe. 217). 
 
Perhaps more specifically, this sense of isolation is a result of Joe’s re-orientation.  Prompted by his 
actions during the accident, his isolation is symbolic of his self-construction.  He is striving here to find 
a consonant equilibrium between the internal and external factors at play in this re-calibration of 
‘selfhood’ that, when measured against Jed’s more specific Theist ideology, develops into a more 
specific Atheist one.  As well, this is intriguingly similar to the clinical description of Jed’s obsessions 
by Wenn and Camia:   
It was at this time of increased loneliness that [Jed] became aware that he faced a test.  On a 
country walk he was initiated into a makeshift community of passers-by struggling to tether a 
balloon caught in strong winds.  Such a transformation, from a ‘socially empty’ life to intense 
team-work may have been the dominating factor in precipitating the syndrome, for it was 
when the drama was over that he became ‘aware’ of [Joe]’s love; the inception of a delusional 
relationship ensured that [Jed] would not have to return to his former isolation” (Wenn and 
Camia, Appendix 1, 239).  
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Basing this analysis on Mullen and Pathe’s (1994) clinical interpretation—“the common features in 
these descriptions is of a socially inept individual isolated from others, be it by sensitivity, 
suspiciousness, or assumed superiority” (Mullen and Pathe, 620)—Joe and Jed’s isolationism becomes 
seemingly inseparable from their modes of identification, to the point that they appear pragmatically 
identical: where Jed’s isolation has ‘intensified’ and ‘personalized’ his religious convictions to the 
point of substituting ‘God’ for other ‘intimate relationships’ (Wenn and Camia, 237 and 241), Joe’s 
marginalization has engendered an interest-based focus on scientific rationalism that not only 
contributes to his view on the genetic origins of ethics, but to his construction of Atheism as well.   
 
By their fourth interaction, this sense of isolation is imbued with a mirrored feeling of emotional 
betrayal.  Where Joe feels Clarissa has betrayed him in not empathizing with his fear of Jed, Jed in turn 
feels betrayed by Joe for not empathizing with his own emotions.  Granted, while the latter is depicted 
at this stage as violently lost within his disorder, Jed described here as a ‘madman’ yelling obscenities 
and brought to an emotional tipping point, this shared sense of betrayal between them seems to enliven 
Joe as he again turns to his ‘science’ for a solution; a ‘turn’ that will be more apparent in my discussion 
of Jed’s letters below.     
 
While their final two face-to-face encounters afford a sense of finality to their interactions, they do 
not—at least for my intentions herein—contribute much more to Joe’s construction of identity.  That is, 
though he is vindicated in his proper diagnosis, and though their final confrontation ends with Jed’s 
arrest and Joe and Clarissa’s eventual reconciliation, these interactions are not as validating as the first 
three, nor as insightful as Joe’s inclusion and analysis of Jed’s letters.  It is to that latter discussion in 




The addition of Jed’s letters corroborates my reading of Joe’s text by providing an evidential 
interpretation: Jed’s description of Joe’s Atheism, as well as Joe’s description of Jed’s Theism, 
revealing a reflexivity on both accounts, the self and public both internalized and externalized.  Though 
he includes three of them in their entirety, I will here focus on his interpretation of the first two, 
specifically drawing out the thematic elements that arise in reflection of Jed’s Theist identity and how 
that is validated, and reflected, in Joe’s Atheist one.   
 
The first is placed after Joe’s description of their fourth face-to-face interaction, positioned 
chronologically to when he received it in the course of the action depicted within.  In it we learn certain 
aspects about Jed’s interests, in many ways mimetic of Joe’s disclosure at the start of his own account.  
Intriguingly, he inserts it without commentary or description, perhaps in order to provide a type of 
evidential description, allowing Jed to ‘speak for himself.’  If this is the case, then it works quite nicely 
in my favor, for its inclusion offers the chance to perceive Jed’s worldview without Joe’s narrative 
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translation, transforming it into a primary source against which to further substantiate my perception of 
Joe’s identity.   
 
As pursuant to his illness, Jed’s ‘embodied self’ appears myopically focused on his religious 
convictions, and though he does not cite any particular dogmatic or denominational sources for his 
beliefs, his confessional style offers an introduction to the intense and almost overwhelming power of 
the correlation between his condition and his worldview.  In this way, his Theism is insular and 
personal, a private conception of his own creation.  He begins the letter with an invocation:  
I close my eyes and thank God out loud for letting you exist, for letting me exist in the same 
time and place as you, and for letting this strange adventure between us begin.  I thank Him 
for every little thing about us.  This morning I woke and on the wall beside my bed was a 
perfect disc of sunlight and I thanked Him for that same sunlight falling on you!  Just as last 
night the rain that drenched you drenched me too and bound us.  I praise God that He has sent 
me to you.  (Ibid.).       
    
He reminds Joe of the difficulty and ‘purpose’ behind God’s plan for them both: “I know there is 
difficulty and pain ahead of us, but the path that He sets us on is hard for a purpose.  His purpose!  It 
tests us and strengthens us, and in the long run it will bring us to even greater joy” (Ibid.).       
 
He next offers an apology.  He asks Joe’s forgiveness in not immediately recognizing their love in their 
first glance.  He portrays himself as unworthy, in denial, and ignorant of God’s plan for them, in many 
ways echoing the fearful humility of Biblical characters called13 by God:  
I stand before you naked, defenceless, dependent on your mercy, begging your forgiveness.  
For you knew our love from the very beginning.  You recognized in that glance that passed 
between us, up there on the hill after he fell, all the charge and power and blessedness of love, 
while I was dull and stupid, denying it, trying to protect myself from it, trying to pretend that 
it wasn’t happening, that it couldn’t happen like this, and I ignored what you were telling me 
with your eyes and your every gesture [emphasis in original] (Ibid. 93-94).   
 
He then provides a brief account of his life.  He gives details about his home, specifying that it came to 
him through an inheritance after his mother’s death, who herself inherited it from her sister (Ibid.).  He 
reveals that his father died when he was eight, and that he has an older sister who lives in Australia, 
and a ‘handful’ of cousins.  He believes himself to be the only person in his family to earn an education 
past the age of sixteen.  He describes the dissatisfaction he felt while teaching English as a foreign 
language near Leicester Square, complaining about the lack of ‘seriousness’ in his fellow instructors.  
He critiques them for their criticisms of his religious beliefs, and conspiratorially makes the 
presumption that they “talked behind my back because I cared about my religion—not fashionable 
these days” (Ibid. 96).  He also associates his inheritance as being the result of sacred providence, 
making his isolation seem like a duty to be ‘calm and attentive,’ to pray and meditate, and to await 
God’s purpose to unfold for him, as it did on the day he met Joe.   
 
As a symptomatic product of his condition, this first letter almost ideally provides an exemplary 
illustration of Jed’s de Clerembault’s syndrome—which is also why Wenn and Camia use it.  In it he 
speaks of his isolation, and how in that state his convictions intensified, so that his meditative focus on 
‘God’s purpose’ becomes one with his neurotic need to re-enter a communal relationship.  He also 
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speaks of the delusional ‘signs’ and ‘signals’ left for him by Joe as ‘tests’ of his commitment.  As well, 
and perhaps most pertinent to my examination of this and Joe’s account, he details the seemingly ideal, 
and thus ‘designed’ fact that the object of his affection is an Atheist, affording his condition a sense of 
‘certainty,’ which only grows after their later interactions.  As he states:  
There are barriers ahead, of course.  Mountain ranges!  The biggest of which is your denial of 
God.  But I’ve seen through that, and you know it.  In fact, you probably planned it that way.  
It’s a game you’re playing with me, part seduction, part ordeal.  You are trying to probe the 
limits of my faith.  Does it horrify you that I can see through you so easily?  I hope it thrills 
you, the way it thrills me when you guide me with your messages, these codes that tap straight 
into my soul.  I know that you’ll come to God, just as I know that it’s my purpose to bring you 
there, through love.  Or, to put it another way, I’m going to mend your rift with God through 
the healing power of love (Ibid. 97). 
 
As Wenn and Camia describe it, this dialectic opposition is impeccably harmonized by Jed’s ‘personal 
relationship’ with God, setting up in his mind a certainty that he perceives as imbued with divine 
intention: “The mission to ‘bring [Joe] to God’ may be seen as an attempt to achieve a fully integrated 
intrapsychic world in which internalized religious sentiment and delusional love became one” (Wenn 
and Camia, 241).  Additionally, this reveals yet another correlation with my examination of Jeremy’s 
account, Jed’s intent to ‘bring Joe to God’ through the ‘healing power of love,’ seemingly 
indistinguishable from a statement made by June in her description of the ‘center’ around which 
orbited her conception of ‘Theism:’ “What matters is to make the connection with this centre, this inner 
being, and then extend and deepen it.  Then carry it outwards, to others.  The healing power of love” 
(June quoted, Jer. 60). 
 
However, though this is almost equally identical to Jed’s conception of the ‘Christ within Joe’—“But I 
know that the Christ is within you […] the purpose is to bring you to the Christ that is in you and that is 
you” [emphasis in original] (Jed quoted, Joe. 66)—which is also mimetic of Jeremy’s description of 
June’s beliefs—“unicorns, wood spirits, angels, mediums, self-healing, the collective unconscious, the 
‘Christ within us’” (Jer. 46)—it can in no way be seen as based on, inspired by, or motivated by June’s 
Theism.  These individuals have, to my knowledge, never interacted, and their conceptions appear as 
products of different transformations in their individual lives.  For this reason, I believe these 
similarities are actually exemplary of their shared discursive context, the setting within which they 
have constructed their individual and personal ‘Theisms.’  That is, I view their shared interests and 
conceptualizations as indicative of the way their environments have contributed to, and shaped, their 
ideologies, which, we must remember, are also based on texts constructed by individuals who are 
equally shaped by their own oppositional contexts.  This is also a great example of the precariousness 
in attempting to ‘generalize’ the meaning of terms like this.  Thus, I conclude that these matching 
‘Theisms’ are examples of discursive influences, which for Jed becomes more fully developed through 
Joe’s inclusion, and critical interpretation, of his second letter.    
 
Placed once more at the chronological point in which he receives it, this letter is an interlude between 
Joe and Clarissa’s eventual separation.  In it, Jed’s focus is mostly on describing Joe, in particular his 
oppositional criticism of Joe’s writing and scientific rationalism.  He describes the process of reading 
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Joe’s articles—35 in total—as ‘tortuous,’ feeling pity for the ‘innocent readers’ whose minds were 
polluted by their ‘sad’ and ‘dry’ content.  He states that in the process he heard every word spoken in 
Joe’s voice, a connection whereby each article is described as a “letter sent by you into the future that 
was going to contain us both” (Jed. 133).  He asks Joe’s intentions, if he wrote them out of malice or 
insult, or if they were meant to test him.  Then he reminds himself, once again, of his duty:  
He needs my help, I told myself whenever I came close to giving up, he needs me to set him 
free from his little cage of reason.  I had moments when I wondered if I had truly understood 
what God wanted from me.  Was I to deliver into His hands the author of these hateful pieces 
against Him?  Perhaps I was intended for something simpler and purer.  I mean, I knew you 
wrote about science, and I was prepared to be baffled or bored, but I didn’t know you wrote 
out of contempt (Ibid. 133-134). 
 
For Jed, this letter represents an opportunity, a chance to reflectively ‘reach out’ to Joe via his own 
discourse.  For Joe, it represents a threat, a piece of textual evidence to support his diagnosis about 
Jed’s hostile nature.  For my intentions, it represents a reflective validation for both of them.  Jed’s 
interpretation of Joe’s writing further establishes his position, while at the same time providing a 
discursive insight into Joe’s own interests, like a filter, such as Joe offers in his own descriptions of 
their interactions.  Seeing Joe from this side of the spectrum, through Jed’s Theistic filter, we discover 
a slightly more refined sense of his Scientific Worldview.     
 
Out of all the articles, Jed takes explicit offence to one in particular’s adoption of ‘characterization’ and 
‘fictionalization’ in an analysis of God and the Bible.  Thinking perhaps Joe’s intentions were meant as 
a joke, Jed admits to being ‘shocked’ by the callousness and arrogance of Joe’s reduction of God as a 
‘literary character:’ 
You pretend to know what or who He is—a literary character, you say, like something out of a 
novel.  You say the best minds in the field are prepared to take ‘an educated guess’ at who 
invented Yahweh, that the evidence points to a woman who was living around 1000 BC, 
Bathsheba, the Hittite who slept with David.14  A woman novelist dreamed up God!  The best 
minds would rather die than presume to know so much.  You’re dealing in powers neither you 
nor any person on earth can have any grasp of.  You go on to say that Jesus Christ was a 
character too, mostly made up by St. Paul and ‘whoever’ wrote the gospel of St. Mark (Ibid. 
134).        
 
Joe’s demotion of God and Jesus to mere ‘characters,’ likely based on his analysis of Biblical 
Criticism, proves excruciating for Jed.  He defends the existence of God, again, by means of the power 
gained by combining his love and faith:  
How is it possible to love God and love you at the same time?  Through faith alone, Joe.  Not 
through facts, or pretend facts, or intellectual arrogance, but by trusting in God’s wisdom and 
love as a living presence in our lives, the kind of presence that no human, let alone literary 
character, could ever have (Ibid.).    
  
In fact, Jed attempts to use the ‘grandeur’ of science as a defense against Joe’s arguments, as well as to 
bolster his own beliefs, a sort of mirroring effect whereby they seem to both be using the same material 
to argue two opposing positions: 
You might have got the impression that I hate science.  I was never much good at school and I 
don’t take personal interest in the latest advances, but I know it is a wonderful thing.  The 
study and measurement of nature is really nothing more than a form of extended prayer, a 
celebration of the glory of God’s universe.  The more we find out about the intricacies of His 
creation, the more we realize how little we know and how little we are (Ibid. 135). 
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Moreover, he contends that Joe’s use of science to remove God’s power as ‘creator’ through scientific 
discoveries is ‘childish’ and ‘sad.’  After all, he argues, it is God that gives us this ability to think this 
way in the first place:        
You write that we know enough about chemistry these days to speculate how life began on 
earth.  Little mineral pools warmed by the sun, chemical bonding, protein chains, amino acids 
etc.  The primal soup.  We’ve flushed God out of this particular story, you said, and now he’s 
been driven to his last redoubt, among the molecules and particles of the quantum physicists.  
But it doesn’t work, [Joe].  Describing how the soup is made isn’t the same as knowing why 
it’s made, or who the chef is.  It’s a puny rant against an infinite power.  Somewhere among 
your protestations about God is a plea to be rescued from the traps of your own logic.  Your 
articles add up to a long cry of loneliness.  There’s no happiness in all this denial.  What can it 
give you in the end (Ibid.)? 
 
More than this, Jed accuses Joe of wanting to supplant God, to become something divine himself:  
I imagined you telling me in your cold way that God and His Only Son were just characters, 
like James Bond or Hamlet.  Or that you yourself could make life in a laboratory flask, given a 
handful of chemicals and a few million years.  It’s not only that you deny there’s a God—you 
want to take his place (Ibid. 136-137). 
 
These rebukes are symbols and symptomatic of both his perception of Joe, as well as his own illness.  
He describes him as an intermediary ‘adman,’ a ‘cheerleader’ hired to “talk up other people’s stuff” 
(Ibid. 137), an eerily mimetic critique of Joe’s own reflective self-criticisms.  He makes a list of his 
‘artificial interests,’ stating with finality that the ‘truth’ Joe sees in writing about bacteria, particles, 
agriculture, insects, satellites, nano-technology, genetic engineering, and hydrogen engines, can never 
be as ‘real’ as things like ‘love’ and ‘faith’ (Ibid.).  Likewise, he makes a conclusive assimilation of 
himself with God, warning Joe about the danger in denying the ‘truth’ of their love and the inevitability 
of their union: 
Never deny my reality, because in the end you’ll deny yourself.  The despair I felt at your 
rejection of God had something to do with my sense that you were also rejecting me.  Accept 
me, and you’ll find yourself accepting God without a thought.  So promise me.  Show me your 
fury or bitterness.  I won’t mind.  I’ll never desert you.  But never, never try to pretend to 
yourself that I don’t exist (Ibid. 138).       
 
Joe acknowledges this personal assimilation in his later interpretation, noting Jed’s own sense of 
‘fictionalization’ in his religious references: “His one concession to a source beyond himself was a 
couple of references to the story of Job, and even here it was not obvious that he had read the primary 
material” (Joe. 153).  In the same analysis, Joe singles out Jed’s use of ‘fabrication’ as indicative of a 
crisis or confusion, citing part of a letter not quoted in full: 
‘You looked uncomfortable,’ he wrote once about seeing me in the street.  ‘You even looked 
as though you might have been in pain, but that shouldn’t make you doubt us.  Remember 
how much pain Job was in, and all the time God loved him.’  Again, the unexamined 
assumption was that God and [Jed] were one, and between them they would settle the matter 
of our common fates.  Another reference raised the possibility that I was God.  ‘We’re both 
suffering, [Joe], we’re both afflicted.  The question is, which one of us is Job’” (Jed cited, Joe. 
153)?    
 
This ‘confusion’ carries over into Joe’s assessment of Jed’s ‘Theism,’ as he sees it as being based on an 
exclusive adherence to the “inner voice of his private God” (Joe. 153).  Citing once more Jed’s utter 
lack of textual references, Joe ‘defines’ Jed’s religion as being ‘dreamily vague,’ assigning its meaning 
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to the same discursive influences I mentioned above in the correlation between June’s conception of 
religion and Jed’s ideology about the ‘Christ within Joe:’ 
There were very few biblical references in [Jed]’s correspondence.  His religion was dreamily 
vague on the specifics of doctrine, and he gave no impression of being attached to any 
particular church.  His belief was a self-made affair, generally aligned to the culture of 
personal growth and fulfillment.  There was a lot of talk of destiny, of his ‘path’ and how he 
would not be deterred from following it, and of fate—his and mine entwined” (Jed cited, Joe. 
152).     
 
Additionally, Joe’s analysis of Jed’s conception of ‘God’ is inextricably linked with his construction of 
self, both internally and externally designed.  Joe deems this a “perfect loose structure for a disturbed 
mind” (Joe. 152), threading a line through Jed’s religiosity and illness, just as much as his own 
scientific rationalism binds him to his particular Atheism, once more reflective of their ‘mirrored’ 
dependency: 
Often, God was a term interchangeable with self.  God’s love for mankind shaded into [Jed]’s 
love for me.  God was undeniably ‘within’ rather than in his heaven, and believing in him was 
therefore a license to respond to the calls of feeling or intuition.  It was the perfect loose 
structure for a disturbed mind.  There were no constraints of theological nicety or religious 
observance, no social sanction or congregational calling to account, none of the moral 
framework that made religions viable, however failed their cosmologies (Joe. 152-153). 
 
Through Joe’s diagnostic interpretation, Jed’s Theism appears disorganized and unstable, the mirrored 
reflection of his own ordered and structured rationalism.  As such, he worryingly describes the 
isolation and internalization of Jed’s ‘love’ and ‘faith,’ how the pattern of his love “was not shaped by 
external influences” (Ibid. 143), but was rather self-determined: 
His was a world determined from the inside, driven by private necessity, and this way it could 
remain intact.  Nothing could prove him wrong, nothing was needed to prove him right.  If I 
had written a letter declaring passionate love, it would have made no difference.  He crouched 
in a cell of his own devising, teasing out meanings, imbuing nonexistent exchanges with their 
drama of hope or disappointment, always scrutinizing the physical world, its random 
placements and chaotic noise and colours, for the correlatives of his current emotional state—
and always finding satisfaction (Ibid.). 
   
He further determines Jed’s condition as “love’s prison of self-reference” (Ibid.), so that Jed, the 
prisoner, is locked within his own inviolable sense of solipsism.  Yet, Jed does not appear entirely 
alone.  In a self-conscious nod to the dependent nature of interactional validation, Joe’s self-described 
actions begin to mimic Jed’s accusations, so that their worlds begin to ‘entwine,’ much like their ‘fates’ 
cited above.15  In his obsessive need to ‘test’ Jed and catch him in an incriminating reaction, he 
describes himself as acting out his descriptions, on one occasion, and filled with the desperation and 
curiosity of his influence on Jed’s condition, he describes himself as tempting him with a familiar 
ritual: “watched by [Jed], I lingered by the privet and ran my hands along it to imprint it with a 
message, and then I turned his way and looked at him.  But he wouldn’t come, and nor did he refer to 
that moment in the letter he wrote later the same day” (Ibid. 143).  As such, Joe’s narrative begins to 
adopt Jed’s tone of desperation, noting a sense of ‘bereavement’ at Jed’s sudden refusal to talk with 
him, and thus provide validation for his fears:   
I wanted more than that.  I longed for it.  Please put the weapon in my hands, [Jed].  One little 
threat would have given me enough to take to the police, but he denied me, he played with me 
and held back, just as he said I did.  I needed him to reiterate his threat because I wanted the 
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certainty of it, and the fact that he would not give me satisfaction kept my suspicion alive that 
sooner or later he would do me harm (Ibid. 142).   
 
Likewise, he describes himself as obsessively reading and re-reading Jed’s letters, a mirrored 
description of Jed reading his articles.  This process also depicts a pragmatic ritual not unlike the 
method adopted by an anthropologist who might treat the letters as ‘data,’ a dialogical transcription he 
must translate: 
I gathered all [Jed]’s letters together, arranged them chronologically and fixed them in a clasp 
folder.  I lay on the chaise longue turning the pages slowly from the beginning, looking out for 
and marking significant passages.  These I typed out, with location references in brackets.  By 
the end, I had four sheets of extracts of which I made three copies, placing each in a plastic 
folder.  This patient activity brought on in me a kind of organizational trance, the 
administrator’s illusion that all the sorrow in the world can be brought to heel with touch-
typing, a decent laser printer and a box of paper clips (Joe. 151).  
 
In what he describes as compiling a ‘dossier of threats,’ Joe is once more marking himself an artificer, 
the creator of a text, and thus description, of an individual or action.  He is constructing Jed here in a 
certain way, molding him into an oppositional, and thus validating, identity.  In seeking out the ‘real 
threats’ in Jed’s writing he has become his creator, making conscious choices about how to 
manufacture this ‘true fiction’ in order to define Jed in a particular fashion.  His research becomes a 
scientific obsession, his own prison of isolation, wherein his meticulous ordering of Jed’s 
correspondence takes up the methodological ritual of re-orientation, of clarifying Jed’s chaos in order 
to compile an identity built around what he perceives to be a threat, not just to his physical self, but to 
his embodied self and sense of ‘identification’ as well.  From his perspective, he has become an 
observer, forming his subject’s identity through an objective and rational base.  Yet, from my end, Joe 
is equally a subject, and his obsession with Jed’s obsession illustrates an ideal dialectical snapshot, an 
oppositional validation between two subjects whose dialogical—both verbal and literary—interactions 
act as evidential data concerning the process by which Joe defines himself in reflection of an Other.  	  
 
This provides for us a more nuanced interpretation of both men’s relational need of each other.  When 
placed within Joe’s account, these letters appear as mirrored expressions, reflective first-person 
descriptions of both Self and Other, dialectically supportive of an interactional validation.  In reference 
to my own interpretation of Joe’s Atheism, they add a secondary layer to his own self-description, 
much in the way their dialogues introduce a dialectical confirmation to his Scientific Worldview.  Side 
by side they function as a whole, one validating the other, collectively presenting the discursive data 




I will conclude here with two specifics.  First, through their interactions, both face-to-face and textual, 
Joe and Jed become an entwined entity based upon necessity.  Even though his inclusion in Joe’s life 
leaves a destructive scar, Jed seems an essential part of Joe’s process of identification.  Thus, I contend 
that even with all the pain he causes him, Joe needs Jed.  Their oppositional dialectic not only 
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illustrates the difference necessary for Joe to validate his science-based Atheist interests, it also affords 
him the opportunity to use these same interests within the process of defining Jed, and thus himself. 
 
Second, because of this necessity, Joe’s Atheism appears here as a dependent variable.  While his 
interests seem innocuously based within a particular type of scientific rationalism, exhibited by his 
description of John’s fall or the moral and ethical dilemma faced by he and the others in their decisions 
to save themselves, they are not entirely ‘Atheistic’ until he meets Jed.  That is, though he offers hints 
that his Atheism is based upon his rationalism—which I incorporated into a distinct Scientific 
Worldview—these ideologies do not become significantly validated, and thus established, until he 
begins interacting with Jed’s Theism, regardless of their origins or whether they might be symptomatic 
of his illness.  Their dialectic, poised between Jed’s fervent and impassioned attempts to ‘bring Joe to 
God,’ and Joe’s descriptive reduction of these attempts through his diagnostic and empirical 
assessments, illustrates an Atheism that, like that between June and Bernard, is composed of a 
dependent refutation, and then promotion, of an ideology inherently ‘parasitic’ upon the beliefs and 
rituals used to define particular monotheistic and ‘God-based’ Theisms.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jeremy identifies June as being sixty-seven years old in 1987: “that sixty-seven could be 
early in the end-game” (Jer. 31). 
2 For information and images of the Dolmen de la Prunarede and the village of St. Maurice de 
Navacelles, see http://www.trekearth.com/gallery/Europe/France/South/Languedoc-Roussillon/Saint-
Maurice-Navacelles/photo1353121.htm (accessed 13 February 2013).  
3 For details on the restaurant at Les Tilleuls in St. Maurice where June and Bernard—as well 
as Jeremy, forty years later—stayed, see http://www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Restaurant_Review-g3490621-
d4756520-Reviews-Les_Tilleuls-Saint_Maurice_Navacelles_Herault_Languedoc_Roussillon.html 
(accessed 14 February 2014).  
4 “Institutions are established patterns of practice, recognized by such actors, which have force 
as ‘the way things are done.”  See Jenkins, Social Identity, 45.   
5 See also Thrower (1992); Smith’s (1994) discussion of Marxism as ‘quasi-religion’—which 
is really just another term for ‘civil religion;’ and Dixon (2002). 
6 See also, Aveling (1907); Fabro (1968), 7; Cliteur (2009), 12; Smart (2012); Hyman (2009), 
27-29; and Buckley (1990), 14-17 and 338.  
7 “Identification and collectivity are generated as emergent by-products of the transactions and 
negotiations of individuals pursuing their interests.” See Jenkins, 7. 
8 “In the beginning was the word. The word proselytised the sea with its message, copying 
itself unceasingly and forever. The word discovered how to rearrange chemicals so as to capture little 
eddies in the stream of entropy and make them live.”  Ridley (1999), 11. 
9 “The 'everlasting arms' hold out a cushion against our own inadequacies which, like a 
doctor's placebo, is none the less effective for being imaginary. These are some of the reasons why the 
idea of God is copied so readily by successive generations of individual brains. God exists, if only in 
the form of a meme with high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by 
human culture.” Dawkins (1976 [2006]), 193. 
10 Granted, this statement is made by Joe adopting Clarissa’s perspective, and is made in 
response to his accusation: “I thought even you were above this kind of new-age drivel.”  Thus, 
Clarissa’s like-minded position here might be nothing more than Joe’s creation.  Sadly, not much more 
is given about her religious beliefs, so I must be content with these speculations. 
11 Note the similarity here with his earlier response to Jed: “Because, my friend, no one’s 
listening.  There’s no one up there” (Joe and Jed, in dialogue, Joe. 26). 
12 As a further reference, Jenkins cites this as related to Marx’s (1844) discussion of 
alienation-as-estrangement, Durkheim’s (1893, 11-88) differentiation between similarity and solidarity 
in his concept of ‘anomie,’ and MacIntyre’s (1985, 11-14 and 16-35) notion of the ‘emotive self.’    
13 For example, see Moses—Exodus 3:11-12; Samuel—1 Samuel: 3-10; Isaiah—Isaiah 6: 5-6; 
Jeremiah—Jeremiah 1: 4-9; Jonah—Jonah 1-3; Mary—Luke 1: 29-38; and Saul/Paul—Acts 9: 1-9.    
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14 I am not entirely certain what Jed means by this, and a review of Joe’s writing lends no 
answers, nor any such reference.  Additionally, a cursory inquiry to a few Biblical Scholars, 
Theologians, and other professionals returned no basis for Jed’s reference here.  I believe, then, that 
this theory stems from Jed’s misunderstanding.    
15 This is mimetic, as well, of an earlier description of Joe’s fear of being left alone as Clarissa 
leaves for work, and just before his and Jed’s second interaction: “standing there on the polished dance 
floor parquet I felt like a mental patient at the end of visiting hours.  Don’t leave me here with my mind, 
I thought.  Get them to let me out [emphases in original]” (Joe. 58).  As well, it is especially symbolic 









From the outset, my intention herein has been to promote the utility—as well as ability—of using 
amateur textual accounts for cultural insights about Atheist identity construction, in lieu of more 
traditional or professional ethnography.  This was done for three reasons: a lack of existent 
ethnographic data on the subject, the ambiguity of the term ‘Atheism’ within academic discourse, and 
the difficulty in locating a distinct organizational type of Atheism with which to conduct participant 
observation.  Choosing two accounts that I believe represent suitable substitutes, I examined the 
Atheist construction within in order to create an ‘ethnographic understanding’ about how Atheism-as-
identity is constructed within the specific contexts of those texts.  I contend that, though it would be 
terminologically inappropriate to define them as ‘ethnography,’ I do believe, after careful examination, 
that in many ways they are at least ethnographically suggestive.  I defend this conclusion for two 
specific reasons. 
 
First, these two texts are indicative of ‘discourse’ and ‘signature,’ categories borrowed from Geertz’s 
(1988) conception of ethnography as a ‘kind of writing,’ that translate into ‘textual format’ and ‘voice.’  
On the ‘discursive’ end, Jeremy’s text is reflective, or even mimetic, of the translation of a fieldwork 
account, defined by Clifford (1986) as embodying the rhetoric of the “autobiography and the ironic 
self-portrait” (Clifford, 14).  Exemplified by texts such as Leiris’ L'Afrique Fantôme (1934), Levi-
Straus’ Tristes Tropiques (1955), and Bohannon’s Return to Laughter (1954), the fieldwork account 
reflects a particular literary conduit between the personal narrative of a diary, such as Malinowski’s 
(1967) A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term, and the ordered, structured, and objectively detailed 
formal ethnography, like we see in Jeremy’s Part Four.  Moreover, appearing less ‘fictional’ than the 
texts cited above—especially Bohannon’s—Jeremy’s text is equally reflective of the focal shift toward 
the process of conducting fieldwork, such as we see with Briggs’ (1970) construction of interactional 
vignettes between subjects within a finite group; Rabinow’s (1977) critical examination of what might 
constitute the ‘doing’ of anthropology by focusing on his experiences with his subjects, rather than just 
on the data recorded; Dumont’s (1978) acknowledgment of the dialogical ‘anthropologization’ between 
the ethnographer’s ‘I’ and the subject’s ‘they; and Crapanzano’s (1980) and Dwyer’s (1982) equally 
dialogical attempts to allow the subjects to ‘speak for themselves.’  As well, when his case-history of 
June shifts into a more dialectic-focused validation between June and Bernard in Part Two, his text 
becomes seemingly auto-ethnographic.  Similar to the manner with which Jackson, Knab, and Richard 
and Sally Price insert themselves into their ethnographies in order to present an ‘insider’ account, as 
discussed above, Jeremy’s presence in the text is equally self-reflective, so that he becomes, in some 
ways, an ‘informant’ just as much as June and Bernard. 
 
In this same way, Jeremy’s self-insertion is symbolic of the author’s ‘signature,’ the idea that as 
ethnography is a ‘form of writing,’ there inherently exists a ‘writer,’ opening up the possibility that, 
just like fiction, ethnography is equally manufactured.  This is perhaps more reflective of Joe’s text, as 
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his form of auto-ethnography appears as both a ‘true’ insider account—Joe’s Atheism is at focus—as 
well as a first-person narration from inside the culture he means to represent.  More indicative of 
Wolf’s (1992) and Ellis’ (2000) descriptions of a ‘fictional’ type of auto-ethnography, Joe’s position as 
author, as well as subject, is equally suggestive of a larger critique about how ‘traditional’ ethnography 
earns its authority.  As his text is both self-reflective, as well as self-confessional, and because the 
dialogical interactions within shape a polyvocality of shared voices—Joe/Clarissa and Joe/Jed—Joe’s 
active role as ‘author-as-character’ both empowers and restricts his text.  On one end it permits the 
reader the ability to, as Clifford (1986) states, both “discern the personal bias of the ethnographer,” as 
well as “make sense of the complex interactions” that make up that representation (Clifford, 14).  On 
the other, this ‘first-person form’ also tends to inherently encourage a sense of ‘unreliability’ by 
presenting certain limitations that an omniscient third-person narration does not.  This latter issue 
becomes more apparent when the ‘author-as-character’ is found to be ‘distorting’ or ‘misremembering’ 
certain actions and facts, or when the author’s text is shaped by bias, intent, or justification.   
 
Thus, it seems suitable to contend that as the position of the ‘insider’ is ethnographically reflective of 
the bias of a first-person perspective, as well as the literary process of Geertz’s portmanteau, 
‘faction’—“imaginative writing about real people in real places at real times” (Geertz, 141)—the 
insider’s authority might be challenged by his very existence as the author—‘artificer’—of the text 
itself.  For example, after examining his text as a whole, it becomes apparent that Joe’s description of 
the accident at the beginning, which stands as the catalytic motivation for his writing the text in the 
first place, is compiled from a number of differing perspectives added onto his own.  First, it is formed 
through the cohesion of his and Clarissa’s joined perspectives as they talk through the tragedy, share 
each other’s experiences, and comfort one another.  Later, as they share the story with friends, Joe 
notes that they do so in the ‘married style:’ “running alone with it for a stretch, talking through the 
partner’s interruption sometimes, at others, giving way and handing over” (Joe. 36).  It then receives 
more modification by John’s widow when she contests his ‘sacrifice’ by claiming that what Joe 
perceived as ‘altruism’ was actually the result of John’s attempt at looking heroic for a presumed 
mistress—“he was showing off to a girl […] and we’re all suffering for it now” (John’s widow, quoted, 
Joe. 123).  Joe even admits to considering this hypothesis as he walks along his ‘stations of the cross’ 
at the site of the accident: “standing by the passenger door she would have had a clear view of the 
whole drama, from the balloon and its basket dragging across the field, to the struggle with the ropes, 
and the fall” (Joe. 126).  Lastly, at the close of the text one final perspective lends itself to Joe’s 
account, the point-of-view of ‘James,’ whose affair with a student, and fortuitous assistance from John, 
reveals the true reason for his presence at the accident, as well as why his widow had suspected the 
affair in the first place (Ibid. 228-229). 
 
In that within ethnographic representations ‘culture’ has always meant to be “constructed as an 
ensemble of characteristic behaviors, ceremonies and gestures, susceptible to recording and 
explanation by a trained onlooker” (Clifford, 1983 [1988], 125 [31]), the ‘made-ness’ of Joe’s text 
skillfully treads the line between authentic and inauthentic, measured out between the acknowledgment 
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of the text as artfully created, and the polyvocality inherent in the varied perspectives of the ensemble 
represented.  Likewise, I might equally conclude from this same logic that in regard to the ‘literary 
conventions’ inherent in an insider’s first-person account, there might be found an equally more 
nuanced type of authority.  That is, as seen through the perspective of the ‘indigenous ethnographer,’ 
auto-ethnographic by means of being both the “ethnography of one’s own group,” and encompassing 
“autobiographical writing that has ethnographic interest” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, 2), Joe’s account 
might derive a sense of authority by simply being ‘un-sullied’ by objective interpretation.  Though 
clearly biased and influenced by his own self-reflexivity, it might still offer a certain ‘imponderabilia’ 
(Malinowski, 1922, 14-15) concerning his Atheism not attainable by an observer on the outside—such 
as we might see in Jeremy’s anxiety about re-creating June and Bernard’s story.      
 
Which brings me to my second defense.  While it is one thing to note structural and thematic 
similarities between these amateur accounts and the professional ethnographies cited above, it is 
another to blithely state that what might look similar is the same thing.  This is not my intention here.  
Rather, my illustration of these similarities is meant as a critical assessment, notably of the restrictions 
and limitations we create in the process of ‘standardizing’ methods and processes in defining what is, 
or is not, textually authoritative or authentic.  In this way, with all their flaws for being ‘un-
professional,’ ‘non-traditional,’ or indicative of ‘fictional’ style, and though they provide insights that 
would, I admit, appear more ‘academically authentic’ within objective representations such as the ‘in-
process’ accounts cited above, I still fail to see how they lose any sense of significance in their being 
constructed by amateurs.   
 
After all, the Atheism provided by the individuals in these accounts appears just as thoughtfully 
described; and especially in reflection of Jenkins’ internal-external and interactional validations, it 
seems nuanced to the point of being ‘professionally’ represented.  Additionally, because this Atheism 
is presented via first-person accounts, and delineated between historical and philosophical validation, 
when aligned side by side, they afford us, their readers, the opportunity to see how Atheism itself 
embodies more than what might be defined by a scholar making stipulations based on theoretical 
interpretations.  That is, rather than offering a mere ‘definition,’ this analysis gives us an insight about 
Atheism and Atheist identity construction entirely unique to the manner with which it might be 
described in the scholarship cited in the Introduction.  Yet, one might also argue that it provides a 
similar, if not the same, sort of discursive example upon which those ‘definitions’ are built.  With these 
two texts we are provided an intimate look at how certain individuals, restricted within a particular 
context, have shaped their distinct Atheisms via a process bound to a dependency on certain types of 
‘Theism.’  In this way, we are equally provided a means with which to ‘define’ that process as a 
relational ‘reaction’ to those Theisms, characterizing ‘Atheism’ here as shaped by those Theisms, so 
that it becomes a mirrored reflection.  In both texts, this is exemplified by the manner with which the 
respectful Atheism of each is introduced and validated.  In Jeremy’s text, this becomes a relationship 
between June and Bernard, while with Joe’s it is defined by the interactions between himself and Jed.  
Without these relationships, the ‘Atheism’ that we might determine from within these examples is not 
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completely established.  That is, though we might determine Bernard’s communism and Joe’s 
Scientific Worldview as ‘Atheistic,’ their ‘Atheism’ is not fully solidified until after their processes of 
identification are made apparent.  This is not possible, as Jenkins reminds us, without the result of 
relational confrontation.  Therefore, rather than conclude here with a stipulation that ‘Atheism’ is 
defined—in a general sense—by these examples, we can use them—as I have—in order to more 
efficiently examine the ways in which ‘Atheists-in-particular’ go about defining themselves.  As a 
more ‘anthropological’ or ‘discursive’ approach, this moves us away from the precarious territory of 
‘defining things,’ toward the perhaps more pragmatic domain of an ethnographic criticism.      
 
However, while my argument here that the analysis provided herein has afforded me the ability to 
separate myself from the discourse wherein I would perhaps more traditionally be required to offer a 
‘definition,’ this sort of examination is not without a particular fault concerning the inference necessary 
to do that.  Ignoring this, especially in regard to the ethnographic ‘value’ that I have sourced out of 
these texts, would prove rather detrimental to my use of them.  Thus, I will conclude here with a brief 
acknowledgement of this issue, not only as a critical caveat to my more experimental use of texts not 
usually considered ‘authoritative’ when compared to more empirical ones, but as a means with which 
to further support my notion that they do, in fact, offer an insight arguably hidden by the textual and 
methodological restrictions of such objective sources.     
 
In both texts, neither subjects—Bernard and Joe—refer to themselves exclusively as ‘Atheists.’  That 
is, nowhere in these sources do these individuals directly identify as such.  Rather, their description 
comes from secondary interpretations: in the case of Bernard, this appears via Jeremy’s references, 
such as at the beginning of his text when he uses the phrase ‘invincible atheism’ (Jeremy 9); while in 
the case of Joe, this emerges from Wenn and Camia’s description of him as a “well-known science 
writer who wrote from an atheistic point of view” (Joe, Appendix I, 237).  Thus, a keen-eyed 
individual might establish an argument here that my interpretation of these subjects as Atheists, and 
thus my use of these texts to bolster my argument that an interpretation of their ‘Atheism’ is without 
the requisite need of a ‘definition,’ is rather hypocritical.  This argument, I would contend, is both right 
and wrong.  In regard to the former, this is indeed a logical conclusion: these individuals, though 
perhaps more so with Bernard than Joe, do not openly identify themselves as ‘Atheists,’ so we are 
inherently required to infer much of their identity via an analysis of their interactions with individuals 
who appear ‘opposed’ to their world-views.  Additionally, this means there is a level of double 
inference taking place here, as an interactional validation is in need of two individuals dialogically 
opposing one another.  In this way, simply stating that Bernard is an Atheist because he was once a 
Communist, and then later shaped his identity against June’s ‘Theism,’ seems rather like ‘filling in the 
blanks’ left by his lack of self-description, which also seems quite similar to the theoretical stipulations 
against which I argued in the stipulation section above concerning the generalizations of the definition 
of Atheism.  This could equally be argued in consideration of Joe’s ‘Atheism,’ and the inference we 
might make of his opposition to Jed’s exclusive form of ‘Theism.’             
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However, and on the latter end of my contention above, I would likewise defend my description of 
Bernard and Joe as Atheists because, like with any ethnographic text, a sense of inference is not only 
necessary, but in many ways intrinsic.  That is, because I have translated these amateur accounts into 
unique types of auto-ethnography, they must be read as such.  This also means that they must be read at 
‘face value,’ or rather, simply ‘as they are.’  As we do not know the intricate details about how the data 
and descriptions presented within came into existence, and because these texts—like all texts—are 
artifices, and thus the result of the authors’ influence in constructing them, we can only make use of 
that which is provided us.  In other words, though Bernard and Joe might not exclusively state ‘I am an 
Atheist,’ we do not know whether they ever did, simply because we do not know what Jeremy and Joe 
might have left out of their narratives.  Such is the reality of using any type of ethnographic text, 
written either about one’s own culture, or especially about a culture not one’s own.  As the product of a 
literary act, and thus as something translated for the benefit of a reader, ethnographic data is always 
privy to interpretation and insinuation.  This does not, in my opinion, devalue that data, but rather 
provides a much more beneficial description than even the most objective theoretical stipulation. 
 
Therefore, by using these accounts as auto-ethnographies, any inference that I may have adopted in 
examining them is forgiven by mere methodological necessity, and is not unlike the same inference we 
would adopt when reading the ethnographic texts cited above, such as Crapanzano’s Tuhami, or the 
ethnographic novels of Jackson, Knab, and Richard and Sally Price.  Which brings me back to my 
initial argument concerning the anthropological utility of these types of texts.  Though it might not be 
perfectly defined, the Atheism within these two accounts is clearly lived, imputed, and personified 
within individual selfhoods and dialogical interactions, so that, even as it is textualized by un-trained 
hands, it is still qualitatively suggestive of even the most objective, proficient, and authoritative source 
as that constructed by an individual looking in from the outside.  In this way, even if an ‘ethnography 
of Atheism’ was something fully established within the anthropological study of that concept—which 
it will be soon—I would still argue in favor of the utility of these sorts of ‘non-traditional’ sources.  
Moreover, because these texts are reflective of the literary styles more expected of fictional accounts, 
we as the readers are offered the chance to be immersed within a certain ‘ambience,’ move alongside 
the individuals portrayed, empathize and ‘play-act’ with their emotions and confrontations, come to 
understand their beliefs, and begin to experience their Atheism ourselves.  Because they look ‘as-if’ 
they are fictional, just like the auto-ethnographies cited above, we are given the chance to know their 
Atheism as they do, so that by means of pragmatic imagination, their identity constructions appear 
unfiltered, less winnowed by interpretation, and thus more easily accessible.  Consequently, though 
they are not ‘ethnographies’ in a more traditional manner, they are still ‘ethnographic,’ facing not only 
the same sort of criticisms—such as issues of inference—but also the promotional values that 
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CHAPTER FIVE—THE UTILITY OF PRAGMATIC ACCIDENTS  
 
“Despite the ambiguities as to where exactly ethnography ends and 
fiction begins, I believe that to do away with a border would be a 
loss for both sides.  For ethnography to become too much like 
fiction is to lose clarity, so that readers have to puzzle along, trying 
to guess what is the point of the text and how likely such events 
would be to happen.  It is to lose the power of disciplinary 
shorthand for situating lives with broad contextual strokes.  It is to 
confuse whether anthropology’s mission is to write about other 
people or oneself and to take potentially dangerous liberties in 
attempting to speak from within other minds.  Most importantly, it 
is to undermine what I consider the heart of anthropology: the 
importance of close, respectful attention to the lives of other actual 
people that characterizes fieldwork.  After all, if one is free to 
invent other people and their lives, why even bother with the 
inconvenient dislocations and anguished ethical ambiguities of 
fieldwork?”  
 
— Kirin Narayan, “Ethnography and Fiction: Where is the Border?” 19991 
 
 
5.1—Introduction: Meant to Shock  
The preceding text was an experiment, both complementary and critical.  As mentioned previously, it 
was the result of a certain progression, a theoretical culmination of the Literary Turn and the notion 
that writing ethnography like fiction would justify the reading of fiction as ethnography.  Additionally, 
in this same way it was not only an attempt at addressing the political ‘blind spot’ created when 
ethnographers objectively remove themselves from their ethnographies, it was also designed to address 
the issue of textual authenticity when ethnography is perceived as fiction, and vice versa.  It was, to 
borrow once more from Crapanzano’s own description, ‘meant to shock.’      
 
This short Chapter is reciprocal of the fourth one, a correlative theoretical discussion that will act as a 
further elucidation about the style and design of “The Merits of Non-Tradition,” as well as a more 
distinct description of Ethnographic Criticism beyond this type of textual experimentation.  In order to 
do this, it will incorporate three sections, each devoted to clarifying an aspect perhaps not entirely 
explained thus far.  To begin, the first section will focus once more on textual style, reiterating many of 
the points made in the fourth Chapter, particularly concerning the narrative voice of ethnographic 
description, and how that alters the reader’s perception not only of the text itself, but of the culture 
depicted within.  Then, in reference to the novels examined within “Merits,” this same discussion will 
turn to a further justification of the ‘fictionalization’ adopted, providing both an auxiliary defense of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Narayan, “Ethnography and Fiction: Where is the Border?,” 143-144. 
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usage, as well as a critical description of its ‘inherent-ness.’  In this way, it will turn its focus toward 
pertinent details, such as the ‘signature’ of the author in the construction of the text, and how reading 
certain texts, based on the narrative voice telling us the story, alters the reader’s perception about who 
might be the actual writer.  The third section will turn to a more definitive clarification of Ethnographic 
Criticism, utilizing McEwan’s ‘Atheist trilogy’ as examples, in order to better define, for the benefit of 
future uses, the complexities and requisite necessities required of this type of textual analysis.  Lastly, 
and in reflection of this final description, the conclusion will address the question as to whether or not 
“Merits” is, in fact, an Ethnographic Criticism. 
 
While the utility of this Chapter will be apparent in the explications below, perhaps its greater value is 
found in its relatedness to the fourth Chapter.  As ‘bookends’ meant to bracket the experimentation of 
“Merits,” these two Chapters exist to assist the reader, an attempt on the part of the author of this 
Thesis to ensure the ‘shock’ or ‘twist’ here is not lost within any sort of confusion.  Thus, while this 
Chapter’s partnership with Chapter Four will hopefully ensure the examination in “Merits” is properly 
understood, it will also assist in the overall transition from the empirical, methodological, and 
experimental discussions of Parts One and Two, to the more conclusive and direct discussions within 
this explanatory Part Three.     
 
5.2—Textual Style 
In the fourth Chapter, there was a great deal of attention given to the ‘description’ of Ethnographic 
Criticism, beginning with a review of the methodological and theoretical foundations upon which the 
‘idea’ of it is built, followed by a more explanatory depiction of the ‘marital defect’ that might occur in 
the process of doing it.  The delineating thread running through that Chapter’s narrative was Geertz’s 
notion of ‘discourse’ and ‘signature,’ two signifiers that describe on one end what a text is, and on the 
other, the author’s role in creating it.  While the discussion therein helped prepare the reader for the 
unique experimentation of “Merits,” a brief reiteration here of the latter’s methodological and 
theoretical foundations, as well as how Geertz’s terms might have influenced its precarious location 
between fiction and ethnography, will not only serve to further explain why that text looked the way it 
did, but also why I chose to design it that way.   
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As mentioned previously, how a text is read is determined by the voice of the narrative itself, and in the 
context of ethnographic writing, there are two predominately employed types of voice: first-person—I 
saw the ‘X’ do this—and third-person—the ‘X’ do this.  As we might also recall, the differentiation 
between first- and third-person narrative style alters not only the way in which the data presented 
within the text is revealed to us—discourse—but how we might perceive that information to have been 
influenced by the author—signature.  Then, and within the framework of our two types of textual 
representation—ethnography and the novel—this differentiation plays a large part in how that data is 
both transcribed and examined.  To better explain this, let us consider the review below, which I have 
slightly amended for the benefit of this Chapter.       
 
When an ethnographic text is written from a third-person perspective, the data is presented in an 
objective manner, the author’s ‘voice,’ and thus opinion, relegated to footnotes or an appendix, so as 
not to infect the narrative with bias and/or authorial influence.  In other words, the goal is to submit the 
data ‘as it is,’ unaffected by any sort of judgment.  This is exemplified, as I cited earlier, by 
Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific.  As an amendment to this description, though, I might 
further determine this type of narrative as one of a two-part category, a third-person omniscient broad: 
the text reveals the culture of the subjects at central focus through an objectively wide lens.  In 
Malinowski’s case, this encompasses the tribal culture within the Kula Ring, the trading system 
adopted by the inhabitants of the Trobriand Islands of New Guinea.  In an antithetical manner, then, the 
second part of this category is defined as a third-person omniscient narrow: the text reveals the culture 
of the subjects at central focus through a more myopic, yet no less objective, perspective.  This type 
itself is represented by examples such as Crapanzano’s Tuhami, or Dwyer’s Moroccan Dialogues.  In 
these texts, the focus is on an individual, who the authors have isolated as archetypical symbols of their 
culture.  This is not, however, the only means with which this type differs from its broader counterpart.  
In fact, to determine this narrative type as strictly ‘third-person’ is something of a misnomer, as the 
‘voice’ of the narrator is not entirely vacant, such as we see in Argonauts.  Rather, it exists in a 
dialogical manner, inserted within the narrative in order to drive the story along.  What this then 
becomes is an ethnographic biography, or as Crapanzano distinguishes, a text defined as either a ‘case 
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history’ or ‘life-history:’ where the former adopts much of the narrative qualities of a biography, so 
that the data within presents “a view of the subject from the perspective of an outsider,” the latter, like 
the autobiography, presents the subject of the text “from his own perspective.”2  Moreover, the third-
person omniscient narrow represents a transitional type, standing firmly on the objective and 
omniscient-voiced foundation established by Malinowski’s Argonauts, while also leaning slightly 
toward a more experimental—and, albeit, more ‘literary’—first-person voice.   
 
In reflection of these two third-person ethnographic narrative types, there is an equal two-part 
differentiation between the first-person voice: first-person other and first-person self.  The former, like 
the third-person omniscient narrow, is likewise a transitional type.  That is, while it firmly fits within 
the context of a reflexive narrative, the observations provided by this voice offer an insight about an 
other, rather than about the individual speaking to us.  In other words, though the voice is that of the 
narrator, spoken from a first-person perspective, like the third-person omniscient narrow, the story that 
it tells is about someone else.  The latter, then, does the same, but turns the focus inward, rather than 
outward.  This voice is more ‘purely’ reflective, as it represents a self-focused narrative about the 
individual speaking to us.  Ethnographic examples of these two types are exemplified by the auto-
ethnographic novels of Jackson, Knab, and Richard and Sally Price—‘other’—and Ellis’ Ethnographic 
I—‘self.’ 
 
Moving beyond the means with which these differing narrative voices dictate the style of the text—the 
‘discourse’—there arises here a theoretical concern regarding the existence, and ‘signature,’ of the 
author within the text itself.  Perhaps the central issue at the heart of the marital defect discussed in 
Chapter Four, this acknowledgment of the author’s creative position, made via our acceptance that a 
text written with either a third- or first-person voice equally defines it as the product of artifice, proves 
analytically problematic when we begin to read fiction ‘ethnographically.’  That is, as the voice of the 
narrative not only changes the way in which the data is presented, but also read, this likewise alters 
how we might proceed with an examination of the ‘novel as ethnography’ within Ethnographic 
Criticism.  For the sake of a useful example here, let us once again consider Eriksen’s use of Naipaul’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 2 Crapanzano, Tuhami, 8. 
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A House for Mr. Biswas as an ‘ethnographic description,’ a methodological distinction that, as 
discussed in Chapter One, plays an integral role in the methodology of Ethnographic Criticism.   
 
A House for Mr. Biswas is a third-person omniscient narrow, meaning that because its focus is on Mr. 
Biswas, it reads like a combination of the case-history and life-history, a biographical representation of 
a singular individual’s life, that provides for us an autobiographically allegorical view of that 
individual’s culture.  As such, and because as an ‘ethnographic description’ it can be examined without 
the comparative use of an ethnographic equal, when we read it ‘anthropologically,’ it becomes 
something like an ‘ethnographic documentation,’ what Eriksen refers to as both a “rich and sensitive 
ethnography and an historical event in its own right” [emphasis in original].3  Consequently, and as 
represented by the title of his article, this definition equally transmutes Naipaul himself into a type of 
‘anthropologist.’  For his usage, then, and because he regards this novel as an apt representation of Mr. 
Biswas’ Trinidadian identity, Eriksen describes it as having two anthropologically descriptive qualities:  
[…] A House for Mr. Biswas has itself become something of an icon in Trinidadian society 
and has contributed to shaping ideology and reflexivity in that society.  It can be seen 
simultaneously as an ethnographic description of the East Indian community in the first half of 
this century (and can in this way be a source of historical and ethnographic insight), and as a 
description of Trinidadian society which has reflexivity fed back into the society with which it 
deals.”4  
 
As a methodological guide, then, Eriksen’s use of A House for Mr. Biswas paves the way for the 
ethnographic examination I shaped in my creation of Ethnographic Criticism: the use of a fictional text 
in lieu of an ethnographic one, that not only provides for us a nuanced insight about a particular 
concept, but that equally works to challenge the established notion that ethnography and fiction are two 
separate entities.  Beyond the context of Eriksen’s usage here, this integrated perception works just as 
well with a third-person omniscient broad, especially given the manner with which these types of 
narratives mimic the fictional realism adopted by early ethnographers seeking to, as Marcus and 
Cushman argue, “represent the reality of a whole world or form of life.”5  Because of this, then, and 
because Ethnographic Criticism is built upon Eriksen’s own methodology, it would seem just as 
equally unequivocal.  This is not the case, however, due in large part to Eriksen’s oversight—by means 
of his exclusive use of novels written from a third-person perspective—in not considering how we 
might do this same sort of examination when our fictional sources are written with a first-person voice.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Eriksen, “The Author as Anthropologist,” 177. 
4 Ibid., 189. 




As I briefly discussed in Chapter Four, this oversight creates an issue determined by authorial 
signature: where with a third-person narrative the author’s voice is concealed via a stylistic objectivity, 
in a first-person narrative that voice becomes an integral part of that narrative.  This not only plays a 
significant role in our perception of the data being provided, but equally, perhaps even more 
importantly, challenges the notion that the author of the text is the same as the narrator speaking to us.  
In other words, where with first-person ethnographic accounts the ethnographer has fictionalized him 
or herself in order to present a reflective narrative about their subjects, in first-person fictional 
accounts, the author has fictionalized a narrator different from themselves in order to adopt a particular 
narrative style.  Within the context of ethnographic writing, this seems less of an issue when we 
consider the non-fictional qualities of these types of texts.  I referred to this previously in my citation of 
the ‘real-world’ Jackson alongside his auto-ethnographic self-fictionalization in Barawa.  This 
becomes problematic, however, when we contextually shift our examination from a third-person 
narrative fiction—such as A House for Mr. Biswas—to a first-person novel, like McEwan’s Black Dogs 
or Enduring Love.  In these latter examples, the fictionalized author is not the same as the author of the 
text, as the narrators speaking to us are, in fact, invented characters designed and created by McEwan.  
This is also where I situated my previous argument that the author of such a novel ceases to exist, as 
when we Ethnographically Critique such a text, the author whose signature we find throughout is no 
longer attached to the novelist.  Instead, it is ascribed to the author of the text within the novel.  Thus, 
where we might have earlier imputed the distinction ‘anthropologist’ onto Naipaul for his text’s ability 
to aptly describe Mr. Biswas’ culture, the distinction here would be attributed to the narrators of these 
internal texts: Jeremy and Joe.  In other words, like how Jackson’s self-fictionalization creates a 
different textual entity than the ‘real world’ Jackson, so the narrators of McEwan’s novels become 
equally separate.   
 
Lastly, because McEwan ceases being the author of these texts, their signature dictates a different 
discourse: now that they appear as if written by individuals wholly separate from McEwan, they 
themselves likewise cease being novels.  Rather, they become first-person amateur accounts, 
representing the two types of first-person narratives listed above.  For my intentions with “Merits,” 
then, and because shaping it in such a way would likewise perform a critical assessment of too liberally 
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blurring the border between ethnography and the novel, this textual transformation was catalytic, the 
inspirational motivation of my own self-fictionalization, and the driving force behind my choosing to 
introduce Ethnographic Criticism with such an experimental primer.  As such, and though the exact 
reasoning for this fictionalization was left pragmatically unclear in Chapter Four, revealing the magic 
behind this trick should assist here in clarifying a few rather important points.  
 
5.3—A Pragmatic Accident 
One of the leading reasons for the fictional style of “Merits,” and thus the fictionalization of myself as 
its author, is to provide a warning, a reminder that when we overlook how the style of a text might alter 
the way in which that text is perceived, and thus inadvertently blur the lines between fiction and non-
fiction, there appears an equal alteration concerning the notions we might have about textual authority, 
authenticity, and the important, almost necessary, acceptance that though they might look similar, there 
is a significant content difference between the ethnography and the novel.  Moreover, if we permit 
these alterations to weaken this sharp separation, then the value of the data from within the former 
begins to deteriorate as we struggle to determine what is ‘real’ and what is ‘imagined.’  While this is 
indeed an essential point of discussion here, which will receive a good deal of attention in the 
Conclusion, it is also, however, not the only reason for my self-fictionalization.  Rather, and like the 
plot/subplot paradigm running throughout this Thesis as a whole, the fictional narrative that I employed 
within “Merits” really tells two stories.   
 
The first is reflective of the different narrative voices used throughout this Thesis.  As we might recall 
from the description in the Introduction, both it and the Conclusion are written from a self-reflective 
first-person narrative, a style chosen not only because it adds an element of intimacy to the text, but 
because it also allows me to be a bit more candid about my inspirations and intentions.  In contrast to 
these, the three Chapters of Part One are presented via an omniscient third-person narration, so that 
while the author here is the same as the author of the Introduction and Conclusion, there exists no ‘I’ 
within the narrative.  I adopted this style not only to ensure these Chapters were free from any 
subjectivity concerning the content discussed, but because also I wanted these Chapters to read like a 
very distinct ‘academic’ text.  With “Merits,” there occurs another perspective change, this time back 
to a first-person voice, though markedly different from the Introduction and Conclusion.  Here, this 
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narrative style is reflective of the auto-ethnographic self-fictionalizations that we find in the 
ethnographic novel, such as that used by Jackson in Barawa or Knab in A War of Witches.   
 
My usage of this type of narrative voice not only assists my argument that “Merits” represents a critical 
example of this very sort of experimentation—as I shall discuss in more detail below—it also makes 
my analysis within the text a bit more accessible because of its fictional style.  Or, as Langness and 
Frank argued previously: “if interpretation and explication of others’ lives is the goal, the novel may 
prove a better medium than the standard or topical ethnography.”6  In that the novel serves as a more 
evocative outlet than the objective ethnography, or, if nothing else, in that it permits the ethnographer a 
sense of freedom from the austere confines of methodological neutrality, then this type of narrative 
voice would likewise better illustrate how “Merits” is meant to do more than merely provide 
anthropological data.  As such, the fictionalization of myself, and thus the presentation of my 
examination as a type of ‘ethnographic novel,’ means that the other ‘story’ that “Merits” tells is that of 
the Thesis, writ small.  By designing the text via the discourse described in the first and second 
Chapters, “Merits” also becomes a representation, an embodied illustration of my marriage between the 
‘fictional’ emendations of the Literary Turn, and the Ethical Criticism of McEwan’s fiction.       
 
What this also does is motivate a critical assessment, a raising of the reader’s awareness not just about 
the issues detailed above concerning the ways in which textual style alters one’s narrative perception, 
but about the way it might also depict a dangerous weakening of the border between the ethnography 
and the novel.  I might further make the argument, then, that this weakening could also lead to a 
confusion about which is which, that equally might, provided the right circumstances, lead to an 
accidental association of the novel as ethnography, and vice versa.  As such, part of the 
experimentation within my analysis of Black Dogs and Enduring Love is situated in the details it does 
not provide: while the analysis itself reveals a great deal of information about the texts, both through its 
early descriptions, and later discussion of the characters’ interactions with one another, it fails to give 
specifics about where the texts themselves were ‘found,’ or where they might be located in the ‘real’ 
world.   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Langness and Frank, “Fact, Fiction, and the Ethnographic Novel,” 21. 
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While this oversight might seem somewhat innocuous, given the comprehensive details provided 
within my analysis, it is in fact quite deliberate.  By leaving out any discussion as to where my 
fictionalized self found these texts, I have in essence paved the way for what I might call the 
‘pragmatic accident’ at the heart of that analysis.  This also inspires a rather useful ‘what if,’ as well as 
a number of follow-up questions: if we were to come across these texts with neither the luxury of 
knowing they were novels, nor with the knowledge of their existence as the result of a novelist’s 
imagination, would our initial perception of them be that they were ‘fictions?’  As well, what clues 
might there be to deter us from simply assuming they were ‘real?’  Surely they look real, given the 
realism with which McEwan has written them.  In fact, the stories even exist within a ‘real’ world: not 
only can we identify the places mentioned, we can isolate their narratives to a particular time as well.  
Granted, our attempts at locating and contacting the individuals telling them would of course inherently 
fail, given that they do not actually exist.  Then again, we might simply excuse this by deducing that 
for the sake of professional discretion the authors had employed pseudonyms for themselves and the 
other individuals mentioned, as is an oft-used method by writers, such as Knab, who begins A War of 
Witches with this provision:  
Out of respect for the privacy and traditions of the people of the Sierra de Puebla, all personal 
names (except the author’s), kinship relationships, and placenames have been altered so as to 
be unrecognizable.  Events have been rearranged and locations transposed to conform to the 
narrative line of the story and protect the identity of the individuals involved.  Any remaining 
similarity to actual people and events is purely coincidental.7 
 
What, then, is there to ultimately determine these texts as ‘fiction?’   
 
This final question is of course answered by the fact that we know these are novels, not only by the 
descriptions on their covers, but by my own discussion of them as such in Chapter Three.  
Nevertheless, if we were to play along with my pragmatic ‘what ifs,’ and pretend that our ‘finding’ 
them was without the prerequisite knowledge of their fictional nature, we might logically conclude that 
because they appear real, both narratively, and because of McEwan’s own ‘tricks’—such as the 
fictional journal article in the second Appendix of Enduring Love—the question of their ‘fictitiousness’ 
would become a rather moot point.  Perhaps, then, the leading critical element of my fictionalization in 
“Merits” derives exclusively from the notion that where reading a novel as ethnography might be 
beneficial to my interests in studying Atheist identity construction, given both the issues cited above 
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about the limited access we have to an ‘anthropology of Atheism,’ as well as the methodological and 
theoretical support found within the discourses of this Thesis’ Part One, doing so could, if we were not 
explicitly cautious, inherently lead to this manner of analytical accident.  It was for this reason 
especially that I chose to fictionalize “Merits,” not only as a physical embodiment of such an accident, 
but in order to equally provide a textual example of the outcome that could arise from such 
experimentation.  As such, my intentions might then be delineated between two points: while on one 
end, this fictionalization would convey the sort of experimentation that I presented in the ‘non-
fictional’ Parts of this Thesis, on the other, it could also exist as a fictional theoretical criticism, a 
demonstration of the precarious, even dangerous, consequence of weakening the border between fiction 
and non-fiction.  
 
However, while my intentions here might justify the fictional style used to conduct the analytical 
examination within “Merits,” it likewise produces a rather tricky side-effect, an issue of descriptive 
clarity concerning its role as an introductory representation of Ethnographic Criticism.  After all, if we 
were to once again simply define that analysis as the reading of a novel as ethnography, then “Merits” 
does not do that.  Rather, in its fictional form, and even as a critique of this methodology, it is, in fact, 
no longer an examination of two novels.  Instead, it has equally transformed alongside those novels 
into an analysis of two ‘real’ texts.  In order to both address this issue, as well as eventually defend the 
notion that “Merits” still functions in this capacity, the discussion in which I now turn will attempt to 
more distinctively define not only what that an Ethnographic Criticism is, but what shape it might take 
in relation to the textual style of the novels chosen to conduct it.         
 
5.4—Ethnographic Criticism beyond Theoretical Criticism  
As specified within the hypothesis of the Introduction, this Thesis’ principal intention was to plot out 
both the established precedents that might lead to, as well as the methodological properties that make 
up, an Ethnographic Criticism.  This was then thoroughly developed via the three Chapters of Part One, 
as well as the further descriptions in Chapter Four.  However, due to the experimentation of my 
representation of that examination, and as briefly discussed above, there still might endure a general 
confusion about like what an Ethnographic Criticism might actually look.  In order to mitigate this 
confusion, as well as to provide a useful description for later uses beyond the critical perceptions of this 
 
	   227 
Thesis’ objectives concerning the sub-plot of ‘everything is fiction,’ I will once more borrow from 
McEwan’s ‘Atheist trilogy’ in order to both demonstrate how we might read these novels as 
ethnography, as well as to further determine the complex and essential boundaries necessary to avoid 
the sort of accident discussed above.  Not only will this ensure we do not perform any stylistic mistakes 
in our analysis—such as forgetting that the text is actually a novel—it will also assist us in making a 




Focused on the thoughts and opinions of its lead character, Henry Perowne, McEwan’s Saturday 
provides a nuanced insight into Henry’s opinions on religion, politics, and war, as well as an intimate 
perspective on the development and defense of his uniquely science-based Atheism.  Told with the type 
of realism beneficial for this examination, the style of the narrative is a third-person omniscient 
narrow.  This means the story is expressed from an omniscient voice, so that the narrator—McEwan—
is providing us with descriptions and details about Henry and his interactions from a position of 
detached neutrality.  Thus, if we were to translate Saturday into an ethnographic text, it would register 
somewhere between our above description of third-person omniscient broad and narrow: though the 
central focus within the text is on a single individual, it reads less like our examples above—Tuhami 
and Moroccan Dialogues—as the voice telling us Henry’s story does not offer any personal 
commentary about the story itself.  As a ‘case-history,’ then, Henry’s story represents a synecdochic 
allegory, a biographical account wherein he becomes an individual example of his own context who, 
again like our examples above, stands as an illustration of a particular cultural identity via an isolated 
examination.  Then, and with our focus again on the construction of Atheist identity as it is presented 
through dialogical encounters and interactional validations, Henry’s story becomes useful to us as a 
discursive representation.   
 
Additionally, Saturday’s narrative perspective makes the novel especially suitable for an Ethnographic 
Criticism, and thus for its transformation into an ethnographic text, as it matches in both tone and 
objective voice the traditional absence of the ethnographer’s presence in his or her ethnography.  As 
such, were we required to make a thematic comparison here in order to further support this 
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transformation, Saturday would become something akin to, but not exactly like, Tuhami, as the two 
texts share many similarities, particularly concerning both author’s focus on a singular individual as 
representatives of their cultural milieux.  In this same way, then, McEwan would be equally 
comparable to Crapanzano.  This latter comparison is, in fact, quite useful here, even though it is also a 
tad inadequate.  While Tuhami and Saturday are indeed very different types of texts—especially given 
Crapanzano’s voice within the narrative—and though Saturday’s textual style is a bit more reminiscent 
of an author-evacuated ethnography, Tuhami’s transitional placement between the third-person 
omniscient narrow and the first-person other serves as a reminder that with this style of text we are not 
required, nor is it necessary, to acknowledge or examine the narrator’s perspective or role in shaping 
such a narrative.  In other words, just as we might read Malinowski’s Argonauts without needing to 
also read his Diary, nor must we make sense of Crapanzano’s opinions about Tuhami’s culture in order 
to understand it, we can ethnographically read Saturday without needing to first make analytical sense 
of McEwan’s own personal notions about Atheism.  This is, perhaps, not only one of the major 
defining characteristics of Ethnographic Criticism, it likewise assists in describing it as uniquely 
dissimilar to any other type of textual analysis: where the examples discussed in the third Chapter 
require an understanding of McEwan as the author in order to examine his writing, with Ethnographic 
Criticism this acknowledgment becomes redundant, as it is, in essence, the translation of the novel into 
a type of ethnography.  As such, then, when we perform an Ethnographic Criticism we are allowing the 
text to ‘speak for itself,’ meaning that the author’s intentions in shaping the narrative becomes less 
important than what the text itself is telling us about the subjects it represents.   
 
As well, this proposes a much more nuanced approach to the use of fiction ‘as ethnography’ than 
Eriksen’s previously discussed notion of the ‘ethnographic description:’ where with his methodology, 
the culture within the text is so well represented that it is without the need of a comparable 
ethnographic precedent, the methodology of Ethnographic Criticism argues that this distinction is no 
longer necessary, as the novel itself has become an ethnographic text.  However, while this does 
provide a reasonable defense of both the distinctiveness and benefit of Ethnographic Criticism, 
particularly for my intentions concerning Atheist identity construction, the simple description I have 
provided here is guilty of the same oversight as Eriksen’s use of the novel as an ethnographic 
description.  That is, while the use of a third-person text appears somewhat straightforward, especially 
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as the ethnographic examples provided here look textually similar to a third-person novel, this un-
equivocality quickly fades when we shift our analytical focus onto a first-person one.       
 
As complex and precarious the use of first-person narratives might seem, especially given the 
pragmatic accident underscoring the fictionalization in “Merits,” an approach of this kind is not only 
possible, but equally useful, as long as the individual performing such an examination is analytically 
conscious of the discussion above concerning narrative voice and the reflective role of the author in 
such a text.  Moreover, this methodological prerequisite is already established by the mere fact that a 
first-person ethnography not only appears textually different from its third-person counterpart, but that 
the information provided must be read differently as well.  For example, while the authorial differences 
between an ethnography such as Argonauts and an auto-ethnography, such as those described by Reed-
Danahay, Van Maanen, Brandes, Denzin, and Wolcott, are isolated almost exclusively to the context of 
the author’s signature within the narrative, how we use these sources differs just as much as how they 
have been written.  Thus, when we read an autobiographical auto-ethnography, not only are we reading 
the author’s textual account of his or her fieldwork, we are also reading about their experiences, 
interactions, and influences on that account’s existence.  In this way, the ‘author’ here becomes a 
‘character,’ privy to the same examination and analysis that we would bestow upon the other 
informants or subjects presented within the text.  As such, though our examination of such an 
ethnographic text would dismiss the influence or opinions of the author were our data coming from a 
third-person account, when we shift our focus onto a first-person one, our analysis of the author is 
actually an analysis of yet another subject.  In a related manner, then, an Ethnographic Criticism of a 
first-person novel must therefore incorporate a two-point analytical paradigm: not only must we ensure 
our analysis takes into consideration the type of ‘ethnography’ this fiction might become—as we do 
with a third-person novel—we must also recognize that the ‘discourse’ of this text has been formed via 
two authorial signatures.  Consequently, where with an examination of a first-person ethnographic text 
we would need to both acknowledge and accept into our analysis that the author has become a 
character, with an Ethnographic Critique of a novel ‘as ethnography’ we would need to do the same, 
with the caveat that the author of the novel is not, necessarily, the author of the text within.  While this 
same condition inspired the fictionalization of “Merits,” as well as shifted this discourse as a whole 




As determined above, Black Dogs becomes a first-person other auto-ethnography, a self-reflective 
ethnographic snapshot of two subjects whom, when combined into an interactional unit, stand to 
represent the whole of their cultural milieu.  When read ethnographically, we might compare Black 
Dogs with an ethnographic novel, such as Knab’s A War of Witches, wherein Knab has become a 
character within the narrative in an effort to depict himself as a more empathetically accessible 
‘insider.’  Yet, again, this is a slightly inaccurate comparison, as Knab has purposefully fictionalized 
himself in order to achieve this goal, while Jeremy is merely providing for us an account of his subjects 
alongside his own thoughts and experiences.  Likewise, where we might compare A War of Witches 
with Black Dogs, given that the two texts seem stylistically similar, an authorial comparison becomes 
somewhat difficult as Knab and Jeremy are not equal, especially as the latter is the figment of 
McEwan’s imagination.  Yet, this too could be seen as an inaccurate comparison, particularly 
concerning the more theoretical argument that because these texts are both ‘novels’ in regard to their 
‘fictional nature,’ Knab and Jeremy are equally ‘fictionalized’ narrators.  To remedy this, then, and in 
order to proceed with an Ethnographic Criticism of this type of novel, we need to ensure that our 
examination recognizes not only the existence of this ‘two-author’ distinction, but of its role in how we 
might analytically proceed. 
 
Additionally, this likewise requires a bit of an emendation of the ‘two-author’ condition discussed in 
this Thesis’ fourth Chapter.  Where in that context it helped inspire the fictionalization of “Merits,” 
here it will act to avoid that outcome by focusing on the relationship between the external and internal 
authors of a first-person novel, rather than simply removing the former.  In fact, we might link this 
relational acceptance back to Clifford’s description of ethnography as a ‘polyvocal’ text in his 
“Introduction” to Writing Culture: where in ‘traditional’ ethnographic accounts authority is determined 
via a single-voiced narrator—monophony—an acceptance of the fact that as a discursive account, an 
ethnography is inherently saturated with a myriad of voices ‘clamoring for expression,’ equally defines 
the text itself as encompassing a polyvocality—polyphony—wherein even when the culture of the text 
is represented through the voice of one narrator, it becomes the product of many voices.8  For my 
intentions here, this translates into an analytical obligation, the acknowledgement of, even focus on, 
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both narrators as essential to a clear and detailed analysis.  In this way, just as we might determine that 
there exist ‘two-authors’ in Knab’s A War of Witches—the fictional narrator within the text and the 
real, external anthropologist who designed it that way—so we must also determine that just as Jeremy 
is the ‘true’ narrator of Black Dogs, so too is McEwan.  For this example, then, an Ethnographic 
Criticism of the latter would expand the two-point analytical paradigm mentioned previously into three 
essential concerns: the type of ethnographic text this is (a first-person other auto-ethnography); the role 
of the internal author of the text (how has Jeremy influenced this text by inserting himself into the 
narrative, as well as how has his own position influenced his representation); and the role of the 
external author (how has McEwan influenced this text by creating an auto-ethnography, in the same 
way we might determine Knab’s influence on his own fictionalized self).   
 
While this methodology does, in fact, betray the translation of Black Dogs into an ethnography by 
revealing that there are two-authors influencing the text, this betrayal is not overtly detrimental to the 
doing of Ethnographic Criticism.  Rather, I would make the final argument here that this exposes yet 
another methodological link between Ethnographic Criticism and the result of the Literary Turn: just as 
an acceptance that an ethnography is ‘fictionalized’ by means of the author’s role in constructing it, 
which then leads to the notion that an ethnography can be written like a novel, then the betrayal here by 
acknowledging the two authors of Black Dogs is a characteristic product of our accepting that the 
‘Knab’ within A War of Witches is different from the Knab who wrote the text.  While these two 
individuals appear to be the same, by the mere fact that the one within the text is a fictionalized version 
of the one without, means that they, like McEwan and Jeremy, are separate authorial entities.  In a 
comparative manner, then, with Enduring Love this three-part paradigm must be applied as well, 
though because the style of the text differs from that of Black Dogs, it must be perceived in a different 
way.  As a first-person self auto-ethnography, it not only becomes a different type of ethnographic text, 
the focus shifts as well toward a more isolated description of the narrator’s identity, rather than on that 
of his subjects.’  The necessity of perceiving that text as constructed by ‘two authors,’ as we might do 






5.5—Conclusion: Is “Merits” an Ethnographic Criticism  
Given the description just made, as well as the discussion throughout this Chapter, an appropriate final 
question here might be whether or not as an ‘introduction’ to Ethnographic Criticism, “Merits” 
succeeds or fails.  Certainly, an argument can be made for the latter, as the complete translation of 
Black Dogs and Enduring Love into ‘real’ texts means that the analysis that I performed was no longer 
about using fiction as ethnography.  Rather, as one might properly argue, and as my fictional self 
specified, it was instead an examination of two amateur accounts.  How, then, does this analysis 
represent an Ethnographic Criticism?  
 
As I reasoned earlier, the fictional nature of “Merits” might best be understood as an accident, 
pragmatically designed to be both an introduction to Ethnographic Criticism, as well as a critical 
warning about not making this same mistake.  To better elucidate my meaning here, it might help to 
fully reiterate Langness and Frank’s statement concerning the legitimacy and utility of the 
ethnographic novel cited above: 
If we acknowledge our creative abilities rather than pretend they do not exist, if we allow 
ourselves to read perceptively, and if we are honest about our intent and limitations in 
presenting ethnographic materials, there would seem to be no compelling reason that an 
ethnographic novel would not be as useful or as legitimate as the standard monographs.9 
 
As much as the fictionalization of “Merits” was meant as a ‘trick,’ it was equally designed to ensure 
that this prescribed ‘acknowledgment,’ ‘perceptivity,’ and ‘honesty’ is not overlooked by future 
Ethnographic Criticisms.  Or, to phrase that in more colloquial terms: do not as I do.  In this way, just 
as accepting that any type of writing involves a dose of creativity, that all ‘texts’ should be read with 
analytical equality, and that both of these functions are conducted with the utmost sincerity, then 
reading a novel as ethnography should likewise be an approach neither precarious, nor detrimental to 
either medium.            
 
Thus, I will conclude this Chapter here by further reiterating that while it might not ‘look’ like the 
Ethnographic Criticism described above, “Merits” still maintains its identity as such, particularly due to 
the detailed examination that it provides of Black Dogs and Enduring Love.  Because this analysis does 
as an Ethnographic Criticism should do by interpreting the texts ‘as if’ they are ‘real,’ the results of that 
analysis are in no way less useful to us.  Furthermore, because “Merits” is an embodiment of the 
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discourses described throughout Part One, and thus represents this Thesis writ small, its method of 
textual analysis closely reflects the methodological paradigms that exist at the foundational heart of 
Ethnographic Criticism.  Therefore, I would lastly contend that it has, indeed, told its two stories well, 
on one end critically examining the way in which the author’s presence dictates the discourse that 
makes up a text, and on the other, the larger story of ‘everything is fiction.’  How that then relates to 
what Narayan quite critically refers to as an ‘undermining’ of anthropology’s central focus on the 
“close, respectful attention to the lives of other actual people” in the epigraph above, and how that 
equally inspires an ambiguous notion about “where exactly ethnography ends and fiction begins,”10 is 
something in need of more exposition.  In order to better clarify this, further justify my argument that 
this does not, in fact, dismiss the anthropologist’s ‘inconvenient dislocations’ and ‘anguished ethical 
ambiguities’ of his or her doing fieldwork, and in order to segue toward this Thesis’ final dénouement 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Narayan, “Ethnography and Fiction: Where is the Border?”  143. 

	  
	   	   235 
CONCLUSION—PLOT AND SUB-PLOT 
 
“More recently, however, several schools have proclaimed that 
‘everything is fiction.’  Similarities in structure between literary 
discourses and discourses that claim to correspond to the facts, or 
between games and the pursuit of truth, have led them to conclude 
that scientific theories are nothing but constructs, which may 
indeed be powerful, but are somehow ‘not really true.’  Since such 
constructs have just as much right to the word fiction as do literary 
ones, it can be tempting to treat both uses of it as the same concept 
and to deny any difference worth noting between literary fictions 
and scientific fictions, between a novel and a physical, social, or 
historical theory.” 
 
—Eric Miller, “Literary Fictions and As-If Fictions,” 19971      
 
 
1. Two Stories 
As I argued in this Thesis’ Introduction, close textual analysis is like detective work: while it demands 
an intimate examination of the plot on the surface, including a close consideration of both the 
characters involved and the dialogues they share, it also necessitates an investigation of the sub-plot, 
the underlying ‘second story’ that might tell us pertinent details about the author’s intentions in shaping 
the text in the first place.  This further requires an approach designed by an explicit deconstruction, a 
dedicated practice of seeing the text as more than just mere words on a page.  In this way, close textual 
analysis is also like reading two stories in one: an appreciation of the aesthetic qualities on the surface, 
alongside an analysis of the instrumental elements hidden underneath.  
 
With this Conclusion I will attempt to clarify how this Thesis has tried to present a plot and sub-plot, 
by using this ‘two story’ paradigm as a guide.  In the first section, my focus will be on the structure and 
concentration of the Thesis in regard to the hypothesis made in the Introduction.  This will also take the 
shape of a useful summary, and will represent my ‘first story.’  In the second section, I will turn my 
attention toward the ‘subplot’ underscoring my creation and use of Ethnographic Criticism in order to 
further elucidate the description I provided in the fourth and fifth Chapters.  This section will also 
consider what I mean by ‘everything is fiction’ by closely examining what ‘fiction’ might mean within 
the context of my usage here, and how that has influenced my argument about the differences between 
ethnography and the novel.  Lastly, I will conclude with a brief discussion about these differences, as 
well as the role that ‘choice’ plays in shaping any sort of text, so as to further consider where on the 
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spectrum between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ I might place both the experimental ‘text’ that preceded this 
Conclusion, as well as the Thesis itself.        
 
2. Plot: Ethnographic Criticism 
On the surface, this Thesis has addressed the question: what is Ethnographic Criticism?  Stemming 
from a hypothesis dually inspired by certain experimental approaches to the writing and reading of 
ethnographic texts, and in light of the difficulty in relying on more ‘traditional’ means of approaching 
the concept of Atheism, this Thesis has attempted to not only substantiate the utility in reading fiction 
as a culturally rich source, but to also provide a procedure on how that might be accomplished.  In 
essence, then, Ethnographic Criticism is a style of textual analysis, a manner of examination that 
exemplifies how we might read a fictional text in order to gain an ethnographic insight about a 
particular concept.   
 
Across the three foundational Chapters of Part One, we mapped out the procedural way in which this 
type of analysis is both formed and validated.  In the first, a link was made between the literary 
qualities of constructing ethnographic texts and the way previous scholars have allowed those literary 
interests to lead them toward experimental interpretations of certain culturally significant works of 
fiction.  In the second, a link was made between this sort of ‘ethnographic reading’ and the way Ethical 
Critics interpret how characters develop in fiction.  This equally provided a second level of nuance to 
the manner in which Ethnographic Criticism enacts a similar methodology by focusing on the 
correlation between this sort of character develop and the ways in which individuals construct their 
cultural identities in the ‘real world.’  In the third, a link was made between the way Discourse 
Analysis removes us from the necessity of ‘defining’ Atheism, so as to both create an ‘anthropological 
context’ from within which we might carry out our Ethnographic Criticism, as well as to provide for us 
an external comprehension of the Atheism internalized in McEwan’s novels.  
 
These chapters made up the ‘pillars’ of Ethnographic Criticism: the method, theory, and data.  When 
combined, they represented a certain pragmatic structure designed with the intention of addressing our 
hypothesis concerning the use of fiction as a cultural source.  This likewise was an attempt at resolving 
a number of inquiries presented in this Thesis’ Introduction, such as: how would we go about reading 
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fictional accounts as if they were similar or identical to non-fictional ones; given the association this 
sort of reading might have with existing literary criticism, how might that criticism play a part in both 
directing the texts chosen, as well as how we read them; and in reading these texts for an insight on a 
particular concept, how might we stipulate this concept in a manner indicative of an anthropological 
interpretation?  This structure, devised in such a way so that the infrastructure of our Ethnographic 
Criticism might be grounded within established fields, was created for the sole purpose of routinizing 
the use of fiction in the larger study of religion.  That is, when examining a religious identity that is 
built from a particular concept, and when faced with conceptual issues like those cited above, 
Ethnographic Criticism becomes a methodological means with which we might turn to fictional texts in 
order to gain the sort of cultural insight we might have once attained only through reading ethnographic 
ones. 
 
We then tested this analytical process through an interpretation of the Atheism ‘revealed’ in two novels 
by Ian McEwan, locating within these examples a progressive representation of Atheist identity 
construction.  Between the first and the second text, we identified two unique representations, the 
first—Black Dogs—signifying an Atheism ‘in development,’ and the second—Enduring Love—an 
‘established’ Atheism forced to defend itself against an equally oppositional and external validator.  
When viewed through the externalized lens of our third Chapter’s discursive analysis of the definitions 
of Atheism, this revealed a number of correlations on an individual level, the most significant of which 
concentrated on ‘Atheism-as-identity’ as a contingent process of denial or rejection, linked to, and 
dependent upon, an equally unique sort of ‘Theism.’  In the first example, Bernard’s Atheism 
embodied a sense of transition, building to its definitive form only after it transitioned from an 
established base—communism—to a liminal stage—post separation from June, but still 
communistic—and then to an equally established position both dependent upon, and in reflection of, a 
proportionately established position of its own: June’s ‘Theism.’  Out of this transition we were able to 
decipher the elements that culminated, logically, into what we might discursively call ‘Bernard’s 
Atheism.’  In the second text, ‘Joe’s Atheism’ began as an established position, which then found itself 
in need of validation from two interactional points: internal and external.  On the internal level, Joe 
found himself attempting to ‘re-orient’ his sense of self after the events of the balloon accident caused 
within him a feeling of ethical dissonance.  To accommodate this, he turned toward a number of 
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internalized validations, given meaning and fashioned around his scientific explanations about the 
cause and existence of religious belief, which we identified as his ‘Scientific Worldview.’  Then, and 
through a select number of interactions with Jed, Joe’s ‘Atheistic base’ found itself externally 
validated.  Through analyzing their criticisms of each other—though told with Joe’s voice—we came 
to discover not only that which shaped Jed’s ‘Theism,’ but how this Theism affected Joe’s Atheism via 
the latter’s rejection of the former.  
 
While this analysis provided for us a means to avoid simply stipulating a definition of Atheism-in-
general, it also helped establish a more nuanced Atheism-in-specific.  Namely, when used as cultural 
examples, these Atheist identities are not only unique to the individuals who embody them, or even the 
contexts within which they are formed, they are also unique to the interactional relationships in which 
they find validation.  That is, as these Atheisms are inextricably linked with identities that cannot arise 
ex nihilo, and are thus in need of an already established position in which to reflectively take shape, 
they are just as equally reflective of the ‘Theisms’ against which they construct themselves.  From this, 
we might make two important conclusions: First, both etymologically and philosophically, the 
‘Atheism’ in these examples appears dependent upon unique types of ‘Theism,’ and is thus shaped by 
those Theisms, so that it also appears as a product, or conclusion, of Theological thinking.  In this way, 
and in these examples, Theism and Atheism share the same DNA.  We see this exemplified in the way 
Bernard and Joe’s Atheisms are unique to the interactional validations they are engaged in between 
June and Jed.  Or rather, the differentiation we see between Bernard and Joe’s ‘Atheisms’ is not just 
based on the variance between developing and developed, it is also established by the differentiation 
between June and Jed’s Theisms.  In other words, the Atheism we might source out of these examples 
is uniquely intertwined with the Theist identity construction represented by June and Jed.  As such, 
Bernard’s Atheism, though combative, seems less so than Joe’s, particularly because June’s Theism is 
not as fervent as Jed’s.  What we might then take away from this first conclusion is a further reminder 
that generalized definitions appear all the more precarious because they overlook these sorts of 
individual-to-individual subtleties.  In a likewise argument, we might also concede that as these are 
select examples—as we might see in more traditional ethnographic data—they equally do not represent 
a ‘definition’ of Atheism in a broad or general manner.  Rather, these examples exist as contributions 
to a larger discourse on how individuals who identify as ‘Atheist’ go about doing so.                     
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Our second conclusion follows directly from the first: because we can isolate this Atheist identity 
construction within the context of a relationship between Theism and Atheism, it would logically 
follow that this discussion falls into the larger milieu concerning the study of religion.  Because the 
Atheism within this analysis appears like a product of a relationship between itself and Theism through 
the process of identification, it should likewise be considered a religious identity in the same way we 
might define someone who is expressing a Theistic identity.  Likewise, this would also support the 
argument that the discussion we presented herein is equally aligned with the discourse on religious 
identity construction within the larger field of Religious Studies.  In this manner, not only does our 
introduction and use of Ethnographic Criticism offer a unique voice to the study of Atheism, it 
contributes as well to the discourse on the study of religion.           
 
One additional—and final—statement we might make about this analysis is that it also provides us 
with a particular type of referential data.  By using the characters from within these novels as 
representative individuals exhibiting a distinct process of identity construction, we are allotted the 
opportunity to further use them as discursive testimonials that, when compared to the in-process 
ethnographic data referenced in the examples provided at the start of our second Chapter, we gain the 
ability to comparatively shape a larger discursive understanding about how Atheism is defined via 
these sorts of macro analyses.  
    
On the surface, then, the creation, description, and use of Ethnographic Criticism within this Thesis has 
tried to not only give a name to a process that seems too often overlooked in the use of fiction within 
the context of social scientific research, it has equally tried to justify the use of that fiction in our 
efforts at examining identity constructions in the study of religion.  Of course, doing this is not without 
its issues, or, as we referred to them earlier, ‘defects.’  These were exemplified in the style and 
structure of our analysis, which, as an example of the limitations and consequences of using such an 
experimental approach, begs the question as to whether any Ethnographic Criticism going forward 
would require such an avant-garde technique.  To answer this, we must turn here toward a discussion 
of this Thesis’ ‘sub-plot.’   
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3. Sub-Plot: Everything is Fiction 
Beneath the surface of my intentions in creating, describing, and using Ethnographic Criticism, I have 
attempted to write a second story.  Based on the language—discourse—used by many of the scholars 
cited throughout this Thesis, this sub-plot has meant to address the question: is everything fiction?  This 
question derives directly from the marriage that I arranged between the first Chapter’s notion of 
reading fiction ethnographically, and the second Chapter’s description of Ethical Criticism.  By 
combining these two methodological ‘uses’ of fiction, the notion of what is ‘fictional’ becomes 
somewhat amenable to interpretation.   
 
In fact, we see examples of this not only within the context of the Literary Turn, but in a number of 
diverse instances as well.  From within the discourse of the former, Clifford hints at the ‘fictional’ 
nature of ethnography by referring to the constructed truths within ethnographic texts as ‘powerful lies’ 
based on exclusion and rhetoric.  He equally goes on to say that even the ‘best ethnographic texts,’ 
which he calls ‘seriously true fictions,’ are themselves still only ‘systems of truth.’2  As such, and 
though he contends that an acceptance of the ‘partiality’ of ethnographic truth, rather than a strict 
denial of it, leads to a broader understanding of the process itself, it also leads us toward an acceptance 
of the ‘artistry’ involved:  
Ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial—committed and incomplete.  This point is now 
widely asserted—and resisted at strategic points by those who fear the collapse of clear 
standards of verification.  But once accepted and built into ethnographic art, a rigorous sense 
of partiality can be a source of representational tact.3   
 
Clifford’s use of terms like ‘lie,’ ‘fiction,’ ‘partial truths,’ and ‘art,’ are unique signifiers that he and his 
colleagues use in order to shape a discourse around the concept of the literary—and thus ‘artistically 
fictional’—aspects of ethnography.  Much like Geertz’s use of ‘faction,’ or the etymological 
delineation between ‘fiction’ as something made or fashioned, as well as false or made-up (1973), 
these terms are the hallmarks of a shift in conceptual meaning about what might be deemed ‘fictional.’  
As Clifford further states:  
To call ethnographies fictions may raise empiricist hackles.  But the word as commonly used 
in recent textual theory has lost its connotation of falsehood, of something merely opposed to 
truth.  It suggests the partiality of cultural and historical truths, the ways they are systematic 
and exclusive.  Ethnographic writings can properly be called fictions in the sense of 
‘something made or fashioned,’ the principal burden of the word's Latin root, fingere.  But it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Clifford, “Introduction,” 7. 
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is important to preserve the meaning not merely of making, but also of making up, of 
inventing things not actually real [emphasis in original].4 
 
There is an intriguing link made here, a nexus between the fictions made from and the fictions made up 
that I have spoken of throughout this Thesis.  Likewise, this brings us to a terminological broadening of 
sorts, an augmentation of ‘fiction’ itself, not only in how I make use of it, but as demonstrated by the 
uses of it by others outside the influence of the Literary Turn.    
 
As a first example, we could begin with Vaihinger’s (1935) idea that ‘fiction’ really means 
‘fictionalism,’ the belief that something recognized as fictional does not necessitate that thing as being 
completely without value: “an idea whose theoretical untruth or incorrectness, and therewith its falsity, 
is admitted, is not for that reason practically valueless and useless; for such an idea, in spite of its 
theoretical nullity may have great practical importance.”5  Established through his Die Philosophie Des 
Als Ob, wherein ‘consciously false’ fictional explanations are perceived as accepted within the absence 
of evidential phenomena, Vaihinger’s use of ‘as-if’ is underscored by a sense of scientific inquiry:  
I wanted to give a complete enumeration of all the methods in which we operate intentionally 
with consciously false ideas, or rather judgments. I wanted to reveal the secret life of these 
extraordinary methods. I wanted to give a complete theory, an anatomy and physiology so to 
speak, or rather a biology of ‘As if.’  For the method of fiction which is found in a greater or 
lesser degree in all the sciences can best be expressed by this complex conjunction ‘As if'.6 
      
From here, this idea of ‘as-if,’ of fictionalism performing a sort of pragmatic usefulness between 
‘hypothesis’—verifiable as true or false—and fiction—equally verifiable, though not dictated as 
such—has been altered by a number of similar ideologies.  For example, we might consider Said’s 
(1975) own use of Vaihinger’s notion of ‘summational fiction’ in reference to the ‘intransitive’ or 
‘conceptual’ artifice of beginnings, what he deems as relational to the cognitive construction inherent 
in adopting practical fictions: 
[A beginning] is very much a creature of the mind, very much a bristling paradox, yet also 
very much a figure of thought that draws special attention to itself.  Its existence cannot be 
doubted, yet its pertinence is wholly to itself.  Because it cannot truly be known, because it 
belongs more to silence than it does to language, because it is what has always been left 
behind, and because it challenges continuities that go cheerfully forward with their beginnings 
obediently affixed, it is therefore something of a necessary fiction.  It is perhaps our 
permanent concession as finite minds to an ungraspable absolute [emphasis in original].7 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ibid., 6. 
5 Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of ‘As If:’ A System of the Theoretical, Practical and 
Religious Fictions of Mankind, C.K. Ogden, trans. Second Edition (London: KEGAN PAUL, 
TRENCH, TRUBNER &: CO., LTD., 1935), viii. 
6 Ibid., xli. 
7 Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 77. 
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Additionally, we could look at how Kliever (1979) designates ‘religious belief systems’ and ‘life-
worlds’ as particular ‘types of fiction’ that, though not necessarily ‘imagined’ or ‘symbolic,’ are 
nevertheless based upon certain conceptions of those things deemed fictitious or hypothetical:         
Given the linguisticality and historicity of human existence, all reality claims are fabrications 
or constructions.  ‘Facts’ are symbolic constructions which have been established as reliable 
representations of a world that exists independently of all human imagination and 
intervention.  Fictions are not simply symbolic constructs which have yet to be verified.  They 
are not hypotheses whose truth remains in doubt for the present.  They are symbolic constructs 
which cannot be verified and hence cannot be true.8 
 
In a similar context we might compare Fine’s (1993) deduction—“if we knowingly retain a false but 
useful hypothesis, we have a fiction”9—with Miller’s (1997) actual use of the phrase ‘everything is 
fiction’ to denote four distinct ways of perceiving Vaihinger’s ‘as-if’ between scientific and literary 
fictions: 
(1) simply that all human knowledge includes constructs; (2) that all actual, or even all 
possible, such forms of knowledge are nothing but constructs or fictions, and that data, if any 
are admitted at all, are always just projections out from that fiction; (3) that our most 
fundamental categories of possible experience are such constructs, so that reality itself can be 
nothing but fiction; and (4) that scientific fictions are ultimately no different from literary 
fictions.10 
 
As a last example, which in a thematic way returns this discussion back to the context of the Literary 
Turn, we might even look at how Anderson (1983) makes use of ‘fiction’ as a conduit, a link between 
the ‘imagined-ness’ of national identities—“communities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined”11—and the discourse of ‘fiction-as-
constructive-device,’ wherein the ‘national novel’ becomes an illustrative literary form that represents 
the ‘technical means’ of characterizing the society-at-large within an ‘imagined community.’12  
 
These examples reveal as much a broad usage as that found in my third Chapter’s discursive analysis 
of the definitions of Atheism: the definition of ‘fiction’ is here determined by differing theoretical 
contexts, so that the term itself has equally become something imbued with meaning according to each 
distinct example.  In this way, and like my conclusion with Atheism, I might then argue that due to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lonnie D. Kliever, “Polysymbolism and Modern Religiosity” (The Journal of Religion, Vol. 
59, No. 2, 1979), 189. 
9 Arthur Fine, “Fictionalism” (Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 18, 1993), 8. 
10 Miller, “Literary Fictions and As-If Fictions,” 429. 
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 6. 
12 As examples, Anderson uses Rizal’s (1887) Noli Me Tangere; Balagtas’ (Baltazar’s) 
Pinagdaanang Buhay ni Florante at ni Laura sa Cahariang Albania (1838 [1861]); Fernandez de 
Lizardi’s (1816) El Periquillo Sarmiento; and Kartodikromo’s (1924) Semarang Hitam. 
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these dissimilar conceptions, the term is no longer anchored to a specific or concrete ‘definition.’  
Rather, because it is described and represented by individual uses within unique contexts, ‘fiction’ 
ceases being bound to the idea that it only represents things that are false or made-up.  What this also 
means is that any future usage of the term—including my own—represents an equally discursive 
contribution, free of definitive barriers, but also determined by preceding discourses and the context of 
that usage.  Yet, this still leaves us with the issue of separation, of perceiving a distinct difference 
between a cultural object—the ethnography—and a fictional representation—the novel.  After all, if 
‘everything’—in this instance, textualized culture—is ‘fictionalized,’ and thus the result of an 
acceptance that any sort of textual interpretation is both made-from and made-up, what is there to stop 
us from admitting that if everything is fiction, perhaps nothing is?      
 
This statement is perhaps better clarified by translating the term ‘fiction’ in everything is fiction as 
‘artifice.’  While an artifice might equally be defined as something both deceitful and manufactured, 
this term appears much less precarious than ‘fiction’ because it denotes a distinct truth: any text, 
whether fictional or non-fictional, is always written, and is thus designed by choice.  Consider, for 
example, the citation of Said’s use of fiction above, and how it reflects his idea that a ‘beginning’ 
belongs just as much to ‘myth’ as it does to ‘logic:’ “conceived of as a place in time, and treated as a 
root as well as an objective.”13  The ‘beginning,’ here, is obviously something that not only must exist 
in the process of telling any sort of story—whether as an ethnography or a novel—it also reflects a 
significant choice made by the teller.  In this way, even acknowledging that a text has a beginning 
means equally acknowledging that the story it tells is itself designed in a particular way.  Consider 
further the way McEwan—or Joe, depending on how far one is willing to expand their imagination—
designs the beginning of Enduring Love.  Not only does the entire text begin with the line, “the 
beginning is simple to mark,” the story that follows continuously reminds us that Joe, as the artificer of 
this text, has the sole responsibility over how we receive it.  This is further demonstrated by his 
admission just a few pages later:                      
I've already marked my beginning, the explosion of consequences, with the touch of a wine 
bottle and a shout of distress.  But this pinprick is as notional as a point in Euclidian geometry, 
and though it seems right, I could have proposed the moment Clarissa and I planned to picnic 
after I had collected her from the airport, or when we decided on our route, or the field in 
which to have our lunch, and the time we chose to have it.  There are always antecedent 
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causes.  A beginning is an artifice, and what recommends one over another is how much sense 
it makes of what follows.14 
 
On a sub-plot level, this admission, and with it a further disclosure of choice, is just as equally 
evocative of McEwan’s role in shaping Joe’s narrative, perhaps most evident by his creation and 
inclusion of the artificial report by Wenn and Camia in the first appendix.  This clever insertion not 
only bolsters the story’s content from a position of accountability, it also plays a significant role in 
weakening the notion that Enduring Love, as a ‘fiction,’ is entirely made-up.  By citing sources that 
exist within the ‘real world,’ and by crafting the report in such a way as to convince the reader that the 
story within the novel is based on some sort of ‘fact,’ McEwan is reminding us that the dividing line 
meant to separate fact from fiction is not always well defined.   
 
This is perhaps the central point of the ‘second story’ that I have tried to tell throughout this Thesis, 
which also acts as a reminder that an artifice, by its very nature, is something imbued with ‘choice.’  
Where we might amend the ‘fiction’ in our phrase everything is fiction as a reminder that all textual 
representations are the result of an artifice on the part of the author, this also means that every text is 
also the result of a number of conscious choices.  Where above this was demonstrated by the notion of 
a ‘beginning,’ and how in recognizing that a text ‘begins’ gives credence to the idea that it is, in fact, 
designed by an individual for a unique purpose, an artifice is indeed infected by the choices made to 
construct it.  In this same way, where McEwan’s creation of a report that would assist his novel by 
causing the reader to question his own narrative’s authenticity, my creation herein of a fictionalized 
analysis of two first-person accounts in order to reinforce my hypothesis about reading fiction as 
ethnography, is equally a product of very specific choices.  To conclude this Thesis, then, I turn here to 
a description of those choices, not only in an effort to further justify why I chose an experimental 
approach, but to better explicate how those choices helped shape the design of the Thesis as a whole.   
 
4. Conclusion: Four Choices and Future Research Questions 
Just as much as an ethnography and a novel are textual siblings under the definition of ‘artifice,’ a 
thesis is just as fictionally ‘made-from.’  As well, as a text ‘designed’—and thus ‘fictionalized’—in 
order to make a significant contribution to, and unique statement about, a particular subject, a thesis is 
inherently saturated by ‘choice.’  However, when compared to the ethnography or the novel, a thesis is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 McEwan, Enduring Love, 17-18. 
	  
	   	   245 
its own unique sort of artifice.  While the former two are designed for their own textual intentions, a 
thesis is designed for the sole purpose of providing a distinct type of ‘proof,’ not only about the 
author’s knowledge of the field of research to which he or she is contributing, but about that author’s 
manner of designing that research through a unique and novel sort of approach.  In consideration of the 
‘choices’ made to do this, a thesis needs to be quite clear about how and why those choices were made, 
in order to better elucidate the proof necessary for a successful defense.  For my own intentions, I 
designed this Thesis via four specific choices.   
 
My first choice was to use fiction.  Inspired by the utility it might offer the ‘anthropological’ study of 
Atheism, my decision to use it herein also stems from a number of occasions where I found myself 
curiously perplexed by instances where a novel was used either alongside, or in lieu of, a non-fictional 
text on the same subject.  On each of these occasions, I equally found myself intrigued by the lack of 
reasoning or explanation for such an un-orthodox approach, as if this usage was indicative of either an 
inherent or specific belief that the novel was textually interchangeable with its non-fictional 
counterpart.  While this position might be validated by my association of both as ‘artifice,’ and thus 
‘fictional’ in the sense of something both ‘made-from’ and ‘made-up,’ this was never given as a pretext 
for doing so.  For this reason, then, my usage herein has been an attempt at locating a justification for 
either authenticating or strengthening the use of fiction alongside, or independent of, a non-fictional 
text on the same subject.  On a more theoretical level, this first choice lies at the heart of my creation of 
Ethnographic Criticism.  However, and as I have tried to explicate throughout this Thesis, particularly 
in Chapter Five, this sort of approach should be regulated by notable restrictions or limitations.  As 
such, while I have attempted to ‘prove’ that a novel might be useful as an anthropological source, both 
in reference to my own intentions, and in order to assist others who might adopt it for their own, the 
process of interpreting a novel as an ethnography could, if not controlled by strict guidelines, lead us 
toward the sort of ‘defects’ exemplified by my “The Merits of Non-Tradition.”  A significant question 
we might pose here, then, would consider whether or not a text that is solely the result of an author’s 
imagination offers the same sort of authenticity concerning his or her subject as a text that is designed 
within the context of strict and empirical objectivity.  Or, to state that question differently: is not a 
novel, with its ability to bring the reader into the world of the text itself via a fictionalization of that 
world, not a better medium to understand or appreciate a particular culture or context than a text clearly 
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infected by an objective observer’s separation from his or her subject?  Which brings me to my second 
choice, and the precarious nature of textual format in the process of ‘fictionalizing’ another’s culture.         
 
By choosing to anchor this discussion to a marriage between the effects of the Literary Turn and the 
Ethical Criticism used to analyze McEwan’s fiction, and then by selecting two sources that would raise 
the question about the ‘true’ author of those texts, I could position my analysis within the discourse 
about the precarious similarities between ‘fiction’ and ‘non-fiction’ presented in Part One.  In this way, 
not only would the Thesis as a whole reflect the nature of a novel, wherein the characters and plot are 
slowly revealed across the body of the text, thereby making the reader an ‘expert’ by its dénouement, I 
could equally construct it in a manner indicative of a text both ‘made-from’ and ‘made-up.’  On the 
former end, it would represent the artifice of a scholarly—‘non-fictional’—one: based on the 
information presented in the three Chapters of Part One it would accumulate those discourses into a 
singular discussion focused on the identity construction found within the examined data.  Thus, not 
only would it demonstrate a methodological means with which we might read a novel as ethnography, 
it would also provide an example of that model ‘in practice.’  However, this might equally create the 
opportunity for me to approach my analysis in a manner more similar to the novelist’s creation of a 
world for the benefit of his or her story, such as we saw with the ethnographic novels by Jackson, 
Knab, and the Prices, and as I discussed in Chapter Five: in order to more literarily convey the story of 
his chosen subjects, the narrator of my ‘text’ would appear to merge the ethnographic language that I 
introduced in Part One with an imaginative—yet still heavily scholastic—thematic style.  Moreover, it 
would also tell the story of a ‘fictional’ character: ‘Ethan G. Quillen,’ the analyst, who placed himself 
into a fictionalized milieu—a plot designed to lead toward a particular conclusion—in order to better 
translate the identity construction of the individuals whose texts he had chosen to examine.  By doing 
this, then, not only could I present an analysis that would support my hypothesis, as well as represent 
the precarious outcome of an excessive experimentation, it would also be linked to the experimentation 
conducted by others within the context out of which my analysis itself derived its theoretical 
inspiration.  Lastly, by linking it to this established discourse it would inherently present its own unique 
offering: rather than fictionalize data that represents real and existing culture for a particular literary 
effect, it would represent an analysis—based on examining invented individuals—that would look like 
an analytical examination for a particular realist effect.     
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My third choice deals directly with the novels that I selected for that analysis.  First, these two fictions 
were useful for thematic reasons: Black Dogs for providing a narrative about the difficulties inherent in 
textually recreating another’s life that I could link to the same issues concerning the writing of 
ethnography; and Enduring Love for providing a similar correlation focused on the uncertainty about 
what might be deemed ‘accurate’ or ‘authentic’ about textual representations provided by one 
individual’s interpretation.  Second, they were also useful for stylistic reasons: while McEwan’s use of 
realism fulfilled my requirement for this sort of enquiry, and though his skill in creating individuals 
who look and feel as if they might actually exist helped my argument that Black Dogs and Enduring 
Love could represent expedient sources of Atheist identity construction, it was because of their first-
person narration, and how that would influence my reading of them ‘ethnographically,’ that perhaps 
more directly inspired my choice in using them.  That is, while their stories provided a means with 
which I could further elucidate the discussions about ethnographic construction and textual analysis 
from the first two Chapters, their narrative perspectives as first-person accounts meant that my analysis 
of them as ethnographic descriptions would require a consideration about the ‘place’ of the author, 
given that my assessment about the style of the text would likewise dictate the type of ethnographic 
insight that they might offer.  In this way, not only were they useful for my intentions as descriptions of 
Atheism, their shared narrative perspective, and the way that would alter my perception of them, made 
them ideal for my introduction, and critique, of Ethnographic Criticism.   
 
This leads to my final choice: to present the discourse of the first three Chapters in such a way so that 
the experimentation of my analysis seemed like an inevitable ‘next step.’  Or, to borrow from the 
language I used above about my analysis looking like a novel, by shaping the three Chapters of Part 
One so that the ‘stories’ they told would lead to a designed conclusion, the experimental nature of my 
“The Merits of Non-Tradition” would seem like the logical result of correlative discourses; a type of 
magician’s misdirection, where the detailed theoretical contextualization of those Chapters would lead 
the reader, via my narrative control, toward an acceptance of the ‘trick’ of my experimental analysis.  
Not only would this give that analysis—and thus the Thesis as a whole—a sense of evidential proof 
concerning my knowledge of these discourses, it would demonstrate a unique analytical perspective by 
providing an introduction, use, and critique of a new methodological approach.  Of course, given the 
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discussion so far addressed in this Conclusion, this naturally poses the question: is my construction of 
Ethnographic Criticism herein nothing more than a useful device with which to defend my use of 
fiction as ethnography?  Or, in another way: is my ‘artifice’ here representative of that term’s meaning 
as ‘deception,’ ‘trickery,’ or ‘artful cunning,’ and in that way revealing too much of the magic in my 
magic trick?  In answer to these questions, I would reply both ‘yes,’ and ‘no,’ which brings us back to 
my notion of this Thesis’ two stories.   
 
On one end, I would argue that Ethnographic Criticism is indeed a new and beneficial method of 
reading fiction beyond its limitations as mere aesthetic entertainment, and my usage of it here has 
revealed a pragmatic methodology that not only addresses my hypothesis, but that correspondingly 
places the novel alongside the ethnography as a text accessible for cultural insight.  While this is not, 
perhaps, a correlation of equal authoritativeness, it nonetheless has affected an association that helps to 
defend not only my usage, but also the usages cited above in the description of my first choice.  In a 
similar manner, my employment of it here has not only stipulated a successful interpretation of Atheist 
identity construction exclusive of the ambiguous discourse influencing the study of Atheism, it has also 
provided quite a useful insight about how individuals might shape their identities in a style more 
culturally relevant than that offered by a purely theoretical assessment.  
 
On the other, my more creative engagement with it has provided a convenient critique of this very 
method itself, raising an important awareness about how textual experimentation might lead toward an 
‘unexpected’ or entirely ‘un-orthodox’ outcome.  This does not, as I reasoned at the end of Chapter 
Five, mean that every Ethnographic Criticism that comes after this one needs to follow this approach.  
Rather, the style that I chose for this first example was merely meant as an exemplary warning for 
those future analyses, an illustration of the ‘defect’ that might occur if we are not careful about how we 
use fiction ‘ethnographically,’ as well as a challenge toward the notion that when we consider all 
textual representations—everything—as ‘fiction,’ the important distinction between what is ‘real’ or 
‘imagined’ within the context of the ‘fiction’ of textual construction, might become dangerously 
skewed.  In other words, my choice to present my introduction of Ethnographic Criticism in such an 
experimental manner was meant as well to stress the importance of theoretical clarity.  After all, if we 
fail to recognize these differences, and thus allow ourselves to read a novel as if it is as culturally 
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informative as a ‘proper’ ethnography, then maybe the reverse is possible as well: perhaps we can write 
a fiction that makes a novel look like an ethnography.  
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